Chapter XXIX. Some Fundamental Doctrines of Pūrvamīmāmsā

Volume V: Part II pp. 1202–1282

Chapter XXIX. Some Fundamental Doctrines of Pūrvamīmāmsā

Some Fundamental Doctrines of Pūrvamīmāṁsā

Some of the characteristic fundamental doctrines of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā will now be set out with some references and a few remarks as to some of them, the views of Prabhākara and his followers being also rarely referred to.

(1) Veda is eternal, self-existent, not composed by any author, human or divine, and is infallible. This is the core of the P. M. systeṃ Vide P. M. S. I. 1. 27-32 and Śabara on I. 1. 5 (p. 53) and Ślokavārtika (Vākyādhikaraṇa, verses 366-368). The argument briefly is; Veda is learnt at present and was studied in the past also by students from teachers, that there is no evidence about the person who first composed it or who first studied it. If it be argued that such a reasoning may be put forward as regards the Mahābhārata, the reply is that Vyāsa is the author of it. Similarly, the passages in Smṛtis and Purāṇas that Prajāpati created the Veda are merely arthavādas (laudatory) not based on any evidence or perception and are meant only to convey the absolute authoritativeness of the Veda. If the connection between word and sense is eternal and not brought about by any person, the same reasoning holds good as to the Veda. This view is opposed to the view of the Naiyāyikas who hold that God is the author of the Veda or the interpretation of V. S. I. 1. 3 (Śāstrayonitvāt) by Śaṅkarācārya based on Bṛ. Up. II. 4. 10. Manu I, 21 (stating that Brahmā created from the words of the Veda the names and appropriate duties of all) seems to suggest that (according to¹⁴¹ Manu) the Veda was self-existent. Similarly, the Mahābhāṣya on Vārtika 3 on Pāṇini IV. 3. 101 ('tena proktam') remarks² that the Vedas were not composed by anyone, that they are eternal, that the meaning of the Veda is eternal, but the arrange- ment of the letters is not eternal and therefore we have different vedic texts like Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, Paippalādaka &c. The Smṛtis also sometimes state that there is no author of the Veda, that Brahmā remembers it and that Manu also has remembrance of Dharma in different Kalpas (Parāśarasmṛti I. 21).

In P. M. S. I. 1. 28 ('Anityadarśanāc-ca') the opponent of the eternality of the Veda puts forward such passages as 'Bābara Prāvāhaṇi (son of Prāvāhaṇa) desired' (Tai. S. VII. 1. 10. 2) and 'Kusuruvinda Auḍḍalaki desired' (Tai. S. VII. 2. 2. 1), which mention men named Prāvāhaṇi and Auḍḍalaki (son of Auḍḍalaka) that are mortals and argues that Veda did not exist before those mortals and is, therefore, not eternal. To this the Siddhānta replies in P. M. S. I. 1. 31 ('param tu śrūtīsmāmanyam') that such examples are to be explained differently viz, 'Bābara' is a onomatopoetic word meaning 'rustling' and Prāvāhaṇi (from 'pra' and 'vāhay' causal of rah) means the winḍ

