Chapter XIV. Conception of Kāla

Volume V: Part I pp. 463–485

Chapter XIV. Conception of Kāla

Conception of Kāla

Among the first of the great problems of philosophy is that of the nature of Space (dík) and Time (kāla). The questions that arise are: Are Space and Time ultimately real ? Is the world we apprehend spaceless and timeless or has the universe a beginning in time; are Space and Time them- selves things or real, attributes or relations of thingṣ Great divergence of views has prevailed on these problems from ancient times to this day. It is therefore advisable to indicate briefly the speculations on Time contained principally in Sanskrit workṣ The word Kāla occurs only once in the Ṛgveda ⁶⁵¹ 'as a gambler collects the kṛta (highest stake) at the (proper) time' (Rg. X. 42. 9, 'Kṛtam yac śvaghnī vicinoti kāle'). The Atharvaveda contains two hymns (XIX. 53 1–10 and XIX. 54, 1–5) embodying a most sublime conception of Kāla. A few striking verses ⁶⁵² are translated here, 'Kāla (Time) carries (as) a horse with seven reins, thousand-eyed, ageless, endowed with plentiful seed (power); the wise posts mount him (as one mounts a chariot); all worlds are his wheels (53 1); he (Kāla) himself brought together the worlds and he himself went round (all) worlds together, being the father, he became the son of them (worlds); there is indeed no other brilliance that is higher (or beyond) him (53 4); in Time is mind, in Time is breath, in Time is placed name, all these beings are glad by time when it arrives (53. 7), Time created beings, in the beginning Kāla (created) Prajāpati, the self-existent Kaśyapa sprang from Kāla and (so did) tapas spring from Kāla (53. 10); Kāla, the son, created past and the future, from Time arose the ṛk (verses) and the yajuṣ (sacrificial formulas) were born from time (54. 3), this world and the highest world, holy worlds and holy vidhṛtis having completely conquered these worlds by the brahman Time goes on (abides) as the highest god' (54 5).

From these passages it appears that the word Kāla was used even in very early Vedic times in two senses, viz. time in general (as in modern Sanskrit and modern Indian languages) and Time as identical with the Supreme Being or the source of creatioṇ This latter sense, it will be shown a little later on, is also emphasized in many Sanskrit works (including the Purāṇas).

In the Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa the word Kāla is often used in the sense of 'time' or 'proper time'³ e g. 'he (Rudra angry because he was excluded from a share in offerings) flew up towards the north at the time when sruṣṭaḥ offering was to be made' (I. 7. 3. 3); Prajāpati (when cattle approached him) said 'whenever you may get anything at the (proper) time or at an improper time you may eat it' (II. 4 2 4).

A few passages from some of the Upaniṣads regarded as ancient by most scholars may be cited here; the Chāṇ Up. II. ⁴ 31. 1 (while speaking of Vāmadevya Sāman and its parts) uses the word Kāla as equal to 'end' or 'finish'. The Bṛ⁵ Up I. 2.4 says "He desired 'would that a second self of me were produced' ... He bore him for a time as long as a year; after that long time he brought him forth". In the dialogue between Gārgya and king Ajātaśatru in the same Upaniṣad Gārgya put forward several objects which he reverenced (upāsanā) as brahma when the king replied as to those cases in these words 'Prāṇa (breath) does not leave him before the time' and 'death does not come to him before time'. Here the word 'Kāla' is used in the sense of 'proper or appointed time'. In the passage of the Kauṣītakī Br. that corresponds to Br Up II, 1 10 and 12 the words are 'neither he himself nor his progeny pass into unconsciousness before the time' and 'neither he nor his progeny dies before the time'. In some passages of the Śvetāśvatara Up. some thinkers are stated to have put forward Kāla as the cause or source of creation e. g. 'what is the cause?⁶ Is it Brahma? Whence are we born? Whereby do we live? On what are we established (or where are we going?) .. Time or inherent nature or necessity or chance or elements or yoni (prakṛti) or the person, it is to be considered (whether one of these is cause )'; 'Some sages dis- course upon inherent nature ( as the cause ) while other deluded persons speak of Time ( as the cause ).' Here Kāla is represented as the cause of creation, which is the 2nd meaning of the word Kāla set out from the Atharvaveda. In another passage⁷ of Kāla is said to have been generated by Him who is intelligent and omniscient The first meaning of Kāla (time in general) is also found in Śvetāśvatara Up. 'He (God) is the beginning, the efficient cause of (all) combinations, He is beyond the three times and is also without parts'. The Māndū- kyopaniṣad avers that Omkāra is beyond the threefold time viz. past, present and future.

