Chapter XXX. On Mīmāmsā Principles and Rules of Interpretation in Relation to Dharmashastra

Volume V: Part II pp. 1283–1338

Chapter XXX. On Mīmāmsā Principles and Rules of Interpretation in Relation to Dharmashastra

The Pūrvamīmāṁsā evolved a method of its own and a set of principles for the interpretation of Vedic textṣ It is now time to set down and explain some of these principles and rules and point out how they have been employed by dharmaśāstra writers for solving their own difficultieṣ

The Mīmāṁsā principles and rules of interpretation fall into several groupṣ There are rules that are concerned only with the details of Vedic sacrifices and their inter-relationṣ The most important rule in this field is this that only Vidhis properly so called have absolute authority and binding force, while what are called arthavādas have authority in so far only as they form one syntactical whole with the vidhis and as they are meant to praise the vidhis. (P. M. S. I. 2. 7). Vidhis and Arthavādas are not discussed consecutively, but they are scattered over the several chapters of the P. M. S. For example, arthavādas are first dealt with in I. 2. 1-18 (the arthavādādhikarana), but in many other places there is a discussion about arthavādas as in III. 4. 1-9, III. 4. 10, III. 4. 11, IV. 3. 1-3, VI. 7. 26-30, X. 8. 5, X. 8. 7 and 8.

It should not be forgotten that the Mīmāṁsā is not concerned with legislation by the king or a sovereign popular assembly. It promises to convey correct knowledge of Dharma (meaning religious rites and matters connected therewith) and the means of arriving at that knowledge is the Veda itself and the main purpose of the Mīmāṁsā is to regulate the procedure (itikartavyatā), the various auxiliary and principal matters in Vedic sacrificeṣ ¹

There is a great deal of difference between the interpretation of statutes and the Mīmāṁsā rules of interpretatioṇ In the first place, statutes are man-made, they express the will of the enacting authority, have mostly secular purposes, may be amended or even repealed and have to be expounded according to the intent of those that made theṃ But the Mīmāṁsā is concerned with the Veda that is deemed eternal and self-existent (and not man-made), that deals with religious matters, cannot be amended or repealed and is to be expounded according to the intent of the Vedic wordṣ Therefore, though some rules of the interpretation of Vedic texts evolved by the Pūrvamīmāṁsā are identical with or resemble the rules of the interpretation of statutes developed in such works as Maxwell’s on ‘interpretation of statutes’, the author will not enter into any detailed treat- ment showing the parallelisms between Mīmāṁsā rules and Maxwell’s ruleṣ This task was attempted over fifty years ago by Mr. Kishorilal Sarkar in his Tagore Law Lectures published in 1909. It would appear ungracious on the part of the present author to offer criticisms against a predecessor in the same field who wrote more than half a century ago when Mīmāṁsā studies by modern educated Indians were in their infancy. But the author cannot help stating that Mr. Sarkar was obsessed by the notion that he must show somehow or other that Jaimini’s rules of interpretation were not inferior to those of Maxwell’s and agreed closely with hiṃ For this purpose he relies often on far-fetched analogies and employs obscure explanationṣ In several cases it appears that he had not been able to grasp correctly what Jaimini and Śabara meant.²

In this work the author is concerned only with the question of the influence on Dharmaśāstra of Pūrvamīmāṁsā doctrines and rules of interpretatioṇ He has already shown how many of the doctrines and technical expressions of the Mīmāṁsā have dominated Dharmaśāstra. He would now turn to the rules of interpretatioṇ

The first rule is that no part of the Veda (not even a word) can be treated as anarthaka (meaningless or purposeless). It is therefore that a very large part of the Veda is treated as arthavāda intended to praise vidhis. This has been stated above (p. 1243). The result of the vital importance attached to vidhis In the PMS and of the assignment of a very subordinate role to arthavādas (as merely intended to praise) and to mantras (as merely 'abhidhāyaka') has resulted in this that a small portion of the Brāhmaṇas has been held to be of supreme authority, while a large part of the Brāhmaṇas and of Saṁhitās containing mantras has become of secondary importance or of little importance.

The Mīmāṁsā rules of interpretation fall into different classes from different standpointṣ Some rules are general and some are special. Some rules have to do with the proper procedure to be followed when several texts laying down matters relating to the same subject are in conflict by means of the application of the technical words śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa, sthāna and samākhyā (III. 3. 14) and there are rules about adhikāra, atideśa, ūha, bādha, tantra and prasaṅga.

Some examples of general rules may first be citeḍ That vidhis alone have special obligatory authority and that arthavādas are authoritative only in so far as they form one syntactical whole with the vidhis is a general rule. The rules distinguishing between vidhis (properly so called), niyama vidhis and parisaṅkhyā are general.

The Mīmāṁsā rule is that where there is a ³ doubt about the exact meaning of a part of a passage, it may be determined by relying on the remaining parts of the passage. Vide above for the example 'he puts down anointed pebbles' &c. (p. 1240). The Mīmāṁsā is very much against assuming conflict among Vedic texts and therefore allows an option only if there is no other way out. Vide remarks on vikalpa above (p. 1250). Another general rule is that the singular includes the plural. In the Mīmāṁsā it is called 'Grahaikatvanyāya (P. M. S. III. 1. 13-15). In the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice a number of cups (grahas) filled with Soma are offered to deities and drunk at the three savanas (pressings of Soma) and Śruti states 'he wipes or cleanses the cup with the strainer made of white wool' (daśāpavitreṇa graham sam-mārṣṭi) and in the Darśapūrṇamāsa it is said 'he carries a firebrand round the puroḍāśa (cake)'. The question is whether a single cup (‘graham’ is the word used) is to be cleansed or a single purodāsa is to have a firebrand carried round it or whether all cups called grahas or purodāsas are to be treated as stateḍ The established conclusion is that all grahas are to be cleansed and all purodāsas have the firebrand carried round theṃ The singular number is not intended to be insisted oṇ⁴ From this a further general rule is derived by Kumārila and others that an attribute of the subject (anuvādya or uddiśyamāna)⁵ about which something is predicated (vidheya) is not intended and should not be insisted upoṇ This is frequently relied on in Dharmaśāstra workṣ Yaj. II. 121 states that the father and son have equal ownership in land, a corrody and wealth (gold and silver &c.) acquired by the grand-father. Here the word pitāmaha is not to be insisted upon and the same rule applies to land or wealth acquired by a great-grand-father, as the V. M. sayṣ⁶ Similarly, when Nāradasmṛti says (16. 37) ‘of brothers being undivided religious worship (or rites) are one, but if there is a partition then they may have separate religious worship’. Here the proper subject is the word ‘undivided persons’, and the word ‘brothers’ is used only as an attribute, which is not intended to be insisted on and the same rule applies to undivided grand-father, father, sons, uncles and nephewṣ Medhātithi on Manu II. 29 mentions this maxiṃ The same rule is applied in some cases to gender also i. e. a word importing males includes females also. For example, Yaj. II 182 and Nārada (8. 40 ff) lay down certain rules about a dāsa (male slave). The V. M. says that the masculine gender in these passages is not intended to be insisted upon, but the rules apply even to female slaveṣ⁷ There are exceptions to these ruleṣ The rule about grahas does not apply to camasas (P. M. S. III, 1, 16–17).⁸ This rule that the qualification (viśeṣaṇa) of the subject in a vidhi is not meant to be taken literally and emphasized is applied in many other caseṣ Three verses from the Kālikāpurāṇa are quoted by Kalpataru (on vyavahāra pp. 210–211) and V. M. (pp. 45–46) about the performance of an ordeal in certain grave charges and this maxim is applied by the V. M. there in the words ‘paradārārūpam viśeṣaṇam-avivakṣitam-abhīśāpasyānūvādyatvāt’; vide notes to V. M. pp. 83–84. But in ‘paśum-ālabheta’, where there is a vidhi about ‘yāga’ what is laid down is yāga as qualified by being made with a male animal and therefore only one paśu (and that paśu a male) is to be sacrificeḍ

Although the Veda employs the masculine gender (in svargakāmo yajeta, ‘one desiring heaven should offer a sacrifice’), yet Jaiminī establishes (in VI. 1. 6–16) that even women are included and have a right to offer a yāga.⁹ Jaimini further provides that husband and wife should perform a religious right in co-operation (VI. 1. 17–21), but he provides that where the Śruti specifically provides for certain matters to be done by the yajamāna¹⁰ (the male performer) it is the male alone who can perform them as the wife is not equal to the husband in the knowledge of mantras and is ignorant and therefore she is restricted to the performance of those acts that are expressly enjoined for her such as looking at the clarified butter, observing brahmacarya and the like (VI. 1. 24 ‘tasyā yāvad-uktam-āśirbrahmacaryam-atulyatvāt’.) The wife also performs bath and such acts as applying collyrium, sipping water (ācamana), observes silence till the morning or evening agnihotra is gone through. She has her waist girt up with a yoktra (a triple cord of muñja grass) in Darśapūrṇamāsa and other sacrificeṣ She has also to look upon the clarified butter in the pot with a mantra (Tai S.II. 10.3 ‘mahinām payosyoṣadhinām rasossi adabhena tvā cakuṣas vekṣe suprajāstvāya’ (‘thou art the milk of cows, the fluid of herbs, with an invincible eye I look on thee for securing good progeny’). The wife was to learn the mantras she had to repeat in sacrifices from her father or husband before the husband set up the sacred fires (vide H. of Dh. Vol. II. p. 1041 n). Gradually, the wife lost all importance in Vedic sacrifices and came to be a mere silent spectator¹¹ of all the weary details that had to be gone through by the sacrificer and the priest.

In spite of the above restrictions on the wife's powers about Vedic sacrifices many smṛti rules apply to women also, though the text employs the masculine gender. For example, Manu XI. 93 provides that a brāhmaṇa, kṣatriya and vaiśya should not drink surā. This prohibition applies to wives of the members of the three varṇas according to the Mit. on Yāj. III. 256.

The P. M. S. holds that the gender and number of a word in a vidhivākya may in certain cases be intended and insisted oṇ For example, in PMS IV. I. 11-16 it is established that the Agni-somīya animal to be sacrificed in Jyotiṣṭoma as prescribed in the words ‘yo dīkṣito yad agnīṣomīyam paśum-ālabhati’ (that the person who has undergone dīkṣā and offers the animal to Agni and Soma) is only one and that the words in the Āśva- medha ‘he offers kapiñjalas to the season of ¹² spring', the kapīñjala birds to be offered are only three (and not one nor two nor more than three). Similarly, the gender in the passage ‘he sacrifices in the morning in spring an animal with dark coloured neck to Agni, in summer in the noon an animal of different colours, in the autumn in the afternoon a white animal to Bṛhaspati’, it is a female animal that is offered because immediately thereafter the words ‘they become pregnant’ occur. Dharmaśāstra works often say that the masculine gender used in many texts excludes womeṇ For example, the Agnipurāṇa ¹³ (175. 59–61), when dealing with the rules to be observed in all vratas in general, provides that the person undergoing vrata should take a bath, should worship the golden images of the deities of the vrata, perform japa and homa and at the end of the vrata make gifts according to his ability and should feed 24, 12, 5 or only three vipras. The N. S. quotes this from Pṛthvicandra and observes that as the masculine gender ‘viprāh’ is employed only males of the brāhmaṇa class are to be fed and not womeṇ

As against this, when Hemādri ¹⁴ quoting Padma says ‘If a woman is pregnant, freshly delivered, or is ill and becomes impure, she should get her vrata performed through another and when she becomes pure she may observe it personally,’ the N. S. remarks that this applies to men also when they are impure, since the gender here is not intended to be emphasizeḍ

There are Mīmāṁsā rules about the interpretation of words and also about sentenceṣ First a few of the rules about words may be illustrateḍ (1) Śābara in the very first sentence of his bhāṣya propounds the principle that as far as possible the words in the sūtras of Jaimini and in the Veda are to be understood in the sense in which they are understood in popular usage and not in a secondary or technical sense. The same rule is propounded by Jaimini in III. 2.1–2 in connection with the meaning of ‘barhis’ in the mantra ‘I cut the barhis as an abode for gods’. Here the conclusion is that barhis is to be taken in the primary sense of ‘handful of kuśa grass’ and not in a secondary sense. such as kāśa or other kind of grasṣ Śabara winds up with the ¹⁵ words ‘between the primary and secondary senses of a word it is proper to hold that the primary sense is to be taken for the business in hand'. Again, on I. 3. 30 Śabara says¹⁶ that the words are the same as in the Veda and popular use and the meanings are the same.