It may be noted that centuries before Jaimini and Yāska there was a school of Vedic interpreters called 'Aitihāsikas'. For example, Ṛg. X. 98. 5 and 7 refer to Devāpi, son of Ṛṣiṣeṇa, and to Śantanu. Yāska (in Nirukta II. 10), starting with the words 'tatra-itihāsamācakṣate' states that Devāpi and Śantanu were brothers of the Kuru family and the younger brother Śantanu was crowned king ignoring the rights of the elder and that these verses refer to theṃ In Ṛg. X. 10 there is a dialogue between Yama and Yami and Nir. V. 2 refers to the 8th verse of it. Those who hold that Veda is eternal would explain Yama as Āditya and Yami as 'Night'. Ṛg. III. 33 is a dialogue between the sage Viśvāmitra and the riverṣ The Nir. (II. 25–27) explains verses 5–6 and 10 of that hymn from the Aitihāsika point of view and states that Viśvāmitra was son of king Kuśika and does not mention the Nairukta interpretation of these verseṣ About the Aśvins the Nirukta (XII. 1) states several views viz. they are Heaven and Earth, or Day and Night, or the Sun and the Moon and remarks that according to the Aitihāsikas they were kings who had accumulated great merit. Probably the Nairuktas were divided among themselves and explained that the Aśvins represented different natural phenomena. About Vṛtra (occurring in such verses as Ṛg. I. 32. 11) the Nairuktas (Etymologists) said in Nirukta II. 16 that the word means 'cloud', while the Aitihāsikas say that he (Vṛtra) was an Asura, son of Tvaṣṭr. As to the hymn Ṛg. I. 105 of 19 verses (in the first 18 of which the refrain is ‘vittam me asya rodasi’) the Nirukta IV. 6 states that the hymn was seen by Trita who was thrown into a well. In Ṛg. VII. 33. 11 there is mention of Urvaśī and Vasiṣṭha (Maitrā-Varuṇa) as born of Urvaśī and Nirukta (V. 13–14) explains that verse and remarks that Urvaśī was an apsaras and Ṛg. X. 95 is a dialogue between Aila Purūravas and Urvaśī. But the interpretation of the Nairuktas and Aitihāsikas on this story are not expressly set out. Probably the Nairuktas would explain Urvaśī as lightning and Purūravas as the roaring winḍ The hymn Ṛg. X. 108 is a dialogue between Saramā (Indra’s bitch) and the Paṇis and the Nirukta XI. 25 explains the first verse and remarks that there is a story (Ākhyāna) therein viz. that there was a dialogue between Saramā sent by Indra and the Paṇis who were Asuraṣ In all such legends the Nairuktas would insist that they are to be taken allegorically as referring to natural phenomena, while the Aitihāsikas would insist that there is historical basis in all these. Though it is not stated by the Nirukta expressly that the Aitihāsikas do not hold the doctrine of the eternality of the Veda it implicitly follows from their explanations that they did not subscribe to that doctrine.

2. The connection between word and sense is eternal.³ This is explained by the words of Śabara (in ṇ 1953) that there is no person who could be put forward as having brought about the connection of word and sense. Vide P. M. S. I. 1. 6–23, Śabara’s bhāṣya thereon, the elaborate treatment in 444 verses in Ślokavārtika (pp. 728–8'5) and Prakaraņa-pañcikā pp. 133–140 (seventh Prakaraņa). On the question “what does a word like ‘Gauḥ’ denote,” the P. M. S. replies that a word denotes ‘ākṛti’ (or jāti) i. e. the universal, the clasṣ Briefly, the Mīmāṁsakas hold that the word, the denotation and the relation of these two are eternal. Vide P. M. S. I. 3. 30–35.

3. The individual soul. The P. M. S. does not expressly affirm the existence of the soul in any sūtra. Śaṅkarācārya on V. S. III. 3. 53 refers to this fact, states that Śabara, the Bhāṣya- kāra, propounded the existence of the soul and that the venerable Upavarșa refrained from going into that question in his exposi- tion of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā with the remark that he would expound it when dealing with Śārīraka (i. e. the Vedānta-sūtra). It was probably due to this fact of the absence of a statement about the soul that the Pūrvamīmāṁsā was interpreted by some as favouring atheisṃ Kumārila complains that the Mīmāṁsā, though not really atheistic, was put forward as Lokāyata (atheistic) ⁵ by some and that therefore he endeavours ( in the Ślokavārtika) to show that it treads the path of belief (in soul and another world). The souls are many, eternal, all-pervading (omnipresent) and different from the body, the senses and the minḍ The soul resides in the body, is the agent (kartṛ) as well as bhoktṛ (enjoyer), is of the nature of pure consciousness, and is cognised by itself (svasaṁvedya). Though the P. M. S. does not expressly deal with the existence of the soul, there are indications that the P. M. S. itself must have impliedly accepted the existence of the soul. The reward of many religious rites is Svarga and the P. M. S. refers to numerous Vedic passages where svarga is the reward of rites and assumes that the reward goes to the performer (e. g. in the adhikaraṇa III. 7. 18-20 beginning with ‘Śāstraphalam prayoktari’ that expounds the meaning of such vedic passages as ‘ agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ ’). Śabara on I. 1. 5 expounds at great length the existence of the soul as different from the body, senses &c. (vide particularly pp. 60-72 of Ānaṇ eḍ). The Ślokavārtika devotes 148 verses to this subject and the Tantravārtika also briefly deals with it on P. M. S. II. 1. 5 (pp. 402-403). The Ślokavārtika (Ātmavāda, verse 148) has this interesting verse ⁶ ‘the Bhāṣyakāra (Śabara) desirous of refuting atheism has established here (i. e. in bhāṣya passages) by reasoning the existence of the soul; the (Continued from last page) apart from the body and that the body alone was the soul. There is a recent book published (while these pages were being sent to the press) viz. ‘Lokāyata’ (study of ancient Indian materialism) written by Shri. Deva-prasad Chattopadhyaya (New Delhi, 1959), which deals with the subject of Indian materialism in detail. knowledge on this subject (viz. existence of the soul) becomes sound and enduring by the study of Vedānta passages'. The Padma-purāṇa states that Jaimini composed a vast, but useless Śāstra by expounding the view of there being no goḍ⁷