The Maitri Upaniṣad⁹ has a long but somewhat rambling disquisition on time (VI. 14–16). It first says “Then it has been said elsewhere ‘Food is indeed the source of this whole world, and time of food; the Sun is the source of time’ Then a little later on it proceeds “Thus one has said ‘From Time flow beings, from Time they reach growth, and in Time they come to disappear; Time is a form (i.e. has definite shape or limits) and is (also) formless’” Then it propounds ‘There are indeed two forms of Brahma, Time and Timelesṣ That which is prior to the Sun is Timeless (form of Brahma) and it is without partṣ But that which begins with the Sun is Time that has parts, year is the form of the Time that has parts All these beings are produced from the year, through the year these beings when born grow, and they disappear in the year Therefore the year is Prajāpati, is time, is food, is Brahma nest (or abode) and is Ātman And it has been said ‘Time cooks (ripens or digests ) all beings in the Great Self, that man knows the (real import of ) Veda who knows that in which Time is cooked”. Here the Maitrī Up speaks of Time in its two senses, contains the germ of the later conception of the experience of Time as due to the actions or movements of the Sun, and refers to Time in the same terms in which the Taitt Up (III 1) speaks of brahma It is unnecessary to set out passages from other Upanisads such as the Mahānārāyaṇa (XI 14 aham-eva kālo nāham kālasya ) where Kāla is identified with God (Nārāyaṇa).⁹

The Mahābhārata recurs to the theme of Kāla time and again In the Ādiparva it is said ‘Kāla creates beings and Kāla destroys people, Kāla extinguishes Kāla that is engaged in destroying people; Kāla brings about good or evil states (or things); Kāla reduces all people and again sends them forth; Kāla is (the only one) awake when all are asleep (i.e. dead or liberated), for Kāla is invincible'. The Strīparva has the following 'Kāla cooks all beings and Kāla destroys people; Kāla is invincible'. The Śāntiparva ¹⁰ in chapters 224 and 227 contains a long disquisition on the formidable influence of Kāla on all including gods like Indra. In the Śāntiparva it is asserted 'beyond the mind is the Great Intelligence and beyond the latter, is the Great Time; beyond Time is the adorable Viṣṇu to whom belongs the whole world'. In another place the Śāntiparva, after detailing nineteen guṇas the last being dvandva- yoga (pairs of opposites such as pleasure and pain), remarks that the 20th guṇa beyond the nineteenth is Kāla and that one should know these twenty to be the source and end of all beingṣ The Aśvamedhika-parva describes (chap. 45) the wheel of Time in an elaborate metaphorical way (verses 1-9) and remarks that the man who well knows the action of Kāla and its sublation is never deluded and reaches the highest goal. In Vanaparva Kṛṣṇa is identified with Brahma, Rudra, the Sun, the Moon, Dharma, Yama, Kāla &c. Vide for further references Śāntiparva 25. 5 ff, 224-225.

In the Bhagavadgītā the word kāla is used in the sense of 'time in general or proper time' in several passages (such as IV. 2, VIII 7 and 27, VIII. 23, XVII. 20) and Kāla is identified with Kṛṣṇa as Supreme Lord in one of his super-eminent manifestations in X. 30 and 33 (I am Kāla among those that seize and I am Kāla that is imperishable) and XI. 32 (I am Kāla, that has increased (in strength) and that brings about the destruction of the worlds).

Pāṇini employs the word kāla in his sūtras many times, but in the sense of time in general or the divisions of time or proper time. Patañjali on Pāṇini III. 3. 167 (Kālasamayavelāsu tumuṇ) quotes a half verse about Kāla, which is the same as the one quoted above from the Mahābhārata (in note 659) and which appears to have been cited by Patañjali as a well-known verse. In another place Patañjali while explaining Vārtika 2 on Pāṇini (II. 2. 5) states a very important theory about Kāla, He says ¹¹ "People speak of that as kāla whereby the increases (or growths) and decreases in solid bodies are observed and the same (time) is called day and night when conjoined with some activity. What is that activity? (the reply is). the motion of the Sun When that (motion of the Sun) is repeated again and again there is a month and a year'. This means that kāla does not exist except as a convenient name or word for the manner of measuring change or becoming in what we observe by comparing one series of changes with another"

In the Manusmṛti the Supreme ¹² Lord is said to have created time and its divisions (I 24 Kālam kālavibhaktiśca) and to have, after He produced the universe, disappeared himself again and again, squeezing one period of time by means of another period (I 51).

Coming to the philosophical systems, it may be noted that the Sāṅkhya system does not include Kāla as a separate tattva in its twenty-five tattvas But Kāla was not altogether forgotten in that systeṃ The Sānkhyakārikā ¹³ states that the karaṇus are thirteen, three being ābhyantara (internal i. e. inside the body) and ten being bāhya, the latter are concerned with the three times (past, present and future)

The Vaiśesika-sūtra treats ¹⁴ Kāla as included in the nine dravyas (substances, I, 5) and states that the indications of the existence of Kāla are the apprehensions of a thing as posterior or prior, the apprehension of simultaneity of certain things, the apprehension of a thing as lasting long or as being momentary, that it is mitya, one and the (efficient) cause of all things that are createḍ Praśastapāda gives the instance of an old man and a young man being seen by a person in one place and direction or in different directions, who apprehends after looking at a young man that another man called old differs from a young man as regards a grown-up moustache or beard, wrinkles on the body and baldness and so apprehends that the old man is remote from the young man and therefore apprehends him as beyond (para) while he thinks of the young man as near, posterior and so apara.

There were certain philosophers who held that Time is either past or future and denied that there is present time (vartamāna). The Nyāyasūtra refutes this view and holds that time is either past, present or future (II. 1. 39-43). From Patañjali’s ¹⁵ Mahābhāṣya it appears that even in his day there were philosophers that held that there was no time called present and that those people quoted certain verses in support.

