Chapter XXXV. The Doctrine of Karma and Punarjanma (transmigration or metempsychosis)

Volume V: Part II pp. 1530–1612

Chapter XXXV. The Doctrine of Karma and Punarjanma (transmigration or metempsychosis)

The doctrine of Karma and Punarjanma (transmigration or metempsychosis )

This is one of the most fundamental doctrines of the Indian system of religion and philosophy, is an endeavour to answer the question that occurs to all thoughtful persons, viz. what happens to man after the death of the body and has influenced for thousands of years or at least from the times of the Upaniṣads all Indian thought and all Hindus, Jains and Buddhistṣ This is a vast subject and has during the last few decades attracted the minds of numerous writers in the West. There is now a voluminous literature in the West on reincarnatioṇ¹ Several countries in historical times believed in transmigratioṇ Herodotus² states that some of the Greeks (whose names he knew but did not disclose) had used that doctrine as their own, but that the Egyptians were the first to teach that the human soul was immortal and that at the time of the death of the body it entered into some other living thing then coming to birth. Pythagoras appears to have believed in it and there are controversies whether he derived it from India. Prof. A. B. Keith (in J. R. A. S. for 1909 pp. 569-606) after a lengthy discussion holds that Pythagoras did not borrow it from India. The present writer does not express any opinion on that subject as it is irrelevant for the purpose of this volume. Hopkins and Macdonnell accept the theory of Indian Influence on Pythagoras, but Oldenberg and Keith do not.

Not only Pythagoras, but Empedocles (who is reported to have said that he was a boy, a girl, a bush, a bird and a fish) and Plato believed in the pre-existence and post-existence of the soul, in the idea that the bodies which will accompany the soul in several births would bear similitude to the lives that they had led, that the happiest would be those who had practised the social and civil virtues called temperance and justice and that supersensible thinking would be the only means of dis- engaging the soul from successive lives of sense. Vide Kenneth Walker’s ‘The circle of Life’ p. 93 (where he says that the doctrine of metempsychosis was probably well-known in India at the time of Christ) and Gough’s ‘Philosophy of the Upanisads’ (London 1882), pp. 25-28, where he cites a long passage from Plato’s Phaedon on this subject and pp. 29-31 for a long quotation from Hume’s Dialogues concernig Natural Religion on the miseries and migration of the soul from body to body. Gough on p. 25 of the above work opines that since in the Vedic literature prior to the Upanisads there is no reference to the belief in the passage of the soul into plants and human bodies, it is reasonable to suppose that the Hindus borrowed this doctrine from the indigenes in the course of their absorption of indigenous blooḍ Vide also ‘Studies in honour of Bloom- field’ pp. 76-88 for G. W. Brown’s views to the same effect. This is a most gratuitous assumption, it is a pure conjecture and without any evidence whatever. If belief in trans- migration could exist among Egyptians and many primitive tribes, there is no reason to assume that Indians did not them- selves arrive at the doctrine, particularly when there exists nowhere else in the whole world any theory of Karma and transmigration so detailed, so influential and so thorough as in Sanskrit Literature. One may dismiss the conjectures of Gough and G. W. Brown as verbiage (the latter conjectures on pp. 87-88 that even the words Yoga, Sānkhya and upaniṣad are coined from similar words in some Dravidian tongue now lost). All Scholars (particularly Western ones when writing about the East) should lay to heart the words of Mallinātha ‘nāmūlam likhyate kiñcit’. The present writer is not against conjectures at all but they must not be bold and must always be treated as such. But the danger is that the conjectures of former scholars or men are often treated as valid conclusions by later writerṣ All scholars must bear in mind Acton’s warning ‘Guard against the prestige of great names; no trusting without testing’. In the H. of Dh. Vol. IV. pp. 38-40 the doctrine of Karma and Punarjanma was briefly discussed in relation to the con- sequence of sins and their removal and details were reserved for treatment later.

In the present chapter the author proposes to examine the Vedic literature for tracing the origin and the growth of this doctrine and the vicissitudes and modifications of it and the objections raised against it in modern timeṣ It is a remarkable circumstance that, though the several darśanas (such as Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Pūrvamīmāṁsā and Vedānta) severely criticize some doctrines of each other, the doctrine of Karma and transmigration received almost unanimous support except among materialists (like Cārvāka). Prof. Wilson in ‘Religion of the Hindus’ (London, eḍ of 1862) vol. II. p. 112 remarks ‘metempsychosis is not only the one point on which all are agreed, it is the one point which none have ever disputed’. The Buddhists and Jains, though they differed on many matters from Vedic and Smṛti literature, adopted this doctrine in their own way. There are some suppositions antecedent to all beliefs in Karma and trans-migration viz. (1) man has a soul, eternal and separate from the physical body, (2) that other organisms, animals, plants and probably inanimate objects possess souls, (3) that the souls of men and lower animals can pass from one kind of physical organism to another, (4) that the soul is both doer and sufferer.

It has already been shown at some length (in Vol. IV. pp. 154–171) how ideas of Heaven and Hell were developed from ancient Vedic times and it has been stated (on p. 158 of that volume) that the doctrine of Karma and transmigration modified the doctrine of Heaven and Hell.

The word karma occurs in the Ṛgveda over forty timeṣ In some passages it appears to mean ‘exploits’ or ‘valiant deeds’ as in the following : ‘Observe the exploits of Viṣṇu’ (Ṛg. 1. 22. 19), ‘proclaim by your word (or verses) the ³ ancient deeds of Him (Indra) who is worthy of praise’ (Ṛg. I. 61. 13); ‘that deed of his (of Indra), who is wonderful, is most worthy of worship, that deed is most beautiful, that he filled with sweet waters of four rivers’ (Ṛg. I. 62. 6); ‘who is firm in each exploit’ (Ṛg. I. 101. 4); ‘O Indra! four are your divine and unconquerable names,... under which you performed exploits’ (Ṛg. X. 54. 4); ‘O Aśvins! frequent drinkers of delicious Soma and Lords of splendour, you helped (or protected) Indra in his exploits against Namuci, son of Asura (or of the Asura breed)⁴ in Rg. X. 131. 4. In several other passages the Ṛgveda ‘karma’ means ‘religious works’ (such as sacrifices or gifts); ‘(the gods) accept (or like) all works of this poet who brings to you a hymn of praise’⁴ (Rg. I. 148. 2); (O Indra, give your ear to (the prayer) of Syāvāśva who offers Soma to you, as you listened to (the prayers of) Atri who performed religious works’ (Rg. VIII. 36. 7); O pure Soma! with thy help our ancient and wise forefathers performed works’ (Rg. IX. 96. 11). In very ancient times Heaven was believed to be the place for enjoying the rewards of most workṣ Rewards of the heroic sons were no doubt prayed for, but it was immortality (amṛtatva) and the joys of heaven, that were highly valueḍ In Rg. X. 16. 4 Agni is prayed to take the deceased to the world of those who performed good works (tābhir-vahainam sukṛtām lokam)⁵. The words ‘sukṛtām lokam’ occur in the Atharvaveda ⁵(III. 28. 6, XVIII. 3. 71) and in the Vāj. S. 18. 52. In Rg. IX. 113. 7–10 the sacrificer who offers Soma to Indra prays that he may be placed in that world (heaven) as an immortal, where there is never-ending light, where Yama, the son of Vivasvat, is the King, where there are joys and delights and where there are desires and their fulfilment. The prayers for immortality are made in the Ṛgveda to all gods, e. g. to Agni in I. 31. 7, IV 58. 1, V. 4. 10., VI. 7. 4, to the Maruts in V. 55. 4, to Mitra and Varuna in V. 63. 2, to Viśve-Devas in X. 52. 5 and X. 62. 1, to Soma in I. 91. 1, IX. 94. 4, IX. 108. 3. But about the fate of evil-doers not much is said in the Ṛgveda. In the Brāhmaṇa works greater details are offered as to rewards of good works and the retribution for evil deedṣ Sāt. Br. (XII. 9. 1. 1) puts forth the idea of retribution (cited above).⁶ The same idea is set forth as to flesh-eating in Manu and Viṣṇu-dharmasūtra, which state "that being whose flesh I eat here would eat me in the next world, the wise declare this to be the origin of the word 'māmsa'." The Śat. Br. in another passage refers to a strange legenḍ⁷ Bhrgu, who had become vain on account of his learning and thought himself more learned than his father Varuna, was asked by his father to go to the four quarters from east to north and report what he would see there. Horrible sights met him in all directions e. g. in the east he saw men dismembering men, owing off their limbs one by one and saying 'this to you, this to me'. He said 'this is horrible'. They replied 'these indeed dealt with us in yonder world and so we now deal with them in return'. Then in the north he saw that men crying aloud were being eaten by men crying alouḍ When he said 'horrible &c'; they replied 'these indeed dealt with uṣ..in return'. This is a long story and it is not necessary to set out the whole. This story probably gives expression to the popular notion of 'tit for tat'. But one thing is clear that the Śat. Br. indicates by this story that a belief had then arisen that one who does evil in one life has to suffer for it in a later life from that being whom he treated badly. The Śat. Br and the Tai. Br. both several times speak of conquering or casting off 'punarmṛtyu' (renewed death, liability to be born and die again and again). Two passages from the Śat. Br. and Tai. Br. may be quoteḍ In X. 4. 4 the Śat. Br. tells the story that gods became immortal by means of the proper performance of Agnicayana as Prajāpati advised them viz. by laying down 360 enclosing stones, 360 Yajuṣmatī bricks and 36 more thereon, 10800 Lokamprā brickṣ In X. 4. 4. 9 it is said 'he who is to become immortal through knowledge (vidyā)⁸ and through sacred works (karman) shall become immortal after separating from the body', and then X. 4. 4. 10 asserts that 'those who know this or those who do this holy work come to life again after dying and coming to life they secure immortal life; but those who do not know this or do not perform this sacred work come to life again when they die and they become the food of him (Death) time after time.' In the Tai. Br. III. 11. 8 the story of Naciketas is narrated just as in the Kathopanisad (some of the verses are the same in both). Death grants Naciketas three boons in the Tai. Br., the third being different in the Kathopaniṣaḍ The third boon asked by Naciketas in Tai. Br. is 'Declare to me how to cast off `punarmṛtyu`.' Death declared to him the Naciketa fire, thereby he (Naciketas) cast off or kept off `punarmṛtyu`⁹ The words '`apa punarmṛtyum jayati`' occur in Kauṣitaki Br. 25. 1 and several times in the Br. Up. I. 2. 7., I. 5. 2, III. 2, 10, III. 3. 2.

From the ancient popular idea of retribution for evil deeds probably arose the idea of the setting of good deeds against the evil deeds of a person and weighing them as if in a balance. The Śat. Br. states¹⁰ 'Now this one is the balance, viz. the right side of the vedi, 2496 Let him sit down touching the right edge of the vedi, for indeed they place him on the balance in yonder world and whichever of two will rise he will follow, wondever it be good or evil. And whosoever knows this mounts the balance even in this world and escapes being placed on the balance in yonder world, for it is good deed that rises and not his evil deed'.

The Śatapatha had arrived at the idea that man's will (and corresponding deed) governs what world he will reach after death. It says 'Let him meditate on truth as brahma. Now man here is mostly will and, according to as his will is when he departs from this world, does he on departing become of similar will in the yonder world'.¹¹

There is a curious passage in the Śatapatha (X. 1. 5. 4) about the powers conferred by sacrifices in the yonder worlḍ It states that he who had regularly performed Agnihotra eats fooḍ in the evening and morning in the yonder world, the performer of Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa sacrifice eats food every half month; the performer of Cāturmāsyas (seasonal sacrifices) eats food in the yonder world every four months; the performer of animal sacrifice every six months; the Soma sacrificer once a year; the builder of the fire after (agnicit) eats food every hundred years at his will or may not require it at all after once taking it, for a hundred years are as much as immortality, unending and everlasting.

The Śat. Br. had arrived at the conclusion that every man is born in a world fashioned by himself. It also asserted that he who sacrifices to the gods does not win such a place as the Ātman and the latter frees himself from the mortal body, from sin, as a snake frees itself from its slough.¹²

It must be conceded that a clear statement about the doctrine of karma and punarjanma is absent from the whole of the Ṛgveda. Rg. VII. 33 is an important hymṇ The first nine verses are spoken by Vasiṣṭha about his sonṣ Verses 10-14 refer to Vasiṣṭha¹³ himself and are either attributed to his sons or according to another view are part of a dialogue with Indra. The verses are mythological, mystical and rather difficult to explaiṇ Verse 10 refers to one birth of Vasiṣṭha when the gods Mitra and Varuna saw him reaching the refulgence of lightning and it is said that Agastya brought him (Vasiṣṭha) to the people. Here the words 'ekam janma' indicate that another janma of Vasiṣṭha is intended in this hymṇ Verse 11 refers to Vasiṣṭha as born of Mitra and Varuna from Urvaśī and states that all the gods placed him in puṣkara (either antarikṣa or lotus); verse 12 is important for the metaphorical and mystical statement that wishing to weave the cloth stretched by Yama, Vasiṣṭha was born from Urvaśī. Verse 13 refers to the seed cast in a pitcher by the two (Mitra and Varuņa) from the midst of which arose (Agastya) and from which also Vasiṣṭha was borṇ Verse 14 is addressed to Pratṛds (the Tṛtsus according to Sāyaṇa) and calls upon them to wait upon (or honour) Vasiṣṭha who would be coming to them (for performing sacrifice. This, it seems, is the second birth of Vasiṣṭha.

Prof. R. D. Ranade¹⁴ in his ‘Constructive survey of the Upaniṣhadic philosophy’ (pp. 145-166) relies upon certain mantras of the Ṛgveda for stating that there is evidence for holding that an approach to the idea of Transmigration was being made by the vedic sages (p. 147), though he concedes (on the same page) that in the major part of the Ṛgveda the idea of transmigration is conspicuous by its absence.

Among the texts on which he relies are Ṛg. I. 164. 3, 4, 16, 17, 20, 30, 31, 38. The whole hymn has several riddles, has highly imaginative descriptions of the year, the path of the Sun, questions and answers and is a late hymn, as he himself admits (p. 150). Verses 3 and 17 contain nothing suggestive of punarjanma. Verse 4 is really concerned with the first creation, as it literally means ‘who saw that one that was first being born, where was the boneless (prakṛti) bears a body possessing bones; where was the life (prāņa) of the earth, or its blood or its self? Who (a pupil) approached a wise one (a guru) to ask this?'. Verse 16 means 'they declare to me the women that exist and the men; one possessing eyes (the light of true knowledge) may see (the Reality); the blind (the ignorant) will not know; the wise son may know this; he who knows these would be the father's father'. Sayana gives several meanings of this verse. The present author fails to understand how the words 'father's father' indicate any reference to transmigration in this verse, as Prof. Ranade assertṣ Why he presses this verse of I. 164 into service the present author cannot understanḍ After referring to I. 164. 32 (which doubts whether he who created all this knows its real nature) he states 'it sets such a high price on the mystical knowledge which it glorifies that any one who comes in possession of this knowledge may be said to be his father's father.' To whom does 'his' refer?.

The verse 20 'dvā suparṇā' also occurs in the Muṇḍakopaniṣad III. 1. and ŚV. Up. IV. 6 and refers to the individual soul and the Supreme Self and tells us that the former is bhoktṛ (taster of worldly pleasures), while the latter simply looks oṇ But so far as the present writer can see there is absolutely nothing about a former or future life in the verse. Verse 30 draws a sharp distinction between the self which is immortal and the body which is mortal and states that the two are bound together to the same place. Verse 31 is a description of the movements of the Sun who is called 'gopā' (protector, guardian) and speaks of his coming to the worlds again and agaiṇ Prof. Ranade sees too much in the words 'gopām', which is applied to Agni (Ṛg. I. 1. 8, I. 96. 7), to Soma (in Ṛg. VI. 52. 3), to Varuṇa (in Ṛg. VIII. 42. 2), to Viṣṇu in Ṛg. I. 22. 18. In Ṛg. III. 43. 5 the words 'gopām janasya' (protector of the people) occur. Prof. Ranade translates (p. 151) 'he saw the guardian returning frequently to mundane regions'. Why should we not translate (particularly when we have the words 'bhuvanesvantaḥ') 'I saw and again returning to the worlds and moving towards me and away from me by different paths'?. Prof. Ranade also¹⁵ relies on Ṛg. X. 3 and particularly on the word 'dharmaṇā' in it which he renders as 'his qualities'. Ṛg. X. 16 has 14 verses, is one of the funeral hymns and the cre- mation fire (as Agni or Jātavedas) is expressly mentioned in eleven verseṣ Verse 3 (addressed to the deceased) may literally be translated as 'may thy eye go to the Sun, ātman (prāṇa) to wind, go to heaven or the earth by dharman or go to the waters if you find your benefit in them; be firmly established in the plants with the limbs of the body.' The express mention of 'heaven' shows that this is only one of the numerous verses of the Ṛgveda in which heaven is referred to as the abode of those who perform good works and that there is nothing more in it than that. Vide above pp. 20–21 for the meaning of dharman (which is the only form of the word employed in the Ṛgveda) viz. 'religious rites or sacrifices' (in most Ṛgveda passages) or rarely 'fixed principles of conduct'. The very next verse (X. 16. 4) contains a prayer to Agni to carry the deceased to the world of people of good deeds (tābhīrvahainam sukṛtām-u lokam). There is no reason to suppose that in Ṛg. X. 16. 3 anything more is meant than what is prayed for in verse 4. Besides, the basic idea of punarjanma is that future existence is regulated by the good or evil deeds of a person and he has no option whatever. In Ṛg. X. 16. 3 the departed spirit is told that he may go to heaven or earth or waters or plantṣ This is not the doct- rine of punarjanma at all. In X. 16. 5 the cremation fire is addressed 'O Agni! send forth the departing man who is offered as an oblation into thee and who will move on with the food offered, again to (the world of) pitṛs; the remainder (left after the body is burnt) putting on a new life may go near ( pitṛs ) and be connected with (a new) body in that worlḍ' This verse con- tains the same idea as in X. 16. 4 in different words and refers only to the other world (pitṛs) and not to transmigration, Prof. Ranade refers (p. 148) to Ṛg. X. 58 and translates one of the verses as meaning that the sage will recall the soul and make it live again by his song. It is not clear what verse or he has probably only the first verse in view. That hymn has twelve verses in each of which a quarter is different but three quarters are the same. None of the verses contains any express word for song. Besides, mind is different from the soul even in the Ṛgveda (vide Ṛg. X. 57. 5 where both words ‘manaḥ’ and ‘jīvam’ occur). Moreover, the man is not yet deaḍ The composer uses the present tense (ā vartayāmasi) and means to say that he will try to prevent his dying. In the present author’s opinion there is not even a distant reference to trans- migration in this hymn or in any of the four hymns (Ṛg. X. 57–60) which are assigned to brothers Bandhu, Śrutabandhu and Vipra-bandhu, who are called Gaupāyanas in the Anukra- maṇī. In Ṛg. X. 60. 7 Subandhu who appears to have been a brother of the three is addressed ‘O Subandhu! here comes your mother, your father, your very life’ etc., and in X. 60. 10 it is said ‘I have brought the mind of Subandhu from Yama Vaivasvata in order that he may live and not die.’