As regards the setting up of Vedic fires, the Tai. Br. I. 1. 4 and Āp. Śr. V. 3. 18 prescribe different seasons for men of the three varṇas and add that a ‘rathakāra should set up Vedic fires in the rainy season'. The question arises whether the word ‘rathakāra' in these passages means a person of that caste (i. e. whether it is to be taken in the popular sense) or whether it refers to any one of any varṇa who manufactures chariots (i. e. the etymological sense). The established conclusion is that the popular sense is to be taken and not the etymological (P. M. S. VI. 1. 44-50). In the case of the rathakāra the mantra for ādḥāna (setting up of Vedic fires) is ‘ṛbhūṇām tvā' (Tai. Br. I. 1. 4. 8). Though not belonging to one of the three higher varṇas, the rathakāra could repeat that mantra because the Śruti expressly authorized him to do so, but he was not entitled to upanayana. The P. M. S. (VI. 1. 50) held that the rathakāra (mentioned in the Tai. Br. and Āp. Śr.) was a caste called Saudhanvana which is neither śūdra nor one of the three higher varṇas but is slightly inferior to theṃ Vide H. of Dh. Vol. II, pp. 45-46. The S. Kau. argues that ¹⁷ if once the right of a Hindu widow to adopt is conceded, the mere fact that she is not entitled to repeat Vedic mantras in general cannot deprive her of that right and that it is possible to hold, as in the case of the rathakāra, that she can repeat the specific mantra required in adopting a boy. The Tai. S. IV. 5. 4. 2 separately mentions several craftsmen such as takṣaṇ, rathakāra, kulāla, karmāra &c. From Atharvaveda III. 5. 6 and Vāj. S. 30. 6 (medhāyai rathakāram dhairyāya takṣaṇam) it appears that the rathakāra held a good position in the then society.

A word is to be understood in that shade of its meaning that is appropriate to the act in hanḍ For example, śruti says ‘he cuts off with sruva, he cuts off with a knife, he cuts off with the hand’ (the same verb ‘avadyati’ being used for all the acts). The question is whether one is to cut all offerings, whether liquid or solid, whether of flesh or other substances, with sruva ladle or whether he is to employ the method or implement appropriate for each i. e. clarified butter should be taken from a pot and offered by means of a sruva ladle, flesh should be cut off with a knife and offered, and hard or thick things (like fuel sticks) should be offered with the hanḍ The conclusion is that one is most appropriate to each kind of offering. This is called ‘sāmarthyādhikaraṇa’ (PMS. ¹⁸ I. 4. 25). The V. M. relies on this when dealing with the homa prescribed by Pitāmaha for all ordeals in the words ‘homa should be offered in the four directions with clarified butter, boiled rice and fuel sticks &c’ and declares that the homa of clarified butter should be made with sruva ladle, of havis (i. e. ‘boiled rice &c’) with sruc and of fuel sticks with the (right) hand, on account of the fitness (sāmarthya) of these for the various offerings and sharply criticizes Raghunandana who in his Dāyatattva provided that the homa should be made of all three together (and not separately). A similar rule is applied to the ten sacrificial implements enumerated in Tai. S. I. 6. 8. 2 viz. sphya (the wooden sword), the potsherds &c. Here the Pūrvapakṣa is that one may employ any one of these for any purpose required in the sacrifice; the established conclusion (PMS III. 1. 11. and IV. 1. 7–10) is that the enumeration of ten implements is a mere anuvāda and is not to be understood as the pūrvapakṣa states, but each is to be employed for the purpose for which the Vedic texts prescribe it (such as one cooks the puroḍāśa on potsherds, pounds grains in mortar and pestle). Vide H. of Dh. vol. II. p. 985 ṇ 2233 for ten implements of sacrifice and others that are required and p. 1232 above for their disposal.

One and the same word must not be used in two senses in the same sentence, that is, in the primary sense and also in the figurative sense.¹⁹ This maxim is relied upon by the Dāyabhāga. When brothers (sons of the same mother) come to a partition, smṛti texts (like Yāj. II. 123) prescribe that the mother takes a share equal to that of a soṇ On this the Dāyabhāga remarks that the word ‘mātā’ (in Yāj. II. 123 and others) primarily means a real mother (jananī, that gives birth) and this smṛti rule has no application to the step-mother, since it is improper to hold that the same word once used in a sentence has a primary and a secondary sense at the same²⁰ time. But it must be pointed out that all Dharmaśāstra works do not observe this rule. Aparārka (p. 730) on Yāj. II. 123 (pitur-ūrdhvam vibhajatam mātāpyamśam samam haret) includes the step-mother under the word ‘mātā’ following a text of Vyāsa. The Mitākṣarā interpreting Yāj. II. 135 about obstructible heritage stating the order of succession as wife, daughters, parents, brothers, their sons, provides that full brothers first succeed, in default of them half brothers, in default of the last, full brothers’ sons. The V. M. disagrees ²¹¹⁴ with this and says that the word ‘brother’ primarily means ‘full brother’ and only secondarily ‘half-brother’, that, as it is not allowable to use a word like brother in two senses in the same passage, in default of full brother his son succeeds (and not half-brother as the Mit. provides). The primary sense of a word is got by ‘abhidhā’, the secondary sense is said to be due to vyañjanā. These are the three vṛttis (functions) of a worḍ

One of the rules about the interpretations of words is contained in P.M.S.I. 3. 8–9. Śabara cites three instances of words²¹¹⁶ viz. caru made from yavas, sandals made of boar skin, a cane mat. The words yava, varāha and vetasa are respectively employed by some people in the sense of ‘priyaṅgu’ (long pepper), dark bird (crow) and jambu (black berry). The prima facie view insists that one may use those words in any one of the two senseṣ The Siddhānta is that those words must be used in the sense in which the Veda (or śāstra) or śiṣṭas employ them i. e. the usage of learned Aryan people is to be followed where words may have two or more senseṣ As in several other cases Kumārila does not like Śabara's explanation and proposes two other explanations, viz. one being that the sūtras relate to the word ‘pilu’ used in the sense of a tree and mlecchas employ it in the sense of elephant. The meaning of the word in smṛtis is a tree and that should be followeḍ Here ‘Śāstrasthāḥ’ means ‘the sense given to the word in the Śāstra i. e. smṛti’. Another meaning he sees into those sūtras is the comparative strength of smṛti and ācāra. This adhikaraṇa is relied upon by Viśvarūpa on Yaj. (I. 225) on the question of the primary meaning of the word Śrāddha which he states is ‘piṇḍadāna’ (offering balls of boiled rice to the manes) and not feeding brāhmaṇaṣ The Parāśara-mādhavīya refers to Parāśara-smṛti (VI. 70–71) about the food cooked from rice in such quantities as measuring an āḍhaka ²⁴ or droṇa and rendered unclean by being pecked by crows or touched by dogs and smelt by asses and provides that the measures āḍhaka and droṇa were to be taken as those known from śāstras and not those known among mlecchaṣ

Another rule (PMS I. 3.10) about words is that ²⁵ words, though of foreign origin, that are in vogue in Sanskrit, are to be understood in the sense which they have in the foreign language and one should not think of an attempt to derive them with the help of Nirukta and grammar. Śabara cites four such words viz. pika (cuckoo), nema (half), tāmarasa (lotus), sata (circular wooden vessel).

Another rule about words is that where a single substance connected with several attributes is concerned in an action laid down for being carried out, all of these attributes should be taken to refer to the same one substance (PMS III. 1.12). The Tai. S. prescribes ‘he purchases Soma with a heifer one year old and having brown eyes and reddish in colour’. Here the two words ‘piṅgākṣī’ and ‘ekahāyanī’ yield a good etymological meaning, are in the same case and so refer to the same substance (heifer in this ²⁶ case). But the word ‘arunaya’ (of red colour) causes a doubt viz. whether it should be separated from the other two words in the sentence and taken in the sense of ‘any reddish substance such as a piece of cloth’ or whether it should be connected with the verb (he purchases), should thus be subordinate to the purchase and should be taken as referring to the one year old heifer. This last is the established conclusioṇ How Soma is to be purchased does not follow from any other text. Therefore, in such a case several subsidiaries can be laid down in one injunctioṇ If ‘arunaya’ be taken as referring to any red substance such as a piece of red cloth this one sentence would have to be divided into two vidhis ‘he should purchase with a red piece of cloth’ and ‘he should purchase with a brown-eyed (heifer) one year old’. This would be a fault called ‘vākyābheda’. [This nyāya is explained by the Madanapārijāta pp. 88–89 and Aparārka (p. 1030) makes use of ²⁷ it in explain- ing the correct import of the words of the Br. Up. IV. 4. 21 ‘tam- etam vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇa vividiṣanti’ by saying that when the highest object in view is one but the subordinate elements are different these latter are to be lumped together.

Another rule about words is evolved by what is called ‘niṣādasthapatinyāya’ (PMS VI. I. 51–52). ²⁸ It is stated that the Iṣṭi in which an offering of boiled rice is made to Rudra is one that should be performed for niṣāda-sthāpati. A niṣāda is a person born of a brāhmaṇa father and śūdra mother (vide Manu X. 8). He does not belong to one of the three higher varṇaṣ Sthapati means 'chief or leader'. The question whether the compound word means 'a niṣāda who is a chief (that is a karmadhāraya compound) or whether it means 'the ruler of niṣādas' who may not necessarily be a niṣāda himself but may be a kṣatriya (i. e. whether one should take the word as 'ṣaṣṭhi- tatpuruṣa' as niṣādānām sthapatiḥ'). The conclusion is that a karmadhāraya is more powerful than a tatpuruṣa, since in the former both the words may be directly connected with the verb (niṣādaścāsau sthapatīśca, tam yājayet). The V. M. makes use of this 'maxim'. The Śaunaka-smṛti authorizes śūdras to adopt a son, yet some writers like Rudradhara, author of Śuddhiviveka, held that adoption required a homa with mantras and as a śūdra could not repeat vedic mantras he could not adopt. To this V. M. replies that his power to adopt a son being established by Śaunaka's smṛti all that is required is that he may get the homa performed through a brāhmaṇa. The Bhāmati on Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on V. S. I. 3. 15, where the meaning of the word 'brahmaloka' in Chāndogya-Up. VIII. 3. 2 is in question, says that the niṣādasthapatinyāya applies and so 'brahmaloka' means 'brahma as the goal' and not 'the world of brahma.' Manu XI. 54 enumerates five Mahāpātakas (deadly sins), one of which is 'gurvaṅganāgama' (sexual intercourse with gurvaṅganā). Commentators have differed about the meaning of this word, some like Bhavadeva in Prāyaścittaprakaraṇa stating that, following niṣādasthapatinyāya, the word must be dissolved as a Karmadhāraya compound (guruḥ or gurvī cāsau aṅganā ca), the meaning being one's own mother, while many others dissolve it as a tatpuruṣa compound meaning 'guror or gurūpām aṅganā' (which would then include a step-mother, an elder brother's wife and teacher's wife &c.). Vide H. of Dh. vol. III, pp. 23-25 for a discussion of thiṣ

Prabhākara held that no word was significant in isolation, but that words became significant when joined together in a sentence. Therefore, he and his followers were called 'anvitābhidhānavādinaḥ' as opposed to Kumārila and his followers who held that words have different senses of their own and then they combine in a sentence and yield a further sense of the sentence. These latter were called 'abhihitānvayavādinaḥ'. Vide notes to Sahityadarpana (I., II., X) pp. 86–88 for explanations of these two terms by the present writer (eḍ of 1956).