The Nyāyamañjarī ¹⁶ of Jayantabhaṭṭa (K. S. S. 1936) has a long discussion on Kāla It first sets out the views of those who deny the very existence of Kāla as a separate entity. These latter say that Kāla is not perceptible like a jar &c and that the ideas of quickness or slowness depend merely on the observed effectṣ The same theorists raise the further objection that if Kāla is a dravya (substance) that is all-pervading and permanent, as the Vaiśeşikas assert, then how is it that Kāla is spoken of as past, present and future. To these objections some reply: Kāla is directly perceived, since it appears to the mind as distinguishing the various perceptions of effects, that the several experiences such as ‘these matters happened simultaneously, this happened after long, this happened quickly’ cannot be perfectly explained if one denies the existence of Kāla and holds that these experiences depend solely on the perceived objects or actions Others hold that Kāla is really inferred and not directly perceived They argue merely because Kāla is not directly perceived it does not follow that it does not exist; to infer that Kāla exists is proper as it is proper to infer that the other side of the moon exists though we see only that face of the moon that is below the earth; therefore Kāla exists as a separate entity to which is due the common experience of simultaneity, quickness or slowness &c. The differing observations about persons being young or old cannot be well explained without admitting the existence of Kāla, which like ākāśa is one, all-pervading and permanent. To the objection how, if Kāla is one, all pervading and nitya, it is spoken of as having three divisions, the reply is: in reality there are no divisions in Kāla, but divisions are imagined in Kāla on account of the upādhi ( a limiting or restrictive adjunct ) viz. kriyā ( activity ). When we speak of a man as cooking rice in the present ( odanam pacati ), that is due to the distinguishing nature of the result ( boiled rice ) which is brought about by several activities ( kriyās ) beginning with the placing of the cooking pot on the fire up to its being taken down on the grounḍ Then we use the word ‘present’. But when we bear in mind the series of activities that produced the boiled rice we use the expression ‘he cooked’ ( in the past tense ) for the activities that have endeḍ In this way we speak of time also as past on account of the distinguishing characteristic of the activities that have ended It may be noted that Raghunātha on ‘Padārtha-nirūpana’ (a work of Navyanyāya school) held the view that Space, Time and God are all one and the same thing and not separate substances ¹⁸ In the Yogaśūtrabhasya on III. 51 there is a brief but very interesting and abstruse disquisition on Kāla. The sūtra runs¹⁸ ‘by constraint ( samyama ) upon moments ( kṣaṇa ) and their sequence ( or succession ) ( arises ) knowledge due to discrimina- tion’. The bhāṣya explainṣ Just as an atom is substance or matter ( dravya ) reaching the limit of minuteness, so a kṣaṇa (moment) is time that reaches the highest limit of minuteness, or a kṣaṇa (moment) is time taken by an atom in leaving the posi- tion in space it occupies or the time taken in reaching the next point in space; krama ( sequence ) is the non-cessation of the flow of moments; moments and their succession do not form a collection ( or combination ) of actual ( or perceptible ) thingṣ Muhūrta ( 30th part of day and night ), day and night and others are combinations made by the mind ( or by mental conceptions ). This time, though devoid of being a real thing by itself, is indeed only a creation of mental conceptions and results from knowledge derived from words ( alone ) and appears as if it were an actual object to ordinary people whose doctrines are divergent ( or confused ). But kṣaṇa (moment) falling among ( i.e. being mixed up with ) real perceptible things appears ( to the human mind ) as dependent on or constituting sequence ( or succession ). Krama ( sequence ) is of the nature of uninterrupted successioṇ This sequence is called Kāla by Yogins who know ( the real nature of ) time. For, two kṣaṇas cannot exist together ( simultaneously ). It is impossible that there should be a sequence of two moments that exist simultaneously. When a later moment comes after an earlier one without interruption, that is called krama. In the present there is only one moment and there are no earlier and later moments in the present. Therefore there can be no combination of two moments ( in reality ). But those moments that have passed away and those that are yet to come are to be interpreted or described as connected with the ( constant ) flux of changes ( in the world ). Therefore the whole world experiences change in each single moment. So all these ( external ) aspects of the world are dependent on one moment ( in the present ).

This disquisition shows that the Yogaśūtra and its bhāṣya held that time was not a dravya and not a tangible reality, but was merely a word, a mental concept inseparable from the perception or experience of physical objects as a characteristic (viśeṣana or upādhi), that it attaches itself to the changing realities, that we measure it according to the movements of objects and that it was not merely like a hare's horṇ

