Chapter XXXIII. Tarka and Dharmashastra

Volume V: Part II pp. 1468–1482

Chapter XXXIII. Tarka and Dharmashastra

The Yājñavalkyasmṛti (I. 3) mentions Nyāya (logic)¹ as one of the fourteen vidyās and as one of the means of knowing what Dharma iṣ Nyāya is rendered as 'tarkavidyā' by the Mitākṣarā on Yāj. and the Mit. states that the fourteen vidyās are the hetu (means) of (knowing) dharma.

Both the Nyāyasūtra and the Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda postulate that 'niḥśreyasa' follows from the correct knowledge of the categories of the two darśanaṣ²

One of the earliest occurrences of the word tarka is in the Kathopaniṣad³ where it is declared 'This knowledge (about the Self) cannot be obtained by (mere) ratiocination' and the previous verse states that the Self is subtler than the subtlest and not capable of being understood by mere inference or reasoning. The word 'mantavyah' in the passage⁴ 'Ātmā vā are drastavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo' (in Bṛ. Up. II. 4. 5 and IV. 5. 6) is held by the objector (in bhāṣya on V. S. I. 1. 2) and also by Saṅkarācārya as referring to tarka on V. S. II. 1. 4. Tarka is accepted as an aṅga of Yoga in the Maitrāyaṇī Up. (vide note 2327 above), which further quotes a passage stating that by the control of speech, mind and prāṇa one apprehends brahmaṇ with the help of tarka.⁵ The Gautamadharmaśūtra⁶ remarks 'tarka is the means for securing justice (among contending parties)'. One of the replies given by Yudhiṣṭhira to the Yakṣa guarding a lake is 'ratiocination is unstable (leads to no certain conclusions), the Vedic texts differ (among themselves), there is no single sage whose opinion is held authoritative (by people or other sages); the essence of Dharma is placed in a cave (i. e. is enveloped in darkness and cannot be seen clearly), that is the path (to be followed) by which the majority of people⁷ proceed'. This appears to make man in the mass the ultimate tribunal on all questions of value. In its peroration at the end, the Manusmṛti observes 'one who desires to secure the pure Dharma must know well the three viz. direct perception (or experience), inference, and śāstra based on various traditions; none but that man who considers the sayings of sages (i. e. the Veda), the instruction on Dharma (contained in the Smṛtis) with the help of reasoning that does not (directly) conflict with Veda and śāstras knows what Dharma is'.⁸ This is the position of most orthodox Sanskrit writers about Tarka. Their mere reason, the result would be uncertainty and anarchy. Every theorist states that his system is based on reason; but the answers arrived at on the basis of reason as to questions of vital importance to ordinary men are bewilderingly different. Thinkers brought up in different environments and of different experiences have different logics and propound even different moral lawṣ Whom should an ordinary man follow? The Vedas and Smṛtis embody the principles of conduct in all spheres of life arrived at by eminent and selfless sages during the course of thousands of years i. e. they embody the experiences and the reasonings of numerous wise meṇ Therefore, if a modern man says that reason leads him to hold opinions opposed to the Veda, most people are not prepared to accept a single man's opinion pitted against the views of numerous ancient sageṣ This point need not be elaborated further. On many important questions viz. whether there is God or a Supreme Intelligence guiding the universe, or whether there is an individual self, or what the future of a man when he dies is, the wisest among men have given widely differing answerṣ⁹ On such questions final answers acceptable to all or most people cannot be given by reason alone. Though the orthodox position is as stated above, it has been shown above (e. g. on pp. 1267-1269) how Vedic practices have been discarded by the weight of popular opinion from time to time. It is laid down by Smṛti writers themselves that blindly following the words of Śāstra would lead to loss of Dharma and in case of conflict between two Smṛtis reasoning should be resorted to and popular opinions and practices should be considereḍ Vide H. of Dh. vol. III, pp. 866-868 for thiṣ The Mahābhārata enjoins ¹⁰ 'one should not try to solve incomprehensible matters by ratiocinatioṇ' In the dialogue between the famished sage Viśvāmitra (who desired to eat the tail of a dog) and a caṇḍāla the great Epic winds up by saying 'therefore a learned man whose soul is pure should act after relying on his intelligence in the matter of deciding what Dharma and adharma are.'¹¹ It should not be supposed that Śaṅkarācārya and other great Indian writers wanted to throw reasoning over-board altogether. What they emphasized was that mere reasoning of one or more men should not as a rule be followed if the conclusions arrived at by reasoning are in direct conflict with Vedic and smṛti textṣ Śankarācārya clearly states his position on V. S. II, 1, 1, and 11.¹² Beliefs (such as those of Jains and Buddhists) were held to be heterodox, because they did not acknowledge the authority of the Veda and the sacred tradition, though they often observed Hindu practices and married with Hindus; but within this limit there was room enough for an enormous and bewildering variety of convictions, rites and practices that claimed to be orthodox. This may be illustrated by the attitude of some Upaniṣadṣ For example, the Muṇḍaka Up. (I. 1. 4–5) speaks of two vidyās, parā and aparā, includes under aparā the four Vedas and the six āṅgas and parā (highest) vidyā is that by which the imperishable brahman is attaineḍ In the Chāṇ Up. (VII. 1. 1–5) when Nārada approached Sanatkumāra for instruction, the former recounted what he had already learnt viz. the four Vedas, Itihāsapurāṇa and other lores; then Sanatkumāra tells him that all that he has studied is mere name and then explains what Mundaka (I. 2. 7) condemns yajñas as leaky vesselṣ It is extremely surprising that the Chāṇ Up. in I. 12. 2–5 compares the procedure of the five priests and the sacrificer touching each other and creeping from the sadas towards the cātvāla where the Bahiṣpavamāna chant is to be sung with a procession of dogs, each dog holding the tail of the preceding dog in his mouth. Vide for the creeping of priests noiselessly and silently Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa VI. 7. 9–12 and Āp. Śrauta-sūtra XII. 17. 1–4 and H. of Dh. vol II. pp. 1166 and 1169. Though this is so, the Upaniṣads are called Vedānta, are looked upon as orthodox and as the highest end of the Vedic religion and literature. Most ancient Upaniṣads, however, quote Vedic Saṃhitā texts as authoritieṣ For example, Br. Up. I. 4. 10 and Ait. Up. II. 5 quote Rg. IV. 26. 1 and IV. 27. 1 respectively ; Br. Up. II. 5. 16–17 quote Rg. I. 116. 12 and I. 117. 22 and Br. Up. II. 5. 19 cites Rg. VI. 47. 18; Katha IV. 9 is the same as Atharvaveda X. 8. 16, Praśna I. 11 is quoted from Rg. I. 164. 12. The Muṇḍaka III. 2. 10 provides that brahmavidyā is to be expounded to śrotriyas (those who have studied the Veda). Herein the Upaniṣads rely upon the principle of adhikārabheda.