Let us now turn to the interpretation of vākya (sentence). The Ṛgveda and the Sāmaveda are metrical and therefore there is generally no difficulty in arriving at what constitutes in them one syntactical unit (vākya). But much of the Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda is in prose. Therefore, PMS (II. 1. 46) defines ³⁰ what makes one vākya by stating that when a number of words serve a single purpose, but if one or a few of those words are separated from the rest, the latter words are incomplete in effecting a purpose and stand in need of the words separated, then all these words make one vākya. An example is the mantra ‘I offer thee, that art dear to Agni, at the command of God Savitṛ with the arms of Aśvins, with the hands of Pūṣan’. This is one sentence, the purpose of which is nirvāpa (offering). For other definitions of vākya, vide the author's notes on Sahityadarpana (II. 1) p. 34. For constituting words into a sentence with an understandable meaning expectancy ³¹ (ākāṅkṣā), compatibility (yogyatā) and proximity (sannidhi) are required, particularly the first. For example, Śaṅkarācārya on V. S. I. 4. 3 says that without ākāṅkṣā there is no cognition that the words form a vākya. The word ekavākyatā occurs in V. S. III. 4. 24 and conveys that there is a twofold ākānkṣā viz. grammatical as well as psychological. It is the listener or reader who has, on hearing or reading a word, a desire to know another idea or word to get a complete sense. When several sentences, each conveying its own sense as far as it goes, are brought together having regard to the fact that one of them may be principal and the others auxiliary, they form one syntactical whole. This shows that sentences are of two kinds, vākyas and Mahāvākyas, as the Sāhityadarpaṇa puts it.

It follows from the definition and the bhāṣya thereon that, in order to constitute a vākya, three conditions are necessary viz. (1) there must be a number of words uttered or put down together (padasamūha), (2) the words must have an expect ancy for each other (i. e. if a word in the collection is dropped no complete sense can be had), (3) all the words must serve one purpose or convey together one meaning (arthaikatva, acc. to another view). It is not absolutely necessary that the words in order to form a vākya must be in close proximity. Even if some words intervene there may be a sentence, provided there is ākānkṣā between the wordṣ Śabara on PMS IV. 3.11 illus trates this well as stated in the note.³² In the verse quoted 'paśyasi' is to be connected with 'jaradgavam', though several other words intervene. Though there is proximity (sannidhi) between 'pinakṣī' and 'jaradgavam' they do not form a sentence as there is no capacity as also ākānkṣā between the two. The upshot is that sannidhi (proximity) of words is generally required to form a sentence, though not necessarily required in every case.

The different parts of a mantra text, meant to serve different purposes, may be regarded as distinct sentenceṣ For example, the mantra in Tai. Br.³³ (III. 7.5) ‘I make an agreeable seat (or abode) for thee (O cake!), I prepare it as a very happy one with a stream of clarified butter; do sit thereon with pleased mind, be established in ambrosia, O sacrificial essence of rice'. These are two sentences, the first part being concerned with making a seat, the latter part being concerned with depositing the purodāśa on the seat. Similarly, in the passage 'I (cut) thee (O palāśa branch) for food, I (wash or rub) thee for vigour' there are two different sentences, that are independent of each other, as the Śat. Br. employs these with the words 'he cuts the palāśa branch with the words 'for food (I cut) thee', he washes it with the words 'for vigour thee'. The same rule applies to the ten different clauses 'āyuryajñena kalpatām, prāņo yajñena kalpatām' in Tai. S. I. 7. 9. 2. They are all different sentenceṣ³⁵

The doctrine of Vākyabheda plays a very important part in Mimāmsā as well as in dharmaśāstra. Vākyabheda literally means 'split of sentences'. When the sentences are equally independent and one sentence does not require or expect words from the other sentence to complete it, they should be treated as separate sentenceṣ This is one sense of 'Vākyabheda.' Another and more frequent sense of Vākyabheda is as follows: The underlying principle of vākyabheda is that one and the same text cannot be construed as laying down two separate vidhis (prescriptions) or that when a certain matter has already been prescribed and then several auxiliary matters are to be prescribed, prescribing³⁶ all the auxiliaries in one sentence would give rise to the fault of vākyabheda (syntactical split of sentence). In Tai. S. there is the following passage 'the sacri-ficial post is to be of udumbara tree, the udumbara (tree) is vigour, cattle is vigour; he obtains for him (the sacrificer) by means of vigour ūrj (i. e. by udumbara post) vigour (i. e. cattle) for the attainment of vigour'. This is one syntactical whole (vākyā). If it be said that there is a vidhi prescribing the use of udumbara post in a sacrifice and that there is also another vidhi about the fruit viz. securing vigour (i. e. cattle); this would give rise to vākyabheda. Therefore there are no two vidhis in the sentence but only a vidhi and an arthavāda (praise).³⁷ Śaṅkarācārya on V. S. III. 3. 57 remarks 'ekaṁ hīdaṁ vākyam Vaiśvānaravidyāviṣayaṁ paurvāparyālocanāt pratiyate... eka-vākyatāvagatua satyāṁ vākyabheda-kalpanāsyānyāyyatvāt.' This is said with reference to the first aspect of the idea of Vākyabheda.

The basic idea underlying the latter sense of vākyabheda is thiṣ If an act or a substance or a secondary matter has already been the subject of a vidhi and if concerning the act (or substances &c.) a number of other matters (actions, substances &c.) are enjoined in one sentence, there would be vākyabheda (i. e. there would have to be a separate vidhi for each of the other matters relating to what has already been the subject of a vidhi). On the other hand, if an action, substance or a guņa is enjoined for the first time along with several secondary matters in one sentence, there would be no fault of vākyabheda i. e. in a single vākya however long or containing many matters, if there is a single vidhi there is no fault. If, in the passage quoted on p. 1258 above ³⁸ 'one desiring prosperity should offer in sacrifice a white animal to Vāyu', one were to hold that first there is to be a vidhi about prosperity and, there would be two vidhis and so the fault of vākyabheda, but if one holds that the vidhi is only concerned with offering a white animal and what follows 'vāyurvai kṣepis-ṭhā.....bhūtim gamayati' is merely an arthavāda (praise of the preceding vidhi), there is no vākyabheda. The fault of vākya- bheda arises when more vidhis than one are held to occur in the same vākya.³⁹

A few examples must be cited to illustrate the principle of vākyabheda. A simple example is ‘graham sammārṣṭi’. If one were to interpret this as meaning ‘he is to clean the cup’ and also as meaning that only a single cup is to be cleaned there would be vākyabheda. Therefore, it was decided that the singular number in ‘graham’ is not to be insisted upon and cleaning of all cups was to be resorted to; otherwise there would be two vidhis viz. ‘graham sammṛjyāt’ and ‘ekam-eva sammṛjyāt’. Śabara quotes (on PMS I. 3. 3) a śruti ‘one who has a son and whose hair is dark should consecrate the vedic fires’. Agnyādhāna is laid down by śruti texts such as Tai. Br. I. 1. 2. 6, Śat. II. 1. 2. Therefore, the above text only lays down certain subsidiary matters about it. A man may have dark hair but no son or he may have a son when his hair is turning grey. Therefore, if that sentence is meant to prescribe both attributes (having a son and also having dark hair), there would be two distinct vidhis in the same vākya, that is, there would be the fault of vākyabheda, which has to be avoideḍ Therefore, that sentence must be understood as indicating a certain age viz. he must not be a mere boy (at the time of agnyādhāna) but of an age to bear a son, nor very old (when hair turns grey). i. e. he must be neither too young nor too old at the time of agnyādhāna. A lakṣaṇā as regards the words ‘jātāputraḥ’ and ‘kṛṣṇakeśaḥ’ is resorted to and lakṣaṇā is only a fault as to a word, while vākyabheda is a fault of a sentence and therefore lakṣaṇā should be preferred to vākyabheda. The V. M. quotes (p. 115) the verse of Manu⁴⁰ IX. 142 'the son given shall not have (share) the family name (gotra) and the wealth (riktha) of his natural father; the piṇḍa (cake offered to deceased ancestors) follows the family name and the wealth; of him who gives (his son in adoption) the svadhā (obsequies) cease (so far as that son is concerned)'. After citing the above smṛti passage 'one having a son' and another text' for the position of the sacrificial post (vide PMS III. 7. 13-14) with reference to the altar, the V. M. holds that one should not merely emphasize the words gotra, riktha, piṇḍa and svadhā used by Manu and take them literally but should hold that the verse contains a lakṣaṇā (indicated meaning); it indicates the cessation of all those consequences that are due to connection with the piṇḍa in the case of the natural father and Manu says nothing about the property taken by a son before he is given in adoption into another family.

Another illustration of vākyabheda can be cited from the law of re-unioṇ The Mit., Dāyabhāga and Sṃ C. (on Vyavahāra p. 302) quote a text⁴¹ of Bṛhaspati 'that man who being once separated from his father, brother, or paternal uncle again dwells (Continued from last page) natural family that had become vested in him before adoptioṇ That Manu laid down two propositions, viz, (1) a man forfeits by adoption into another family the property that once belonged to the family and that became vested in him before adoption, (2) A person given in adoption into another family does not, after the adoption, take any property of the family to which he belonged but whose connection with the family ceased after adoptioṇ These are two distinct propositions and to hold that Manu's text is capable of these two propositions is liable to the fault of Vākyabheda. The V. M. (p. 115) further relies on the construction of another vedic text 'He fixes half of the yūpa inside the vedi and half outside it.' This is interpreted by PMS III.7. 13-14, Śabara and the Tantravārtika as merely indicating a certain region for the fixing of the yūpa and that the words are not to be taken literally, because in that case there would be Vākyabheda. The दुपटीका brings out the meaning clearly. ‘समस्तस्य यूपस्यान्तर्बहिर्माने प्राप्ते-अर्धमन्तर्वेदि–इति नियम्यते । द्विसीपस्यार्धस्य पुनर्बाह्यर्धं–इति नियमोऽसकौ–अर्थ बहिर्वेदि–इत्यपि विधातव्यम् । ततश्चार्धमेव–इति शब्दार्थोऽप्युपजायते । अत्तश्चैषणशमचारणधर्मान्तरत्वेनेच न त्वार्धशब्दोऽपि लाक्षणिकत्वेनेति । तथा सति प्रावृत्तिश्चार्थे प्रामोतीति न बहिर्भावः सिद्धरुपपत्ते । ... तत्समानुभाष्यात्पिनमभाष्यकमेवः।’ through affection with them (or any of them) is said to be re-united with them (or him)'. According to the Mit., a reunion is possible only with father, brother and paternal uncle and with no one else, since no one else is mentioned in the text of Bṛhaspati. The V. M. does not approve of this limitation and says that a re-union is possible with all or any of those that participated in the partition and that the three persons, father, brother and uncle are mentioned only by way of illustration (i. e. there is lakṣaṇā). A man may separate not only from the three named persons but also from his paternal grand-father, the grandson of his brother and the son of his paternal uncle and several other persons and therefore the construction of the text of Bṛhaspati by the Mit. is liable to the fault of vākyabheda, since on that interpretation there would be two separate proposi-tions viz. (1) that man is to be called re-united who having become separate again stays together with the one from whom he separated, (2) one can re-unite only with the father, brother, or paternal uncle. Thus there would be two distinct prescriptions in one sentence. Therefore, one should have recourse to lakṣaṇā viz. that the three named persons indicate a class of persons from whom one may have separated but with whom he then stayed together. The Vīramitrodaya (on Vyavahāra), V. R. (pp. 605–67), V. C. p. 533 hold the same view as that of the V. M.⁴²

The Smṛticandrikā provides that after the death of a man when the sons divide, the mother is entitled to a share equal to that of each son if the estate to be divided is not very large, but if the estate be very large she is to get as much only as would be necessary for her maintenance (although Yaj. II. 123 and others employ the words 'samam aṁśam'). The Madanaratna on Vyavahāra criticizes this as a bad provision on the ground that it is vitiated by Vākyabheda, since there would be two different propositions (vidhis) about the meaning to be attached to the words ‘samam amśam’ (equal share) according as the estate to be divided is large or small.⁴³