I have confined myself to Sanskrit works and particularly to works of the Vedic school type ¹⁹ Buddhist and Jaina thinkers had to say a good deal on Kāla. For example, the Prāmāṇa-vārtika-bhāṣya or Vārtikālaṅkāra of Prajñākara-gupta (about 700 A. D.) combats the view of the Vaiśesikasūtra and Praśastapāda (quoted above) and holds that there is no separate entity like Kāla, that it is not possible to have the ideas of distant time and near time if Kāla be without beginning and be endless, that the ideas of being distant or near or quick are not distinct from the activities about which they are predicateḍ This Buddhist view practically amounts to saying that time is not a thing, but only an idea, only a subjective condition of human sensorial experiences and intuitions and is non-existent in itself, apart from the subject. On the other hand Jaina ²¹ writers hold that there are six padārthas viz. jīva, dharma, adharma, ākāśa, pudgala and kāla i. e. Time has separate existence. Some of the purāṇas contain disquisitions on Kāla. The nature of Time is described in the Kūrmapurāṇa as follows: This adorable²² Kāla is without beginning and without end, it is ageless and immortal, it is a great Lord because it is all-embracing, it is independent and is the self of all, there may be many Brahmās, Rudras and Nārāyanas and other godṣ It is declared that the divine Lord is one and is omniscient and is Kāla; they ( the gods ) are created by Kāla, who again swallows ( or makes them disappear), the gods Brahmā, Nārāyana and Īśa (Śiva ) are said to undergo prākṛta disappearance by the power of Kāla and also spring again therefrom as highest Brahma, the elements, Vāsudeva and Śankara. Therefore the whole world has its soul in Kāla. He alone is the highest Lorḍ The Viṣṇudharmottara²³ has a similar long disquisition on Kāla the gist of a few verses of which may be set out here ‘Kāla is without beginning and without end, it is Rudra that seizes all ( or it is Saṁkarṣaṇa ); it is called Kāla because it carries off or drives all beingṣ Kāla is great and the highest Lord, because it is beginningless and endless; it is more subtle than the winking of one's eye, very much more subtle than the subtilest. Its 'subtleness cannot be understood even by Yoginṣ When a thousand lotus leaves are pierced by a needle ignorant people think that the piercing of all leaves is at the same time, but really the leaves are pierced at separate units of time. This is the subtileness of Kāla. But though Kāla is very very subtile, it is also great and measurement of it can be computed because of the motions of planets’ The Vāyu and Kūrma both say ‘Time creates beings and again destroys them; all are under the rule of Time, while Time is not under the dominance of any one ²⁴ The Viṣṇupurāṇa ²⁴ holds that Brahma which is one, unborn, permanent, ageless appears in the form of Kāla, which is without beginning or enḍ The Bhāgavatapurāṇa ²⁵ also regards Kāla as inferred in regard to its minuteness and its grossness is all-pervading, and holds that it is supposed to have units from the subtlest (atom) to the highest.

Among astronomical works the Sūryasiddhānta states ²⁶ 'Kāla is the destroyer of worlds; another (kind of time) is of the nature of calculation; Kāla is of two kinds, gross and subtle, which are also called mūrtā (physically apprehensible) and amūrtā (not so apprehended); (the divisions of) time called prāṇa (respiration) and the like are mūrtā, while truṭi and the like are amūrtā.' The Caraka-saṃhitā ²⁷ includes Kāla among nine dravyas and holds that it is acetana (non-sentient). Thus it agrees with the Vaiśeṣika view. In the Suśrutasamhitā it is declared 'Kāla is indeed self-existent, without beginning, middle or end; the poverty or richness of substances that have (one or more of the six) flavours (rasas) and the life and death of human beings are dependent on Kāla. It is called Kāla because it does not remain sticking to even the smallest division or because it heaps together (beings by leading beings to death) or drives them together. Of that adorable Kāla which assumes the character of year, the divine Sun produces by his special movements the divisions called twinkling of the eye, kāṣṭhā &c. Similarly, philosophical grammarians like Bhartṛhari²⁸ (author of the Vakyapadiya) holds that Kāla is a substance (dravya), all-pervading and permanent apart from activities, that it is the efficient cause of all created things, that it is divided into years, seasons &c. on account of the different activities, just as the same man may be called a carpenter or a blacksmith &c. (on account of his different activities). For reasons of space it is not advisable to pursue the subject of the nature of time from other Sanskrit works of medieval and modern timeṣ For those who desire to make a further study of this subject I would recommend the ‘Kalāsiddhānta-darśinī’ composed and published by Shri Haranchandra Bhattācārya of Calcutta in 1941, which exhaustively deals with the philosophical conceptions about Kāla held by different sects, schools and Sanskrit writerṣ

There is a great temptation to compare Indian ancient and medieval conceptions about Time arrived at more than a thousand years ago with similar or corresponding conceptions on the same subject in modern Western philosophical works such as Kant’s ‘Critique of pure reason’, Prof S. Alexander’s ‘Space, Time and Deity’ (1927, London, two volumes), ‘Time and Western Man’ by Wyndham Lewis (London, 1927), Pierre Burgelin’s ‘L’ Homme et Le Temps’ (1945), Bergson’s ‘Time and Freewill’, S. G. F. Brandon’s ‘Time and Mankind’ (1953). But as this volume has already grown to large proportions, comparisons with Western philosophical views have to be given up.