In Ṛg. X. 14. 8 there is no reference (as some suppose) to return to this world after enjoying the fruits of good deeds in the company of pitṛṣ The first half of the verse expresses that the newly departed spirit will be united with pitṛs, with Yama and with his good deedṣ The 2nd half asks the departed to leave behind his sons and be united in heaven with a new and brilliant body.

Ṛg. IV. 42 (in ten verses) is a hymn of a sage-like king Trasadasyu, son of Purukutsa, who identifies himself with Indra and Varuṇa in verse 3 ¹⁷ ‘I who have become enlightened about the worlds Indra and Varuṇa and by my greatness am the two worlds (heaven and earth) that are wide, deep (spacious) and well-fixeḍ I sent forth heaven and earth like Tvaṣṭṛ (Prajāpati) and support theṃ’ Here by virtue of true knowledge he identifies himself with Indra and Varuṇa but there is no conception of transmigratioṇ Similarly, Vāmadeva having attained knowledge of Reality asserts ¹⁸ 'I have become Manu and the Sun, I am the wise sage Kakṣīvat; I reached Kutsa, the son of Arjuni, I am the seer Uśanas; look upon me (as identifiable with all)'. This verse is quoted in Br. Up. I. 4. 10 (which would be set out later on and explained later). In this also there is no express reference to a past birth as Manu or as the Suṇ In Rg. IV. 27. 1 Vāmadeva declares 'while still staying in the womb (of my mother) I learnt all the births of these gods; if a hundred fortresses of ayas (copper or iron) had guarded me, I would have still escaped like a hawk with swiftness' (another meaning is also possible which may be quoted in the Ait. Up. II. 5 (to be quoted and explained later). Prof. R. D. Ranade understands (pp. 49, 153) Rg. IV. 26. 1 as saying that Vāmadeva makes an unconscious utterance that he was in a former life Manu or the Suṇ In that verse Vāmadeva indentifies himself with five persons, Manu, Sūrya, sage Kakṣīvat, Kutsa and Uśanaṣ There is no word like 'janma'. On Prof. Ranade's view Vāmadeva would have to be held to state five previous births at least (and if so in a confused order). Besides, the following verses clearly show that Vāmadeva makes a claim to be identical with the Supreme Principle by giving the earth to the Āryas, sending rain to those who give offerings, making the gods follow his desire or will. The utmost that can be said is that he claims identity with the Godheaḍ Deussen in 'Philosophy of the Upaniṣhads' (p. 318) holds that both the verses (Rg. IV. 26. 1 and IV. 27. 1.) have nothing to do with the doctrine of the soul's transmigratioṇ The present author respectfully agrees with Prof. Ranade is wrong. Śaṅkarācārya ¹⁹ on V. S. I. 1. 30 explains that Indra looking upon himself as brahma according to the Vedāntaśāstra gives the instruction Br. Up. I. 4. 10, and on V. S. III. 4. 51 reiterates that in Rg. IV. 27. 1 the Veda expressly asserts that Vāmadeva, while still in the mother's womb, realized his identity with brahma and then remarks that this vedic assertion indicates that correct knowledge of Reality may arise in a succeeding life owing to the means (or efforts) made in a previous life or liveṣ It may be noted that Śaṅkarācārya draws a distinction between what Śruti (Veda) expressly declares ( vadanti ) and what it indicates or what is to be inferred from it ( darśayati ).²⁰

Mr. J. S. Karandikar of Poona (a staunch disciple and follower of Lokamanya Tilak) in his learned work ‘ Gitātattva- mañjarī ’ (in Marathi, Poona 1947) asserts (on pp. 775-776 ) that the doctrine of transmigration is as old as the Vedic age (i. e. the Samhitās) and relies for this proposition on only four verses of the Ṛgveda viz. X. 14. 8, X. 16. 3 and 5 and X. 135. 6. The first three of these four have been explained above in dealing with Prof. R. D. Ranade’s viewṣ Mr. Karandikar summarises Ṛg. X. 16. 3 as a prayer to Agni that the latter should take the departed to the world of pitṛs and should send him back to his relatives after endowing him with a new brilliant body. There are no words for ‘back to his relatives’ nor for ‘brilliant’ in the verse at all. The word ‘ punah ’ occurs in the first half and refers to the deceased’s coming to pitṛloka after the body is burnt on the earth and the second half refers to the new body to be had in the world of pitṛs (and not to relatives). Ṛg. X. 14. 8. on which Mr. Karandikar relies has nothing to do with returning to the earth. After leaving his bad deeds ( avadya ) behind the deceased is asked to go to the home of the pitṛs with a brilliant body. The brilliant body is not earthly but of the pitṛ worlḍ Ṛg. X. 135. 6. is quoted in the note below.²¹ That verse is an extremely vague one and is a riddle or is metapho- rical. That hymn of seven verses is addressed to Yama and the ṛṣi of it is Kumāra of Yama’s family. The first verse of Rg. X. 135 refers to Yama who is said to drink (Soma) along with the gods under a tree (i. e. in a garden) with fine foliage, where our (my) father, lord of people, desires to send (me) to the ancient fatherṣ It is possible that this refers to Naciketas as Sāyana, following the story of Naciketas in the Tai. Br. III. 11. 8 and in the Kathopanisad, holdṣ This verse may be taken as containing the words of Naciketas, sent by his angry father Vājaśravasa to the world of Yama as donation in the Viśvajit sacrifice. The 2nd verse also contains what Naciketas said viz. that he (at first) looked upon his father in anger, since he (the father) desired to send him (the son) to the ancient pitṛs in that evil way, but that he (on further consideration) liked (what the father did). He liked the idea of facing Yama himself. Verses 3 and 4 are addressed by Yama to the boy Naciketas who approached Yama with prayer (or metaphorically in a chariot). Verse 3 says ‘O boy! the new wheel-less chariot (viz. ṛk prayer) with only one beam that you created by your intellect soars up in all directions and that you mount it without seeing (without considering the result of your action).’ In Rg. a prayer to (and a laud of) gods is often compared to a chariot (as in V. 73. 10, VIII. 3. 15). Therefore, verse 3 suggests two meanings viz. Naciketas went to Yama in a chariot or that he sent up a prayer to Yama. Verse 4 is spoken by Yama ‘O boy! that chariot (i. e. prayer which you sent up from the learned priests on the earth) was followed by Sāman (a melody) from this place (the earth) as if it were placed in a boat.’ Almost all the verses of the Sāmaveda except about 75 are taken from the Ṛgveda and therefore the Chāṇ Up. says ²² ‘therefore Sāman is sung as resting on the ṛk’. As the melody (Sāman) is sung on a ṛk verse, the Sāman is said in this verse (4) as placed in a boat. Verse 4 may also convey another meaning. Sāman also means ‘reconciliation’ and the verse may be taken as referring to the legend that Yama gave the boy a boon that the boy’s father would become well-disposed to hiṃ Verse 5 contains a question (supposed to be asked by Yama). It means ‘who is the father of this boy (meaning probably that the father must be a bad man as he sent his own son to Yama)? Who sent up the chariot? Who would tell me to-day how (this boy) became anudeyi (a small gift accom panying the large principal gift)?' Then follows the verse on which Mr. Karandikar relies as expressing Karma and rebirth. That verse literally means 'as if it stood in front (or on top); the bottom (or base) was spread in front (or first or to the east), the coming out (or end) was behind (or afterwards or to the west).' This conveys no clear sense. But it is possible to explain it in this way, viz. though the boy was sent by his father as an anudeyī (as a subsidiary gift) still he came on top of all (in that Yama was pleased with him and bestowed on him three boons); he was in front of all though he (boy) was at the bottom of all gifts (i. e. though he came last of all gifts)'. There is another possible way of explai- ning this verse. Each Sāman in a stotra has five parts called Prastāva, Udgītha, Pratihāra, Upadrava and Nidhana (finale); vide H. of Dh. Vol. II, p. 1169 note 2589. Naciketas (who was a subsidiary donation following the donation of all hia father's property and designated 'anudeyi') is deemed here to have chanted a Sāman; when he began that, the ṛk verse on which the Sāman rests went forth. The bottom of a Sāman is a ṛk verse. Therefore it is again said that the base or bottom went forward and the 'Nirayaṇa' (i. e. the nidhana of the Sāman) came last. Mr. Karandikar explains verse 6 as the cremation rite of the body of a deceased person shows the two-fold path; by the front path he should go to the highest world or by the hind path he should return to this world' (p. 776). It passes the present author's understanding how this translation follows from the words of verse 6. Verse 7 of the hymn presents no difficulty; it means 'this is the house of Yama that is called the palace of gods; here is played (or blown) the flute (or tube or trumpet) for him (Yama); he (Yama) is embellished with songs (of praise).'

An interesting passage of the Taittirīya-saṃhitā²³ may be cited here. "Whoever threatens a brāhmaṇa, he shall atone for" it with a hundred years; he who strikes him (shall atone) with a thousand years; he who sheds the blood of a brāhmaṇa would not know the world of the Fathers for as many years as the number of the particles of dust that would be moistened into a ball by the stream of blooḍ Therefore a person should not threaten a brāhmaṇa or strike him or draw blood from his body, since (in doing so) so much (sin) is involveḍ” This does not mean that only the world of Fathers had been conceived at the time of this passage (as Deussen supposes on p. 325 of his Ph. Up.). It will be shown below that even the Ṛgveda was well aware of both Devayāna and Pitṛyāṇa. Most men would go to pitṛloka presided over by Yama according to the Ṛg. and only the blessed would go by the Devayāna to the world of godṣ This passage is important as conveying that for a very mortal sin the offender would have to suffer for a thousand years or even several thousand years and, therefore, would have to be born for several lives, since one human life was held to extend to one hundred years only (Ṛg. X. 161. 4 = Atharva III. 11. 4, Ṛg. I. 89. 9 = Vāj. S. 25. 22). Following the above Tai. S. passage, the Gautama Dh. S. provided that threatening a brāhmaṇa in anger would bar going to heaven for a hundred years (or lead to hell for &c), striking him would bar for a thousand years and on drawing blood there would be bar for as many years as the number of the particles of dust that would be made into a ball by the stream of blooḍ Manu (XI. 206-7) understands that the several acts against a brāhmaṇa mentioned therein would lead to the offender being consigned to hell for 100, for 1000 or for thousands of yearṣ Jaimini (III. 4. 17) discusses this passage and holds that the prohibition is not restricted only to Darśapū- ṛṇamāsa, but it applies to all brāhmaṇas in all conditionṣ It is possible to understand by the words ‘śatena’ and ‘sahasreṇa’ as a hundred or a thousand cows (or money). The Tantravār- tika refers to this meaning but seems to prefer the idea of connecting the two words with yearṣ Vide H. of Dh. Vol. II. pp. 151-152 where the first meaning was put forward and also A. B. Keith’s tr. of the Tai. S. in the H. O. S. vol. I pp. 216-217 ‘him who reviles him (a brāhmaṇa) he shall fine with a hundred’ &c.

The doctrine of how a man’s own works and conduct fashion his future life is taught as follows in the ²⁴ Br. Up. IV. 4. 5-7: "so truly according as he works and according as he behaves so will he be, a man of good deeds will become (be born) good, a man of evil deeds will become (be born) evil; he becomes holy by holy deeds, evil by evil deedṣ Here they say 'a person only consists of desires (or is fashioned out of) desires and as his desire is so will he be (determination or) will and as is his will, so is his deed; and whatever deeds he does that he will become (reap).' ²⁶ On this there a man's mind and subtle body are attached to that he goes together with (the fruits of) his deeds and after having obtained the end (the last results) of whatever deeds he does in this world, he re- turns again from that world (where he temporarily went by way of reward) to this world of action; so much with regard to him who is consumed by desires; now concerning the man who has no desires (akāmayamāna); he who is without desire, free from desire, in whose case desires are laid to rest, who is himself his own desire, his vital spirits do not withdraw elsewhere but he, being brahma itself (here), is absorbed into brahma (or attains to brahma). On this point there is a verse: ‘When all hanker- ings that found an abode in a man’s heart vanish, then he who was liable to death becomes immortal, here (in this body itself) he attains to brahma.” In the above passage the sequence is: desire, will and act.

About the grandeur of this passage it is enough to quote what Deussen (in ‘Philosophy of the Upaniṣads’ p. 348) says ‘there follow words than which deeper, truer, more noble were never uttered by human lipṣ’ Vide also remarks of Gerald Heard in ‘Is god evident’ (Faber and Faber, London) p. 34 ‘Here (in Vedānta and Mahāyāna) is spirituality showing its full fruits; freedom from physical craving, from economic possessiveness, from social desire for recognition and that triple freedom removing all fear’ and he hopes that the Vedānta picture, far from being contra- dicted, is being increasingly confirmed by modern science.

This sublime passage is preceded and followed by illus- trations two of which may be cited for explaining the conception of the passage of the soul from one body to another: ‘Just as the caterpillar, having reached the tip of one blade of grass, makes an approach to another blade, draws itself towards it and establishes itself thereon, so this (individual) self, casting down this body in death, dispelling avidyā (ignorance) and making approach to another body draws itself to another body and esta- blishes (or identifies itself) thereiṇ’ This is Br. Up. IV. 4. 3. Another illustration (in Br. Up. IV. 4. 7) is ‘just as the skin (slough) of a snake lies dead and cast-off in an ant-hill, in the same way the body lies (dead and cast-off) and then the self is bodiless, immortal spirit, is brahma only and is light only.’

This whole passage (Br. Up. IV. 4. 5–7) is the leading, the oldest and the clearest passage on the doctrine of trans- migration in the Upaniṣadṣ There are several others of similar import. At the end of the story about Yājñavalkya and Ārtabhāga referred to above (where Yājñavalkya discussed with Ārtabhāga alone in private the question as to what happens to a man when the body dies) the upaniṣad states 'what they said was Karma alone, what they praised was Karma alone viz. ²⁷ that a man becomes good by good works and evil by evil workṣ' These two are the fundamental passages which express the reason and motive that lie at the basis of the doctrine of transmigratioṇ

The gist of these two passages is that works and conduct done in this life fashion a man's future life or liveṣ But works and conduct are the result of volition or will and this last is due to desireṣ A man may have several desires, he may curb some of them, but may make a resolve to consummate some of his desireṣ Therefore, desires (kāma) are the root of volition, of works and conduct and ultimately of the cycle of birth and deaths (that is called 'saṁsāra'). Hence Śaṅkarācārya, following the idea of the verse 'yadā sarve pramucyante kāmā' (in Br. Up. IV. 5.7) says 'Kāmo mūlaṁ saṁsārasya' (Kāma is the root of saṁsāra).

2. There the story is told of Śvetaketu, son of Āruṇi, who being proud of his learning, came to the assembly hall of the Pañcālas and saw there Pravāhaṇa Jaivāli (a kṣatriya or prince) being waited upon by servantṣ When the prince saw him he asked Śvetaketu 'have you been taught by your father?' When Śvetaketu replied 'yes', the prince put to him five questions viz. (1) do you know how men when they depart from this world go in separate (different) directions; (2) Do you know how they come back to this world; (3) Do you know how the yonder world does not become full with many men going there again and again; (4) Do you know at the offering of which oblation waters become endowed with human voice and rise and speak; (5) Do you know the access to the path called 'Devayāna' ²⁸ and to the path called 'Pitṛyāna' (i.e. the deeds by which men gain access to the paths called Devayāna and Pitṛyāna), for we have heard the saying of a sage 'I heard two paths for men, one leading to the Fathers and the other leading to the Devas; on those two paths all the world that is active moves on, whatever exists between father (sky) and mother (earth).' To all these five questions Śvetaketu replied that he did not know any one of theṃ The prince offered hospitality but Śvetaketu ran to his father and demanded how the latter could say that he had been thoroughly-taught by him and that he could not answer even one of the five questions that the fellow of a Rājaṇya askeḍ Then the father replied that he had taught all that he knew but he himself did not know the answers to those questionṣ He went to the prince (kṣatriya) who honoured him with offeringṣ Āruṇi did not want wealth but the replies to those questionṣ The prince said 'come as pupil.' Āruṇi (Gautama) stated he came as a pupil. The prince stated that the vidyā²⁹ that he would teach was never before with any brāhmaṇa. Then he propounds to Śvetaketu the answers to the five questions (to be brief) viz. that the five fires are (figuratively) heaven, god of rain, the earth, man and woman, and the five āhutis (oblations) are śrāddha (faith), Soma (Moon), rain, food and seeḍ This answers the 4th questioṇ The first and fifth questions are answered by the statement 'Some go by the path of Devas, others by that of pitṛs and others (like flies and worms) know no path (they merely live and die)'; vide Br. Up. VI. 2. 15–16. The 2nd and 3rd questions are answered by the same viz. those that go by the path of pitṛs return to the earth and others that go to brahman do not return and therefore the world does not become full.

In the Ch. Up. V. 3. 2 the questions are put in a slightly different form: (1) do you know to what place men go from here, (2) how they return, (3) do you know where the path of devas and the path of the fathers diverge, (4) why the world never becomes full, (5) why in the 5th oblation water is called 'maṇ' The answers to these in Br. Up. and Chāṇ Up. are not identical, though very similar. A fire has five constituents, fuel, smoke, flame, live coals, sparkṣ In both Chāṇ Up. V.10.4–9 and Br. Up. VI. 2. 9–13 the fires are the same, but the constituents of each of these five differ slightly; compare, for example, Br. Up. VI. 2. 11 with Chāṇ Up. V. 3. 6. The first question in the Ch. Up. is answered by the mention of the two pathṣ The 2nd is answered in Chāṇ Up. V. 10. 3-5.³⁰ The paths diverge (3rd question) after reaching the moon (Chāṇ Up. V. 10. 2 and 4-5), the 4th is answered in Chāṇ V. 10. 8. The fifth is answered by means of the statement on pañcāgnividyā.