There is another principle about sentences called ‘anuṣaṅga’ (elliptical extension) or the extension of a word, phrase or clause from a sentence to another or other sentences, provided all those sentences are of the same type or forṃ This is one type of anuṣaṅga. Another type is where each of two or more sentences appears to be complete by itself, but there are certain words of a subordinate character in the last sentence of a passage which have to be taken up or understood in the preceding sentenceṣ This latter is also called anukarṣa. In the three upasads of Jyotiṣṭoma, the first⁴⁴ is in honour of Agni in which the mantra is ‘yā to Agne ayāśayā tanūr-varṣiṣṭhā gavhareṣṭhogram vaco apāvadhim tveṣam vaco apāvadhim svāhā’; the other two Upasads have the two mantras ‘yā te Agne rajāśayā’ and ‘yā te Agne harāśayā’ which are incomplete and in need of complementary words to complete the sentenceṣ The conclusion is that the words ‘Varṣiṣṭhā ... svāhā’ are to be supplied from the first sentence and not other words from the popular language that one may choose. Another passage of the Tai.⁴⁵ S. is ‘cit-patiṣṭvā punātu, vākpatis-tvā punātu, devas-tvā savitā punatvacchidreṇa pavitreṇa vasoḥ sūryasya raśmibhiḥ’. Here the first two clauses appear to be prima facie complete, but when we look to the last clause where the word ‘punātu’ is particularised by certain other words, we at once feel that the first two clauses also should be connected with the words ‘acchidreṇa... raśmibhiḥ’ and that then they would be quite complete. The V. M. has a long disquisition on the principle of anusaṅga applied by the Mit. and Madanaratna to the succession to the wealth of one who died re-uniteḍ Yāj. II. 135-136 lay down the order of succession to the wealth of a person dying sonlesṣ Yāj. II. 137 deals with succession to the property of a forest hermit, an ascetic or a perpetual Vedic student. The Mit. then holds that Yāj. II. 138 'samasṛṣṭīnastu samasṛṣṭī' is to be construed as an exception to Yāj. II. 135-136 and understands that the words 'of one dying without having a son' (grandson or great-grandson) are to be supplied before Yāj. II. 138 from II. 136 (i. e. there is to be anusaṅga of the words 'svaryātasyāputrasya'. The V. M. does not approve of this and states that there is no rational ground for applying the principle of anusaṅga and therefore the order of succession to the property left by one re-united propounded by V. M. becomes different from that of the Mit. The whole discussion is rather abstruse and lengthy and the present writer feels that the space required for exposition should be saveḍ Those interested may consult the exhaustive notes (pp. 265-275) in the edition of the Vyavahāramayūkha (Poona, 1926) on the passages of the V. M. beginning with the one in the note below.⁴⁶

This principle of anusaṅga cannot apply where words of a different type intervene between the several sentenceṣ For example, when the animal to be offered is killed a long passage occurs which contains the⁴⁷ words 'saṁ te prāṇo vāyunā gacchatāṁ, saṁ yajatrāir-aṅgāni, saṁ yajñapatir-āśīṣā' &c. (may your limbs be joined to the worshipful deities and may the sacrificer be united to blessing &c). Here the first clause is separated from the 3rd clause by a clause in which there are two words in the plural while the first and third clauses have two words in the singular; therefore there is no anusaṅga of the words of the first clause into the 2nd and one may employ for completing the sense of the 3rd clause some ordinary word from popular language (and not the words from the 1st clause).

Veda enjoins many acts such as performing a yāga, casting an oblation into fire, making a gift, milking a cow, melting clarified butter &c. but all are not on the same level. Some are pradhāna (primary ⁴⁸ or principal), while others are guṇabhūta (subsidiary). The acts denoted by words such as Prayājas by which some substance is not embellished or not made fit or is not produced are primary, while those which produce a substance or make it fit (such as pounding in the case of grains of paddy) are subsidiary. Acts are further classified into various groups such as nitya, naimittikṛ or kāmya or as kratvartha and puruṣārtha. These have already been explaineḍ There are six means ⁴⁹ by which is ascertained the difference or non-difference among acts viz. (1) śabdāntara (different words, such as yajati, juhoti, dadāti, i. e. yāga, homa, dāna are different acts); abhyāsa ⁵⁰ (repetition) as in 'samidho yajati, tanūnapātaṁ yajati' &c. (Tai. S. II. 6. 1. 1–2), where the word yajati is repeated five times and therefore there are five different acts prescribed; (3) saṅkhyā (number) as in 'he sacrifices seventeen animals to Prajāpati' (Tai. Br. I. 3. 4. 3), which are seventeen distinct acts; (4) guṇa (an accessory detail such as the deity or substance in such a passage as ‘when curds⁵¹ are put into heated milk it turns into curdled solid mass āmikṣā which is offered to Viśvedevas and the liquid called vājina is to be offered to Vājins, these two being two distinct offerings); (5) prakaraṇa (context). In the sentence ‘one should offer agnihotra’ (Tai. S. I. 5. 9. 1) there is a vidhi of the daily performance of Agnihotra. In the Kundapāyinām-ayana⁵² it is said ‘he offers agnihotra for a month’. Since this last occurs in a different context altogether (while the former occurs in the context of Darśa-pūrṇamāsa), this sentence (from Kundapāyinām-ayana) deals with a different act from that of the daily Agnihotra. (6) The name (Sañjñā) also differentiates acts, since they occur in utpattivākya (originative injunction) as in the passage quoted in the note below.⁵³ This technique about determining what actions are different on account of the several grounds noted above, was employed by Hemādri, the Kālanirṇaya and the Nirṇayasindhu in deciding whether Janmāṣṭamīvrata and Jayantīvrata are really one vrata or separate vratas. Vide pp. 132-133 above. It has already been stated above (p. 1228) that there are four kinds of vidhis of which viniyogavidhi is one. This last conveys the relation between a religious act as principal ( śeṣin or aṅgin) and⁵⁴ its auxiliaries (aṅgas). This is the concern of the third chapter of the P. M. S., which first defines ‘śeṣa’, states why it is employed in religious acts, what are the means of determining the relation of śeṣa to śeṣin and the comparative strength of each of the meanṣ Some examples of aṅga and aṅgin may have to be given here. In ‘vrihin prokṣati’ (he sprinkles rice grains with water) the sprinkling (prokṣaṇa) is an aṅga (stands in a subsidiary relation to) of rice grains as directly shown by the objective case (vrihin). The prokṣaṇa (is motivated by) has the purpose of contributing to the transcendental result (the apūrva), since what is meant is that if, without the sprinkling of water on the rice grains, a sacrifice (yāga) were performed, apūrva would not be brought about. To take another example, ⁵⁵ ‘he takes hold of the bridle of the horse with (the mantra beginning with) ‘they took hold of the bridle of ṛta (cosmic order)’. Here the direct assertion (śruti) shown by the objective case in ‘raśanām’ shows that that mantra stands in a subordinate relation to (is an aṅga of) the bridle of the horse, since the utterance of it when taking hold of the bridle of the horse effects a saṁskāra in the bridle and taking hold is also an aṅga of the horse bridle (which is in the objective case), just as prokṣaṇa is an aṅga of rice grainṣ

It has already been stated that ‘śeṣa’ means ‘what subserves the purpose of another’ and it is śeṣa of that other (P. M. S. III, 1. 2 ‘Śeṣaḥ parārthatvāt’) and that, according to Bādari (III, 1. 3) ‘to substances, properties (like reddish colour of a cow), saṁskāras ⁵⁶ (what makes a person or thing fit for being employed in a yāga or for any other purpose) the word śeṣa is always applied, while, acc. to Jaimini (III. 1. 4-6) religious rites are śeṣa to the result or fruit (expressed or implied), the fruit is śeṣa to the agent of religious acts and an agent is śeṣa to certain actṣ The word ‘śeṣa’ is often employed by Dharmaśāstra workṣ For example, the Mit. while commenting on Yaj. II. 118–119 states that the first half of verse 118 is śeṣa to all the rest ⁵⁷ (i. e. serves the purpose of the remaining verse and a half). The result is ( if the Mit. be followed) that if a gift is acquired (by a coparcener) from a grateful friend who was placed under an obligation by spending family wealth, if a property is acquired by a gift from a member's father-in-law who was paid from the family property for securing the bride for that member, or if the property of the family lost to it was recovered by a member with the help of (other paternal estate), or if a member of the family learnt at the expense of the family and made gains from that learning, then those kinds of property were liable to be partitioned among all memberṣ This view of the Mit. was not shared by several other writers and works such as the Dāyabhāga (VI. 1. 8), and Viśvarūpa. Vide H. of Dh. vol. III. pp. 579-580 for further remarkṣ

The P. M. S speaks of six means that are helpful in determining, as regards viniyoga-vidhis, what are principal and what are auxiliary when there is a doubt or when there is a conflict. They are śruti (direct vedic statement or assertion), liṅga (indirect indication), vākya (syntactical connection or relation), prakaraṇa (context), sthāna (place or sequence), samākhyā (sañjñā, name). When several of these come together and refer to the same subject each succeeding one is weaker than each preceding one, since each succeeding one is more remote than each preceding one from the objective (viz. the viniyoga). P. M. S. III. 3. 14 is called ‘balābalādhikaraṇa’.⁵⁸

An example where both śruti and liṅga come in conflict is 'with the Aindri verse (verse addressed to Indra) he should worship the Gārhapatya fire'. The verse addressed to Indra⁵⁹ is 'niveśanah sañgamano vasūnāṃ..Indro na tasthau samare pathinām' (Tai. S. IV. 2. 5. 4). Here the doubt arises whether one should worship Indra as the word 'Aindryā' indicates or whether one should worship Gārhapatya (as the passage directly asserts) with a verse addressed to Indra, or whether one should worship both or whether one should worship either Indra or Gārhapatya as one likeṣ The conclusion is that śruti (direct Vedic assertion) is more powerful than liñga. On hearing the words 'Gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhate' we are directly told by the Veda about the worship of Gārhapatya. The word 'Aindryā' being in the instrumental (as in 'dadhnā juhoti'-he performs homa with curds) merely supplies a detail (guṇa) viz. that the mantra to be repeated is one addressed to Indra and there is no word that directly asserts that Indra is to be worshipped,⁶¹ Śabara on PMS III. 2. 4 explains that even Gārhapatya has some of the qualities of Indra and so metaphorically he may be called Indra (as a brave man is called a lion), since Gārhapatya is a means of accomplishing yajña like Indra or Gārhapatya may be called Indra from the root 'ind', and may be taken to mean 'a master or lord'.

The six means may each come in conflict with all the means that follow each of theṃ Therefore, there will be five cases of conflict of śruti with liñga (which has already been described) or with vākya, or prakaraṇa or sthāna or samākhyā; there will be four cases of conflict between liñga and vākya or each of the three ones (of the means) that follow vākya in the sūtra, in the same way vākya may be in conflict with prakaraṇa and the other two (in all three cases), prakaraṇa may be in conflict with sthāna or samākhyā (i. e. two cases) and sthāna may be in conflict with samākhyā. So that there are in all fifteen cases of conflict of the six means among themselveṣ We need not take into account the conflict of one of the six means with its predecessors, since to say that liṅga may be in conflict with śruti is the same thing as saying that śruti may be in conflict with liṅga. Very large space would have to be devoted if all these fifteen possible conflicts are to be exemplified from Vedic and Dharmaśāstra textṣ Therefore, the author does not essay that task.

Dharmaśāstra works often utilize this adhikarana called balābala (PMS III. 3. 14). For example, the Par. M. quotes²¹⁵³ a śruti passage that one should perform the daily evening sandhyā adoration of Āditya (the sun) with mantras addressed to Varuṇa and remarks that “Vāruṇibhiḥ” (like Aindryā) is only liṅga while, ‘Ādityam-upsthāya’ is śruti (direct assertion) and therefore the sun is to be worshipped in the evening with mantras addressed to Varuṇa and refers to the example ‘aindryā gārhatyapatyam upatiṣṭhate’ for support.