From very ancient times minute divisions of time have been mentioneḍ The Vaj. S. states²⁹ ‘that all winkings of the eye (and similar units of time) were produced from the (supreme). Person that is brilliant (like lightning)’. This half verse occurs in the Mahānārāyana Upaniṣad also. It is stated in the Br. Up.³⁰ that under the dominion of this imperishable brahma the Sun and the Moon are held apart, as also nimeṣas, muhūrtas, days, and nights, half months, months, seasons, and years stand apart The Mahānārāyaṇa upaniṣad (I 8-9) mentions as units of time ‘Nimesas, kāla, muhūrta, kāṣṭhā, ahorātra, half months, months, ṛtus, year’ Manu I 64 provides that 18 nimeṣas are equal to kāṣṭhā, 30 kāṣṭhās to kāla, 30 kalās to muhūrta, 30 muhūrtas are equal to one day and night Early and very exhaustive enumeration of the several units of time from subtlest to the highest are contained in Bṛhat-saṃhitā of Varāha and in the bhāṣya of Praśastapāda on Vaiseṣikasūtra ³¹ viz ‘Kāla is the cause of the popular usage about the units being kṣaṇa, lava, nimeṣa, kāṣṭhā, kāla, muhūrta, yāma (prahara or 1/8th of a day), ahorātra (day and night), ardhamāsa (half month), māsa (month), ṛtu (season), ayana, samvatsara (year), yuga, manvantara, kalpa, pralaya and mahāpralaya. The Purāṇas also dilate upon the units of time from nimeṣa to pralaya or kalpa. Vide Brahma 231. 6-12, Kūrma I 5 6-14, Padma V 3.4-20, Vāyu 57 6-35. Nimeṣa (lit winking of the eye) is defined by the Vāyu and Viṣṇudharmottara as the time required for pronouncing a short letter and the latter adds that a smaller unit than it cannot be (physically ) apprehendeḍ There is great divergence of views about the number and names of the minute units of time and their mutual relationṣ A few examples alone can be citeḍ Manu (I. 64) furnishes the following table : 18 nimeṣas=kāṣṭhā, 30 kāṣṭhās = kāla, 30 kalās = muhūrta, 30 muhūrtas = ahorātra (day and night ). The Arthaśāstra ³² of Kauṭilya provides : 2 trutas (i.e.) = lava, 2 lavas = nimeṣa, five nimeṣas = kāṣṭhā, 30 kāṣṭhās = kāla, 40 kalās = nāḍikā, 2 nāḍikās = muhūrta, 30 muhūrtas = ahorātra. Some of the purāṇas contain the same ³³ verse on the names and relations of small units of time vis 15 nimesas = kāṣṭhā, 30 kāṣṭhās = kāla, 40 kalās = nāḍikā, 2 nāḍikās = muhūrta, 30 muhūrtas = day and night together It should be noticed that here the relation of nimesas to kāṣṭhā is different from that in Manu and Kauṭilya The Arthaśāstra ³⁴ of Kauṭilya does not stand alone in speaking of truți (p. 1) as the smallest unit of time. The Sūryasiddhānta (quoted above) provides that truți is the smallest unit of time, that it is amūrta (not apprehended physically), that the prāna is the first mūrta (physically apprehended) unit of time, that 6 prānas are equal to a vināḍī, that 60 vināḍīs are equal to a nāḍikā, 60 nāḍīs are equal to an ahorātra Utpala ³⁵ on Br. S. quotes verses from Pauliśa-siddhānta and Brāhmasphuṭa-siddhānta to the effect that six prānas are equal to a vināḍikā, 60 vināḍikās are equal to a nāḍikā or ghaṭikā and 60 ghaṭikās are equal to a day (i.e. ahorātra) A smṛti quoted in the Tithitattva states that two truțis make a lava, 2 lavas make a nimesa, so that truți is equal to 4th of nimesa. Hemādri on Kāla (p. 7) quotes a verse that two nimesas and 10 truțis are equal to prāna. The Amarakosa follows Manu as to eighteen nimesas being equal to kāṣṭhā, but it introduces a unit called kṣaṇa between kāla and muhūrta, so that its scheme is: 18 nimesas = kāṣṭhā, 30 kāṣṭhās = kāla, 30 kalās = kṣaṇa, 12 kṣaṇas = muhūrta, 30 muhūrtas = ahorātra The Bhāgavata-purāṇa (III. 3. – 10) puts forward a far more elaborate scheme: two atoms (of Time) = aṇu, 3 aṇus = trasareṇu, 3 trasareṇus = truți, 100 truțis = vedha, 3 vedhas = lava, 3 lavas = nimeṣa, 3 nimeṣas = kṣaṇa, 5 kṣaṇas = kāṣṭhā, 15 kāṣṭhās = laghu, 15 laghus = nāḍikā, 2 nāḍikās = muhūrta, 30 muhūrtas = ahorātra. In the Atharvaṇa-jyotiṣa the table iṣ 12 nimesas=lava, 30 lavas=kāla, 30 kalās = truți, 30 truțis = muhūrta. This agrees with none. Further units of time from ahorātra to pralaya will be dwelt upon a little later.