One of the oldest philosophical problems is Authority and Reason or to put it in different words, Faith and Reason and there has been throughout the ages a constant struggle between these two. Most men want to rely on some authority, on someone deemed higher than themselveṣ For vast numbers of people this authority or the something greater than themselves is Revelation and Goḍ They have neither the leisure nor the inclination nor the intellectual ability to think for themselves rationally on such abstruse questions as the existence of God or an individual self, free will and determinism, the general principles of conduct, the final destiny of men after physical death &c. In sociological matters human judgement is often warped by prevailing dogmas and prejudices; on questions which are deemed to be religious (and in India the field of matters deemed to be religious has always been very extensive) a frank discussion is almost impossible without creating anger and rancour. Several ethical questions such as divorce and birth control often assume the position of religious dogmas and when openly discussed create great heat. In several so-called democracies of the present day rational discussion comes last and vital questions are determined by party loyalties or by personality cults or by lust for power and self-aggrandisement. It should not be supposed that ancient and medieval India had no rationalists nor atheistṣ As a matter of fact there were several rationalistṣ Vide the present author's note 875 pp. 358-359 in H. of Dh. Vol. II, Vol. III. pp. 46-47 note 57 on Lokāyatas and their views, ¹³ and pp. 974-975 note 1596 above for rationalistic criticism of sacrifices, śrāddhas &c. Many rationalists hold that there is no proof of the existence of God, they deny an individual soul, they deny immortality and the existence of any intelligence in the universe higher than man's, deny that there is any design or purpose in the Universe and they believe that in all religions there is some truth mixed with a great deal of error. The case of the rationalist is that he should not be called upon to prove that there is no God ( which is a negative proposition ), that it is for theists to prove that God exists ( which is a positive proposition ) and that he is omnipotent and omniscient. They say that to attribute anger, love, pity to God is to implicitly negative God's omnipotence. The problem of evil in the world is, according to rationalists, a great stumbling block in accepting God as good, kind, all-knowing and all-powerful. The rationalist might agree with the theist that man as an individual depends on something greater than himself that is able to give directions and to punish him for the disobedience of directionṣ For the rationalist it is some kind of community or society in which men live and have their being that is greater than themselveṣ This would be substituting the worship of the human community or of collective human power for the worship of Goḍ What human community is to be in the place of God? Is it to be the whole human race ( now having over two thousand million human beings ) or some big or small groups out of these? There are now two well-defined blocks between whom there is a conflict of ideological ends, viz. the communist block represented by U. S. S. R. and China and the capitalistic block represented by U. S. A., England and several other countries of Europe, and a third unorganized block of countries professing to have no alignment with anyone of the two blockṣ