Before proceeding further some remarks are called for about what might possibly happen when a man's body dieṣ There are mainly three possibilities, viz. (1) annihilation, (2) endless retribution in heaven or hell and (3) punarjanma (transmigration). Those who do not believe in an individual immortal self, including some most eminent³¹ men such as G. B. Shaw, hold the first view and even in ancient India (as the Kathopaniṣad I, 20 testifies) there were people who had doubts about survival after death. Those who hold that there is no survival after death are not troubled by other questionṣ Therefore, the most vital question is the one about survival after death. The very first verse of Śv. Up. puts forward four problems; is brahma the cause, whence do we come, what sustains us and whither we are going? Many of those who believe in God, heaven and hell do not admit pre-existence of the soul but only post-existence. They believe that if a man leads a virtuous career in this life (and virtue according to them consists in obedience to the will of God as disclosed to their intellect in Revelation such as the Bible or the Koran) he would have an eternal life of bliss in heaven and that if one led a life of sin and evil, he would after death remain for ever in hell. Very few accept the first possibility (annihilation) because it is in conflict with man’s cherished desires and with deep-rooted emotional certitude that efforts made in a long life, the mental and spiritual equipment acquired cannot have been meant to be dissolved altogether without leaving any trace behinḍ The 2nd possibility also leads to the prospect of eternal reward or eternal damnation for acts done during a life of a few years’ span and becomes unacceptable to many by the unparalleled disproportion between deeds (as causes) and their endless rewards or retribution (as effects). Therefore, to many people the third possibility of transmigration appeals, since it allows continued existence of the soul after physical death in some other forms and environmentṣ

The above Upaniṣad passages are enough to show how the doctrine of transmigration was being moulded in the Upaniṣad perioḍ The Ṛgveda knows the two paths of Devayāna and Pitryāna and also that in heaven there were joys and delights but the Ṛgveda does not say how long the joys of Heaven were to last and makes no clear and definite statement on the doctrine of transmigratioṇ In the Brāhmaṇa period the two paths were often referred to and the conception had dawned upon the minds of thinkers that man might have to pass through death several times (punarmṛtyu). But even then there is hardly any definite theory of punarjanma based on good or bad deedṣ The clearest statements (and probably earliest) of the origin of the doctrine of transmigration are the two passages (Br. Up. III. 3. 13 and IV 4. 5-7) in which Yājñavalkya is concerned and is the instructor and emphasizes that it is man’s own works and conduct that lead a man to new birthṣ In both those passages the Devayāna and Pitryāna paths are not mentioned at all. But the Br. Up. VI. 2. 16 and Chāṇ Up. V. 10 relate the two paths to transmigration and speak of a third place for those born as worms and flieṣ This is an addition to the doctrine of the two paths, but they make a further departure. The Chāṇ Up. V. 10. 5 states that those that perform sacrifices, works of public utility and charity go to the moon and when the results of their actions are exhausted after staying in the moon world by the path they went (i. e. from Vayu, smoke, mist, cloud and rain and they may be born from a mother's womb.³² This shows that a double retribution awaits those who perform sacrifices &c. viz. stay in the moon for a time and their rebirth on this earth. Other Upaniṣads follow the Chāṇ Up. in the theory of double retribution e.g. the Praśna has the following passage in prose: ³³ “The year indeed is Prajāpati, there are two parts thereof, the southern and the northerṇ Now those who believe in sacrifice and gifts for public utility as work that must be done, secure the moon only as their (future) world and it is they who return to the southern (path). That path of the Fathers is indeed treasure (or wealth). But those who, after having sought the Ātman by austerities, (sexual) abstinence, faith and knowledge go by the northern path to the Suṇ This is the home of the vital spirits, it is immortal, free from fear, it is the highest (or final) enḍ Thence they do not return, that is a check to other thingṣ On this there is a verse (Rg. I. 164. 12) 'some call him the father with five feet (the five seasons) and with twelve forms (twelve months), the giver of rain in the highest of heaven; others again say that the sage is placed in the lower half, in the chariot with seven wheels (horses or rays of sun) and six spokes'". This verse of the Ṛgveda is probably quoted here in support of the conception of the two paths symbolically represented as two parts of the year, as the Ṛg. verse (first half) appears to refer to the Sun, placed in highest half of heaven and as the second half seems to refer to a lower (upara) half of heaven with six spokes (i. e. the six months of Dakṣiṇāyana). Deussen (Ph. Up. p. 338) is positive that Rg. I. 164. 12 has nothing to do with with the subject (of the two paths). But what is there to prevent an ancient sage of the Upanisadic times from holding that the verse in its two halves refers (figuratively or symbolically) to two paths, particularly when even in the Ṛgveda times paths called Devayāna and Pitṛyāna were well-known as shown below ? It should be noted that in the preceding verse (I, 164. 11) the wheel of ṛta (the year or the sun) is Dvādaśāra (with twelve spokes, viz. months) and therefore when saḍara (with six spokes) is mentioned in I, 164. 12 a period of six months could well have been intended or could very well be got by interpretatioṇ

The Kauṣītaki Up. (I. 2-3), however, speaks only of Devayāna and Pitṛyāna and has no third place for worms and birds &c. and states (vide n 2520 below) that worms &c. also come to the same world to which men returṇ Further, the stations of the Devayāna path (Agni, bright half of the month etc.) had been given a counterpart in the Pitṛyāna path in the Br. Up. and Chāṇ Up. which made the moon the point of divergence for the two pathṣ The Kauṣītaki Up. omits all the preliminary stations up to the moon and brings all transmigrating beings to the moon (in I. 2). There are some other variations also that need not be dwelt upon here.

Deussen (in Ph. Up. p. 318) argues that in the Ṛg. verse (X.88. 15) the two ways are really to be understood as day and night and he translates that verse as 'I have heard from my forefathers that there are two ways alike for gods and men', thus giving to the world 'pitṛnām' the sense of the ablative and holding that 'my' is to be understood before pitṛnām, though not to be understood before the other two words in the genitive in the same verse. The meaning which the Upaniṣad reads in the Ṛg. verse is proper and also the original meaning of the verse. The path called Pitṛyāna ³⁴ is mentioned in Ṛg. X. 2.7 (Agni knows well the path called pitṛyāna) and Ṛg. X. 18. 1 runs 'O Death ! Follow another path which is your own and different from Devayāna.' These two verses clearly show that the Ṛgvedic sages had arrived at the conception of paths called Devayāna and Pitṛyāna. Therefore, the express mention of two paths in Ṛg. X. 88. 15 in connection with Pitṛs and Devas should be deemed to refer to Pitṛyāna and Devayāna paths and it is far-fetched to take them as day and night, which are hardly ever referred to in the Ṛgveda as pathṣ This verse is explained in the Śat. Br. XII. 8. 1. 21 ³⁵ (quoted below) which says that the two ways are those of the gods and pitṛs and the commentary of Dvivedaganga explains the first half in the same way. Vide also Śat. Br. I. 9. 3. 1–2. Devayāna is sometimes used in the plural in the Ṛgveda (as in III. 58. 5, VII. 38. 8, VII. 76. 2, X. 51. 5, X. 98. 11). In Rg. X. 15. 8 Yama is said to enjoy offerings along with the ancient fore-fathers of the sage and in X. 154. 4 Yama is requested to be united with ancient pitṛs, righteous and full of austeritieṣ The Śat. Br. (XIII. 8. 1. 5) states that the door to the world of the Fathers is in the southwest, while Northeast is the direction of Gods and men (I. 2. 5. 17 and XII, 4. 2. 15). The Atharva-veda (XV. 12. 5.) mentions both Pitṛyāṇa and Devayāna pathṣ Soma, rain, food, retas (semen) may be described as watery, but the question is how the first āhuti ‘śrāddha’ (faith) can be des-cribed as an āhuti offered in Agni (viz. the yonder world) by the Gods from which king Soma arises (in Chāṇ Up. V. 4. 2 and Br. Up. VI. 2. 9). This is answered by V. S. ³⁶ III. 1. 5 and (and at some length) in the Śaṅkarabhāṣya thereoṇ

The Kauṣītaki Up. (I)³⁷ sets out rather obscurely the doctrine of the two paths as part of the Pañcāgnividyā taught by Citra Gārgyāyaṇi (v. 1. Gāṅgyāyaṇi) to Śvetaketu, son of Āruṇi. It is passed over here for reasons of space and as not of material importance except one passage which runs 'He (Citra) said that all those that depart from this world go to the moon; in the bright half the moon is increased by their spirits, in the dark half the moon sends them on to be born agaiṇ The moon is verily the door of the heavenly worlḍ Now if a man disowns the moon (i. e. is dissatisfied with life there) the moon sets him free. But if a man is not dissatisfied then the moon sends him down as rain here (on the earth). And according to his deeds and according to his knowledge he is born again here as a worm, a locust, a bird, a tiger or a lion or a fish, or a snake, as a man or as something else in different placeṣ' Then I. 3 begins by referring to Devayāna and I. 4 ends by saying, ‘being freed from good deeds and from evil deeds, he, the knower of brahman, (neuter) moves towards brahman alone.’

In the Kathopaniṣad ³⁸ Yama tells Naciketas the secret about Brahmavidyā and what the self becomes on the death (of the body) viz. some men go to a mother's womb for an embodied existence while others are transferred into stumps (of trees) according to their deeds and knowledge.

The Br. Up. VI. 2. 15–16 and Chāṇ Up. V. 3. 10 ff deal with the question of those who go by Devayāna and by the Pitṛyāna pathṣ First ³⁹ the Br. Up. ‘Those (even householders) who know this (Pañcāgnividyā) and also those (hermits and ascetics) who, in the forest being full of faith, worship Truth (Brahman, Hiraṇyagarbha) go to arcis (light), from arcis to day (ahan) from day to the increasing fortnight (i. e. śukla-pakṣa), from the increasing half to the six months during which the Sun moves in the north, from those six months to the world of the Devas (Devaloka), from the Devaloka to the Sun, from the sun to lightning. When they have reached the place of lightning a person born of the mind (of Brahmā) comes to them and leads them to the worlds of Brahmā. In these worlds they being exalted, dwell for ages and there is no return (to saṁsāra) for theṃ But they who conquer (attain) worlds by sacrifice, charity and austerities go to smoke, from smoke to night, from night to decreasing half (of the month), from decreasing half month to the six months during which the Sun moves in the south, from these months to the world of the fathers, from the world of the fathers to the Moon, having reached the Moon, they become food and then the Devas feed on them there as sacrificers feed on king Soma as it increases and decreases (in a sacrifice). But when this (the result of their works done on earth) is exhausted they return to either (ākāśa), from that to Vāyu, from Vāyu to rain, from rain to the earth; on reaching the earth they become fooḍ They are then again offered into the fire called man, from that (i. e. man) they are born in the fire called womaṇ These, making efforts to secure worlds (by sacrifices &c.), again and again repeat coming to this worlḍ Those, however, who do not know both these paths, they become (are born as) worms, locusts (or birds) and flieṣ

The Chāṇ Up. V. 10. 1–2 are almost in the same words as Br. Up. VI. 2. 15 with a few slight changes viz. Chāṇ Up. reads ‘śrāddha tapa ityupāsate’ and ‘from months in the north to the year, from year to the Sun, from the Sun to the Moon, from the Moon to lightning; there is a person who is not human (amānavaḥ) for ‘mānasah’ of Br. Up.) who leads him to brahman &c.; then Chāṇ Up. V. 10. 3–4 are again the same as Br. Up. VI. 2. 16 except that Chāṇ Up. reads ‘those who living in a village practise (a life of) sacrifices, works of public utility (called pūrta) and almsgiving, go to smoke’, but adds ‘these do not reach the year,’ and proceeds ‘from the months to the world of fathers, from that world to ether, from ether to the moon, this is king Soma that is the food of Gods (i. e. the gods like or love them). Having dwelt there (in the moon) till their works are exhausted, they return by the same way by which they came i. e. to ether, from ether to Vāyu, smoke, mist, clouḍ (The persons that had performed sacrifices &c) having become clouds come down as rain, are then born as rice and barley, herbs and trees, sesame and māsa beanṣ Escape from that state (to that of human beings) is beset with extreme difficultieṣ Whoever the beings (cattle or other animals or man) may be that eat the food (into which one has been transformed) and beget offspring he (the transmigrating entity) becomes most like theṃ One of the most important passages in the Upanisads on conduct fashioning the life that would follow is the Chāṇ Up. V. 10. 7–8 which may be rendered as follows: ²⁵²³ Those whose conduct has been good will quickly attain some good birth, the birth of a brāhmaṇa, of a kṣatriya or of a vaiśya. But those whose conduct has been evil will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog or a hog or a cāṇḍāla. Those that do not go by either of the two paths become those small creatures (worms, flies &c) that are continually returning and whose destiny may be said to be ‘to live and die’. Theirs is a third place (apart from the two paths). Therefore the yonder world does not become full. Hence one should be disgusted (with this Saṁsāra).

It may be stated here that the Bhagavadgītā (VIII. 23–27) also refers to the two paths following one of which a yogin does not return to this world and following the other of which he returns to this worlḍ These are called śukla (bright) and kṛṣṇa (dark) gati (in VIII. 26) and ārti (in VIII. 27). The former is fire, light, ²⁵²⁴ day, the bright half of the month, the six months of the northern path of the sun; those men who have realized brahman when going from this world go to brahman (the absolute)'. The latter path is ‘smoke, night, the dark half of the month, the six months of the southern path of the Sun; the yogin reaching the moon-light by that path returns to this worlḍ The Śāntiparva ²⁵²⁵ of the Mahābhārata refers to the northern and southern paths, the latter of which is attained by gifts, study of Veda and sacrifices (as in Br. Up. VI. 2. 16 and Chāṇ Up. V.10.8). The Yājñavalkya-smṛti ²⁵²⁶ also refers to those pathṣ In III. 195-196 it mentions the Pitṛyāṇa path, which is very like the one described in Bṛ. Up. VI. 2. 16 (except that Yāj. omits ākāśa) and Chāṇ Up. V. 10. 3-7 (which mentions more stages than in Bṛ. Up.). Yāj. III. 197 also states that those who do not know any one of these two paths (i. e. do not perform the acts peculiar to those who go by these paths) become snakes, locusts, creeping insects or wormṣ

The Vedāntasūtra frequently refers to the doctrine of trans- migration, but owing to the limits imposed by available space only a few important sūtras and their explanations will be set out here. The three sūtras of V. S. II. 1. 34-36 ⁴⁴ are of great importance for the theory of transmigratioṇ An objector says 'to hold that God is the cause of the world does not stand to reason, for, if it be so, God would be liable to the charges of un- equal treatment (or dispensation) and cruelty. He creates some that enjoy extreme happiness (like gods and others), some lead an extremely miserable life such as beasts (of burden &c.) and some like men, who enjoy an intermediate position, secure a modicum of enjoyment. So God may be charged with acting through hatred and love (like ordinary men). God also produces misery and finally destroys all personṣ This aspect (of great cruelty) appears abhorrent even to evil meṇ To this the reply is: if God had created inequality in the world at his sweet will and without regard to any other matter, he might have been liable to the two charges of unequal treatment and cruelty. But God has regard to the righteousness (merit) or other- wise of beings when he produces inequalities among creatureṣ The position of God should be looked upon like that of rain, which is the common cause (or factor) in the production of crops of rice and barley, but the difference (in quality) between rice and barley is due to the varying potentialities of the seedṣ God is the common cause in the creation of beasts, men and gods but the inequalities in these are due to the special potentialities of each. Śaṅkarācārya relies expressly on two Upa- niṣad passages viz. Kauṣ Up. III. 8 and Bṛ. Up. III. 2. 13 'punyo vai puṇyena, karmaṇā bhavati pāpaḥ pāpena). The Kauṣ Up. passage means 'He ⁴⁶ (the Absolute Ātman) is not exalted by good works nor degraded by evil works, but it is He indeed who inspires (a person) to do good works, whom he wishes to lead high over those worlds and it is he who in-spires one to do evil deeds whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds'. It will be noticed that the Kauṣītaki bases the attainment of a higher life (or birth) or a lower life on the quality of men's deeds (just as in Br. Up. III. 2. 13, IV. 4. 5, Chāṇ Up. V. 10. 7, Praśna 3. 7 ). The Gīta states 'I treat them the same way (with appropriate fruits) in which they come to (or approach) me.'

Another objection is raised to the above proposition contained in V. S. II. 1. 34. The Upaniṣads often state 'In the beginning there was that only which is one without a second (Chāṇ Up. VI. 2. 1 sad-eva somyedam agra āsīd-ekam evā-dvitīyam). Therefore, before creation there was no difference between deeds and so there could have been no inequality among the first created beings dependent on difference in deedṣ You may say that after difference in deeds arose God has regard to deeds of men, but all beings created in the beginning must have been alike. To this the reply is that saṁsāra is without beginning (anādi) and that such a conception of the beginning-lessness of saṁsāra stands to reason and is supported by (Śruti) textṣ

Another discussion on the working of Karma occurs in V.S. II. 3. 41-42.⁴⁶ According to the highest metaphysical doctrine the Ātman is one and all individual selves are really free but they are affected in the empirical state by the Upādhis of buddhi, mind &c. and in that state they are controlled by Īśvara (as Anta-ryāmin, as Br. Up. III. 7. 23 or Kauṣ. Up. III. 8 says) and they receive the fruits of their good and bad actions through Isvara who does not act at his sweet will but has regard to good or bad conduct.

A few passages about karma and transmigration and stories illustrating how people's minds were affected by them in ancient times may be cited here. The Ap. Dh.⁴⁸ S. provides 'Members of all varnas (classes) reap (in heaven) highest and measureless happiness by carrying out their prescribed duties; thereafter (i. e. after enjoying happiness in heaven) they return (to this world) on account of the (unenjoyed) residue of the results of their actions and secure birth in an (appropriate) caste (or family), beauty of form, charming complexion, power, mental ability, wisdom, wealth, the (blessing of the) performance of duties and this results in happiness only in both worlds like a wheel. A similar rule applies to the increase of the results of evil actṣ The thief of gold, one guilty of brāhmaṇa murder, according as he belongs to the brāhmaṇa, kṣatriya or vaiśya class, after undergoing torments in hell for a limited time becomes respec- tively a caṇḍāla, pauľkasa or vaiṇa.' The Gautama Dharma- sūtra has a passage in very similar words: 'Members of the varnas (brāhmaṇa and others) and of āśramas (brahmacārin &c) who are devoted to performing the appropriate duties (of their class or stage in life) enjoy the fruit (heaven) of their actions after death and then by virtue of the residue (of their actions) they attain a (new) birth (in this world) endowed with a good country, caste, family, life, learning, character, wealth, mental ability and happinesṣ Those who act contrary to this are ruined by having to resort to many (evil) birthṣ' On V. S. III. 1. 8 Śaṁkarācārya after quoting Gautama XI. 29 states 'there is no possibility of the destruction of the effect of an evil deed except by some of the methods prescribed by śāstra (such as expiations and realisation of the Absolute) and that it is possible that a good deed may begin to yield its reward after a long time because it is hampered by the results of an evil deed and quotes a smṛti ( Mahābhābhārata ) in support.⁴⁹

The principle of the doctrine of Karma is that every act, whether good or bad, produces a certain result or return which cannot be escapeḍ In the physical world there is the universal law of causatioṇ The doctrine of Karma extends this inexorable law of causality to the mental and moral sphere. The doctrine of Karma is not a mechanical law; it is rather a moral or spiritual necessity. It cannot, however, be said that this doctrine is an induction from observed facts nor can it be asserted that it is experimentally verifiable, but it is only a hypothesis or supposition; it is, however, far better than other naive and childlike theorieṣ In the absence of the theory of karma and rebirth it would have to be assumed that the world is arbitrary, that the Creator is not bound to regard the nature of men's actions but may distribute rewards as he pleases or by caprice. This doctrine of Karma emphasizes three things, firstly it regards an existence as a sort of expiation for the doings of a previous existence or existences; secondly, an evil deed cannot be expiated by works of merit but its punishment must be borne; thirdly, the punishment for wrong is automatic and personal. Under the doctrine of Karma there is no such thing as chance or luck. When we use those words they correspond to no reality and are a tacit confession of our ignorance or inability to state the cause or causes of what has happeneḍ This doctrine of Karma leads on to the doctrine of transmigratioṇ The results of a man's actions may not happen at once or in the present life. The Ādiparva and Manu say⁵⁰ 'an evil deed does not yield its retribution immediately like a cow (that yields plenty of milk immediately after she is well fed) but returning slowly it cuts off the very roots of the perpe- trator. Man's actions in past existences determine or fashion the nature of the present existence and the actions in the present existence taken along with the residue of past actions will determine the future existence. This, in short, is the basis of the doctrine of punarjanma. The modifications introduced by texts or popular notions will be briefly dealt with later. The theory of rebirth is as logical as any of the hypotheses that hold the field about what happens after physical death of the body. It is certainly as satisfactory as (or rather more satisfactory than) the theory of absolute annihilation after physical death (held by atheists) or the theory of eternal reward or retribution in heaven or hell (for confirmed criminals of one life). The leaders or exponents of almost all religions hold that God is with them and they generally have never seen (up to at least the 19th century A. D.) any good outside their respective Churcheṣ Hinduism of the Upaniṣads and Gītā is the only religion and philosophy that proclaimed thousands of years ago that the man of good deeds is nearest to God on account of his goodness and the man of evil deeds cannot secure divine grace and fellowship, whomsoever he may regard as a prophet or messiah sent by Goḍ

The Vedāntasūtra in III. 1 examines the passages of the Chāṇ Up. and of the Br. Up. dealing with Pañcāgnividyā. It is not possible to set out in detail the discussions in the bhāṣya of Śaṅkara on the sūtras in V. S. III. 1. Some of the important final conclusions are: The individual self, while passing from one body to another, is accompanied or surrounded by subtle elements (bhūtasūkṣma), that the āhutis are spoken of as 'āpaḥ' (in Chāṇ Up. V. 9. 1) because the human body is full of fluids, blood &c., because sacred works like Agnihotra &c. are the causes of a new body after death and in those works the principal materials used (such as Soma juice, ghee, milk) are mainly fluiḍ In the statement that those who perform sacrifices &c. go to the moon by the Pitryāṇa path and that śrāddha is offered as oblation from which Soma that is the food of gods arises, the words 'food of gods' are used in a metaphorical sense (and not in the sense of eating). The souls of sacrificers and the like, after reaching the moon and enjoying the fruits of their good deeds that can be enjoyed in the moon, return to the earth by the way they went but in reverse order of stations for enjoying the fruits of their actions that can only be enjoyed on the earth.⁵¹ This combines the idea of a life beyond (often referred to in the Ṛgveda) with the notion of rebirth and offers two prizes for good deeds (viz. reward in heaven and then a rebirth with material well-being and cultural environment, as in Gautama Dh. S. XI. 29 and Gīta VI. 37-45 and there is a double penalty for evil deeds (viz. hell torture and then a despised or low life).