The fourth adhyāya of the PMS deals mainly with the subject of prayojya and prayojaka and kratvartha and puruṣārtha. The latter two have been explained and illustrated above (pp. 1232-1235). A few illustrations of the first two may be giveṇ The Prayājas have been declared above to be kratvartha (p. 1233). Therefore, kratu (sacrifice) is the prayojaka (motivating force) of Prayājaṣ The reward (phala, svarga or the like) is the prayojaka of yāga or a puruṣārtha rite. That is a prayojaka for the sake of which a man is led to perform something by a Vedic exhortatory passage. The sentence ‘one should offer the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacri-fice for securing svarga’; therefore the reward (svarga and the like) is the prayojaka of Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga.²¹⁵⁴ The injunction to mix curds with milk makes a person do so for producing āmikṣā and not vājina, since this latter arises of it- self in preparing āmikṣā. Therefore, it is āmikṣā, being the havis in the Vaiśvadevayāga that is the prayojaka of the Vaiśvadevayāga and vājina-yāga is not the prayojaka of putting curds into milk ⁶⁴ ( P. M. S. IV.1. 22-24). The result is that, if by accident āmikṣā is destroyed, in order to secure the havis ( āmikṣā ) curds will have again to be put in boiled milk, but if vājina, not being prayojaka, is destroyed, curds need not be put into boiled milk agaiṇ

Examples of puruṣārtha acts have been given above (p. 1234) such as the Prājāpativrata. This chapter (in 2nd pāda) deals with several cases of pratipattikarma and arthakarma already explained above (pp. 1231-32 ). There are certain substances, embellishments and subsidiary actions with which some phala is associateḍ For example, it is said (in Tai. S. III. 7. 5. 2) 'he who has juhū ladle made of parṇa (palāśa) wood never hears an evil word about himself'; 'that he applies collyrium (to his eyes), he injures the eye of his enemy' (Tai. S. VI. I. 1. 5); 'That he performs the Prayājas and Anuyājas, that is indeed the armour of the sacrifice'. PMS declares that these texts about rewards associated with substances, embellishments and subsidiary acts are really not vidhis about rewards but are mere arthavādas, because all these serve the purpose of the principal kratu. ⁶⁵

This fourth chapter (in 3rd pāda) also decides that, although no reward is expressly declared by Śruti (the Veda) for the performance of the Viśvajit sacrifice, still in the Viśvajit sacrifice (and in other sacrifices where no reward is expressly mentioned) svarga is the rewarḍ ⁶⁶

The Viśvajit is a striking sacrifice in which the performer donates all belongings of which he is the owner ('Viśvajiti sarva- svam dadāti'". Jaimini devotes about fourteen adhikaraṇas ²¹⁵⁸ to it, viz. IV. 3. 10–16 (three adhikaraṇas), VI. 7. 1–20 (nine adhikaraṇas), VII. 3. 6–11 (one adhi.), X. 6. 13–14 (one adhi.). Some of the interesting propositions are: the performer cannot donate his own relatives (such as father or mother) but can denote that of which he is real owner or master; that even the emperor cannot make a gift of the whole kingdom, as other people have rights over land and the king protects the people and has only the right to a certain share in the produce of the land; that the performer cannot donate horses as śruti expressly forbids the gift of horses in Viśvajit; that the performer can donate only that which exists as his property at the time of giving dakṣiṇā in the sacrifice and not that which may become his at a future date; that a śūdra ²¹⁵⁹ who waits upon the performer because it is his duty to serve (acc. to Manu) cannot be donated; a person of a higher varṇa cannot be donated; only he who has 112 cows or more wealth is entitled to perform Viśvajit.

The 5th adhyāya of P. M. S. deals with krama (the order in which the several component parts or acts that go to make up a sacrifice are to come one after another). Vidhis speak of the performance of many acts in a sacrifice and do not always lay down the order in which those acts (principal and auxiliary) are to be performeḍ It would not do to perform them in any sequence of several acts in a sacrifice one has to depend upon six means ²¹⁶⁰ viz. śruti (direct assertion as to order), artha (purpose, suitability); pāṭha (verbal texts), pravṛtti (commence- ment), kāṇḍa (place in the texts), mukhya (principal).

In the Vedic passage about the dīkṣā in a sattra, the adhvaryu after performing the dīkṣā (initiation rite) on the gṛhapati (the yajamāna, the performer of the sacrifice) performs dīkṣā on the brahmā priest, then on udgātṛ etc. the Vedic text directly lays down the sequence (by means of the termination 'tvā') that the dīkṣā of brahmā priest comes after the dīkṣā of the yajamāna. In the passage 'samidho yajati tanūnāpāṭam yajati &c'. the very order in which the sentences occur in the text (i. e. pāṭha) determines the order of the performance of the several yāgas (PMS V. 1. 4). The Veda first speaks of the offer- ing of Agnihotra and then of the cooking of gruel. Here the offering of Agnihotra comes first and preparation of gruel comes after that. But, unless the material to be offered is ready, no Agnihotra offering can be made. Therefore, here the pāṭha- krama has to be given up and arthakrama (order as dictated by the purpose and suitability) has to be followed i.e. first gruel must be prepared and then Agnihotra offereḍ ⁶⁷ This is an example showing that arthakrama is more powerful than pāṭhakrama (PMS V. 4. 1). The Parāśarasmṛti lays down that every day one should perform sandhyā (morning adoration), bath, japa (mutte- ring of sacred texts), homa, study of the Veda, worship of gods, Vaiśvadeva and feeding guestṣ The Par. M. says that ⁶⁸ setting aside the pāṭhakrama one must follow the suitability and therefore bath comes first and sandhyā afterwardṣ The Sṃ C. quotes Vṛddhamanu to the effect that a childless chaste widow should offer piṇḍa to her deceased husband and take his wealth. Here it is proper to hold that she should first take his wealth and then perform his śrāddhaṣ In the Vājapeya the text says that the performer (yajamāna) has to tie to the sacrificial post seventeen paśus to be offered to Prajāpati (Tai. Br. I. 3. 4. 2-3). It is also provided that each of the 17 paśus should have several saṁskāras performed on it such as prokṣaṇa (consecration by sprinkling sacred water on it), upākaraṇa (bringing near). One may take any of the 17 animals first and begin to perform the first of the saṁskāras on it; but having once begun with a particular animal he must perform the second and other saṁskāras one after another on the same animal; i. e. the order of the saṁskāras on an animal is determined by the commencement. Kāṇḍa or sthāna is exemplified as follows: The Jyotiṣṭoma is the model sacrifice (prakṛti) of which Sadyaskra is a vikṛti (modification). It is prescribed by the Veda in the case of Sadyaskra that all animals should be sacrificed together at the savaniya stage.⁶⁹ In Jyotiṣṭoma, there are three animals offered viz. ‘agniṣomīya’ in the morning, ‘savaniya’ in the noon and ‘anubandhya’ in the evening. Sādyaskra, being a vikṛti, all these have to be performed in it; but the particular text about it provides that all three must be sacrificed together at the savaniya stage. This (offering all three simultaneously) is impossible and therefore all that can be done is to offer (them) one after another (and not at three different times in the day); it would appear at first sight that the Agniṣomīya paśu comes first; but that is not so, since simultaneous offerings being laid down at the savaniya stage in sādyaskrayāga, the savaniya-paśu is to be first offered (and not Agniṣomīya) and then the Agniṣomīya immediately after and then Anubandhya or these two may be offered in any order one likes (but immediately).

An example of sequence being determined by the mukhya (first or principal) is: there is a śruti passage ‘two Sarasvata, offerings are to be made; this is indeed a divine couple’.⁷⁰ Details are provided as regards the two offerings to Sarasvati and Sarasvata. The doubt arises: are the details about the offering to be made to the female deity to be performed first or are they to be first performed as the offerings to the male deity? The prima facie view being that as no śāstra exists regulating priority one may do as one likes, the established conclusion is that the order of sequence in the case of the details should be determined by the order of the Yājyānuvākyā verseṣ These are mentioned first about the female deity in the words 'pra po devi Sarasvati' (Tai. S. I. 8. 22. 1, Rg. VI. 61. 4). Therefore, the conclusion is that in the details also the offering to the female deity should come first.

In PMS V. 1. 16 it is decided that the order expressed in mantras should be followed in preference to the order contained in Brāhmaṇa textṣ⁷² The Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice is made up of three component sacrifices, Āgneya, Upāmsu and the Agniṣomīya. In Tai S. II. 5. 2. 3, the Agniṣomīya sacrifice is first described and in Tai. II. 6. 3. 3 the Āgneya is describeḍ But these are held to be Brāhmaṇa texts, though now appearing in the saṃhitā texts, since they lay down a vidhi; but in the Mantra-pāṭha the Āgneya mantra ‘Agnir-mūrdhā’ (Tai. Br. III. 5. 7. 1) is first set out and then follows the mantra ‘Agniṣomā savedasī’. Therefore, the Āgneya is to be first per-formed and the Agniṣomīya afterwardṣ

If there are several deities or brāhmaṇas to be honoured with several acts or things, or there are several yūpas (sacrificial posts) as in Aikādaśina animal sacrifice on which several saṁskāras are to be performed from añjana to purīvyāṇa (sur- founding with a girdle), then one should perform all the sams-kāras from añjana to parivyāṇa on the yūpa first and then all these on the 2nd and so on up to the last yūpa or whether one should perform añjana on all yūpas one after another, the next saṁskāra on all yūpas one after another and so on till the last saṁskāra of parivyāṇa is done on all yūpas one after another. The former way is called kāṇḍānusamaya and the latter ‘padārthānu-samaya’.⁷³ Jai. V. 2. 7-9 refers to the first method and Jai. V. 2. 1-3 to the 2nḍ Vide for the explanation and illustration of these two, H. of Dh. Vol. II. pp. 739-740, p. 1132 n 2528 and Vol. IV. pp. 441-42 n 987. On Yāj. I. 232 ('apasavyam tataḥ kṛtvā) the Mit. remarks that the performer of Śrāddha follows the kāṇḍānusamaya method for the Vaiśvadeva brāhmaṇas i. e. gives them water for washing the feet, then ācamana, seat, sandalwood paste, flowers &c, then he should wear the sacred thread on the right shoulder and offer the upacāras to the pitrya brāhmaṇaṣ

The sixth adhyāya of PMS is a very interesting one. It deals with the various aspects of the question of adhikāra, that is, qualifications of the performer of a sacrifice. It is a very extensive chapter having eight pādas like chap. III and X. A few of the numerous propositions contained therein that have influenced the works on Dharmaśāstra have already been set out, such as women's right to participate in Vedic sacrifices, śūdra’s ineligibi-lity for them, the rathakaraṇyāya and niṣādastahpatinyāya and a few more will be dealt with here. As a preliminary Jaimini establishes (in P. M. S. VI. 1. 1-3) that in such texts as ‘one desirous of heaven should offer the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice or one should offer the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice’ the Veda prescribes yāga for one who desires heaven i. e. heaven is the principal (or predominant) factor while yāga is subsidiary or subordinate; thereby it follows that the Vedic text lays down the characteristics of the performer. The Tūptikā says that⁷⁵ 'adhikārī is the owner (or master) who stands above all actions (yāga).' Another more elaborate definition is given as 'adhikārī is one who desires some reward (such as heaven or happiness), who is possessed of the capacity to perform the act prescribed, who has learning and who is not excluded from performing a sacrifice (by śruti)'. Even lower animals desire happiness; hence to exclude them the words 'possessed of the capacity' &c. are addeḍ A man may be totally ignorant and so the word 'vidvān' is added; a śūdra may desire happiness, may have capacity and be also learned but he is excluded by the vedic text, 'Therefore the Śūdra is not fit (or ordained) for sacrifices'.

In VI. I. 39-40 it is established ⁷⁶ that every man belonging to one of the three higher classes has a right to perform Vedic sacrificeṣ A man though at one time devoid of wealth may acquire wealth by various meanṣ Similarly, it is said in VI. 1. 41 that one who is defective in a limb is just like one who is devoid of wealth i. e. such a man has a right to offer Vedic sacrifices provided he takes steps to remove the weaknesṣ In VI. 1. 42 it is further provided that if the defect is congenial and incurable, the person who suffers from such a defect is not entitled to perform Vedic sacrificeṣ The ancient and medieval Hindu law of inheritance and succession was modelled on thiṣ Vide Yaj. II. 140, Manu IX. 201 and Nārada (dāyabhāga, verses 21–22). Yaj. II. 140 declares that the impotent, the outcast and his son, a lame man, a lunatic, an idiot, a blind man and a person afflicted with an incurable disease are not entitled to a share, but are entitled to receive maintenance. This subject has been dealt with in H. of Dh. Vol. III. pp. 610–612. The Mit. on Yaj. II. 140 provides that the grounds of disqualification apply to males and females alike. But the recent Hindu Succession Act (No. 32 of 1956) sweeps away all these grounds of disqualification by providing that no person shall be disqualified from succeeding to any pro- perty on the ground of any disease, defect or deformity or, save as provided in this act, on any other ground whatever (section 28).