In these days Communism is really a form of worship i. e. worship of man or men in place of the worship of Goḍ It may be conceded that probably the masses of the Russian people are far better off in the matter of physical needs than they were in the regime of the Tsarṣ The masses seem to have devotion to Communisṃ But that devotion is more apparent than real, based on the hope of quick gains or the fear of prompt punishment and is the product of rigid State control of education and the environment. The communists have an attractive slogan in the words 'Workers of the world ! unite, you have nothing to lose but your chainṣ' There are also the catchwords 'Dictatorship of the proletariat.' But this ends in fact in a dictatorship of the Communist Party over the proletariat. In return for physical well-being the common people have had to bargain away several freedoms, freedom to think for themselves, freedom of expression, freedom of intercourse with foreigners, freedom to choose their occupation &c. The communists make no secret that they want to bring the whole world under Communisṃ Therefore, they pose that they are the H. D. 185 savours of common men and women throughout the world and they cannot be charged with aggression since they mean to liberate people from the bonds of capitalism or colonialism &c. Their creed is one of fanaticism, of intolerance or hatred of otherṣ The only experiment of a godless society on a large scale was made by the Soviet, but it does not appear to outsiders to have been a happy or successful one. The universal exhibition of portraits of great Soviet leaders (some of whom were declared by successor leaders to be no better than murderers) ¹⁴ proclaims the necessity of worship even in a godless society. Dictators have nationalized not only all the means of the production of wealth but also all the labour in the country. They have established themselves in the place of God and desire to have total control over the bodies and the minds of all their subjectṣ The faith of the communists is that their country is a heaven on earth and one must accept their word for that without wanting to see for one self the real state of thingṣ The Communists have their own special versions of history, economics and science. These one must not questioṇ