The V. S. (III. 1. 13-17) further explains that all men do not go to the moon, but only those that perform sacrifices &c. and those that do not perform sacrifices or works of public utility but are guilty of evil acts go to the abode of Yama for undergoing tortures of hell ⁵² (which are seven, according to V. S. III, 1.15) and after that they come to the earth. Those who follow the path of faith and austerity go by the Devayāna path (Chāṇ Up. V. 10. 1 and Muṇḍaka I. 2. 11) and those who perform sacrifices, charity and works of public utility go by the pitṛyāṇa path (Chāṇ Up. V. 10. 3 and Muṇḍaka I. 2. 10) ⁵³ and those that do not follow any one of the two have to go to a third place and be born as worms &c. (Chāṇ Up. V. 10. 8), that when a śruti text like Kauṣītaki Up. (I. 2) states that all those that depart from this world go to the moon, what is meant by 'all' is all those that have the adhikāra (capability or fitness) to go to the mooṇ

There is one word, namely 'saṃsāra', which occurs frequently in the comparatively later literature on Vedānta and Dharma-śāstra but rarely in the Upaniṣadṣ It means 'passing through a succession or a round or a cycle of births and deathṣ' The Kathopanisad says ⁵⁴ 'that person who has no understanding, who has not controlled his mind, who is always impure, does not attain that (highest) state and undergoes saṁsāra (births and deaths)'. The Śv. Up. VI. 16 speaks of the Supreme Spirit as the 'creator and knower of the universe, as self-born, the knower, the destroyer of time, possessing (all) qualities, know- ing everything, Lord of Pradhāna, individual souls and the guṇas (sattva, rajas, tamas) and as the cause of release from saṁsāra, of sustaining it and of bondage.' The Maitrāyaṇi Up. I. 4. says 'such being the nature of saṁsāra what is the use of the enjoyment (of pleasures)'. The Muktikā Up. (II. 37) states 'mind is established as the root of the tree of saṁsāra'. The word 'saṁsāra' occurs in the Vedāntasūtra ⁵⁵ IV. 2. 8. The Bhagavadgītā mentions the word several times e. g. 'men who have no faith in this way (of life) do not attain to me (Lord Kṛṣṇa) and return to the path of death and transmigration' (IX. 3); those whose minds are fixed on me I deliver in no time from the ocean of death and transmigration' (XII. 7). The Manusmṛti employs the word saṁsāra frequently e. g. in the table of the subjects to be treated in the Smṛti 'the passing through saṁsāra' is mentioned (in I. 117) and the 12th chap. uses the word ofteṇ It is said (in XII. 51) 'the entire saṁsāra of three kinds due to three sorts of Karma affecting all beings has been expounded'. After describing the various characteristics of the three guṇas, sattva, rajas and tamas (in XII. 26-29), and the effects of these guṇas (XII. 30-38), Manu states that those in whom sattva, rajas or tamas preponderates respectively become gods, men or lower animals and again divides each of these three classes into lowest, middling and highest (XII. 40-50). Manu uses the word 'saṁsāra' in the plural (in XII. 52, 54, 70) in the sense of 'gati' or 'yoni'. In chap. VI. 40-60 Manu first dilates at length on the daily routine of one who has entered on the stage of sannyāsa, what he should wear and carry, how he should maintain himself, how he should restrain his senses and give up love and hate and practise ahimsā and then proceeds ‘he should ponder over the destinies of men due to bad deeds, falling in hell and the tortures of hell, separation from loved ones and contact with undesirable persons, the ravages of old age and the pains of diseases, the departing from the body and again lying in the womb and the passage of the soul through thousands of crores of births of all sortṣ’ It is entirely wrong to suppose (as done by Mr. Sanjana on p. 10 of his ‘Dogma of reincarnation’) that Manu prescribes that ‘each ego has to go through ten thousand millions of existenceṣ’ Manu nowhere says so. All that he means is that the Sannyāsin desirous of liberation should revolve in his mind the possibility of some souls having to migrate through millions of birthṣ Yāj. (in III. 169) employs the verb ‘samsarati’ in the sense of ‘undergoes births’ and states ‘The fruition of actions done by some men results after death (in other bodies) or in this very life (as in the case of Kārīri sacrifice and in some cases either in this world or the next (i. e. there is no hard and fast śāstra rule that fruits of actions result immediately after they are done); it also states in a fine simile ⁵⁶ ‘just as an actor, when acting different parts, colours his body in different colours (fair, dark, brown), so the soul assumes various forms (as short, hunchback, &c.), assumes different bodies due to the various acts done by it. In Yāj. III. 140 the word saṁsāra itself occurs ‘The soul affected by (or under the influence of) rajās and tamās, wandering in this world and coming in contact with undesirable objects (or mental attitudes) goes through transmigration (i. e. assumes various bodies)’. This is in reply to the question in Yāj. III. 129 (Īśvarah sa katham bhāvairaniṣṭaiḥ samprayujyate). The Śāntiparva ⁵⁷ remarks ‘there is no doubt that in life there is far more misery than happiness’. The Purāṇas often harp on the theme that saṁsāra is impermanent, abounds in sorrows and is fragile like a plantain leaf (e. g. vide the Brahmapurāṇa ‘saṁsāre… anitye duḥkhabahule kadalīdālasannibhe’ (178. 179). The present writer cannot help feeling that this view of the thorough miserableness of life has been so much and so persistently dinned into the ears of common people not only by much of Sanskrit literature but also by medieval saints like Tukaram (who says 'happiness is as little as a grain of barley while misery is as big as a mountain') that people have lost zest in life, are unable to put their heart and soul and serious efforts for improving their own lot and the lot of otherṣ It cannot be denied that in India the doctrine of Karma, instead of being a powerful means of urging all men to put great efforts in doing good deeds and a gospel of hope, became in the minds of many confused with fatalism, which led men to become feeble, submissive and disinclined to work harḍ

All the above discussion in the Upaniṣads about transmigration of the individual self are valid and concerned with the empirical or phenomenal world (saṁsāravasthā or vyavahāra-vasthā) but considered from the highest metaphysical stand-point of thorough-going advaita (the parā vidyā of Muṇḍaka I. 1. 5-6 or amūrta brahma of Br. Up. II. 3. 5-6) it falls to the ground, since the individual self is non-different from the Absolute Brahmaṇ Śaṅkarācārya on V. S. II. 3. 30 emphasizes this point. He states: As long as the individual self is in saṁsāra state and has not attained perfect knowledge and brought the empirical or phenomenal state to an end, so long the connection of the self with buddhi does not cease. As long as this connection with buddhi (a limiting adjunct) lasts, so long the state of being an individual self merged in saṁsāra. But the real truth is that there is no entity called jīva by itself except in so far as it is fictitiously hypostatized by buddhi, the limiting adjunct. For, when we determine the real meaning of Vedānta texts, we find no intelligent substance other than the one omniscient Lord whose nature is eternal freedoṃ Then Śaṅkarācārya cites certain texts (viz. Br. Up. I. 4. 7, III. 7-13, Chāṇ Up. VI. 1. 6, VI. 8. 7 ⁵⁸ and remarks that there are hundreds of such textṣ Śaṅkarācārya states that even Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Vedāntasūtras, composed some sūtras from the highest advaita standpoint and some from the empirical standpoint. In the following sūtras of V. S. Bādarāyaṇa is obliged to differentiate Jīva and Paramātman: I. 1. 16–17; I. 1. 21, I. 2. 20, I. 3. 5, II. 1. 21–23, II. 3. 21, II. 3. 41, II. 3. 43 &c. But the sūtras I. 1. 33, II. 1. 14, IV. 13 indicate that there is non-difference between the two.²⁵⁴¹

The theory of transmigration postulates that each life is the result or fruit of the actions of the preceding existence or existenceṣ It follows from this that if we go backwards far enough, no existence or birth can be the first. Therefore, the Vedāntasūtra had to declare (in II. 1.35 quoted in ṇ 2527 above) that saṁsāra is anādi (beginningless). But this is in conflict with many passages of the Upaniṣads, which, in speaking of creation, employ the words 'in the beginning' (as in Chāṇ Up. VI. 2.1, Bṛ. Up. I. 4., 1, 10 and 17, V. 5.1, Tai. Up. II. 7.1). In order to get over this conflict the conception of the recurring creation of the universe periodically from all eternity was postulated by means of the machinery of kalpas,²⁵⁴² which provides that the universe created by brahman persists through a vast period called Kalpa, after the lapse of which it is absorbed into brahmaṇ Vide Śāntiparva 231. 29–32 (Ch. eḍ = cr. eḍ 224. 28-31). It is stated in the Gītā VIII. 17–19 that the day of Brahmā is equal to one thousand yugas (four yugas make one unit or Mahāyuga ) and the night of Brahmā is also of the same duratioṇ All objects spring up from Prakṛti at the advent of the day of Brahmā and at the advent of night are absorbed (or merged) in the Prakṛti. Vide Bhagavadgītā IX. 7 also ' at the end of a Kalpa all elements (or beings) pass into prakṛti over which I preside; but when the next Kalpa starts I send them forth'.

The reasoning is; just as we cannot decide which comes first, the seed or'sprouting plant, so it is impossible to say which comes first ( body or Karma ), since no body is possible without Karma ( deeds ) and no deeds are possible without a body. The Chāṇ Up. (V.13.2) states 'that Being ( deity ) that had produced fire, water, and earth thought 'let me enter those three beings (fire, water and earth ) with this living self and then develop names and formṣ" That shows that Jīva ( the self ) was there at the time of creation and thereby indicates that saṁsāra is beginning- lesṣ The Ṛgveda in X. 190.3, expressly says 'the creator arranged ( or created ) as before.'⁶¹ Similarly, the Gītā ( 15.3 ) states 'the real form of it ( of the tree of saṁsāra ) is not thus perceived, nor its end nor beginning nor its support; having cut off this deeply rooted Aśvattha ( pippala ) tree with the powerful sword of non-attachment, that place must be sought for from which those who have reached it do not again return'. The Smṛti verses relied upon by Śaṅkarācārya on V. S. 1.3.30 are noted below.⁶² The Bhagavadgītā (VI. 37–45) is very emphatic that no exertions made by a man on the path of Yoga with faith are lost even if he does not quickly attain perfectioṇ Lord Kṛṣṇa replies (VI. 40 ff) that such a man fails to secure perfection does not come to an evil end, but he attains to the worlds of the righteous, dwells there for many years, is born in the family of wise yogins, prosperous and pure men or is born in the family of wise yogins, where he regains the mental impressions of his past liveṣ He makes fresh efforts to gain perfection and is carried forward irresistibly by his practice in former lives and being free from all sins and perfecting himself through many lives attains the highest goal. In the Gītā, Kṛṣṇa says (in IV. 5) ‘many are my lives that are past and thine also. All of them I know but thou knowest them not.’ In many places the Gītā touches upon the doctrine of transmigration (such as in II. 12–13 and 22–27, IV. 8–9, VII. 19, VIII. 6, 15–16, IX. 21).

In chapters 30–32 (of ch. eḍ) of Vanaparva there is a dialogue between Draupadi and Yudhiṣṭhira, who, having lost his kingdom in gambling with the Kauravas, was in exile and hard presseḍ Draupadi wonders how such a straightforward, mild, benevolent and truthful prince allowed his mind to be involved in gambling (30. 19), that God does not act towards beings like a father or mother, but He appears to be irascible like a common man, when she sees that honourable men of high character have difficulties in maintaining themselves and dishonourable men live in pleasures (30. 38–39); she proceeds ‘human beings, ⁶⁴ ignorant and having no control over happiness and misery, go to heaven or hell at the caprice of Goḍ’ Yudhiṣṭhira warns her that she talks like an atheist, that he performed no deed with the thought of seeking the reward thereof, that he made gifts and performed sacrifices because he held that it was his duty to do so.’ He asked her to give up atheistic talk and not to disrespect Highest Goḍ Then Draupadi came round and replied that she did not mean to disrespect or censure Dharma, that it is far from her thoughts to show disrespect to God, but that, being distressed, she talked like an atheist. She then enters upon a discussion ⁶⁵ about what people mean by diṣṭa (fate) or hatha (chance) or nature (svabhāva) and winds up by saying that whatever a person gains is all the result of deeds in past liveṣ

It is not necessary to say here anything about human effort (puruṣakāra) and daiva. That topic has been dealt with and the different views of ancient and medieval writers about the respective spheres of these two have been pointed out in H. of Dh. vol. III, pp. 168–170 and notes 214–216.

When the son of Gautami, who was an old woman that had attained control of mind, died by snake-bite, a hunter caught the snake, brought it bound to Gautami and said that he would kill the snake for having bitten an innocent and unoffending boy. Gautami dissuades him from killing the snake by stating ‘by killing the snake my son would not be brought back to life, I see no good in killing the snake.’ Then Kāla came forward and explained ‘Just as a potter moulds from a lump of clay whatever he desires, so man secures fruits of deeds done by himself ; the boy’s death was due to his deeds in a former life’ and Gautami agreed that her son died by his own deeds in a previous life and that her bereavement by the death of her son was due to her own former deedṣ⁶⁶ This story occurs in the very first chapter of the Anuśāsanaparva.

Draupadi who had to work as Sairandhri (a maid servant) in the harem of Virāṭa bewails before Bhima ‘in my girlhood I must have done something which displeased the Creator by virtue of which I have been reduced to this distressing conditioṇ’⁶⁷ The Anuśāsanaparva states ‘just as the calf finds its own mother from among thousands of cows, so karma done in a previous life pursues the doer of it.’ The Āśvamedhika.⁶⁸ parva asserts that there is no destruction of good and evil actions ; they ripen and produce results when the self passes from one body to another. The Śāntiparva (cr. eḍ 316. 25 and 35=ch. ed, 329. 25, 35 ) avers ‘a man by performing good deeds secures the state of a god, he is reborn as a human being by actions of a mixed character (good and evil both) and he is born as lower (than man) by evil deeds ; when you (yourself) start after death no one will follow you; only your good or evil deeds will follow you when you leave this worlḍ’

All strata of Hindu society were permeated by the theory of Karma and transmigratioṇ Great Sanskrit poets often allude to it. In the Raghuvamśa XI. 22 describing the visit of Rāma to the hermitage of Vāmana pointed out by Viśvāmitra, Kālidāsa remarks ‘Rāma became restless (or disturbed) in mind, though not remembering his actions in the former existence as Vāmana’ (both Vāmana and Rāma being avatāras of Viṣṇu). Similarly, in Śakuntala (Act V) the poet remarks ‘when on seeing charming sights and hearing pleasing words, a person, though surrounded by pleasures, becomes restless (or sorrowful), that is indeed due to this that his mind unconsciously has the impressions of loves and friendships of past lives presented to it’. In the seventh Act of the same play when Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā were re-united, she, referring to her previous rejection by the king, remarks⁶⁹ ‘indeed at that time some (bad) actions of mine (in some former life) hampered my good deeds and became ripe for fruition’. In the Raghuvamśa the 14th canto contains at first a message of spirited protest by Sītā whom Rāma ordered Lakṣmaṇa to abandon near Vālmīki’s hermitage on account of the scandal about her among common people, but afterwards qualifies the message by saying that the terrible misfortune that she was going to suffer was the fruition of her misdeeds in former existences and that she desired to be his wife in a future existence but without separation from hiṃ Vide also the Meghadūta verse quoted above in note 2533 p. 1563. Many questions naturally arise on the doctrine of Karma and transmigratioṇ One of them is discussed by the bhāṣya of Vyāsa on Yogaśūtra II. 13. In Yogaśūtra II. 3 five kleśas (hindrances) such as avidyā (nescience) are enumerated and it is stated (II. 13) that these kleśas lead on to fruition of actions by way of birth, life (long or short), kind of experience. Actions (Karma) are of four sorts according to Yogaśūtra (IV. 7) viz. kṛṣṇa (dark found in wicked people), (2) śuklakṛṣṇa (white- dark) that are accomplished by external means in which there is some injury to or benefit of others; (3) śukla (white) belonging to those who engage in tapas, svādhyāya (study of the sacred texts) and contemplation; because this kind of deed depends on the mind alone and does not depend on external means and does not involve injury to others; (4) aśuklakṛṣṇa (neither white nor dark), which is found in sannyāsins (ascetic saints) whose hindrances (avidyā &c) have dwindled and whose bodies are the last (they will have). Of these four kinds, the yogin alone has non-white karma since he has renounced the fruit of all actions (even of good ones) and he has akṛṣṇa since he will never resort to dark actionṣ The bhāṣya on Yogaśūtra II. 13 states four questions, (1) whether one Karma is the cause of one birth, or (2) whether one Karma is the cause of more births than one; (3) whether more than one Karma brings about more births than one; (4) whether more than one Karma brings about one birth. The bhāṣya raises objections to the first three and states that the fourth alternative alone is acceptable. Vide p. 1417 note 2325 for the text of the Yogabhāṣya on these four alternativeṣ The Śāntiparva (chap. 273. 33-34 of cr. eḍ =chap 280. 33-34 of ch. eḍ) mentions individual souls as of six colours viz. kṛṣṇa (dark), dhūmra (grey), nīla (blue), nakta (red), haridra (yellow) and śukla (white) in an ascending order, the dark being the lowest and śukla being the highest and verses 36-46 describe these six in detail.