Before proceeding further clarification is required on certain points At least several centuries before Christ Jyotisa had attained the position of being one of the six angas (auxiliary studies) of the Veda The Mundakopanisad⁶⁸⁵ states that the aparā vidyā (inferior exoteric knowledge) comprises Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda, Atharvaveda, Śikṣā (Phonetics), Kalpa (ritual texts), Vyākaraṇa (grammar), Nirukta (Etymology), Chandas (metrics) and Jyotiṣa (astronomy and mathematics). The Āpastamba-dharmasūtra enumerates the same six angas of the Veda. In the Pāṇinīya Śikṣā⁶⁸⁶ the science of the movements of heavenly bodies is said to be the eye of the Veda. The Jyotiṣa which is Vedānga (of the Ṛgveda and Yajurveda) was concerned with purely astronomical matterṣ In the Vedānga-Jyotiṣa⁶⁸⁷ it is remarked ‘ the Vedas arose for the purpose of (use in) sacrifices; sacrifices are enjoined according to the order of times; therefore he who knows Jyotiṣa which is the science laying down the (proper) times knows sacrificeṣ Just as a tuft of hair stands on the head of peacocks or a jewel (in the heads) of cobras, so gaṇita (astronomical calculations) stand at the head of all the sciences that are (spoken of as) Vedāṅgas’. This shows that the words Jyotiṣa and gaṇita are used as synonyms in the Vedāṅga-jyotiṣa. The Vṛddha-vāsiṣṭhasiddhānta (Benares S. Series ) says ‘this śāstra is indeed the eye of the Veda, therefore, among the aṅgas (limbs, subsidiary lores of Veda) it has got pre-eminence; a man endowed with all other limbs and therefore appearing to be perfect is worth nothing, if he is devoid of eyes ’ Gradually, however, Jyotiṣa came to include three distinct branches (skandhas) viz the determination of the motions of planets by means of calculations which was called Tantra, the second called horā that deals with horoscopes and (was also called jātaka) and the third called Śākha which was an extensive branch and included many topics of divination which are summarised In Br. S. chap. II. A work embodying complete presentation of the three branches was called saṃhitā³⁹ and he who well knew the three branches, viz Ganita, Horā and Śākhā was called, as Garga says, ‘Samhitāpāraga’ (master of samhits). Varāhamihira⁴⁰ himself tells us in the Bṛhat-jātaka, that, for the benefit of astrologers, he compiled a comprehensive work on Jyotisa in its three brancheṣ The word saṃhitā appears to have been used in two senses, the first⁴¹ (a wider sense) referring to a complete presentation of Ganita, Horā and Śākhā, while the second (a narrower sense) refers only to the Śākhā part. Why the third branch was called śākhā is not satisfactorily explain- ed anywhere. It was so called probably because it had to deal with numerous circumstances, such as the fruits of the simple and retrograde movements of planets; the movements of Agastya (Canopus) and saptarṣis (Ursa Major), the conjunc- tions and oppositions of planets, haloes, meteors, earthquakes, lore about the movements and cries of birds, nirājana, removal of the evil effects of utpātas. In this sense saṃhitā was what is called natural astrology. Horā again had three sub-sections, viz. jātaka or janma (judicial astrology, predictions from the situa- tions of the zodiacal signs and planets at a person’s birth ), Yātrā or Yātrika (Bṛhat-jātaka 28.4-5) that dealt with progno- stications on starting on a journey or on a king’s marching against an enemy derived from the tithi, nakṣatra, the week-day, the muhūrta, the moon's position, dreams, throbbing of limbs, the cries of birds, and vivāha i. e. examining the horoscopes of the parties to a marriage (called Vivāhakāla or Vivāhapatala).

The usual practice of the Grhyasūtras and Dharmaśāstra works was to take their astronomical requirements and know-ledge from astronomerṣ The Gobhila-gṛhyasūtra⁸⁹¹ provides 'the work on this point is separate; one should study it or should obtain information about (the exact time of) the parvan (New moon and Full moon) from those who know it'. The astronomical knowledge of ancient and medieval India has been a subject riddled with acute controversieṣ Somewhat reluctantly I have come to the conclusion that discussions about the theories and practice of astronomy in ancient and medieval India should be omitted from the History of Dharmaśāstra. An adequate treat-ment of ancient and medieval Indian astronomy and discussion of the theories advanced by Western scholars (some of them quite unwarranted) would require a large volume by itself. Here and there I may have to refer to pure astronomical matters for certain purposeṣ But the two other branches of Jyotiṣa, viz. Horā (astrology) and Śākhā have exerted a vast influence on Dharmaśāstra writers took their astronomy from astronomers, they did not hold that astronomers had the last word, but they rather held that if there was some conflict or contra-diction between strict astronomical theory and Dharmaśāstra, the latter was to prevail. An example may be cited for illustrating this: Suppose that a man has resolved to undertake ‘ekabhakta-vrata’ on 7th tithi. The saṅkalpa for a vrata is as a general rule to be made in the morning. Suppose that 7th is mixed with 6th and 8th tithis and that 7th commences about 10 A. M. on a certain week-day, then according to Yugmavākya (vide p. 75 note 191 above) 7th mixed with 6th is to be preferred for the vrata and the saṅkalpa would have to be repeated in the morning when according to correct astronomical calculation the tithi might be only the 6th at that time. Devala declares that a tithi is, for the purposes of religious bath, gifts and vratas, to be regarded as covering the whole day if the Sun sets during the period ⁴³ of that tithi. Vide Kṛtyaratnākara p. 299 and Smṛti-kaustubha ( on tithi p. 12 ) for other exampleṣ