The followers of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (all believing in one God and one Book) did not hesitate for centuries to inculcate their doctrines and practices by terrible persecutions and bloody warṣ This spirit is very shocking to people brought up in Hinduism or Buddhisṃ If Rationalists substitute blocks of humanity or the leaders of such blocks for worship and for argument that the existence of an omnipotent and omniscient Power cannot be proved to the satisfaction of the so-called rationalists, the present writer feels that it is for the good of most societies consisting of millions of common men and women that they believe in God and the individual soul. Most men are influenced to keep to the path of virtue and right by the fear of God, by the prickings of conscience (which is the inner light implanted in man by God), by the fear of public opinion, and by fear of punishment at the hands of the rulers of the State (vide Śāntiparva quoted in H. of Dh. vol III, p. 389 note 619). Those who reject the first of these would have to reject the 2nd also and would have to fall back upon hedonism (the greatest pleasure for themselves) or the idea of greatest good of the greatest number or progress towards some ideal state of society painted by imaginatioṇ The pursuit of purely secular or worldly happi- ness is incompatible with the precepts and ideals of Hinduism and all higher religionṣ Rationalism accepts the postulates which science finds convenient and useful. Though these postulates work well up to certain limits, it must be said that those limits are very narrow. Science aims at establishing general rules or lawṣ From those laws we know only the behaviour of nature and how man can utilize natural forces for realizing human aims; but science does not tell us what those aims should be, it is amoral and not concerned with morals or spirituality. Rationalism appears to smother many experiences of the human mind which are beyond the present machinery of science. When the scientific method is adopted in social studies, there is little to show that it leads to increased wisdom about the values that should be pursueḍ Rationalism insists that all our beliefs ought ultimately to be based on tangible and definite grounds and that modern scientific method is the only reliable method for acquiring knowledge of all kindṣ But there are sub-conscious and non-rational impulses, beliefs and intuitions in men that are held by men to be truer or of a higher order than what is on the rationalistic level (vide W. James' 'Varieties of religious experience' p. 74, eḍ of 1920). It should be the endeavour of leaders of thought in each generation to find out what is essential and vital in tradition (without believing in the infallibility of all traditions) and to present reasoned dogmas which, while retaining the essential elements of tradition, will meet the demands of modern thought and conditions and environment. It is not necessary to say here more about modern rationalisṃ For over two thousand years our ancient writers and smṛtis like those of Manu (XII. 105-106 which are relied upon by Kumārila himself as shown on p. 1261 above) have allowed to tarka a place in the matter of finding out what Dharma is and have been most tolerant of differing views even on fundamental matters as shown above and brought about great changes even in religious rituals, philosophical views, social customs and practices without perpetrating atrocities and indulging in wholesale persecutionṣ A man may be a monotheist, or a polytheist or an image-worshipper, an agnostci, or atheist or an idealist philo- sopher holding ‘nirguna brahma’ as the only reality, yet he may nevertheless be held to be a full Hindu, if he conforms to the general attitude towards Veda and social usageṣ A more radical tolerance than what our people showed throughout the ages is almost unthinkable. Western writers while admitting great tolerance in religious views and practices harp often on the requirements about observing caste rules in matters of food, marriage etc. But caste is more a social institution than a religious one and therefore just as in Western countries there were rules of etiquette and observance (such as the number 13 working on Sabbath and against theatre going, card playing and physical exercise except walk- ing) that had to be observed meticulously, in India caste rules had to be observeḍ Besides, even when caste rules were broken the offender had in a meeting of the caste people to admit his mistake, to pay a fine to the caste or village temple and then was restored to all privileges of the caste. As the Christian churches were extremely intolerant of the slightest departure from religious views held at particular times, there arose in Europe the emphasis on rationalism and freedom to hold opinionṣ Government could effectively mould the opinions of its subjects by controlling education, by censorship of books and by inflicting severe penalties on those who expressed opinions opposed to those espoused by theṃ The Roman Church prepared an Index of forbidden books and an Index expurgatorius (a list of passages to be expunged from books that were otherwise permitted). The first Index Librorum Prohibitorius in its latest edition (before 1949) contains 5000 titleṣ Lecky in his ‘History of the rise and influence of ration- alism in Europe’ ¹⁵ points out to the extirpation of Christianity from Japan, of Protestantism from Spain, of the Huguenots from France, of most Catholics from Englanḍ The Jesuits acted on the ¹⁶ principle that the end justifies the meanṣ Their end was the 'greater glory of God', which meant to them the conversion of peoples and kingdoms to Roman Catholicisṃ Their means included incitements to assassination and to war. It has been mentioned above (p. 483) how Galileo was persecuted for espousing the Copernican theory in astronomy. Not much difference is made to religion whether the Sun revolves round the earth or the earth round the suṇ In this connection it may be pointed out that Āryabhaṭa (born in 476 A. D.) appears to have held the view that the stars did not revolve round the earth, but the latter revolved round itself and gave the illustration of a man sitting in a moving boat feeling that it is the stationary objects on the banks that rush past in the opposite directioṇ¹⁷ The Pañcasiddhāntikā (13. 6) of Varāhamihira refers to this view and rejects it, not on the ground that it is opposed to the Veda, but on the ground that, if that view were correct, hawks and other birds flying high up in the sky would not be able to come back to their nests without fail. He did not know that the atmosphere also goes with the earth. This was more than eleven hundred years before Galileo and there is nothing to show that Āryabhaṭa suffered in the Āryabhaṭa's view vide 'Āryabhaṭīyam' by W. E. Clark (Chicago, 1930) p. 64. As observed by Archibald Robertson the history of the Rationalist movement in Europe is to a very great extent the history of a fight for the right to hold and propagate opinions unpopular for the time being and the growth of religious toleration in Europe has in fact gone hand in hand with the decay of traditional religious beliefṣ Reason arrives at different conclusions on the same matter in different ages and even in the same age what appears reasonable to one group or people is held to be unreasonable by another people. Vide Robert Bridges' 'Testament of Beauty' Book I lines 465-470 on what is reasonable. Millions of people saw fruits falling from tree tops to the earth, but it was only the intuition and logic of Newton that enabled him to formulate the laws of gravitatioṇ Doubt has been and is a frequent and legitimate attitude of the mind as recognised by the Br. Up. (I. 5. 3) 'Kāmah, saṅkalpo vicikitsā śrāddha, aśraddhā, dhṛtir adhṛtir hrīr-dhīr-bhīr-etyetat sarvam mana eva' (desire, fancy, doubt, faith, want of faith, steadiness, restlessness, shame, understanding, fear, all these are aspects of mind). Even the Ṛgveda (II. 12. 5) refers to doubters about Indra (utem-āhur-naisostityenam'). In the Katha Up. Naciketas says "when a man dies there is the doubt, some saying 'he (the self) exists', others saying 'he ceases to exist'" and prays to Yama to resolve that doubt for him as the third booṇ