There are several features of our present life that can be more satisfactorily explained on the theory of transmigration than on any other. Why do two people who have seen but little of one another feel friendship or hatred? The surmise that in past existences they were friends or had obliged each other or harmed each other offers an explanatioṇ The doctrine of karma and transmigration accounts for the apparently unmerited misery and suffering of many people, while some enjoy undeserved happiness or a good life. Our sense of fairness and justice would be shocked by the inequalities in the world, if such a doctrine were not there. The hypothesis and belief that all human volition and conduct will suitably be rewarded and punished in subsequent existences has an important bearing on present conduct, would act as an urge to continual effort for good-ness in this life and is likely to deter men from vice and cruelty. This doctrine of karma not only offers an explana-tion about the varying degrees of happiness and unhappiness among human beings, but also accounts for differences in material well-being and unhealthy bodily conditionṣ It offers a solution of the problem of evil in the world and explains precocious abilities in mathematics, music and arts among children and grown up men as in the case of Ramanujan about whom Prof. Hardy of Cambridge (in ‘Ramanujan,’ Cambridge, 1940) says that he was the most romantic figure in the recent mathematicṣ If rightly understood, it is not pessimistic or fatalist, but rather emphasizes all out human effort in this life. It will be seen how many of the works on Dharmaśāstra or connected with it as sources emphasize effort (puruṣakāra) as against views of various people that it is Daiva or Svabhāva or time or the combination of all these that yield rewards or retribution in this life. It also explains sudden accession of prosperity or high position such as, for example, a poor man’s son being adopted by a prince or queen and then becoming an enlightened and famous ruler as was the case with the late Sayajirao Maharaj Gaikwad of Baroda.

Even from Upaniṣadic times various views were held about the origin of the world and similar questionṣ The Śv. Up. (I. 1) asks the question ‘Is brahma the cause ? Whence are we born ? Whereby do we live and whither are we going ? Tell us, O knowers of brahman, under whose control do we abide in pain or pleasure ?’ The next verse states ‘Should Time or nature or necessity or chance or the elements be considered as the cause or He who is (called) Puruṣa ? It cannot be their combination either, since even the self has no power over happiness and misery.’ Then verse 3 (latter half) states ‘He being one superintends (or controls) all causes viz. Time, self and the rest.’ Yāj. I. 350 refers to five views on the question as to what causes desirable or undesirable results viz. some hold that it is Daiva alone, some put forward Svabhāva (nature), some rely on Time, some on human effort and some on a combination of all these; but, Yājñavalkya’s own view (I, 349, 351) is that good or bad results are due to daiva and puruṣakāra and that the former is nothing but effort of former existences that has begun to manifest resultṣ The Śāntiparva (chap. 238. 4-5 = cr. eḍ 230. 4-5) refers to the fact that there are three views viz. either human effort or daiva or svabhāva being the cause, but its own view appears to be that Puruṣakāra and Daiva combine to produce fruitṣ The Matsyapurāṇa (221. 8) asserts that daiva, effort and kāla working together produce the fruits of actionṣ The Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa (Ų. 8. 61-62) refers to three views viz. Daiva, effort and Svabhāva are put forward as causes separately but its own view is that daiva and effort together yield fruitṣ

It may be stated here that Karma is put in three groups viz. sañcita, prārabdha and kriyamāṇa (or sañciyamāna). The first is the total accumulated deeds of all past existences, the fruits of which have not been experienceḍ The prārabdha Karma is that which was the strongest among the group of sañcita deeds just before the present existence of a person begins and which is supposed to determine one's present existence. What a person accumulates during the present existence is called kriyamāṇa (or sañciyamāna, being collected) and the next existence is determined by the strongest (or the earliest according to some) among the sañcita and kriyamāṇa deeds put together. As the karmans⁷⁰ are of different characters and yield different consequences (heaven in case of sāttvika deeds, or the earth or mid-regions when they are mainly rājasa), and places of tortures when deeds are mainly tāmasa the existences (or births or bodies) differ and the self being affected by the body, the individual souls appear as different. The objection is raised that freedom of will is the basis of all ethical values and that if a man's Karma in past lives determines the present life, then a man in the present life is merely a toy in the power of Karma and has no power to do as he sees best. The question about a man's freedom of will is a most thorny one, on which the greatest thinkers from ancient times to the present day have differed⁷¹ and no satisfactory reply can be giveṇ There are numerous works on discussions on Free will and Determinism such as Rashdall's 'Theory of good and evil' vol II. pp. 302-355 (1907) on 'Free Will,' Bergsons's 'Time and Free will,' Viscount Samuel in 'Belief and action' pp. 303-320; but the present author does not propose to recommend any of these books to the reader of this volume. But if the reader wants a small book on the Free Will controversy he may read the book by M. Davidson (London, 1942 ). So far as the Indian doctrine of Karma is concerned, it appears that freedom of will is postulated for a man during the present existence to lead a good moral life and perform meritorious acts subject to the limitations caused by the environment in which the present existence is cast. The important working belief is that one has free will and that one is free in the present existence to mould the future (so far as he is concerned ) by means of meritorious workṣ This is the message of the Śāntiparva.⁷² Lord Kṛṣṇa, after a long discourse in the Bhagavadgītā gives Arjuna permission to do as the latter likes (18.63 ' yathecchasi tathā kuru '). In Gītā 9.30 also Lord Kṛṣṇa says 'if even a person of the vilest conduct worships me with undivided devotion, he must be held to be righteous, for he has made a right resolve.' Similarly, in VI. 5 the Gītā provides ' let a man lift himself higher by himself, let him not degrade himself; for the self alone is the friend of the self and the self alone is the enemy of the self'. Vide notes below for Upaniṣad passages, V. S. and Śańkarabhāṣya. It is possible to accept, on the ancient Indian doctrine, both predestination and free will, the first so far as one's being born in a certain environment is concerned and the 2nd so far as one's actions in the present life are concerneḍ The Bhagavadgītā ( VI. 5-6 ) holds out the hope even to a sinner that it is never too late to mend and ( II. 40 ) avers that even a little of righteousness saves a man from great fear and no effort is lost.

Though the general drift of the Gītā is in favour of Free Will, there are a few passages that seem to savour of determinism, e. g. 'everyone is made to do acts helplessly by the guṇas born of Prakṛti ( III. 5 ); 'all beings follow Prakṛti (Nature); what can control (or repress) do'? (III. 33), 'due to your conceit you think 'I shall not fight,' this thy resolve is vain; (your) Nature will compel you to do it; you being constrained by your own acts born of your nature will helplessly do that which you do not wish to do " ( XVIII. 59-60 ). It may have to be conceded that there is no freedom of will in the matter of environment during childhooḍ

The Rāmāyaṇa gives expression to the belief that sorrow in the present life is the result of similar actions done in past life or liveṣ When Rāma left Ayodhyā as an exile for the sake of fulfilling the promise given to queen Kaikeyī by king Daśaratha, Kausalyā, mother of Rāma, laments ‘I believe indeed that in a past life I must have made many persons lose their sons or I must have harmed ( or killed ) living beings; it is therefore that this ( sorrow ) has befallen me’; ‘I think beyond doubt that in a former life, I, a wretched woman, must have cut off the breasts of cows ( or mothers ) when their calves ( or children ) desired ( to drink milk at the breasts ) of their mothers '.⁷³

The Purāṇas also emphasize the importance of good or evil deeds and say that one has to reap the fruits of one's actions, whether good or evil, and Karma does not come to an end even after hundreds of lives unless the results thereof are undergone.⁷⁴ The Padmapurāṇa states 'there is no destruction of Karma except by reaping the fruits thereof; no one can set aside the bondage due to the Karma of past lives' and further 'man by his own actions may become a God, or a human being, cattle, a bird or a lower animal or even a tree ( or rock ); no man in this world is able to annul the effects of actions done in previous existences by his power or by the birth of progeny '.⁷⁵ The idea of transmigration as described in the Upaniṣads had become universal in India at the time of Buddha. Buddha rejected the reality of a permanent ego or self as an entity. He was not a metaphysical philosopher, but wanted to lay down a way or method by which mankind could be freed from ignorance and suffering and liberation could be achieveḍ Therefore, while rejecting a permanent ego he accepted the doctrine of rebirth.

A side issue has been very much debated by some eminent scholars, viz. whether the cherishers of the Vedānta thoughts were originally the Kṣatriyas and not the Brāhmaṇaṣ The present author dealt with that question in a brief compass in H. of Dh. vol. II. pp. 105-107 and note 222. Deussen in 'Das System des Vedānta' (1883 pp. 18-19) and Ph. Up. (tr. by Geden pp. 18-19) and Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar in 'Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism' p. 9 hold the view that the kṣatriyas were the original possessors of Vedānta doctrineṣ Deussen relies mainly on six passages and Dr. Bhandarkar on two :only (Chāṇ V. 3 and 11) and besides Deussen (in Ph. Up. p. 19) admits that his conclusion is not absolute certainty but has a high degree of probability. Barth in 'Religions of India' p. 65, Hopkins in 'Ethics of India' (1924) p. 63, 'Vedic India' by Macdonell and Keith (vol. II. p. 206), and Tuxen on 'The religions of India' (Copenhagen, 1949, p. 88) do not subscribe to this view. Deussen went so far as to aver (p. 19) 'this teaching with regard to the ātman was studiously withheld from them (the brāhmaṇas), that it was transmitted in a narrow circle among the kṣatriyas to the exclusion of the brāhmaṇas'. The present author had not set out the passages on which reliance was placed by Deussen and those who followed hiṃ They will be set out here and will be examined as to the context in which they appear and the subject with which they deal. But it must first be emphasized that the most important doctrines of the main and ancient Upaniṣads are two, viz. 'non-difference of the individual self from the Supreme Self, and (2) transmigration of the self depending on his deeds and conduct. Both these doctrines are expounded by Yājñavalkya to king Janaka in various places in the Upaniṣads e. g. in Br. Up. IV. 4. 4-7 and following passageṣ Deussen regards this part of the instruction as deepest, truest and noblest (Ph. Up. p. 348; quoted above on p. 1547) and this passage is (acc. to him) the leading passage on the doctrine of transmigration and on what accompanies the self in its transmigration (Ph. Up. p. 231). Besides, the words of Yājñavalkya H, D. 198 in Br. Up. III. 2. 13 ‘He who does good is born good,’ and in IV. 4. 5 ‘He who does good is born good, he who does evil is born evil, he becomes righteous by righteous works &c.’ are declared by Deussen himself (Ph. Up. p. 410) as ‘the oldest in which a doctrine of transmigration is found’. Therefore, according to Deussen himself, the original possessor of these two fundamental doctrines of the Upaniṣads is the brāhmaṇa Yājñavalkya who in the same Upaniṣad (Br. Up. II. 4. 1-14) propounds to his wife Maitreyī the identity of the self and elements and everything else with brahma (idam sarvam yādayamātmā). Not only so, there are other brāhmaṇa teachers of these. For example, Uddālaka Āruṇi expounds at great length to his son Śvetaketu the doctrine of identity in the famous words ‘tat-tvamasi’ (Chāṇ Up. VI. 8-16).

Now the examples on which Deussen (Ph. Up. pp. 17–19) bases his conclusions must be cited and examineḍ Chāṇ Up. (V. 11. 1) tells the story of five (named) wealthy householders and great students of Veda who came together and discussed the question ‘what is our ātman, what is brahma’. They proposed to go to Uddālaka Āruṇi who knew the self called Vaiśvānara. Uddālaka thought that he would not be able to explain all and therefore told them that Aśvapati Kaikeya (king of Kekaya country) at that time knew the self called Vaiśvānara and all five together with Uddālaka went to that king, who said he would give an answer the next day. The next day those six went to him with fuel in hand (i. e. pupils) and the king without performing further preparatory rites asked each of them what they meditated upoṇ When each replied as to what he meditated upon, such as heaven, Āditya, air, ether, water and earth (this last by Uddālaka Āruṇi), he told them that all these are parts of Vaiśvānara and he explained to them how the proper Agnihotra is to be performeḍ

Two things should be noticed viz. Uddālaka Āruṇi is here shown as ignorant of true Vaiśvānaravidyā, though in the very next section (Chāṇ Up. VI. 8. 7.ff.) Uddālaka Āruṇi teaches the sublime doctrine of ‘Tat-tvamasi’. Probably these two Uddālakas are different or the present story is more or less a myth. In the second place, all that Aśvapati Kaikeya teaches is about Vaiśvānara and not brahmavidyā (about the identity of in- dividual soul with the Supreme Self). From before the times of Yāska, there have been various opinions about Vaiśvānara, frequently mentioned in the Ṛgveda (e. g. in I. 52. 6. I. 98. 1.). The Nirukta (VII. 21-23) has a long discussion and quotes . three different views viz. that Vaiśvānara is lightning or Aditya or terrestrial fire. The Chāṇ Up. (V. 18. 2) winds up the description of Vaiśvānara and brings it (V. 19-24) in line with the oblations to five breaths (as ‘Prāṇāya svāhā &c.) and sets forth the results of the observance of Agnihotra with full know-ledge of its true purport. The Vedāntasūtra (I. 2. 24-32) deals with what is meant by Vaiśvānara in Chāṇ V. 11 ff. and the conclusion is that it means paramātman (the highest Self) and not individual self or fire as an element or the digestive (stomach) heat.

Deussen then refers to the story of Gārgya Bālāki (in Br. Up. II. 1) who offered to expound brahma to Ajātaśatru, king of Kāśī, who offered to give a thousand cows if he did so and remarked that people run exclaiming ‘Janaka, Janaka’ (mean-ing Janaka is donor and also listener to brahma exposition) .⁷⁶ Bālāki offered twelve objects of meditation on brahma such as the person in the sun, the person in the moon &c. Ajātaśatru replied as to the twelve objects that he knew them already and brahma is different from them and cannot be understood by what he saiḍ Then Bālāki remained silent. Bālāki offered to be his pupil. Then Ajātaśatru said ⁷⁷ “this is topsy-turvy that a brāhmaṇa should approach a kṣatriya as a pupil with the idea ‘the kṣatriya would expound brahma to hiṃ’ I shall make known to you ( brahma ).” So saying he took hold of Bālāki’s hand and got up (from his seat). Certain matters in this story must be carefully noted here. This does not at all say that the class of brāhmaṇas did not know brahmavidyā and that kṣatriyas alone were then the only possessors of it. On the contrary, Janaka is specially mentioned as a donor of cows and is eager to listen to brahmavidyā and people ran to him desiring to accept large gifts of cows for imparting brahmavidyā. know about Janaka from Br. Up. III. 1 ff. wherein Janaka king of Videha, offered a thousand cows and, when Yājñavalkya took away those cows, numerous persons present in Janaka’s court such as his hotṛ priest Āśvala, Ārtabhāga, Gargī, Uddālaka Āruṇi, Vidagdha Śākalya ply him with questionṣ In Br. Up. IV. 4, 7 (Janaka offers a thousand cows to Yājñavalkya, in IV. 4.23 (Janaka offers to give his Videha kingdom to Yājñavalkya along with himself as a slave). The story of Bālāki only comes to this at the most that when Janaka had learnt brahmavidyā, a brāhmaṇa Bālāki did not know it though he professed to know it, and had to be instructed in it by king Ajātaśatru of Kāśī, who knew it and who only stated that a brāhmaṇa did not become a pupil of a kṣatriya. All brāhmaṇas could never have been proficient in brahmavidyā much less kṣatriyaṣ One regrets to say that Deussen is guilty of making a sweeping generalisation without adequate data. It may be noted that in this story Ajātaśatru of Kāśī does not say that the Vidyā was not known to any brāhmaṇas before (as Pravāhaṇa Jaivali claimed), but, on the contrary, expressed surprise that a brāhmaṇa should come to him for learning the Vidyā.

The same story occurs in Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad⁵⁶ IV. 1–19 often in the same wordṣ Bālāki offers 16 explanations about the objects of his meditatioṇ The V. S. devotes three sūtras (I. 4. 16-18) to the passage in which Ajātaśatru stated 'He who is the maker of those persons (you mentioned), he of whom all this is the work, he alone is to be known'. There is in Br. Up. II. 1 and Kauṣītaki Up. IV hardly anything about trans- migratioṇ Both passages simply affirm that from the Ātman all prāṇas, all worlds, all gods, all elements spring forth (Br. II. 2. 20 ). This is nothing more than what is stated in the leading text (Br. Up. IV. 4. 7) of Yājñavalkya or in Chāṇ Up. VI. 1–16 in the oft-repeated words of Āruṇi to his son Śvetaketu (aitadātmyam idam sarvaṃ..tattvamasi ).