4. God and the devatās in sacrificeṣ Śabara's position is that the Vedas were not created by God, nor was the connection between word and sense created by Him, The Prakaraṇapañcikā also (pp. 137 ff) denies a creator for the whole universe. Kumārila's position ⁸ also is peculiar and startling. He says in the Ślokavārtika that it is difficult to prove that God first created the world together with Dharma and Adharma and the means of attaining these, words, senses, and their relations and the Veda. Thus it appears that he does not expressly deny the existence of a supreme power or God but simply ignores such power or Goḍ In spite of this he begins his Ślokavārtika with an obeisance to Śiva.⁹ The Nyāyaratnākara says that the verse can also be an apotheosis of Yajña. But in that case Kumārila would have to be charged with duplicity. It is better to say that the tradition of beginning a work with a maṅgala verse could not be discarded even by Kumārila.

The consideration of the question of what is meant by the devatā with reference to which an offering is cast into the sacred fire leads to startling resultṣ Jaimini (in VIII. 1. 32-34) takes the position that in a sacrifice the havis (offering) is the principal matter while the devatā is a subordinate one (guṇa) and that if there be a conflict between the havis and the devatā, the final conclusion is to be arrived at by relying on the havis. The reasoning is that the Veda connects the deity with the sacrificial act, as in 'one desirous of progeny should offer an havis for Indra and Agni cooked on eleven potsherds and then Indra confers on him progeny' (Tai, S. II. 2. 1. 1.). Even though it is so, the phala (the reward) is conferred by the sacrifice and not by the deities (Indra and Agni in this case) and the words ‘Indra¹⁰ and Agni confer progeny on the sacrificer’ are purely laudatory. P. M. S. IX. 1. 6–10 are very important in this connectioṇ Śabara quotes Vedic passages like Rg. X. 47. 1, III. 30. 5, VIII. 17. 8 (where Indra’s right hand, fist, neck, stomach and arms are mentioned), Rg. I. 95 10, VIII. 77. 4 (where Indra is said to have put in his stomach all foods and to have drunk thirty vessels full of soma), Rg. VIII. 32. 22 and X. 89. 10 where Indra is said to be lord of the world, of heaven and earth, waters and mountains and then remarks that these are all arthavādas, though at first sight they appear to postulate that Vedic deities have bodies, eat and drink. The Śāstradīpikā advances the argument that if the devatā had a body, ate, drank and was pleased, devatā will be anitya (ephemeral) and could not in that case be treated of in the Veda that is eternal. He further asserts that men of limited intelligence not knowing the real import of the Vedic passages may hold wrong opinionṣ Śabara notes (on X. 4. 23) that there are various opinions as to who the Devatās are to whom either a hymn (sūkta) is addressed (as Rg. I. 94) or to whom ‘havis’ is directed by the Veda to be offered as in ‘one should offer to Agni an offering cooked on eight potsherds’; that the devatā becomes connected with the sacrifice not in its own nature but by the word used with reference to an offering and that where the Veda directs an offering to be made to Agni, one cannot use a synonym for Agni such as ‘Śuci, Pāvaka, Dhūmaketu, Kṛśānu, Vaiśvānara or Śāṇḍilya. Thus Devatā is a matter of words, as admitted by ¹¹ Śabara. The Prakařanapañcikā also states that there is no proof that a sacrifice (yāga) is a means of pleasing the deity and that to say that there is worship of a deity in a yāga is really metaphorical. From this and the preceding doctrine (No. 1) it follows that P. M. S., Śabara, and Kumārila discard the idea that the Veda is the word of God or that rewards of religious acts are due to the favour or grace of Goḍ It is therefore that the Padmapurāṇa quoted (in note 1957a) above dubs Jaimini's doctrine ‘nīriśvaravāda’ (Godless).