Descartes held that only one truth is beyond doubt viz., cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am). In Europe the whole of the 18th and 19th centuries were dominated as far as thought- ful men were concerned by boundless faith in reason and progresṣ But owing to the two world wars (particularly the second), their aftermath and the rise of two powerful Communist countries have greatly weakened the faith in progress guided by reason and ethics, faith in the dignity of man and in equality is on the decline and is assailed in many regions and the view that might creates or is right is gaining grounḍ

The Upaniṣads teach that a sound moral preparation must precede the acquisition of true vedāntic view. The Br. Up. states 'therefore one who knows this, after securing quiescence, restraining his senses, being free from all hankerings, bearing with fortitude all pairs of opposites (such as heat and cold), having his mind concentrated, sees the Self in the self, looks upon everything as Ātman'; the Kathopaniṣad II. 24 says 'one who has not ceased from doing evil actions, who is not quiescent, who has not concentrated his mind nor has made his mind quiescent would not realize this Self by correct knowledge'; Prāśna I. 16 'those secure the pure world of brahman who are free from crookedness, falsehood and deceitful conduct'; Śv. Up. VI. 22 'this highly esoteric knowledge of Vedānta should not be imparted to one whose mind is not quiescent or who is not a son or disciple'. The great formula 'thou art That' teaches one to look upon all men as Ātman or as the Gītā (VI. 29-30) puts it 'he who is endowed with Yoga and knows Ātman to be in everything and everything as abiding in Ātman, is not lost to the Lord nor is the Lord lost to him'. Compare Īśā Up. 6 and Manu XII. 91. In the Chāṇ Up. (III. 16. 1) man is symbolically represented as sacrifice and in III. 17. 4 it is stated that tapas, charity, straightforward conduct, ahimsā and truth-fulness are the dakṣiṇā (sacrificial fees).

This shows that Vedānta in its highest form is the best support of pure morality for individualṣ It is on account of this teaching that many sages cultivated these virtues in hermitage and were honoured by kings and common people in ancient times in India, but in medieval times the sages became¹⁸ rare and as regards common people they were tied down by customs and caste and very few people made strenuous efforts for solidarity of all their countrymen, for meeting their common needs and safeguarding all peoples' interests; and by the side of sublime philosophical tenets our country witnessed abject poverty among large masses of people and political domination by alien or brutal invaderṣ The tendency to rely on the Vedas, to believe and to argue that what has been in the best, and to appeal to the past has been very strong throughout our history for centurieṣ Our motto must not be 'back to the Vedas' but rather 'forward with the Vedas'. While giving due weight to the Veda and authority, we must not condemn all independence in thought.

Some Western rationalists such as Bentham, James Mill and John S. Mill put forward the theory of utilitarianism which briefly comes to this that actions are to be judged by their consequences and are right in proportion as they tend to make for the greatest good or happiness of the community or of the greatest number. This theory has great drawbacks, the most important being that it is not really a moral theory at all as it does not tell us exactly what a man or community ought to do. Religions tell their followers what they ought to do or not to do. Another difficulty is that what may appear to one man as being for the greatest good of the greatest number may not be so accepted by others and further it is difficult to define what the greatest number regards as good or happinesṣ Besides, many men care nothing at all about the happiness of otherṣ Moral, political and economic actions are confused by this doctrine. In practice, as the emphasis was put on happiness, this theory was made the excuse for epicurianism and indulgence in things material.