It is most surprising that Deussen should press into service the story of Sanatkumāra and Nārada in order to fortify his proposition that kṣatriyas were the original possessors of the great doctrines of Vedānta. He relies on Chāṇ Up. VII, where It is said that Nārada approached Sanatkumāra and prayed ‘Teach me, Sir.’ Sanatkumāra said to him ‘tell me what you know; then I shall tell you what is beyond that’. Nārada stated (in Chāṇ Up. VII. 1–2) that he had studied the four Vedas, ⁷⁹ Itihāsa-purāṇa and gave a long list of lores including Devavidyā, Brahmavidyā (whatever that may mean), kṣatravidyā, Nakṣatravidyā, admitted he knew mantras only and did not know Ātman (the Self) and added ‘I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Ātman overcomes sorrow. I am in sorrow; bhagavan! do help me to cross (to get over) my sorrow.’ Sanatkumāra replied ‘whatever you have studied is mere name, there is something better than a name’. Then Sanatkumāra teaches him to meditate on speech as better than name, then on manas as better than speech and several others as better than the preceding (in VII. 4–24) till he reaches bhūman (the Infinite, the Paramātman) and describes bhūman in VII. 25–26 ending with the words ‘all this springs from the Self’ and it is stated at the end (in VII. 26. 2) ‘Bhagavān (venerable) Sanatkumāra showed to Nārada, all whose blemishes had been crushed (uprooted), what is beyond darkness (avidyā); they call him (Sanatkumāra) Skanda.’ ⁸⁰

In all this long passage there is not a word whether Sanatkumāra and Nārada belonged to a brāhmaṇa or kṣatriya clasṣ Skanda is known in classical Sanskrit as the God of War (as in Gītā X. 24 ‘Senānīnām-aham Skandaḥ’) and in the Vana-parva 229. 22–23 he is mentioned as the commander of the armies of gods and the Śāntiparva mentions that Nārada approached Devala for knowledge about the creation and dissolution of the world (chap. 275=267 of Cr. eḍ). From this Deussen at once draws the conclusion that Sanatkumāra must have been a kṣatriya and Nārada a brāhmaṇa. In the Mahābhārata, Manu-smṛti and the Purāṇas both of them are semi-divine sages and Gītā X. 13 speaks of Nārada as Devarṣi, the Vāyu-purāṇa speaks of Parvata and Nārada as sons of Kaśyapa and as included among Devarṣis (Vāyu 61. 85). The Manusmṛti includes Nārada among the first ten Prajāpatiṣ (I. 25). The Brahmapurāṇa (I. 46-47) describes both Skanda and Sanatkumāra as sons of Brahmā. The Nāradīyapurāṇa (Pūrvabhāga, 2. 3) speaks of Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanatkumāra and Sanātana as the mind-born sons of Brahmā and Sanatkumāra as brahmavādin and as expounding all Dharmas to Nārada. The Vāmanapurāṇa (60. 68-69) describes the same four as sons of Dharma and Ahimsā, and as exponents of Yoga-śāstra. To crown all, Kūrmapurāṇa ⁸¹ I. 7. 20-21 speaks of these four along with Kratu as Vipras (brāhmaṇas), yogins, and as mind-born sons of Brahmā. Sanatkumāra might have been literally or metaphorically called ‘Skanda’, because he attacked and routed Audyā just as God Skanda routed armies of asuras, if at all the myth about Skanda was known in times before the Upaniṣadṣ

Chāṇ Up. I. 8 narrates that there were (in some part of India not mentioned) three persons well versed in (the esoteric meaning of Udgītha i. e. Om), viz. Śilaka Śālāvatya, Caikitāyana Dālbhya and Pravāhaṇa Jaivali. They sat down for a discussion on Udgītha. The first two (who were brāhmaṇas) first put questions to each other and answereḍ Then Pravāhaṇa Jaivali told them that they were giving replies about matters that were not permanent. Then Pravāhaṇa Jaivali told them that Ākāśa was the origin of this world, that beings owe their origin to Ākāśa and will return into it, that Ākāśa is Udgītha, greater than the great and without end &c. Deussen relies on this passage also for supporting his theory. Udgīthavidyā is only one of several Upāsanas in the Upaniṣadṣ Therefore, what would follow is that Pravāhaṇa Jaivali knew it and two brāhmaṇas of some place not mentioned did not know it. It is not possible to see how this story lends any support to Deussen’s sweeping thesis of all brāhmaṇas being originally excluded from the central doctrine of identity. In the same context (Chāṇ Up. I, 9. 3) Pravāhaṇa mentions that one Atidhanvan Śaunaka ⁸² taught Udgītha-vidyā to Udaraśāṇḍilya. Deussen without giving any reason asserts ‘the names allow of the conjecture that in this case also a brāhmaṇa received instruction from a kṣatriya’ (p. 18). He probably connected the first name with ‘dhanus’ (bow) which was the forte of kṣatriyaṣ But he forgets that Saunaka and Śāṇḍilya are both brāhmaṇa nameṣ This will illustrate how even the most profound scholar goes astray when he becomes over-enthusiastic about a theory of hiṣ In this story Pravāhaṇa does not claim that the Udgīthavidyā was unknown among brāhmaṇaṣ On the contrary he himself states that Saunaka, a brāhmaṇa (called Atidhanvan) expounded that Vidyā to Udaraśāṇḍilya, another brāhmaṇa. Besides, Udgīthavidyā is only one among numerous upāsanās and what Pravāhaṇa teaches is that all bhūtas spring from Akāśa and are absorbed in Akāśa, the purport being that Akāśa here denotes brahman as the V. S. (I. 1. 22) establisheṣ This doctrine is the same as the one taught in Tai. Up. III. 6 (basis of V. S. I. 1.2) and other textṣ Moreover, there is nothing about transmigration in this passage of Chāṇ Up.

The sheet anchor of the views of Deussen and Dr. Bhandarkar are the dialogue between Pravāhaṇa Jaivali and Śvetaketu (Br. Up. VI. 2, Chāṇ Up. V. 3–10) about Pañcāgnividyā and that between Aśvapati Kaikeya and Uddālaka Āruṇi about Vaiśvānara (Chāṇ V. 11. 24). The latter has been already dealt with. In the former occurs an important passage which has been made much of and misunderstooḍ Before proceeding to expound the Pañcāgnividyā to Śvetaketu and his father Āruṇi Gautama, Pravāhaṇa Jaivali remarks (Chāṇ Up. V. 3. 7) ‘this vidyā did not go to brāhmaṇas before you; therefore in all worlds domination (or government) has remained with the kṣatriya class alone’. In the corresponding Br. Up. passage the words are ‘this vidyā did not reside in any brāhmaṇa before this day, but I shall expound it to you, for, who would like to refuse when you address me thus’ ²⁵⁶³ (viz. I approach you as pupil). In the Kausītakī Up. I. the doctrine of the two paths of Devayāna and Pitr̥yāṇa is expounded to Āruṇi (and his son Śvetaketu) by Citra Gārgyāyaṇi (v. l. Gāṅgyāyani), but the remarks about kṣatriyas alone being the first possessors of the doctrine do not occur there at all and Gārgyāyaṇi appears to be a brāhmaṇa teacher. The question is: what is meant by 'this vidyā' in the above passages of Chāṇ and Br. Upaniṣads? In the Upaniṣads (particularly in Chāndogya and Br.) numerous vidyās for the upāsanā of brahman by men that are not yet far advanced on the path of brahmavidyā are dilated upon, such as Udgīthavidyā (Chāṇ Up. I. 8-9, Br. Up. I. 3), Dahara-vidyā (Chāṇ VIII. 1. 1-2, Br. Up. I. 3, Vedāntasūtra I. 3. 14-21), Madhuvidyā (Chāṇ III. 1. 1 ff., Br. Up. II. 5. 1-15), Saṁvargavidyā (Chāṇ IV. 3). In the same way Pañcāgnividyā is an Upāsanā. Deussen and others admit (as shown above) that the great and original texts about the identity of the individual self with the Supreme Self and about transmigration of the soul based on works and conduct are those of Yājñavalkya in the Br. Up. The Pañcāgnividyā expatiates upon and is concerned mainly with only one aspect of transmigration viz. the path of those who living in a village practise a life of sacrifices, works of public utility and almṣ The five fires and five offerings relate only to the pitr̥yāṇa path. It contains an esoteric and semi-physical explanation of the process by which persons come to be born again on the earth. At the most it may be argued that some kṣatriya rulers or noble- men claimed to have given an esoteric or metaphorical explanation of the return of pious men from the moon to the earth agaiṇ Nothing positive is said as to whether Pravāhaṇa Jaivali was the ruler of a country or only a kṣatriya (rājanya in Br. Up. VI. 2.3, Chāṇ Up. V. 3.5) but we are told that Aśvapati was king of the Kekaya country in the extreme northwest of India, while the original proclaimer of the immor- tality of the self and its identity with the supreme self was yajña- valkya who was in Videha (Mithilā, modern Bihar), which was at least a thousand miles away from Kekaya. Yājñavalkya's philo- sophy must have taken a long time before it became well known in the distant Kekaya. Conceding for argument that a few rulers like Aśvapati were the first to propound an explanation of the way of the transmigration of pious sacrifices and the like, it is a far cry from that to assume as Deussen does (Ph. Up. p. 20) that the doctrine of the Ātman as the first Principle of the universe was fostered and progressively developed by the kṣatriyas in opposition to the principles of the brahmanical ritual and this assumption is contrary to what he himself states elsewhere in his own work ( pp. 410, 281, 348 ).

Before proceeding further a passage from the Bṛ. Up. I. 4. 10 and another from the Ait. Up. (II. 4-5) would have to be considereḍ In Bṛ. Up. occurs the following passage : ⁸⁵ " In the beginning brahmaṇ was there, it cognised itself as ‘I am brahma’; therefore it became all; whoever from among the Gods perceived this (viz. ‘I am brahman’), he became that (brahman); the same occurred to sages and meṇ The sage Vāmadeva realizing this reached the conclusion ‘I was (or became) Manu and the Sun also.’ Therefore, this (will occur) even now. Whoever (even a man) who realizes ‘I am brahman’ he becomes (identical with) all this (universe); even the gods are not able to prevent that man’s being one with brahman and with all, for he is the soul of all these.” Deussen translates ‘aham Manurabhavam Sūryaśca’ as ‘I was once Manu, I was once the Sun’. There is no word for ‘once’ and it is supplied by Deussen who remarks ‘as a proof of his knowledge of brahman, Vāmadeva) alleged his acquaintance with his former births as Manu and Sūrya’ (p. 317). The words can very well be construed as meaning that Vāmadeva, having realized brahman when he sang the hymn Rg. IV. 26, expressed his identity with Manu and Sūrya (and the whole universe). There is no express reference to former births and Śankarācārya in⁸⁶ his bhāṣya on Br. Up. understands the passage in this sense and does not refer to former birthṣ It cannot be said that the Br. Up. quotes Rg. IV. 26. 1 for supporting the concep-tion of transmigration but it relies on it merely for the concep-tion of identity, of the individual soul with the Supreme Self.

Then there is a passage in the Ait. Up. which Deussen refers to (pp. 317–318 of Ph. Up.). In the 2nd adhyāya that Upaniṣad refers to the conception of a person as the first birth; when the child is actually born that is described as the 2nd birth. Then it proceeds “He (the son) being the self of the father is placed in his (the father’s) stead for the performance of all sacred works; then his other self (the father) having performed all he has to do and having reached the span of his life (having become very old) departs (from this world) and departing from this world is born again, that is his third birth. And this has been declared by a sage ‘while dwelling in (mother’s) womb I came to know all the births of the gods; a hundred strongholds of ayas (copper or iron) held me, but I escaped down with speed like a hawk.’ Vāmadeva lying in his mother’s womb declared this”. In this passage the father and son are treated as identical, as elsewhere it is so said (vide note below). This Ṛgveda verse (the 2nd half) is liable to several interpretationṣ In the Ṛgveda (I. 80. 2, VIII. 95. 3, IX. 68. 6, X. 11. 4 &c.) it is frequently stated that (śyena) hawk brings Soma for Indra. Śyena may also be interpreted as standing for the soul and the iron fortresses as the bodies through which the transmigrating soul wanderṣ The Ṛgveda sage might have only meant the mythical hawk of Indra. But as the word ‘janimāni’ occurs in the first half the Upaniṣadic sage (in Ait. Up.) might have used the verse to support his ideas about the three birthṣ But even in the Ait. Up. passage the three births are not clearly of one person, unless we resort to a myth, viz. the conception of a son and the son’s birth are taken as the two births of the father himself on the ground that the son is the father himself born agaiṇ⁸⁷

The Upaniṣads laid down an inexorable law that fruits of all actions, good or evil, must be experienced and that a person’s deeds and conduct determined the character of his succeeding existenceṣ But from some passages in the Upaniṣads themselves it appears that they recognised some exceptionṣ One exception was that when a person realised that he was one with brahman the actions both good and evil, if any, done by him after that Realization and before the physical death of the body produced no resultṣ In Chāṇ Up. VI. 14. 3 Satyākāma⁸⁸ Jābāla tells his pupil Upakosala that ‘Just as water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows (realizes) brahman’. Chāṇ Up. V. 24. 3 ‘just as the (soft) cottonlike fibres of the iṣīkā reed when cast into fire are burnt out, so all evil deeds of him who knowing (the purport of) Vaiśvānara (brahma) offers Agnihotra are burnt’. The Br. Up. states ‘Him who knows these two do not overwhelm, whether he says that he did evil for some reason or that he did a good deed for some reason; he overcomes both these; neither what he has done nor what he has omitted to do afflict (lit. heat or burn)’. The Muṇḍaka Up. provides ‘when a person has seen (realized) the Highest (cause) and lowest (effect) his actions perish.’ But this is only true as regards all acts before he attained Realization and all acts that his body may do after his attainment of Realization but he cannot rescind the prārabdha karma which brought about that existence wherein he reached Realization of brahman. The idea is that the actions which led to a person’s present embodiment must all be consumed by the body persisting till the appointed period for its death, and then only he becomes free from the physical body. The Chāṇ Up. states⁸⁹ as to a man who has attained true knowledge of the Supreme Self from a teacher that 'for him there is only delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will become perfect'. All these Upaniṣad passages are relied upon in V. S. IV. 1. 13-15 and Śaṅkarācārya explains their purpose concisely but very clearly. The Gītā also says (IV. 37) that the fire of knowledge reduces to ashes all deedṣ Here all means only Sañcita and Sañciyamāna and excludes prārabdha-karma. About the acts during the period between the attainment of Vidyā and the fall of the body Śaṅkarācārya gives the instance of an arrow shot from a bow, which stops only after the initial impetus is exhausted in the flight of the arrow. Some works say that when the meritorious deed or the sinful deed done in the present life is of the extremest kind it may yield results in this very life.⁹⁰

The Upaniṣad theory is that one must bear the consequences of all actions, good or evil. But sometimes an evil action is done without any previous thought, as, for example, when a man's gun goes off by accident and somebody is killed or seriously injureḍ This led to a discussion in Dharmaśūtras and Smṛtis and the doctrine of prāyaścittas (expiations) for sins was developeḍ From Vedic times some rites had been performed to counteract mishaps and irregularities in the course of religious ceremonies and for portentous phenomena or personal misfortunes such as a dog-bite. In these the idea was of ceremonial purity and the averting of evil results from such phenomena in which no question of sin as ordinarily understood entereḍ In the Gautama Dharmasūtra there is 'a discussion on this, which is probably the earliest clear exposition on expiations for sinṣ Gautama states that there were two views on the efficacy of expiations against sinṣ One view was that expiations should not be performed as regards sins, because a sin is not destroyed unless its consequences are experienced; the other view was that 'one should perform expiations since there are Vedic passages indicative of this, such as 'after performing the sacrifice called Punahstoma one can come back (i. e. become fit for) Soma sacrifice (i. e. for all Vedic rites in general)'; 'after performing the Vratyastoma' (one becomes fit for vedic sacrifices), 'he who offers the Asvamedha sacrifice crosses beyond all sin, beyond (even) ⁹¹ brāhmaṇa murder.' Some held the view that only sins committed inadvertently were removed by expiations; ⁹² while others held the view that expiations were efficacious even against sins committed wilfully as there are Vedic indications to that effect (Manu XI. 45). Manu, however, appears to have held that a man is relieved of the lapses inadvertently committed by means of the study of the Veda, but sins wilfully committed can be removed only by various prescribed expiations (XI. 46) and that a man must always resort to expiations for sins, since those who have not done so have to undergo a double retribution viz. the tortures of horrible hells for long terms of years and also being born in other human existences with bodily deformities and diseases (Manu XI. 48 and XII. 54). The subject of expiations and of Karmavipāka (fruition of evil actions by being born as a worm or lower animal, or having a short life and premature death and undergoing torments of Hell) has been dealt with at length in H. of Dh. Vol. IV. pp. 1-178). So far as rebirth for sins is concerned attention may be drawn here to the following authorities : Manusmṛti XII. 54-69, Yāj. III. 131, 135-136, 207-215, Viṣṇudharmasūtra, chap. 44, Atṛsmṛti 4. 5-14, 17-44, Mārkaṇḍeya-purāṇa 15. 1-41 (B. I. eḍ ), Brahmapurāṇa 217. 37-110, Garuḍapurāṇa, Pretakaṇḍa, chap 2. 60-88 (which incorporate almost word for word Yāj. III. 206-215) and also quotations from Śāṅkha Dharmasūtra collected by the present author in ABORI. vol. VIII, pp. 116-117 items 375-378 culled from the Mitākṣarā on Yāj. III. 216, the Madanapārijāta pp. 701-702, the Parāśara-Mādhavīya, vol. II, part 2 pp. 246, 259, 263, 269. For reasons of space it is not possible to set out this whole mass but a few illustrative passages will be citeḍ

Manu states ( XII, 54-69, with which Yāj. III. 206-208 and 212-215 agree in many places ) ‘those guilty of mortal sins (Mahāpātakas), having gone through terrible hells during a large numbers of years, come after the expiration (of hell punishment) to the following birthṣ The slayer of a Brāhmaṇa passes through the births of dog, pig, ass, camel, cow (or ox), goat, sheep, deer, a bird, a cāṇḍāla and a pukkasa; a brāhmaṇa who drinks the liquor called Surā enters the bodies of worms and (large) insects, of moths ( or locusts), of birds feeding on ordure and of carnivorous animals; a brāhmaṇa (who steals gold of a brāhmaṇa) shall pass a thousand times through the births of spiders, snakes, lizards, aquatic animals and of destructive goblins; the violator of his guru's bed passes a hundred times through (the form of) grasses, shrubs, creepers, carnivorous animals and of beasts with fangs and of those (animals) like tigers doing cruel actṣ Those men who are given to injuring others become animals that eat raw flesh, those who eat forbidden food become worms, those that thieve become creatures consuming their own kind (such as fishes) and those who have inter-course with women of the lowest classes become pretas (ghostly spirits); one who has associated with outcasts (for certain specified periods), he who approaches the wives of other men and he who has deprived a brāhmaṇa of his property (other than gold) becomes Brahmarākṣasa (an evil demon); a man who has on account of greed stolen gems, pearls or coral or any of the other kinds of precious stones is born among goldsmiths; for stealing grain a brāhmaṇa becomes a rat, for stealing bell-metal a man becomes a haṃsa bird, for depriving another of water he becomes the bird called Plava, for stealing honey a stinging insect, for stealing milk a cow, for stealing sweet juice (sugar-cane &c) a dog, for stealing clarified butter an ichneumon, for stealing meat a vulture, for stealing fat a cormorant, for stealing oil a bird called Tailapaka, for stealing salt a cricket, for stealing curds a bird called Balākā (crane) : for stealing silk a partridge, for stealing linen a frog; for stealing cloth of cotton threads Krauñca bird, for stealing a cow an iguana, for stealing molasses a bird called vāgguḍa (a bat?), for stealing fine perfume a musk-rat, for stealing vegetables consisting of leaves a peacock, for stealing cooked food of various kinds a porcupine and for stealing uncooked food a hedgehog; for stealing fire a person becomes a heron, for stealing household utensils a mason-wasp, for stealing dyed garments a cakora bird; for stealing a deer or an elephant a wolf, for stealing a horse a tiger, for stealing fruits and roots a monkey, for stealing a woman a bear, for stealing drinking water a cātaka, for stealing vehicles a camel, for stealing cattle a he-goat; that man who has forcibly taken away any kind of property belonging to another or who eats sacrificial food of which no part has been offered in sacrifice certainly becomes a lower animal; women also who in like manner committed theft shall incur guilt; they become the females of those same creatures (enumerated above).

It may be noted that some of the births assigned to those guilty of thefts of various articles have some logic or reason behind those regulations e. g. when Manu XII. 62 and Yaj. III. 214 prescribe that a thief of grains becomes a rat in the next birth or when Manu XII. 61 prescribes that a thief of jewels, pearls and coral is born among the class of goldsmiths, one can easily appreciate this retribution as appropriate or reasonable, but the same cannot be said of all otherṣ It is noteworthy that, in spite of what the bhāṣya on Y. S. quoted in note 2325 and pp.1417-18 above says, a single mortal sin like brāhmaṇa-murder might make the perpetrator pass through several vile births, as stated by Manu in XII. 55–58, Yaj. III. 207–208 and by Śankarācārya.²⁵⁷²

Once the strict rule of the original doctrine of Karma in the Upaniṣads was loosened by the theory of prāyaścittas, a quick pace was set even in early times for the removal or reduction of the effects of sins in other ways than by means of expiationṣ Gautama⁹⁴ prescribes five means for redeeming (or expiating) blamable acts viz. inaudible recitation of the Veda, austerities, sacrifice in fire, fasting, giving giftṣ The history of Dharmaśāstra vol. IV deals at some length with japa (pp. 44-51), tapas (pp. 42-43), homa (pp. 43-44), dāna (pp. 51-52) and fasting (pp. 52-54). Therefore, it is not necessary to say here anything about theṃ But attention must be drawn to some special and far-reaching modifications of these and other meanṣ Śūdras and members of pratiloma castes were not authorized to study the Veda. Hence the authors of medieval works, particularly of Purāṇas, went so far as to say that remembrance⁹⁵ of the name of Kṛṣṇa is superior to all expiations and all forms of austerities and that if a man only remembers Nārāyaṇa in the morning, noon, evening, at night and other times, he at once secures the destruction of (the consequences of) sinṣ Other means were also provided for the removal of sins, one being pilgrimage to holy placeṣ Vide H. of Dh. vol. IV. pp. 55-56 and 552-580. Another was the practice of prāṇāyāma which has been dealt with on p. 42 of H. Dh. vol. IV.