A good many sūtras (in chap. VI. 3. 17–41) deal with what are called ‘pratinidhi’ (substitute, representative or proxy). These have been described in H. of Dh. Vol. II. pp. 6841 1110, 1203, Vol. III. pp. 471, 637, 653. 654 (where Satyāṣādha Śr2 S. III containing similar rules is mentioned). A few of them are briefly mentioned here. The first rule is that if the substance declared by the Veda for preparing an offering perishes or is lost as regards an obligatory rite or as regards kāmya rite that is already begun, one should substitute another substance (like nīvāras, wild rice grains ) for vrīhi (rice grains) or yava i. e. barley grains and finish the rite (VI. 3 13–17). In some cases Vedic texts prescribe a substitute for the substance required to be used, as in ‘ if he (the performer) cannot obtain the Soma plant, he should substitute pūtīka stalks and extract juice therefroṃ’ It is argued by the objector that, as the Veda expressly substitutes pūtīkas for soma, one should conclude that where Veda does not expressly mention a substitute for a prescribed substance, it means that a substitute is not allowed by the Veda in other caseṣ The siddhānta is that the prescribing of pūtīkas as substitute is a restrictive rule ⁷⁷ viz. that although several plants may resemble soma, there is a restriction that only pūtīkas should be substituteḍ It is provided (in III. 6. 37, 39) that when a substitute like nīvāras is employed, the subsidiary acts of sprinkling with water, pounding with mortar and pestle that are performed on rice or barley grains should also be per- formed on theṃ When rice grains are employed the mantra of the rice offering as the sap or essence of rice grainṣ There adaptation ( ūha ) is to be made as 'nivārāpaṁ medha' ( vide PMS IX. 3. 1–2 ).⁷⁸ But in certain cases no substitute is allowed viz. the devatā with respect to which an haris ( offering ) is prescribed cannot have another substituted in a rite e. g. ‘Agneyoṣṭakāpālaḥ’ cannot be changed into ‘aindrostākapālaḥ’, since in that case the rite will cease to be what was intendeḍ Similarly, when the text says 'he offers into the Āhavanīya fire,' one cannot substitute the Gārhapatya fire; another mantra cannot be substituted for the one prescribed nor can other rites be substituted for the Prayājas 'samidho yajati' &c. ).⁷⁹

The Veda forbids the use of varakas, koṅdravas and māṣas as unfit for a sacrifice. If a person mistakenly takes māsa grains or particles believing them to be mudga grains or particles and uses them in a sacrifice in which an oblation of boiled mudga pulse is prescribed, he will not be performing the desired rite as what is forbidden as unfit cannot be a substitute.⁸⁰

This nyāya is relied upon by the Mit. on Yāj. II. 126 ( which simply states that if joint family properties are suppressed or concealed by some members and kept for themselves, they should be distributed in equal shares even after partition ( when this is found out ), which holds that this verse cannot be interpreted so as to absolve the concealer of such joint property from guilt simply on the ground that he was himself a part owner and explains that just as a sacrificer mistakenly believing māṣa particles as mudga ones loses the fruit of the sacrifice, so the concealer of joint property is guilty of wrong. The Vyavahārapradīpa ( p. 555 ) and Aparārka p. 732 take the same view, but the Dāyabhāga ( XII. 11–13 ) and V. R. ( p. 526 ) are opposed to this ( vide H. of Dh. Vol. III. p. 636 ).¶ The Prāyaścittatattva p. 482 has an elaborate note on this nyāya. Another rule is that there can be no substitute for the performer of the sacrifice (VI. 3. 21), since (in Jai. III. 7. 18-20) it is laid down that the fruit of the rite belongs to the owner, though after beginning the rite he leaves everything to the priests engaged to perform the rite. The only exception is in the case of sattras (Jai. VI, 3. 22) performed by many persons together acting both as performers and as priestṣ

One important adhikaraņa is VI. 7. 31-40. There is a Sattrā called ‘Viśvasṛjām-ayanam’ which is said to last for 1000 saṁvatsaras. After referring to Tai. Br. I, 3. 7. 7 and I. 7. 6. 2 (śatāyuḥ puruṣaḥ) and to the views of Kārṣṇājini and Lāvukā-yana, Jaimini boldly establishes the conclusion that saṁvat-sara here means day. Vide H. of Dh. Vol. II p. 1246 ṇ 2683 for the Mahābhāṣya stating that the Yājñikas in speaking about such sattras only follow the tradition handed down by ancient sageṣ Medhātithi on Manu I. 84 ('vedoktam-āyur-martyānām) has a long note wherein he refers to the viw of Jaimini, quotes ‘śatāyur vai puruṣaḥ’ and also ‘śatam-innu śarado anti devā’ (Rg. I. 89. 9) and cites the views of other interpreterṣ The Kātyāyana Śr. (I. 6. 17-27) discusses this very subject at great length, refers to the differing interpretations of Bharadvāja, Kārṣṇājini and Laugākṣi but ultimately holds that saṁvatsara means ‘day’ here.

In the first six chapters of the P. M. S. the procedure of such rites as Darśapūrṇamāsa the details of which are expressly laid down by the Veda has been considereḍ In the six chapters from the 7th consideration will be given to sacrifices like Aindrāgna, the procedure of which is not expressly laid down by the Veda.⁸¹ In the 7th chapter what is considered is whether in the vikṛtis (sacrifices that are modifications of the model sacrifices) details have to be added and, if so, which and how many of the details have to be carried out.

The 7th chapter deals with the general question of the extension or transference of details in general (i. e. atideśa in general) to Aindrāgna and other sacrificeṣ Atideśa is the process or method by which the details prescribed in connection with one rite are taken beyond that rite and transferred to another. Śabara quotes from some ancient author a śloka defin ing atideśa. The sacrifice from which details are transferred is called prakṛti (model or Archetype) and the sacrifice to which details are transferred or extended is called vikṛti (or Ectype). Atideśa may be provided for by vacana (Vedic text) or by the name. The first is of two kinds viz. by a direct statement or by an inferential procesṣ For example, as regards a magic sacrifice called Iṣu the text says, after speaking of some details, that the rest are the same as in ⁸² Śyena. An instance of an inferential vacana is the extension to the Saurya sacrifice of the details of the Agneya in Darśapūrṇamāsa, because both are very closely connected and because no details are prescribed by the text about 'Sauryayāga' (PMS VII, 4. 1). The name also is two-fold, viz. name of a rite and name of a saṃskāra. The Māsāgnihotra prescribed (vide PMS II, 3. 24) in Kuṇḍapāyi nāma-ayana is a different rite from the obligatory Agnihotra (as in 'yavajīvanīm-agnihotram juhuyāt') as proved above, but the name 'agnihotra' being common to both, the details of the usual Agnihotra (such as milking the cow, offering curds or milk, using a Khadira fuel stick &c.) are to be extended to Māsāgni hotra (Jai. VII. 3. 1–4). Extension due to saṃskāra name is instanced in Jai.VII. 3. 12–15. In the Varuṇapraghāsa (one of the cāturmāsyas), Avabhṛtha (bath) is prescribed, but no details are added and therefore the requisite details are to be taken from the rules about the Avabhṛtha in Somayāga. ⁸³ Atideśa is frequently resorted to by smṛtis and digestṣ For example, Yaj. I. 236 and 242 extend the procedure of Piṇḍa pitṛyajña as regards Agnaukarana and offering of piṇḍas to the Pārvanaśrāddha. The Parāśarasmṛti (VII. 18–19) speaks ⁸⁴ of a woman in her monthly illness as a cāṇḍālī on the first day of the illness, as the murderess of a brāhmaṇa on the 2nd day and as a washerwoman on the 3rd day. The Par. M. remarks that the intention of calling such a woman by these names is to convey that intercourse with her will result in the same sin as would be incurred by a person of higher classes if he had inter-course with a cāṇḍālī &c. For an instance of express extension, vide V. M. pp. 56–57 when it quotes a verse of Pītāmaha on the balance ordeal (in which the word ‘yūpavat’ is used) and remarks that atideśa is prescribed expressly by the word ‘yūpa-vat’.

The 8th chapter deals with specific cases of extension (atideśa). The Darśapūrṇamāsa is the prakṛti of all ⁸⁵ iṣṭis and ‘Darśapūrṇamāsābhyām yajeta’ is called vidhyādi and vidhyanta is the whole procedure of Darśapūrṇamāsa (except the originative injunction ‘darśapūrṇamāsyābhyām yajeta) detailed in the Brāhmaṇas about the offering of purodāśa (cake) &c. In the Vikṛtiyāga called Saurya ⁸⁶ the sentence ‘one who desires the Sun’ is the vidhyādi, but no details are mentioned there. There is an expectation of some procedure and, though there are numerous vidhyantas in relation to sacrifices, the special word ‘nirvapati’ is indicative of the procedure of Darśapūrṇamāsa (in which also there is nirūpa) and one comes to understand that the Saurya caru is offered as in Agneya (the first rite in Darśapūrṇamāsa). The details of the prakṛti are to be performed in all other iṣṭis along with the few details that may have been stated expressly as to some.

The Jyotiṣṭoma is the prakṛti of all soma sacrifices of one day and of Dvādaśāhā and its details are performed in all modifications of soma sacrifices such as Atirātra. The Agniṣomīya is the prakṛti of all sacrifices in which a paśu (animal) is to be sacrificed, the details of which are to be performed in all vikṛtis of paśuyāgaṣ Dvādaśāhā is of two kinds, Ahīna and Sattra and is the prakṛti of all Ahīna sacrifices like Dvirātra, Trirātra up to Satarātra; and Dvādaśāhā of the sattra type is the model of all sattraṣ Gavām-ayana is the prakṛti of all sacrifices like Adityānām-ayana. Darvihomas are sui juris and are not prakṛtis or vikṛtis of any other sacrificeṣ All these are considered in the 8th chapter.

The 9th chapter deals with ūha (adaptation). When applying the principle of atideśa certain alterations and adaptations are necessary in the matter of mantras, sāmans and saṁskāraṣ The word ūha ordinarily means only tarka or vicāraṇā (reasoning), yet in PMS it has a special meaning.⁸⁷

The Āgneya is the prakṛti in which the nirwāpa (offering) is to be made with the words ‘I offer to Agni what is liked by him'; in the Sauryayāga, which is a vikṛti of Āgneya, the offering has to be made with the words ‘I offer to Sūrya what is liked by hiṃ' In the Vājapeya we read ‘he offers to Bṛhaspati nirūpa grains cooked on seventeen pans'. The Vājapeya is a modification of Darśapūrṇamāsa in which the grains of rice are sprinkled with water; therefore sprinkling has to be done on nivāra grains also (PMS IX. 2. 40). On the 2nd and following days of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice there is recitation of the Subra- hmaṇyā litany⁸⁸ addressed to Indra by the Subrahmanya priest, beginning with the words ‘Indra āgaccha, hariva āgaccha, Medhātither-mesa &c'. In the Agniṣṭut sacrifice also there is Subrahmanyā-nigada ⁸⁹ addressed to Agni. In reciting it the word 'Agne' is substituted for 'Indra'; but the following words 'Hariva āgaccha' is are not to be changed and are to be recited, as they are attributes which may be predicated of Agni also (PMS IX. I. 42-44). The principle deduced by the Mīmāṁsakas seems to be that, only if the words in the original mantra cannot at all be extended to the modified yāga as they stand, then ūha may have to be resorted to but not otherwise. Śabara however, notes that the 'yājñikas perform ūha (i. e. adapt them by suitable changes) i. e. they recite 'agne āgaccha rohitāśva bṛhad-bhāno' etc.). It is noteworthy that, according to PMS II. 1.34 and Śabara thereon, a mantra as adapted (ūhita) is not called a mantra, since only those are mantras ⁹⁰ that are recognized as such by the learneḍ In the Darśapūrṇamāsa when the priest takes out four handfuls of grains and puts them in a winnowing basket he repeats over three of the handfuls the mantra which literally means 'at the command of God Savitṛ, with the arms of Aśvins and with the hands of Pūṣan I take out for Agni thee that art dear (to him)'. ⁹¹ The PMS holds (in IX. 1. 36-37) that the words Savitṛ, Pūṣan, Aśvin are not to be changed by ūha in the modifications of Darśapūrṇamāsa where the deity to which the offering is to be made is not Agni. Śabara assigns rather far-fetched meanings to the words Savitṛ, Aśvins and Pūṣan (as in the note below) and says that they are meant to eulogize the laying aside of the handfuls of grains for offering. There is another interesting case where there is no ūha. In the Darśapūrņamāsa there is a praiṣa (direction) 'set down ⁹² the water for sprinkling, put down the fuel sticks and the bunch of kuśa grass, clean the sruc and śruva ladles, gird up the wife (of the sacrificer) and come out with clarified butter.' Suppose the sacrificer has two or more wiveṣ Still the singular 'patnīm' was to be used and not the dual or plural either in the model itself (IX. 3. 20) or in any modification thereof (IX. 3. 21). Dharmaśāstra works make use of ūha. The Viṣṇu dharmasūtra provides that one should perform Śrāddha of one's maternal grand-father and the latter's two male ancestors in a similar way by the ūha of the mantra. ⁹³ The mantra in the case of the śrāddha of male ancestors is 'Śundhantām pitaraḥ' (Āp. Śr. I. 7. 13), which should be changed into 'Śundhantām mātāmahāḥ'; vide Mit. on Yāj. I. 254 and H. of Dh. Vol. IV p. 513 ṇ 1142a.