About Astronomy and Astrology as developed in India Western scholars such as Weber, Whitney, Thibaut have pro-pounded many sweeping and unwarranted theories based on flimsy data. Here and there I may have to refer to theṃ But I must say in one place how and why their conclusions are often unacceptable In the first place, they do not attach due importance to the fact that a vast literature in Sanskrit has perished beyond recovery ( as it is admitted was the case in Greece after Ptolemy composed his Almagest ) ⁴⁴ and what we now have is a mere fraction of what once existeḍ In the second place, they forget or ignore that much of the literature that survives is religious and not intended to be a historical and full treatment of any topic i. e. most of the references to astronomical matters found in the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas are not made of set purpose but are incidental or casual. They hardly seem to be aware of the rule of caution and common sense that in ancient literature what is expressly stated may be used for drawing inferences, but the non-mention of certain matters cannot necessarily be a valid reason for arriving at the conclusion of non-existence, unless the subject matter was such that if something connected with it existed it should ordinarily have been mentioneḍ Further, and most important of all, mere similarities in institutions, usages and other matters should not be regarded as evidence of borrowing by one people from another people. Human mind is the same everywhere, its environment and the needs of human beings are often the same and no people, ancient or modern, can be regarded as having had the monopoly of great intellectual powerṣ Most of those who wrote on Indian literature and subjects in the 19th century were nurtured on the literature of the Greeks and Romans and on the vaunted superiority of the ancient Greeks in Philosophy, Mathematics, arts and other matters and of Egypt. But as ancient cuneiform tablets in Babylonia and the Middle East countries came to be deciphered, things began to be seen in proper perspective. Modern scholars have, it is refreshing to note, outgrown the stage when all arts were traced to Greek (see 'Sumerians' by Sir Leonard Woolley, 1928 p. 193, Glanville in 'Legacy of Egypt' p. 160 for the debt the Greeks owed to Egypt). Sir Thomas Heath was obliged to admit that the debt of the Greeks to the Babylonians was much greater than had been imagineḍ⁴⁴ Sarton in 'a History of Science' (London, 1953) has to say that it is childish to assume that science began in Greek (Preface p. IX). It has been found that the Greeks were inferior to the Babylonians in several respects, that their vaunted geometric lore was not as great intellectually as supposed, that out of 200 propositions in Euclid's twelve books only about a dozen are necessary as a preparation for modern mathematics and that the Greeks much developed geometry because they could not easily employ ordinary arithmetical methods owing to their dependence on the abacuṣ⁴⁶ It was further found that the sexagesimal system of degrees, minutes and seconds used by Ptolemy was of Babylonian origin and according to Herodotus (II. 109) the Greeks derived two kinds of Sun-dials and the division of the day into 12 parts from the Babylonianṣ⁴⁷ At present such nations as England, France, Germany, U. S. S. R. and U. S. A. are the foremost nations in Science, Technology and Industry but they clung for about 1400 years to the Alma-best of Ptolemy as their astronomical Bible, were ignorant of the decimal place value system and the use of a sign for zero till the so-called 'Arabic numerals' (borrowed from India) were introduced into Europe.⁴⁸ The intolerance of ignorant and bigoted priests in Europe went so far as to condemn Galileo, one of the greatest intellects in mechanics and astronomy, to perpetual imprisonment at the age of 70 for no greater offence than holding fast to the Copernican theory. Hardly any parallel to such an attempt to suppress honest difference of opinion as regards heavenly bodies can be found in any non-European country claiming to have a civilization There are controversies about the relation of astronomy and astrology. The marvellous spectacle of the sky at night containing thousands of stars of different brightness all apparently in motion round the earth, the Sun's annual northward and southward passage in the sky, Full Moon and its disappearance for one day and its phases, eclipses of the Sun and the Moon, comets and falling stars—all these must have struck even the most primitive men with wonder and also with fear and forebodingṣ In course of time arose astronomy and astrology. In ancient times both words had the same meaning. The Cambridge Ancient History (1925, vol. III, pp. 238-239) holds that the whole science of astronomy is due to astrology. On the other hand Prof. Neugebauer and Mr Peter Doig see no evidence for this theory.⁴⁹ In my humble opinion if we restrict ourselves to existing literatures of different peoples and eschew mere conjectures and speculation, both astronomy and astrology are equally ancient and must have acted and reacted on one another in very ancient times In the following pages some evidence will be given from Vedic literature of the simultaneous cultivation in India of both astronomy and astrology (particularly natural). To a modern scientist, the lucubrations of astrologers in their available works appear to be sheer nonsense. But the fundamental principle assumed by astrology that heavenly bodies exert predictable influence on terrestrial things and persons is not different from the principles of astronomy or meteorology whereby one can predict tides, eclipses, storms, torrential rains, and the like which affect the world and human beingṣ

Whether the stars and planets exert some influence on earthly things is not the real questioṇ Probably they do, but the really important question is whether astrological works and astrologers have discovered correct methods and reached correct knowledge about the influence of planets on the human mind and on the day-today activities of human beingṣ