Even in the earliest times open confession of sin was in certain cases regarded as freeing the person from siṇ In the Cāturmāsya called Varuṇa-praghāsa, the wife who took part with her husband had to confess expressly or by some indirect ways whether she had at some time a paramour and if she did so she was purified and could take part in the sacred rites thereafter. Vide H. of Dh. Vol. II. pp. 575–576 and 1098 for thiṣ Similarly, according to Āp, Dh. S. I. 9. 24. 15, I. 10. 28. 19 and 1, 10. 29. 1 it was necessary when undergoing expiations for forsaking one’s wife or for brāhmaṇa murder to confess one’s siṇ So also the brahmacārin, if guilty of sexual intercourse, had to proclaim his lapse while begging at seven houses (vide Gautama and Manu quoted below).⁹⁶ Repentance (anuttāpa). Manu (XII. 227 and 230) provides that a sinner is relieved of the consequences of sin by proclaiming his sin to people, by repentance, by austerities, by recitation of Vedic texts, by gifts in case of distress (i. e. if he is unable to undergo tapas) ; a man after committing a sin becomes free from it by feeling remorse and if he makes a resolve 'I shall never again do so' he is purifieḍ The Viṣṇupurāṇa provides that, when after committing a sin the man feels remorse, the one high expiation that he has then to undergo is the remembrance of Hari.⁹⁷ MacNicol, a Scottish Missionary, wrote a work (in 1915) on 'Indian theism' in which he boldly asserts, after referring to the Upaniṣadic doctrine of Karma that 'there is no place for repentance in the Hindu doctrine of Karma' (p. 223). It has been shown above that confession was known in Vedic times and that repentance was valued in Dharmaśāstra works either as removing sins or as making the repentant man fit for receiving expiatory rites (vide H. of Dh. vol. IV. pp. 41-42). The worthy missionary author probably thinks his Christian brand of remission of sins by confession and repentance better than the Upaniṣadic teaching. Ancient Indian authors were not prepared to accept mere confession and repentance as enough to absolve a man of all sinṣ The Biblical position that if one believes in Christ and his gospel, confesses his sins and says he repents (as required in Matthew 4. 17, Mark I. 15 and Luke 24. 47) is very likely to engender among common men a complacent attitude about sinṣ This complacent frame of mind, the ancient Dharmaśāstra writers wanted to prevent and therefore, they insisted upon a good deal more than repentance and confession of sinṣ They blended the old doctrine of confession and repentance with retribution viz. hell tortures and vile birthṣ Later Paurāṇik writers approached very close to the common Christians that one has simply to believe in Christ as a redeemer, to confess and to take the name of God for being absolved from all sinṣ Macnicol either did not read the relevant texts from purāṇas or he forgot them when he made the assertion noted above.

Long before MacNicol wrote and since his days numerous Western scholars brought up in Christian surroundings have expressed their view that the ancient Indian doctrine as regards man's destiny after death is far more preferable to Biblical ideas on the same subject. It is enough to refer to only two or three authorṣ Arberry in his 'Asiatic Jones' quotes (p. 37) from Sir William Jones' letter to Earl Spencer the following passage 'I am no Hindu, but I hold the doctrine of the Hindus concerning a future state to be incomparably more rational, more pious and more likely to deter men from vice, than the horrid opinions inculcated by Christians on punishments without end'. Lowes Dickinson in 'Religion and Immortality' (Dent and Sons, 1911) observes (on p. 74) 'it is really a consoling idea that our present capacities are determined by our previous actions and that our present actions again will determine our future character'. Owen Rutter, author of 'the scales of Karma' (London, 1925) says that Christianity has failed to solve the intellectual and moral problems which beset those who live in the complexities of the modern world, that he began to study the doctrine of Karma and reincarnation seven years before he wrote the book, which is a personal statement rather than an essay on Karma (pp. 12-13). Many who have written against this doctrine, while conceding that the Upaniṣadic doctrine is an ancient and serious attempt to solve the problem of injustice and evil in the world, call it a weak one and beset with difficultieṣ One should like to ask, what systems of religion and philosophy are not beset with difficulties? One may take the Christian doctrines for example. To all non-Christians (and to several Christians also in modern times) its doctrine of original sin, its damnation of unbaptized infants, of predestination deduced from the belief that God is an Omniscient and Omnipotent Creator of heaven and earth appear strange and unjustifieḍ L. T. Hobhouse in 'Morals in Evolution' part II (1906) pp. 130 ff points out how all systems with a personal God, particularly Christianity, are beset with difficulties, such as making the problem of evil urgent, eternal punishment for a great sinner in one life suggestive of a moral impossibility, the inescapable conclusion that all men, however good, that did not or could not or do not believe in Christ and are not members of the Christian Church by baptism are irrevocably doomeḍ That Christianity is unique and that Christians are God's chosen people are beliefs which would make God appear quite unjust and therefore some Christian writers like Prof. Toynbee in 'Christianity among the religions of the world' (Oxford Uṇ Press, 1958) have begun to urge that Christianity must be purged of such beliefs (pp. 13 and 95).

The strict doctrine of Karma would require that there can be no transfer of good or bad karma from one man to another and a man cannot suffer for the sins of otherṣ But in the Ṛgveda there are allusions to the belief that God might inflict punishment on the sons for the sins of their fatherṣ For example, in Rg. VII. 86. 5 Vasiṣṭha⁹⁸ prays to Varuna "cast away from us the transgressions of our fathers, and those that we committed in our own person"; 'May we we not have to suffer for the sin committed by another, may we not do that for which you punish (this is addressed to Viśve-devāḥ). The Śāntiparva, however, asserts 'whatever deed a man does in four ways viz. with eye, with thought, speech or action, he receives (in return) that same kind of action; a man does not enjoy (i. e. experience the results of) the good deeds or evil deeds of another; man attains (a result) in consonance with the actions done by himself'.⁹⁹ Similarly, in the Gṛdhra-gomāyu-saṁvāda, it is asserted 'the son does not have to go by the path due to the actions of the father, nor vice versa, they being bound by their own respective good or evil deeds proceed each by a different path'. Whatever deed a man does, whether holy or very unholy (terrible), the consequences of that are experienced by the doer alone, what with that' (Śāntiparva 153. 38 and 41=cr. eḍ 149. 34 and 37).

Modifications of this doctrine were early introduceḍ The Gaut.¹⁰⁰ Dh. S. provides that the king should guard all the varnas and āśramas according to Śāstra and if they swerve from their duties he should make them follow their duties, since he gets a share of the dharma (merit) observed by theṃ Manu provides (VIII. 304-305, 308) that the king who protects his subjects secures the sixth part of the (spiritual) merit of all (his subjects), but if he does not guard them he also shares in the sixth part of their adharma (sin); the king who protects well is entitled to the sixth part of the merit of the Veda study, the sacrifices, the gifts, and of the worship of gods done by all subjects; that king who takes as his one-sixth part of the crops and other products, but fails to guard the subjects is declared (by sages) as receiving all the sins of all his subjects'. Manu says elsewhere (in IX. 301) that the king is the Yuga, that his actions may bring in Kṛta or any of the other Yugaṣ Kālidāsa in Śākuntala echoes this idea.⁴⁸ Manu (in VIII. 316) provides that when a thief comes to a king, confesses his guilt and asks the king to punish him with a heavy staff or a sharp weapon and the king either punishes him or lets him off, the thief is freed from (the effects of) the sin, but the king incurs the guilt of the thief if he does not punish hiṃ To the same effect is Vasiṣṭha 19. 46 and 20. 41. It was stated by Manu (III. 100) that all the merit of even a man who lives a plain life by subsisting on grains left in the field after the crops are garnered and who performs homa in the five fires (to be kept by an householder) is taken away by a brāhmaṇa guest who stays unhonoured by hiṃ Śāntiparva, Viṣṇu Dh. S. and several Purāṇas provide that⁴⁹ when a guest, being disappointed (in getting food), turns away from the house of a person, the guest goes away taking all the merit of the person and transfers to him all his own misdeedṣ This was probably not meant to be taken literally. It is only an arthavāda (in the language of the Mīmāṁsā) and merely exhorts a householder to honour a guest properly. The exhortation addressed by the judge to a witness before the latter began to depose contains in Yaj. the following verse 'whatever good deeds you performed in hundreds of existences, all that will go to that party whose defeat you will bring about by your false evidence.' The Mit. and Aparārka both say that this is meant only to frighten and quote a verse of Nārada (ṛṇādāna 200) in support 'he (the judge) should frighten them (from telling lies) by citing ancient dharmaśāstra texts, by recounting the greatness of truth and by censuring falsehooḍ' Manu (VIII. 90), however, makes the exhortation run as follows 'Whatever good deeds you performed from your birth, the merit of all of them would go to dogs if you will depose falsely'. Manu XII. 81 says ¹⁰⁴ 'with whatever dis-position of mind (either sāttvika or rājasa or tāmasa) a man does an act he reaps the fruits thereof (in a future life) in a body endowed with the same character.'

The Bhagavadgītā, apart from the fact that knowledge of reality destroyed the effects of all deeds, emphasized at the end the path of singleminded devotion (bhakti) to God and surrendering all one's acts and their fruits to Him 'giving up all the various paths, come to me alone as your refuge; don't grieve, I shall release you from the consequences of all evil deeds, if any, of yours'. ¹⁰⁵

As regards husband and wife, the Dharmaśāstra works say a good deal but all that is said should not be taken literally. For example, Manu (V. 164-166) states ¹⁰⁶ 'by playing false to her husband (i. e. by adultery ) the wife is censured in this world, she becomes (after death) a female jackal and is tormented by evil diseases (such as leprosy). That woman controlling herself in thought, word and deed, who does not play false to her husband, resides in the same world (heaven) as her husband, and is called a virtuous wife. A woman restrained in thought, word and deed, secures by such conduct (as is laid down for her) in this life highest renown and residence with her husband in the next world'. For hyperbolical descriptions of the power of a chaste wife (pativratā) in the great epic and Purāṇas, vide H. of Dh. vol. II. pp. 567–568. A verse cited there may be repeated here 'just as a snake-charmer forcibly draws out from a hole a snake, so a chaste wife snatches away her husband's life from the messengers of death and reaches heaven with her husband'. This is also an arthavāda but it probably reflected the popular ideas of those timeṣ

The Mahābhārata has certain interesting verses on the transference of the effects of karma to one's descendantṣ The Ādiparva states 'if the consequences of sin are not seen affecting the perpetrator, they will surely be seen in the sons or grandsons'. This again is an arthavāda.¹⁰⁷

It was believed that punishment by the king for a sinful deed (like a theft &c.) liquidated the consequences of the sin, made the offender pure and enabled him to reach heaven as men of good deeds do.¹⁰⁸

It is difficult to reconcile the doctrine of Karma and punar-janma with the system of Śrāddhas in which balls of rice are offered to the three paternal ancestors of the performer of śrāddha. This subject has been dealt with in H. of Dh. vol. IV. pp. 335–339. The offering of balls of rice to the spirits of the departed male ancestors was in vogue in the times of the Veda probably and even before the Vedas and the theory of Karma and Punar-janma arose later and as people were not prepared to give up the theory of śrāddhas, they kept both.

The popular idea of the last thought at one's death leading to a future birth appropriate to that thought in spite of a life of sin and iniquity is an interference with the working of the law of Karma and transmigratioṇ This notion has been dealt with above (pp. 972-973) where it has been pointed out that that notion is not supported by the Bhagavadgītā (VIII, 5-7).

Apart from the Upaniṣads (and commentaries thereon), the Vedāntasūtras (and the bhāṣyas thereon) and the Bhagavadgītā, there are very few regular treatises on the doctrine of Karma and re-incarnatioṇ One work comparatively early in date is the Vijñānadīpikā of Padmapāda (said to be the same as the favourite pupil of the first Śaṅkarācārya) in 71 verses (edited with a commentary and Introduction by M. M. Dr. Umesha Mishra, Allahabad, 1940) which deal with the means of achieving mokṣa by realizing the identity of the individual self and the Supreme Self (they being like the reflection and its original) and by annihilating karma. Some of the important verses in it have been adduced above in the noteṣ That work (verse 9) ²⁵⁸⁸ compares sañcīyamāna-karma to grain standing in the field, sañcita to grain stored in one's house and prārabdha-karma to food put in one's stomach. The food put in one's stomach is exhausted by its being digested which takes some time. Therefore, Karma of the sañcita and sañcīyamāna types is annihilated by correct knowledge, while prārabdha karma by undergoing its results for some time. It emphasizes that it is Vairāgya (extreme non-attachment to objects of sense) that leads to the rise of correct knowledge of Reality, to the elimina- tion of vāsanās (unconsciously working impressions), to the annihilation of Karma and to cessation of rebirth.

Another work is the Janma-maraṇavicāra of Bhaṭṭa Vāmadeva (published in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies vol. 19, 1918 A. D.). It is a small work in 25 pageṣ²⁵⁸⁹ It appears to belong to the Kashmir Śaiva cult. It states that Śiva has three Śaktis, Cit-śakti (which is of the nature of light or consciousness), Svātantrya (free will, independence) and Anandaśakti (bliss). There are six kañcukas (sheaths, covers) viz. Māyā, kāla, Śuddha-vidyā, Rāga. Kāla and Niyantraṇa. On p. 15 it says that when the bodily machine is broken, consciousness, taking hold of prāṇana (breathing), is carried to another body by the Ātivāhika (subtle body)¹¹¹. This latter body becomes like a vehicle between the body that lies dead and the next physical body. The work then quotes from a Kośabhāṣya three verses which support the theory of the antarābhavadeha (the intermediate body between the dead physical body and the future physical body) and also relies on Ṛg. X. 85. 16.¹¹² It also quotes Bhagavadgītā 14. 14-15 (yadā sattve pravṛddhe tu &c) and says that those bodily states are referred to in such Vedic passages as 'Pañcāre cakre &c' (Ṛg. X. 164. 13), in Kathopaniṣad I. 6 (sasyam-iva martyah pacyate), in 'Vāsāinsi jirṇāni' (Gitā II. 22). He further says that by God's grace a man becomes pure and by dīkṣā and other means he understands his real character and reaches Śiva. It states that all men do not attain liberation, while those who hate (discard) dīkṣā, temples and correct knowledge go to hell. There is very little discussion about the kinds of Karma and the removal of the effects of these.

There is another rather modern work called Prārabdha-dhvānta-samhṛti (destruction of the darkness i. e. ignorance about prārabdha) composed in śaka 1741 (1819 A. D.) at Pañcāvati near Nasik by Acyutarāya Modaka, a learned and prolific writer. The only known mṣ is in the Mysore Government. Oriental Library and is in Kannada script. The present author got a Devanāgarī transcript of the Mṣ through the kindness of the authorities of the Library.

Dr. H. G. Narahari (in N. I. A. vol. V, pp. 115-118) furnishes an account of the mṣ, its date and a brief description of its contentṣ In another paper the same scholar gives a tolerably full analysis of its contents (in J. G. J. R. I. vol. III. for 1945-46, pp. 349-367).

The author Acyutarāya states that the work really means ‘Prārabdha-vāda-dhvāntasaṁhṛti’ (destruction of the darkness caused by the doctrine of prārabdha) and that all that he wants is to combat the false idea that all human acts from the moment of conception to death are governed by past deeds alone to the exclusion of everything else. He postulates that all human activity is due to prārabdha, to saṁskāras (sub-conscious or latent impressions or tendencies) and prayatna (human effort). He explains: the moment after the body dies, all the accumulated good and bad deeds set in motion by God become ready to yield their retribution (results) and that a good or evil deed (or both) that is strongest begins a suitable body. The birth is that of a brāhmaṇa or the rest when there is mixed good and evil as the strongest karma, as a lower animal when sin is strongest, as a godly birth when a good deed is strongest. The duration of life may be 100 years, less or more, and bhoga means experiencing pleasure or pain that is regarded as favourable or unfavourable.¹¹³ Then he launches on the discussion of pleasure (sukha) as threefold, viz. illusory (prātibhāsika), actual (vyāvaḥārika) or actual due to illusory pleasure. Pleasure is again ramya (beautiful) and priya (dear or liked). These two are not synonymous, since gold would appear beautiful to an ascetic but it is not dear to hiṃ Then he divides what is priya into three kinds (or degrees). He divides each of the three kinds of pleasure into three varieties, which are passed over here. The preceding are classifications of pleasure that is ‘Laukikakārya’ (ordinary or common); but there are also other sukhas, viz. vaidika (fourfold such as pratikopāsana, āhārya (assumed) and vāsanātmaka (as in sleep)]. This last he subdivides into three kinds (sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa) that are passed over. Pain (duḥkha) is divisible in the same way as sukha and the author illustrates the different kinds of pain, that are left out here. Then the author dilates upon the cause or causes of pleasure and pain (sukha and duḥkha) that constitute man’s experience on earth, which causes are prārabdha (past karma that has begun to operate and determines the body the soul secures), saṁskāra and prayatna.¹¹⁴ He states that the bliss that a man feels in meditation (samādhi) is due to prārabdha, the pleasure he feels in deep sleep is due to saṁskāras¹¹⁵ and the pleasure on the fall of rain after the performance of the Kārīrī (sacrifice) is due to human effort. From the Upaniṣad passages it follows (says Acyutarāya) that in deep sleep there is no desire, no karma and no fear and so the pleasure (expressed on waking in the words 'sukham-ahamasvāpsam' (I had a happy sleep) is not due to prārabdha but to saṁskāraṣ He relies on the Br. Up. ¹¹⁶ (IV. 4. 2) for holding this view (i. e. he takes 'pūrvaprajñā' in that passage as equal to vāsanā ('latent impres- sions or reminiscences of past experiences). The activities of a person in past lives may be madhya¹¹⁷ (middling or moderate), manda (inferior), tīvra (formidable). A good deed which is three parts sāttvika and one part rājasa is called madhya; a deed which is half sāttvika and half rājasa is tīvra. Then Acyutarāya refers to a conflict of viewṣ Following the words ‘puṇyo vai puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati pāpaḥ pāpena’ (Br. Up. III. 3. 13 quoted in note 2510 above), some writers held that it is only Karma that is the cause of a new birth and that vidyā (knowledge of all kinds) and pūrvaprajñā have nothing to do with it, while others relying on Br. Up. IV. 4. 2 (to which reference is made in the Saṅkṣepasārīraka III, 18) held that Vidyā, Karma and Pūrvaprajñā have all to do with the assumption of a new body by the soul. Acyutarāya agrees with this latter view. He divides and subdivides Karma, vidyā and pūrvaprajñā, so that ultimately the threefold apparatus for giving a new body comes to 96 varieties and remarks that these divisions are not of much use.¹¹⁸ To the objection that all this refutation of prārabdhabhāva is idle and serves no purpose he replies: men are of three sorts, mukta (liberated), mumukṣu (desirous of liberation) and viṣayin (immersed in enjoying the objects of sense). As regards the first the Chāṇ Up. VI. 14. 2 says ‘for him there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from body), then he will be perfect’.¹¹⁹ The same is relied upon in V. S. IV. 1. 19. The idea being that until prārabdhakarma that brought about the body in which Realisation was attained is done away with by the death of the body, the self is Jīvanmukta, but his other karma that has not begun to yield fruit is done away with by Realisation, To the same effect is Bhagavadgītā.