When the Veda says ‘one desirous of heaven should perform a sacrifice’, three ākāṅkṣās (expectancies) arise. The first is ‘what is to be brought about’; this is satisfied by the word svarga, stating the reward or the purpose. The 2nd is ‘by what means’ is the first to be brought about. That is satisfied by the meaning of the root ‘yaj’ (i. e. by yāga); the third is ‘what is the procedure or in what manner’; that is satisfied by the establishment of the sacred fires and other rites that are described in the context of the passage ‘svargakāmo yajeta’. It is learnt from this passage that the reward or purpose (svarga) springs from (is brought about by) yāga and not by the devatā.¹²

Later writers could not digest all these ideas about the deities in sacrificeṣ Veṅkaṭanātha (or Veṅkaṭadeśika, 1269-1369 A. D.) composed a work called ‘Śeśvaramīmāṁsā’, in which he criticizes both Bhaṭṭa and Prābhākara schools and being an ardent Vaiṣṇava of the Rāmānuja school attempts a synthesis of the two mīmāṁsās and brings in the idea of God as the dispenser of the reward of sacrifices against the combined testimony of Śabara, Kumārila, Śālikanātha and otherṣ Vide Dr. Radhakṛṣṇan in ‘Indian Philosophy,’ vol. II pp. 424-429 for ‘God and world according to Pūrvamīmāṁsā’.

5. There is no real creation nor dissolution of the whole universe. The constituent parts may come and go but the universe as a whole has no beginning and no enḍ The descriptions of creation and dissolution are only meant to illustrate the power of daiva (fate, destiny ) and the vanity of human effort and urge men to perform duties enjoined by the Veda. Without any human effort the world may come into being and in spite of all effort it may come to an enḍ The world is real and has always been there and will go on for all time.¹³ Vide Ślokavārtika (V. 11²-117), Prakaraṇapañcikā pp. 137-140 and Nyāyaratnākara on the former. The Ślokavārtika goes so far as to say ‘it must be admitted that all these (worlds &c.) existed before the creator, and again such a creator may be proved (by anumāna) to have been preceded by the Veda on account of his being an intelligent being, just as ourselves are preceded by the Veda.’

It would be noticed that the Mīmāṁsa idea of creation and dissolution is opposed to the Mahābhārata and Gītā (X. 8 ‘ahaṁ sarvasya prabhavo mattaḥ sarvam pravartate).