When in a sacrifice boiled rice is to be offered the mantra is 'syonaṃ..vrihīņām medha sumanasyamānaḥ' (vide pp. 1398-99 ṇ 2125 above). If boiled rice is destroyed or not available and nivāra grains are substituted, there is no ūha as 'nivārāņām medha' but the words 'vrihīņām medha' are to be retained (PMS IX. 3. 23-26), because, as stated in PMS VI. 3. 27 (sāmānyam tac-cikīrṣā hi ), nivāras are substituted on account of the similarity of parts of boiled nivāras with the parts of rice grainṣ

In the third and fourth pādas of the 9th chapter there are twelve adhikaraṇas about the adhrigu-praiṣa recited by the Hotṛ in Paśubandha. Vide H. of Dh. Vol. II. p. 1121, note 2504 for that praiṣa. There is ūha to be made about certain words therein and PMS explains some of the unfamiliar and difficult words in that text.

The tenth. chapter is the longest chapter in the PMS, having eight pādas and 577 sūtras (i. e. more than one-fifth of the total number of sūtras) just as the third (with 363 sūtras) and the 6th (with 349 sūtras) have eight pādas each. This chapter is concerned with bādha (annulment or exclusion) and abhyuccaya or samuccaya which is the exact opposite or antithesis of bādha. The general rule is that the details of the prakṛtiyāga (model sacrifice) should be taken over in the vikṛti (modification). But in some cases the vikṛti-yāga⁹⁴ has a different name, some of the saṁskāras (purificatory and embellishing acts) and some of the substances (dravya) employed in the prakṛti cannot be extended to the vikṛtis, because there are express texts negatiiving their employment or because they serve no purpose or have become useless or senselesṣ Śābara states that bādha occurs when an idea or knowledge determined for certain as this type or that has to be understood as wrong owing to some (special) reason while abhyuccaya (addition or combination) occurs when even after we have the knowledge that certain matters are to be extended to the vikṛti there is the further idea that a few others also are to be additional in the vikṛti.

The Mai. S. prescribes that one desirous⁹⁵ of long life should offer a lump of one hundred kṛṣṇalas (golden pieces shaped as grains of rice) heated in clarified butter. But no pounding (avaghāta, threshing) is is to be done in this, as the grains being made of gold, there is no chaff which can be separated by pounding (X. I. 1-3). Similarly, no upastaraṇa⁹⁶ (pouring of clarified butter) and abhighāraṇa (the subsequent pouring of clarified butter) are to be done, since in the model sacrifice these two are done for making the oblation to have a sweet flavour (X. 2. 3-11). A caru of rice has to be boiled (i. e. the heat of fire is to be applied to it). In the same way the golden pieces are to be heated in clarified butter by fire (X. 2. 1-2). The golden pieces have to be sucked like sugarcane pieces (X. 2. 13-16), because they cannot be eaten while in the model sacrifice iḍā and prāśitra ⁹⁷ are actually eateṇ In a magic rite like śyena reeds are spread on the ground and not kuśa grass (as in the model sacrifice). This bādha is due to a special text. ⁹⁸ The general rule in vedic sacrifices is that priests have to be chosen and dakṣiņā is to be paid to them at the end but sattras are an exception, since in sattras all are priests as well as performers (yajamānas). Here the exclusion of varaņa (choosing) is due to the fact that in the other sacrifices the yajamāna and priests are different and the latter are engaged for fee. There is a visible purpose in select- ing or engaging priests, ⁹⁹ but in a sattra where ex hypothesi all are yajamānas and priests as well, there is no visible purpose in going through the ceremony of choosing priests (ṛtvig- varaņa).

One example of samuccaya may be giveṇ In the Vājapeya (which is said to be a form of Jyotiṣṭoma according to PMS III. 7. 50-51) seventeen animals are to be sacrificeḍ In the model sacrifice (i. e. Jyotiṣṭoma) also there are certain animals to be offereḍ The question is whether there is bādha of the paśus prescribed in the prakṛtiyāga or whether there is combination (samuccaya). The conclusion is that there is samuccaya (X. 4. 6), because in the Tai. Br. there occur passages like this— "The Brahmavādins say 'why is it that all sacrificial rites are contained in Vājapeya' ? He should reply 'by means of paśus, viz. he sacrifices an animal to Agni, thereby he contains Agnis- soma, he contains the Ukthya &c." This shows that he has to sacrifice also other animals besides the seventeeṇ ¹⁰⁰ The Mit. on Yaj. III. 243 furnishes examples of samuccaya in the matter of expiationṣ

The Tantravārtika ( on PMS III. 3. 14 pp. 859-860 ) collects together about three dozen cases of bādha in general not dependent on either the conflict between śruti, liṅga &c. or not bādha instanced above. They are ‘inference means of knowledge, smṛti by śruti, a contradictory and untrustworthy smṛti by a trustworthy and uncontradicted smṛti, a smṛti with a visible purpose by another with an unseen purpose &c.’

There is in the 10th chapter an important topic about dakṣiṇā ( sacrificial fees ). In X. 2. 22–28 it is established that dakṣiṇā is to be given not for an unseen purpose ( adṛṣṭa ) but for engaging the priests to perform rites required in sacrificeṣ In III. 8 1–2 it is established that the yajamāna ( the svāmin ) is to engage priests for sacrifices except where a vedic text expressly directs otherwise ( as in Tai. S. V. 2. 8. 2 ). In X. 3. 39 the items of dakṣiṇā are set out from Tāṇḍya XVI. 1. 10–11; it is held that the words ‘dvādaśaśatam dakṣiṇā’ mean ¹⁰¹ that the cows are to be 112 ( X. 3. 39, 49 ) and in X. 3. 50 it is provided that the yajamāna should himself distribute the fees not to receive equal shareṣ The four principal priests are hotṛ, adhvaryu, ¹⁰² udgātṛ and brahmā and each of these four have three assistants arranged in a certain order set out in the note below. Suppose there are one hundred cows to be distributed as fee. Each group of four is assigned 1/4 i. e. 25 for hotā and his assistants, the hotā getting 12 and the other three getting respectively 6, 4, and 3 i. e. they get respectively half, 1/3 and 1/4 of what their principal getṣ The same method applies to the other three groupṣ The prima facie¹⁰³ view is that there should be an equal distribution of the fee (cows) as śruti does not lay down any unequal distribution; this is not accepted and it is proposed that the fee should be distributed in proportion to the work done by each. The established conclusion is that both the views are unacceptable and that the distribution should be in accordance with the meaning of the words ‘ardhinah,¹⁰⁴ trtīyinah and pādīnāh’ employed by Śruti.

Manu (VIII. 210) mentions the method of the distribution of fees in Vedic sacrifices outlined above and extends its principles of division to men working jointly on such undertakings as the construction of houses &c.¹⁰⁵ Though the sūtra (samam syād-aśrutivāt) is only the pūrvapakṣa view and not accepted as to the distribution of the cows as fees in Vedic sacrifices, it has been frequently followed as an equitable rule by medieval Dharmaśāstra writerṣ The Sṃ C. relies on it about the liability of sureties (II. p. 152), about equal shares between father and sons in partition (II. p. 260) and II. 285 (distribution of yautaka among unmarried daughters), II. 404. Kullūka on Manu III. 1 (where 36 years are laid down as the period of studentship for mastering the three Vedas) states, relying on the sūtra ‘samam’ &c. that thirty-six years should be equally distributed over the three Vedāśākhāṣ The Madanaratna (on Vyavahāra) p. 202 quotes both verses of Manu (VIII. 210-11), then quotes Manu VIII. 210 (on p. 213) and explains and then sets out the distribution of the dakṣiṇā if it was 112 cowṣ The Vyāharaprakāśa pp. 443 and 548 (on division of mother's yautaka strīdhana by unmarried daughters) refer to the rule of equal divisioṇ Most of these works (as printed) read the sūtra as 'samam syādaśru-tatvāt' and not as Jaimini and Śabara reaḍ

The eleventh chapter deals with tantra which embraces cases where one act serves the purpose of several other acts or riteṣ ¹⁰⁶ For example, there are three yāgas viz. puroḍāśa (cake) baked on eight potsherds for Agni, curds for Indra and milk for Indra; one performance of the Prayājas serves these three (XI. 1. 5-19 and XI. 1. 29-37). Ādhāna (establishment of the sacred fires) is to be done only once and is not to be repeated in each iṣṭi, paśuyāga or somayāga (XI. 3. 2); the utensils required for Śrauta rites are prepared only once and are to be kept till the death of the sacrificer (XI. 3. 34-42). ¹⁰⁷ All these are cases of tantra. The general rule is that the place, time and the performer as regards all principal matters in one composite rite such as Āgneya and others in Darśapūrṇamāsa are one (XI. 3. 1) and also that they are the same for aṅgas (details); but in the case of the aṅgas (details) the place, time and the performer may be different on account of express textṣ

If the fruit or result ( phala ) follows from all the component sacrifices collectively, then the subsidiary details have to be performed only once and not separately in the case of each component; this is tantra. But if the result follows from each of the component sacrifices separately, then the subsidiary details should be performed with each one of those componentṣ That would be a case of āvāpa (decentralisation or scattering). In the Darśapūrṇamāsa there are really two sets ¹⁰⁸ of sacrifices, one called Darśa (on amāvāsyā) and the other Pūrṇamāsa. The subsidiaries prescribed for each are almost the same. Yet they have to be repeated with each of the two sets, the principal reason being that the two are performed on two different days separated by a fortnight, though the two sets together make one single sacrifice leading to a single fruit. Vide PMS XI. 2. 12-18 which is a case of āvāpa.