The astronomical and astrological literature in Sanskrit falls into three slightly overlapping periodṣ The first period is that of the Vedic Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas from the mists of antiquity to about 800 B. C. The second is represented by the Vedāṅgajyotiṣa, the Śrauta, Gṛhya and Dharma sūtras, Manu and Yājñavalkya, Garga and Jain works like the Sūryaprajñapti and ended about the 3rd century A. D. The third period begins at the commencement of the Christian era and is represented by the works called Siddhānta and gave rise to the works of Āryabhaṭa (born 476 A. D.), of Varāhamihira (about 475 to 550 A. D.), Brahmagupta (born in 598 A. D.) and so oṇ Those who want to make a deep study of the History of Hindu Astronomy should carefully read the work in Marathi written by Shankar Balkrishna Dixit in 1896 (2nd edition in 1931 by his son). Even Thibaut who is generally chary of praising any Indian achievement in astronomy was constrained to observe that Dikshit’s work is the richest source of Indian astronomical material and that his treatment from Brahmagupta onwards is particularly detailed (Grundriss, p. 3). Dikshit held that the scientific system of Indian astronomy is essentially independent and rests on Indian observationṣ In my humble opinion this view is far sounder than the view that the scientific astronomy of India was derived from or was greatly influenced by Greek astronomy. I have decided (as stated above p. 480) not to enter into detailed discussions about astronomical matterṣ Therefore, I shall rest content with mentioning some of the important works and contributions that should be studied by those desirous of intimate knowledge of the History of Indian Astronomy. Davis on 'Astronomical computations of the Hindus' in Asiatic Researches, vol. III, pp. 209-277; Bentley’s 'Historical view of Hindu Astronomy' in Asiatic Researches, vol. VI, pp. 537-588; Colebrooke’s Miscellaneous Essays (1837) vol. II, pp. 321–373 ( on Hindu and Arabic divisions of the Zodiac ), pp. 374–416 ( on equinoxes ), pp. 417–450 ( on Hindu Algebra ); Warren’s ‘ Kālasankalita ( deals with South Indian astronomi- cal calculations and calendars ); ‘ Indian Metrology ’ by J. B. Jervis; Kern’s Introduction to his edition of the Bṛhat-saṃhitā; the Sūryasiddhānta translated by Burgess and Whitney and with notes by Whitney and a reply by Burgess in JAOS. vol. VI pp. 141–498 and Whitney’s criticism of the views of Biot, Weber and Max Muller in JAOS vol. VIII pp. 1–94; the Pañcasiddhāntikā of Varāhamihira edited by Dr G. Thibaut and Pandit Mahāmahopādhyāya Sudhakar Dvivedi with text ( from two Msṣ ) and amended text with Sanskrit Commentary by the Pandit and translation by Thibaut ( 1889, reprint in 1930 by Motilal Banarsidas ); Prof. Weber’s ‘ Uber den Vedakalendar, Namens Jyotisham ’ ( Berlin, 1862 ), Max Muller’s Introduction to the 4th volume ( of his four volume edition of the Ṛgveda ) particularly pp. XXXVIII–LXVI; notes of Burgess on Hindu Astronomy in JRAS for 1893 pp. 717–761; B. G. Tilak’s ‘ Orion ’ and ‘ Arctic Home in the Vedas ’; Thibaut on the Babylonian origin of the Lunar Zodiac of the Hindus, Arabs and Chinese in JASB ( 1894, Part I pp. 744–63, refutes the theory of that origin ); S B. Dikshit’s ‘ History of Indian Astronomy ’ ( in Marathi ), Thibaut on ‘ Indian Astronomy, Astrology and Mathematics ’ in the Encyclopaedia of Indo-Aryan Research ( referred to in this book as Grundriss ), Alberuni’s ‘ India ’ translated by Dr. Sachau; I. A. vol. XXIII pp. 154–159 ( Jacobi on date of Ṛgveda ), pp. 238–249 ( Bühler on Jacobi and Tilak’s Orion ), I. A. vol. 24 pp. 85–100 ( Thibaut on the antiquity of the Vedic civilization ); Memoir No 18 of the Archaeological Survey of India on Hindu Astronomy by G. R. Kaye ( 1924 ); Indian Historical Quarterly vol IV for 1928 pp 68–77, Indian Historical Quarterly vol V pp. 479–512 on ‘ Scope and development of Ganita ’; C. O. S. Menon’s ‘ Ancient Astronomy and Cosmogony ’ ( 1931 ); ‘ History of Hintlu Mathematics ’ by B. Datta and A. N. Singh; Dr K. L. Daftari’s ‘ Bhāratīya-jyotiḥ-śāstra-nirīkṣaṇa ’ ( Nagpur, 1929 ) in Marathi; Prof. P. C. Sen-Gupta’s paper ‘ Āryabhaṭa, the father of Indian Epicyclic Astronomy ’ ( in the Journal of the Department of Letters, Calcutta University, vol. XVIII pp. 1–56, a scholarly piece of work ); Dr Mrṣ Bina Chatterjee’s paper on ‘motion of the Sun, Moon, and five planets as found in Ptolemy and Hindu Astronomical works’ ( a learned, systematic and balanced piece of work ). in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Science, part I vol. XV, 1949 pp. 41–89.