The present author is not at all against freedom of thought, but what he objects to is making a fetish of rationalism and making millions of common men and women waver in their faith and principles of conduct by the constant talk of the non-existence of God or of the individual soul &c. The rationalists and utilitarians hardly agree upon any values and principles of conduct to be inculcated among ordinary young men and womeṇ If God and soul be eliminated, they have not been able to put something more valuable in their place, for which the young generation that is growing up would be ready to live laborious days or to sacrifice themselveṣ Though we may not subscribe to the position that the last word of wisdom on all religious and social matters is to be found in the Veda or in the works of ancient sages and writers, even wise men may hesitate before they decide the question whether we should carry on a campaign for eradicating beliefs in God and an immortal self. The Gītā strikes the right note for most people when it utters the warning (III. 26) ‘let not the knowing or wise man (the jñānin or vidvān) unsettle the minds of the ignorant that are attached to (certain) actions (by habit); the enlightened man, himself doing all work in the true spirit of a yogin, should set others to do all actionṣ’

As a result of the two world wars in which unspeakable atrocities and barbarities ¹⁹ were committed by highly educated and organized countries most of whose people professed Christianity, there is a revulsion of feeling and several eminent men are busy in attributing the present difficulties to the decay of religious belief and in inviting humanity to return to religioṇ But the crux of the problem is what religious beliefs and practices are to be inculcated and practised by men in the present age. It appears to the present writer that religions can hardly be a panacea for the ills of the worlḍ Very large blocks of modern educated men are dissatisfied with the tenets and practices of several current religions and their authorita-tive bookṣ The real difficulty to be grappled with is to define what must be the content of the faith that would appeal to and secure the allegiance of most or all good, intellectual and educated modern meṇ At different times different virtues (such as monachism, charity, humility, patriotism, social service or philanthropy) were preached as of supreme import- ance. The growth of the virtue of patriotism and of the feeling of nationalism in Western countries was not due to Christianity's teachings but to various other causes in Europe's political and economic history. There are religious virtues, heroic virtues, amiable virtues &c. The Christian people of Europe and America during the last four centuries achieved great wealth and prosperity by throwing to the winds the virtues preached in the Sermon on the Mount, by extending their colonial empires for exploiting vast regions, by decimating millions of unoffend- ing backward races, by hunting human beings as if they were beasts and forcing on them slavery and by preaching from the house tops the great need of competition in all spheres and worshipping it as if it were Goḍ After the holocaust of the great wars, many eminent men, not only religious men, but even those that occupy positions in Government and political life, preach the necessity of the moral sense, of benevolence and kindness towards others, restraint, unselfishness and a desire to allow others to share in the good things of life, which virtues were emphasized for all men in the Br. Up. V. 2, 1-3 quoted above.²⁰

In India Emperor Asoka in the 3rd century B. C. inculcated in his Edicts tolerance for the Brahmanic and the Buddhist faith (vide pp. 1011-12 above). Asoka does not enter into dogma of any kind, but regarding himself as the father of all his subjects enjoins on them a morality that is practical and would be acceptable to all, such as tolerance, humanity, charity to monks and also to the poor and compassionate towards dumb animalṣ Later on, it was at the most necessary to show that the doctrines put forth by reasoning were not directly opposed to the dicta of the Veda. To take only one example: though the Upaniṣads express Advaita in such Mahāvākyas ‘aham brahmāsmi’ (Ch. Up. III. 14. 1), ‘tat-tvam-asi’ (Ch. Up. VI. 8. 7), Madhvācārya could expound his thorough-going dvaita doctrine, could explain away by reasoning the above passages and claim to be the only true expounder of Veda and denounce the advaita doctrine as Buddhism in disguise without any serious persecution on either side. Yājñavalkya (II. 192) calls upon the king to safeguard the special usages of guilds and heretics and their modes of livelihooḍ This tolerance for multiplicity of forms and practices in religion and for diametrically opposed philosophic views has had also its weakness viz. it permitted the growth of endless variations in the formulation of faith, ritual and philosophic doctrines and led in great measure to several abuses, to some unhealthy and even revolting practiceṣ