The Aveṣṭi is a sacrifice which is performed as part of the composite sacrifice called Rājasūya that could be performed only by Kṣatriyaṣ It is also an independent sacrifice that could be performed by any one of the three higher varṇaṣ This is no part of the Rājasūya and is different from it, though the passage about it occurs in the midst of the description of Rājasūya.¹⁰⁹ This is relied upon by the Nirṇayasindhu in connection with the Navarātra from Āśvina 1st to 9th of the bright half. There were different views, viz. Devīpūjā was to be performed for 9 days or on 8th or 9th tithi (vide above p. 154). The Kalikā-purāṇa quotes ¹¹⁰ a verse about Devīpūjā on the 8th or 9th alone of Āśvina (śukla) and the N. S. interprets it as a separate worship on 8th or 9th alone distinct from the whole Navarātra. The same adhikarana where the Pūrvapakṣa proposes that Rāja means any one of any varṇa who rules over a kingdom and offers protection to the country and its cities, the siddhānta (PMS and Śabara) holds that ‘rāja’ is a word expressive of a caste viz. Kṣatriya, and this is referred to by several Dharmaśāstra works like the Rājadharmakauṣṭubha (p. 5). The V. P. refers to this adhikarana and interprets the verse of Nārada viz. ‘one who is an apostate from the order of ascetics would become the slave of the king’ as providing that even a kṣatriya apostate would have to be the slave even of a vaiśya ruler, though the word ‘rāja’ in the primary sense means a kṣatriya yet in a secondary sense (lakṣaṇā) any one who protects subjects could be called rājā. The Par. M. discusses this adhikarana at great length (1. 1. pp. 449–55). It may be noticed that the meaning of ‘rājā’ as kṣatriya in early texts changed to any ruler of any class who protects the country and people ruled over by hiṃ This change is brought out briefly in Tantravārtika on III. 5, 26.

The 12th chapter deals with the topics of prasaṅga, vikalpa and the like. Prasanga occurs when something done in one place is helpful in another place also, just as when a lamp is lighted in a mansion it illumines the public road also.¹¹¹ In connection with the Agniṣomīya animal sacrifice an offering of paśupuroḍāśa (a cake of the meat of the animal sacrificed) in the words ‘having offered the omentum of the animal to Agni and Soma one offers a paśupuroḍāśa cooked on eleven potsherds to Agni and Soma’. The question is whether the details such as prayājas should be performed afresh for this or whether those details performed at the time of offering the omentum will suffice. The established conclusion is that the details already performed at offering paśu (omentum) will serve for the offering of the meat cake also.¹¹² In such cases the place or time and performer are to be the same. This conclusion is relied upon in the Prāyaścittaviveka which says that when a man performs the expiation for twelve years in connection with grave sins of different kinds or of the same kind, there is no necessity of a separate expiation for venial sins on the analogy of paśupurodāśa.¹¹³ Vide H. of Dh. vol IV. pp. 88-91 for twelve years' expiation for brāhmaṇa-murder.

Vikalpa has already been dealt with above (pp. 1249-1252 ).

The preceding pages are enough to exhibit the main doctrines and some of the principal Mīmāṁsā rules of interpreta-tion and the great influence that the Mīmāṁsā exercised for over two thousand years on dharmaśāstra works from the Āpastambadharmasūtra to late medieval works like the Smṛti-tattva, Nirṇayasindhu and Vyavahāramayūkha. An exhaustive treatment of the numerous technical terms, topics and principles of the mīmāṁsā would easily cover a thousand pages, would enormously add to the extent of this work and has to be given up here for reasons of space, if for no other reasoṇ

The Mīmāṁsā rules have been of considerable help to dharmaśāstra writerṣ But it should not be supposed that application of the Mīmāṁsā rules is easy or that the rules always enable scholars to arrive at agreed or certain and definite conclusionṣ Apart from the schism between the Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa schools already referred to above (on p. 1189) there are many circumstances which militate against the certainty and usefulness of mīmāṁsā conclusionṣ There are variant readings in the sūtras themselves (e. g. on I. 2. 9 there are three readings according to Tantravārtika p. 123, on I 2. 14 two readings acc. to Tantrav. pp. 128-129). Śabara omitted the sutra II. 4. 17 (vākyāsamavāyāt) and the Tantravārtika notes (pp. 895-897) that Śabara omits six sūtras after III. 4. 9. Śabara frequently mentions a predecessor called Vṛttikāra with great respect but differs from him in some cases (e. g. on I. 3-5), does not like his way of dealing with sūtras like II. 1. 32, 33 and VIII. 1. 2. Śabara gives alternative explanations of the same sūtra (e. g. of I. 3. 4, VII. 4. 13, VIII. 1. 39). Sometimes he treats two or more sūtras as forming one adhikarana and alternatively treats one of them as forming a separate adhikarana (as in I. 3. 3-4, II. 2. 23-24). He proposes more than two explanations of the same sūtra viz. IV. 1. 2. He puts forward two or more explana-tions of the same adhikarana (as in IV. 3. 27-28, VIII. 3. 14-15 of two sūtras out of four), IX. 1. 1, IX. 1. 2-3, IX. 1. 34-35, IX. 2. 1-2, IX. 2. 21-24, IX 2. 25-28 four explanations, X. 2. 30-31 three explanations, X. 1. 1-2 three explanations, X. 4. 1-2 three explanationṣ On ‘Viṣaye priyadarsanāt’ II, 3, 16 Śabara himself is at a loss as to what the doubt intended by the sūtrakāra is or what the sūtrakāra wants to establish and relies upon what the vṛttikāra says about the passage to be discussed and about the doubt that ariseṣ Besides, Śabara and Kumārila differ about the subject matters of certain adhikaraṇas as in 1. 3. 3-4 (where Kumārila gives on pp. 194-195 a different interpretation altogether after first accepting Śabara’s view), I. 3. 5-7, I. 3. 8-9, I. 3. 11-14. Kumārila shows scant respect for Jaimini by naming him without the honorific title ‘bhagavān’ or ‘ācārya’ on pp. 495, 650, 655, 895, charges Jaimini with composing sūtras not containing much substance (p. 895) and remarks that Jaimini’s sūtra is improper or wrong (e. g. vide p. 1241 about IV. 2. 27).

Kumārila is often critical of Śabara’s bhāṣya and remarks dozens of times that the bhāṣya is improper (ayukta) or deserves to be discarded, is unmeaning or absurd (asambaddha) as on pp. 165, 302 (upekṣitavya), 313 (asambaddha), 314, 662, 710, 731, 863 (asambaddha), 950, 953, 1090-91, 1615 (bahavo doṣāḥ), 1714, 1980, 2004, 2193, 2204.

Another circumstance that makes one entertain grave doubts about the universal validity and usefulness of the principles evolved by the PMS system must also be adverted to. The greatest students of Mīmāṁsā arrive at entirely different conclusions on many pointṣ Some striking cases may be referred to here. One of the most glaring of such cases is the interpretation of the short sūtra of Vasiṣṭha¹¹⁴ (15. 5, na strī putram dadyāt pratigṛhṇīyād vā anyatrānujñādbhartuḥ) ‘a woman should not give or take a son in adoption except with the assent of her husbanḍ’ This has been interpreted in four different ways by works and authors about a Hindu widow’s power of adopting a soṇ The Dattakamīmāṁsā holds that no widow can adopt a son, because, the husband being already dead, no assent of his can be had at the time of adoptioṇ Vācaspati, a Maithila writer, was of the same opinion on the further ground that, as Vasiṣṭha lays down that one about to take a son in adoption should, after having performed a homa in the middle of his house with the vyāhṛtis, take (in adoption) only him who is closely related and who is a kinsman and not remote (in habitation &c.) and, as women cannot perform a homa with Vedic mantras, all women including widows have no power to adopt. But in Bengal, it was held that the husband's assent need not be given at the time of adoption and that it may be given long before the actual adoptioṇ In Madras it was held that the word husband in 'except with the assent of the husband' is only illustrative and that therefore the assent of the agnates of the father-in-law (husband's father) or of the husband's agnates would be enough to enable a widow to adopt. The Vyavahārama-yūkha, ¹¹⁵ the Nirnayasindhu and the Saṁskāra-kaustubha hold that the assent of the husband is required for a woman whose husband is living and that a widow can adopt provided she has not been forbidden to adopt by her husbanḍ For a detailed presentation of these four views and the case law, vide H. of Dh. vol. III pp. 668-674. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (No. 78 of 1956 ) has made far-reaching and radical changes in the Law of Hindu adoptions and section 4 of that Act overrules all texts, rules or interpretations of Hindu Law or customs and usages as part of that law, except in so far as they may have been expressly saved by that Act.

The Mitākṣarī and the Dāyabhāga, both steeped in Mimāṁsā lore, differ on numerous points, some of which are:— (1) The Mit. holds that property or ownership arises by birth, the Dāyabhāga denies it and says it is on the death of the previous owner or by partition; (2) superior right to inherit depends on religious efficacy according to the Dāyabhāga, while nearness of blood relation is the determining factor according to the Mit.; (3) Members of a joint family hold family property in quasi-severalty and can dispose of their shares even before partition according to the Dāyabhāga; the Mit. does not say so; (4) acc. to Dāyabhāga even in a joint family a widow succeeds to her husband's share on his death without male issue, while the Mit. does not accept this view. One may note the great cleavage of opinion (above p. 1230) on such texts as Yāj. I. 81 (whether there is a vidhi or a niyama or parisaṅkhyā); in note 2111 (p. 1291) between the V. M. and Raghunandana both great Mimāṃsakas; in note 2113 p. 1292 on the interpretation of the word 'mātr̥' by Aparārka and the Dāyabhāga; on pp. 1302–3, notes 2133-34 above on Bṛhaspati's verse on re-united coparcenerṣ

In passing it may be stated that to call the Act 'Hindu Adoptions Act' is a travesty and misnomer. It should have simply been called the Law of Adoptions in India and should have retained the ancient Hindu rules for Hindus as developed by the courts and should have been of a permissive character for all Indians like the English Statute (of 1926) on the adoption of childreṇ The general Hindu law of adoption as developed in the authoritative smṛtis and commentaries and the case law did not contemplate the adoption of a daughter (except when she was made in ancient times a putrikā) and to allow the adoption of a daughter when a son was living throws to the winds the basic principle of the Hindu Law that a sonless man should adopt a male as a son for the sake of the presentation of piṇḍas and water (to the Manes) and for continuance of the family name (sections 7 and 11 of the Act). The Act allows a woman (even if not married) to adopt to herself a son or daughter or both and under it a woman, if married, can adopt a daughter even if she has a son but a married woman cannot adopt a daughter if she has already a daughter or a son's daughter living at the time of adoption (sections 8 and 11). The Act does not recognize dvyaṃsyāyana adoptions which were recognized by Sanskrit texts and also by judicial decisionṣ The ministers in the Government and their followers (most of the latter hardly know what Hindu Law was and has been) were carried away by enthusiasm for equality of rights for both men and womeṇ As the Indian Union is now a welfare State and it is professed that laws are to be made keeping in view a socialistic pattern, Govt. should have disallowed adoptions altogether or at least put great curbs on indiscriminate adoptionṣ Instead, they extended the scope of adoption among Hindus by allowing a man to adopt a daughter even when he had a son or sons and by allowing even unmarried women to adopt a son or daughter or both. This is against a socialistic patterṇ If adoptions had been disallowed entirely or allowed within narrow limits cases of escheat to Government for want of heirs would have been many and to that H. D. 168 extent a socialistic pattern would have been advanceḍ There is no evidence to show that women were keen on the right to adopt a son or daughter even when they were unmarrieḍ The first principle of introducing reforms in the existing law is that only strictly necessary changes should be put forwarḍ Reformers and legislators should take to heart the advice of Mr. Aldous Huxley (in ‘Ends and Means,’ p. 30) that change as such is more or less distressing to most human beings, that man’s conservatism is a fact in any historical situation and that social reformers should abstain from making unnecessary changes or changes that are of startling magnitude. Legislators should not forget that when they introduce far-reaching changes to lessen hardships, real or supposed, deemed to be caused by existing social conditions, they very often create new problems for the immediate future. To take a simple example, under the old Hindu Law all girls were to be married before puberty, though Manu (IX. 90) provided that a girl should wait for three years thereafter during which, her parents or relatives might select a bridegroom for her, but that if they failed to do so she may herself choose her partner. This was not a bad provisioṇ People however went in for child marriages for girls and the problem of spinsters never arose. Then over thirty years ago came the Child Marriage Restraint Act (XIX of 1929) whereby the legally allowed marriageable age for girls was fixed at 14. By subsequent amendments and by the Hindu Marriage Act (25 of 1955) the lowest marriageable age for girls is now fixed at 15. This Act of 1929 originally went a long way in raising the minimum age for the marriage of girlṣ Then, after the second world war, owing to economic stringency, and other factors, the tendency of marrying at a late age increased and now the problem of spinsters among Hindus has emerged and great difficulties about the marriages of grown-up women in middle class families are being experienceḍ