Acyutarāya quotes thirteen verses from Vārtikasāra about Vāsanā (pūrvaprajñā), Karma and Vidyā (pp. 31-33). He quotes the Jīvanmuktiviveka on the three means of jīvanmukti viz. tattvajñāna (knowledge of the Reality as enunciated in 'Tat-tvamasi' Chāṇ Up. VI. 8. 7, 'Aham brahmāsmi' Br. Up. I. 4. 10), manonāśa (disappearance of the activities of the mind) and Vāsanākṣaya (destruction of the instincts of anger &c). Then he gives a lengthy disquisition on the condemnation of prārabdhavāda and the superiority of effort from the Vasiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇa. About mumukṣu Acyutarāya advises going to a guru as laid down in Mundakopaniṣad I. 2. 12 (tadvijñānārtham sa gurumevābhigacchet &c).

The present author has read either wholly or partially the following modern works, mostly written by Western scholars on Karma and rebirth, that either offer remarks for or against that doctrine. The space at the author's disposal precludes any detailed statement about the objections raised against this doctrine in some of theṃ But a few important objections will be stated and will be briefly dealt with. The works read or consulted are: "Philosophy of the Upanishads" by Paul Deussen, translated by A. S. Geden (1906) pp. 313-338; J. R. A. S. for 1906 pp. 586-593 and for 1907 pp. 665-72 on modifications of the doctrine of Karma by E. W. Hopkins; 'Transmigration of souls' by Alfred Berthelot, translated by H. J. Chaytor (Harper, London, 1909); 'Karma and redemption' by A. G. Hogg (eḍ of 1910); 'Religion and immortality' by G. Lowes Dickinson (Dent, 1911); 'Re-incarnation' by E.D. Walker (Rider and Co., London, 1913); this book contains extracts from Western authors (22 in number) on re-incarnation (pp. 63-124); there is also a long chapter (pp. 127-191) of extracts from Western Poetry on the same subject; he also deals with evidences of the doctrine in the Bible and early Christendom and a Bibliography on pp. 329-343; 'Fate and free will' by Ardesar Sorabji N. Wadia (Dent and Sons, London 1915). He states the problem to be 'whether fate by itself influences and directs the course of human evolution or freewill by itself or both fate and freewill working conjointly lay down the lines along which human progress must lie'. He states that it must be the one or the other and that it can never be both (p. 180). He himself believes in a fixed and determinist future; 'Immortality' essays on, by B.H. Streeter and others (Macmillan & Co. 1917); pp. 293-317 deal with re-incarnation and Karma by Miss Lily Dougall and pp. 317-341 deal with modern Theosophy which adopts the doctrines of re-incarnation and Karma; 'Religion and philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads' by A. B. Keith, vol. II. pp. 570-584; 'Karma and re- incarnation’ by Paul Yevtic (Luzac & Co., London, 1927); L’ Ame et le Dogme de la Transmigration days les Livres Sacres de L’Inde ancienne’ by Eric de Henseler, Paris, 1928; ‘Some dogmas of Religion’ by McTaggart with Introduction by C. D. Broad (London, 1930 pp. 77–111 on ‘Human Immortality’), ‘Vicissitudes of karma doctrine’ by Prof. H. D. Bhattacharya in Malaviya Commemoration Volume (1932) pp. 491–526; ‘Reincarnation for every man’ by Shaw Desmond (Rider & Co., London). This work mentions in chap. VIII European great men that believed in this doctrine; ‘The scales of karma’ by Owen Rutter (London). This book contains numerous references to Greek and Roman writers and to modern English and German poets and philosophers from whose works extracts are cited for showing that they believed in Karma and reincarnation such as Shakespeare, Hume, Goethe, Wordsworth; ‘Indian Philosophy’, by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan (1941) pp. 244–249; ‘The circle of life’ by Kenneth Walker (Jonathan Cape, London, 1942) chap. VIII and IX pp. 81–104; ‘Karma and re-birth’ by Christmas Humphreys (London, 1944); in chap. VII. pp. 62–66 he tries to show that Schopenhauer, Tennyson, Browning, Rossetti and John Masefield, the English Poet Laureate, believe in this doctrine; ‘The problem of re-birth’ by Sri Aurobindo (Pondicherry, 1952); ‘The Brahmasutras’ by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan (1959), pp.194–207 of the Introduction; ‘The dogma of re-incarnation’ by J. E. Sanjana (New Book Co., Bombay, 1954) pp. 1-134 with an Appendix on the rationale of the dogma of rebirth, pp. 137– 157. This is one of the largest and latest works on ‘re-incarna- tion’ that the present author reaḍ Mr. Sanjana writes bitterly and sometimes in offensive language about those from whom he differṣ He asserts that he is a true Zoroastrian and that ‘it can be said without any exaggeration and with the most perfect reason and justice that a man who believes in re-incarnation is not a true Zoroastrian’ (p. 125). None need quarrel with his first belief, but the latter part of the sentence invites serious consideratioṇ He appears to aver that he has a monopoly of the true doctrines of Zoroastrianism and like the Roman Church and the Popes, that held that the true religion was only in their keeping and that all others (even those who believed in the Bible and Christ) were damned, holds that Zoroastrians believing in re-incarnation are apostateṣ I shall cite only one or two Parsi scholars who hold just the opposite view. Mr. R. F. Gorvala contributed a paper on the “Immortal Soul, its pre-existence, persistence after death and transmigration" to the Spiegel Com- memoration Volume edited by no less a Parsi scholar than Dr. J. J. Modi (Bombay, 1908) pp. 99-124, in which he states (p. 124) 'that the Hindu doctrine of the transmigration of the soul influenced the faith of the ancient Zoroastrians in all timeṣ Indeed the struggle between Good and Evil could not end in the triumph of the former if but one brief life was the only time given for the fight.' Vide also 'Philosophy of Zoroastrianism' by Faredun K. Dadachanji (Bombay, Times of India Press, 1941) pp. 108-133, particularly pp. 116 ff. Mr. Sanjana seems to have been much upset by the fact that some Parsis, who were scholars of Avesta and Sanskrit, became Theosophists and admirers of Mrṣ Besant and other famous personages in the Theosophist movement. Nearly half the main book of 129 pages is con- cerned with the criticisms (sometimes extremely offensive) of the doings and writings of Madame Blavatsky (pp. 28-42), Mrṣ Besant (pp. 43-51), C. W. Leadbeater (pp. 57-59), A. P. Sinnett and others (like Col. Olcott and Mr. K. A. K. Iyer, author of 'Vedanta), W. Q. Judge and a Gujarati book of an unnamed scholar (pp. 59-73). On pp. 82-88 he deals with McTaggart, G. L. Dickinson and W. Lutosowski (Polish writer who claims that he remembers his many past lives). Mr. Sanjana returns (pp. 89-103) to the charge against the Theosophists and the storms and eruptions in the Theosophical society and considers some works on Sufism also (pp. 106-115). He emphasises the good points of Zoroastrianism as certified by W. B. Henning, J. W. Waterhouse and Hopkinṣ He does not devote much thought to the objections, more or less insuperable, against all monotheistic religions with a personal God in such works as Hobhouse's 'Morals in Evolution' part 2, though in the appendix (on p. 140) he has to admit that no satisfactory answer can be given to the question why an omnipotent and omniscient God should allow Evil to exist. He contrasts Zoroaster's religion and philosophy with Hinduism and Buddhism and winds up with an article by Winternitz (pp. 119-121) and then ends on an illuminating personal note in which he confesses (p. 126) that he in his youth was particularly attracted by the doctrine of re-incarnation eloquently propounded by Mrṣ Besant, but later he became sceptical about what was said by Mrṣ Besant. Neophytes generally indulge in opprobrious language for the cult once ardently professed by them and later abjured and Mr. Sanjana seems to be no exception to thiṣ I may mention here only one or two instances of his language against Theosophists; on p. 64 he speaks of Blavatsky, Mrṣ Besant, Sinnett and Leadbeater as “proved charlatans” and on p. 95 he writes about Mrṣ Besant's entry into Politics as “these later metamorphoses of the megalomaniac Mrṣ Besant”. It appears to the present writer that his study of original Sanskrit works is not deep and that he commits serious mistakes in the small portion of his work that he devotes to the ancient Indian view of the doctrine of re-incarnatioṇ His wrong interpretation of Manu VI. 63 (p. 10 of his book) has been pointed out (on p. 1565). Some more cases of mistakes may be cited here. On p.11 of his book he relies on Thibaut for the statement that there is nothing in the sūtras (the Vedānta-sūtras) to warrant the main doctrine of Śankara about two Vidyās, the higher (parā) and the lower (aparā), which respectively lead to the higher (para) brahma and the lower (apara) brahma. If he had carefully read only a few of the eleven principal Upaniṣads (the Īśāvāsya, Kena, Kaṭha, Muṇḍaka, Praśna) he would have found for himself that Thibaut is not a trustworthy guide in all caseṣ The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (I. 1. 4–5) speaks of two vidyās, parā and aparā ‘dve vidye veditavye parā ca, atha parā yayā tadakṣaram adhigamyate’ and this Muṇḍaka text is treated as the basis of Vedāntasūtra I. 2. 21–23 by Śankara and Rāmānuja. The Praśna Upaniṣad 2 states both parā and aparā brahma ‘etadvai Satyakāma param cāparam ca brahma yad-oṁkāraḥ”. On pp. 21, 121, 146 he alleges that the words “yadahareva virajet tadahareva pravrajet” (a man should become a sannyāsin the very day on which he feels disgust for this worldly life) are a dictum or saying of Śankara. But this text is taken from the Jābalopaniṣad 4. The whole passage of the Jābalopaniṣad 4 on the āśramas is quoted by Śankara on Vedāntasūtra III. 4. 20 and Śankara calls it Jābālāśruti. On p. 22 Mr. Sanjana quotes Bhaga-vadgītā (IX. 32, ‘mām hi pārtha vyapāśritya yepi syuḥ pāpa-yonayaḥ, striyo vaiśyās-tathā śūdrās-tepi yānti parām gatim’) and holds that women, vaiśyas and śūdras are declared to be included under ‘pāpayonayaḥ’ (of evil or sinful birth). This is quite wrong. A Vaiśya from very ancient times belonged to the three higher classes and in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad V. 10. 7, it is expressly stated that Vaiśyayoni is of good birth (those whose conduct has been good will quickly attain some good birth, the birth of a brāhmaṇa or of a kṣatriya or of a vaiśya, but those whose conduct has been evil will attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog or a hog or a cāṇḍāla’. So vaiśya's was good Women of the higher classes could not study the Veda in medieval times but women of the three higher classes co-operated with their husbands in all religious rites (including Vedic sacrifices). Therefore, the Gītā first mentions the worst case viz. that of Cāṇḍālas and affirms that even Cāṇḍālas (who belonged to the lowest class) would attain the highest goal if they surrendered themselves as devotees to God and then adds three more classes of people viz. women, vaiśyas and śūdraṣ A Śūdra was never among untouchables; on the contrary, early Smṛtis like Manu VI. 253, Yājñavalkya I. 166, Parāśara XL 19 provide that a brāhmaṇa could take food at the house of a śūdra provided the latter was born of his slave woman or cultivated the brāhmaṇa's fields on the rent of half share of crops or was the friend of his family or tended his cattle or was his barber. In medieval times (after the 5th or 6th century A.D.), however, the caste system became more rigid but even up to the 12th century A.D. a brāhmaṇa could take food at a śūdra's house in extreme calamity (vide History of Dharma-śāstra, vol. III. pp. 952–53). Thereafter this was forbidden and was included among Kalivarjya actṣ The vaiśyas are probably equated with women and śūdras because in their pursuit of wealth they never cared to study the Veda and Upaniṣadṣ Other passages of Mr. Sanjana's work are not cited for criticism for reasons of space.

Some of the objections raised by Western thinkers and writers against the doctrine of Karma and re-incarnation will now be mentioned and briefly dealt with. One or two preliminary matters have to be emphasizeḍ Many in the West regard our life after the death of the bodies as certain, but hardly any- one of them regards our life before our present bodies as a possibility. The explanation of this attitude of many Western thinkers lies in the fact that in modern Western thought the great support of the belief in immortality of the soul has been the Christian religion, which is supposed not to recognize the pre-existence of the soul. Besides, Christian writers from Augustine onwards firmly believed that religious truths outside the revelation in the Bible as interpreted by them were a work of the devil. McTaggart in ‘Some Dogmas of religion’ (London, 1930) attacks this attitude. He holds (p. 113) that any evidence which will prove immortality will also prove pre-existence and that there is nothing in pre-existence that is incompatible with any of the dogmas that are generally accepted as fundamental to Christianity. L. P. Jacks in 'Near the brink' (Allen and Unwin, London, 1952, pp. 10–11) holds the same opinion (at the age of 92) as McTaggart'ṣ Wordsworth in his famous Ode appears to agree that the present life is preceded by another existence when he says 'Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting, the soul that rises with us, our life's star, had elsewhere its setting and cometh from afar.' L. P. Jacks in the work men- tioned above remarks (on p. 9) that an endless punishment is not, strictly speaking, a punishment at all but an exercise of cruelty or vengeance and that the same is true of an endless rewarḍ

The first objection raised against the doctrine of Karma by Pringle-Pattison in 'Idea of immortality' (Oxford, 1922) is that absence of memory of the pre-existence is fatal to it (p. 112) and that immortality without recollection is quite uselesṣ Miss Lily Dougall in 'Immortality' by Canon Streeter and others raises a similar objection (p. 29). This objection can be answered in various wayṣ Does any one remember anything of what one did during the first two years of his life? It is also well-known that men do not correctly remember in old age even the names of their grand-children nor does a man remember what he did exactly ten years ago during his present life. It is rather merciful that there is no memory of past liveṣ If all the multifarious memories of many lives were to crowd on us in the present life, our minds would be confused and matters in the present life would be very much complicateḍ Karma is a cosmic law like the law of gravitatioṇ The latter was not recognized by humanity for thousands of years but all the same it existed and workeḍ Several people claim to remember their past liveṣ The story of Śāntidevī was published as a case of re-incarnation by Lala Deshbandhu Gupta, Pandit Nekiram Sharma, and Tarachand Mathur. The ‘Theosophist Monthly’ for January 1925 mentions concrete instances of the memory of past liveṣ 'The lives of Alcyone' (Adyar, 1924) is a work in two volumes by Mrṣ Besant and Mr. Leadbeater in which 48 lives are traced from 70000 B. C. to 624 A. D. with photographs of some of them as they must have appeared in the respective incarnationṣ The present author does not go into that question here. In the Essays on Immortality edited by B. H. Streeter it is said (on p. 297) that lack of conscious continuity between two incarnations of a soul negatives the doctrine. One may ask: what grounds are there to hold or to prove that the reprobate criminal who will be awarded a judgment of eternal punish- ment will remember while undergoing hell fires his past life on earth? If one can believe in future eternal punishment for a confirmed sinner without any tangible evidence of memory of the sinful life he lived, why refuse to believe in pre-existence merely on the ground of absence of memory? Vide ‘Some Dogmas &c.’ p. 130. Further, science holds that matter and energy are indestructible, they are only transformed into other formṣ Why should one regard it as absurd if one were to hold that the soul (to which post-existence is granted by Christianity and some other religions) should be held to come into existence in the present life all at once and not be held to have had previous existence but only in a different form? The continuity of the soul in past and future existences is merely a metaphysical question and cannot be affected by the loss of memory. The latter occurs in one life of many years as to numerous happenings and at least in that one life the soul is admittedly one throughout.

Another objection is on the ground of heredity. We often find a strong likeness between parents and children in body and sometimes in mental faculties also. How are we to explain this? One answer may be that by some law not yet discovered the soul that has to undergo rebirth is born to parents suited to his conditioṇ Besides, children are not exactly like their parents, some resemble in several physical features the mother or the father, but not in all and children of the same parents differ among themselves even as regards physical featureṣ As regards mental qualities, children do not very often resemble their parentṣ What sort of mental equipment was possessed by the parents of such men of genius as Shakespeare, Newton, Ramanujan, Einstein? Karma does not express what a man inherits from his ancestors, but it expresses that which he inherits from himself in some previous state or states of existence.

Another objection is often raised that belief in the doctrine of Karma would make men callous to human misery and suffering and unwilling to help. This also is a perverse idea. From the ancient Vedic times charity and compassion have been inculcated as the duties of all men without distinctioṇ The Ṛgveda (X. 117. 6) sage declares ‘that man who cooks food for himself and eats it himself alone simply incurs sin’ (kevalāgho bhavati kevalādī). The Bṛ. Up. V. 2. 3 prescribes for all men the three duties viz. self-restraint, charity and compassioṇ If a man having the means to help another does not offer help he would be failing in his duty. It is possible that the result of the sufferer's Karma might have been meant to be mitigated by the kindness of helperṣ

Another objection is sometimes raised as followṣ The population of the earth is growing rapidly. The question is: where do the additional egos come from (vide Berthelot’s work, English tr. p. 127 and J. E. Sanjana's book on the ‘Dogma of re-incarnation’ p. 81). Several answers are possible. Several species of lower animals have become extinct and the number of wild animals such as the lion is rapidly being reduceḍ It is possible for one who believes in Karma doctrine to argue that the selves that were masquerading as beasts now appear as human beings, because their Karma that reduced them to the state of beasts has been exhausteḍ

Some of the Purāṇas declare that a man who is very sinful may reach lower and lower states e. g. the Vāyupurāṇa ¹²¹ (chap. 14 verses 34–37) provides that a very sinful man may become paśu (cattle or a beast), then deer, then a bird, then a creeping insect and then a tree or other immobile object. Theosophists and some modern scholars hold that once the human state is reached there is no regression at all. It may be noted that the Kathopaniṣad expressly states (in V. 6–7) that after the death of the body the souls take up birth in other bodies, while some become tree-trunks according to their actions and knowledge. The Ch. Up. V. 10. 7 says ‘those whose conduct has been evil will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog or hog or caṇḍāla.’ Manu (XII. 9) avers that a man is reduced to being a bird or a beast and by mental sins to lowest births (of a caṇḍāla etc.). In verses 62–68 of chapter XII, Manu describes the different births of various animals by the commission of thefts of various articles and in verses 52–59 the births due to the grave sins of brāhmaṇa-murder, drinking liquor, incest. The Yājñavalkya Smṛti (III. 213–215) also contains provisions similar to Manu XII. 53–59. The Yogasūtra II. 13 also suggests that the retribution for various sins results in being born in low births or dying prematurely or experiencing misery and suffering.

It is rather difficult to regard all this body of authority as mere arthavādas (not meant to be taken seriously but intended only to frighten intending sinners). Dr. Radhakrishnan (in 'An idealist view of life' eḍ of 1932) suggests that it is possible that rebirth in animal form is a figure of speech for rebirth as human beings with animal or beastly qualities (page 292).