6. The doctrine of apūrva (invisible mysterious or subtle potency). The Veda lays down that one desirous of heaven should perform a sacrifice. But the reward heaven comes off only after a long time, while the sacrifice lasts only for a short time. There would thus be no direct connection between the sacrifice (the cause) and heaven (the reward) or purpose. It must be presumed from the Vedic injunction that there is some connecting link between the activity of man to perform a yāga and the rewarḍ Before the principal and subordinate acts in a sacrifice are performed men have no capacity for svarga and sacrifices (described in the texts) are also incapable of producing the effect ‘svarga’. The principal and subsidiary acts in a sacrifice when carried out remove the incapacity and produce a certain capacity or potency for svarga. This must be admitted by all. Unless such a capacity exists there would be the unacceptable conclusion that not doing the acts and doing them are on the same level. This capacity or potency either residing in the man (agent) or arising from the sacrifice that is performed is called apūrva in this śāstra. It is true that this capacity cannot be proved by direct perception or other means of knowledge except by śrūțārthāpatti. When we are told that a man who is fat does not eat by day we presume, in order to account for this, that he must be eating food at night. Similarly, the Veda brings sacrifice and svarga together; we have to presume that sacrifice gives rise to a subtle potency, though the sacrifice itself ceases to an end in a short time, and that this potency is the cause of bringing about the reward svarga and that we may look upon it as abiding in the soul of the sacrificer or as an invisible effect (a reaching forth of the yāga itself that has vanished).¹⁴ Mimāṃsakas do not admit that the results of religious acts are given by Goḍ The V. S. III. 2. 40 states that this is the view of Jaimini (dharmam Jaiminir-ata eva) and is opposed to the view of Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara and the Bhāmatī that it is God who confers the rewarḍ According to the Prakaraṇapañcikā (p. 186) the invisible force or potency is not in the agent but arises as a subtle form from the action itself. Four kinds of Apūrva¹⁵ (with further sub-divisions) as regards Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice are stated by Mādhavācārya.

The idea is that every rite as a whole produces an apūrva, and that each subordinate part (aṅga) of the rite has also an (apūrva) which is subordinate to the apūrva of the whole rite.

The Tantravārtika explains why it is called apūrva. The invisible potency was not in existence before the performance of the sacrifice and arises as something new after its performance and hence apūrva has a purely etymological sense.¹⁶

If one holds the view that apūrva is some potency coming to reside in the performer of a sacrifice one's views would be like those of some modern writers who hold that real prayer is not mere repetition of certain words deemed to be sacred, but it is an upward movement or a real increase in the intensity of spiritual power in the man who prays, it being immaterial to ask to whom he prays (vide W. James' 'Varieties of religious experience' p. 467 ).

7. Svataḥ-prāmāṇya (self-validity of cognition). It has already been stated that the pramāṇas are six (five according to Prabhākara). The P. M. system postulates that all cognitions as cognitions are intrinsically valid in themselves, do not require any extraneous help to establish their validity but in- validity of cognitions is (paratuh) established extraneously by showing that there was defect in the organ that produced the cognition or it is established later on that a particular cognition was wrong.¹⁷ Prabhākara goes much further and holds that every experience as such is valid and no experience can be said to be wrong or illusory.

8. Svarga. The ideas about heaven entertained by Jaimini, Śabara and Kumārila are different from the description of heaven in the Veda and Purāṇaṣ Vide H. of Dh. vol. IV. pp. 165-167 and 168-171 for descriptions of the joys of heaven in the Vedic literature, the Epic and the Purāṇaṣ From considerations of space the remarks will have to be brief. In Rg. IX. 113. 7-11 the sage prays to Soma to place him in that immortal world where there is continuous light, where all desires are fulfilled, where there are joys of various gradeṣ Heaven was deemed to be the place where the souls of valiant men that fought battles and sacrificed their lives went (Rg. VI. 46. 12) and in Rg. X. 154. 2-4 the soul of the dead is asked to join those departed men that had become invincible by great tapas, that had died in battle, that had made gifts of a thousand cows, that had led a life of right and virtue and that were wise sageṣ

The Atharvaveda IV. 34. 2 and 5-6 say that in heaven there are many women, they get edible plants and flowers of various kinds, there are streams of ghee, honey and wine (surā), milk, curds and there are lotus ponds all rounḍ The Śatapatha Br. (XIV. 7. 1. 32-33) states that the joys of heaven are 100 times greater than those on earth. Vide Macdonnell’s ‘Vedic Mythology’ pp. 167-168 and A. B. Keith’s ‘Religion and philosophy of the Veda’ etc. pp. 403-406 (1924). Even the Upaniṣads refer to the joys of heaven e. g. Chāṇ VIII. 5. 3. speaks of two lakes in the world of Brahmā, aśvattha tree showering down Soma and the city of Brahmā calls Aparājitā; the Kauṣītakī Up. (I. 3 and 4) elaborates this and adds that five hundred Apsarases go out to meet him (who reaches heaven), one hundred with garlands in their hands, one hundred with ointments, one hundred with perfumes, one hundred with garments and one hundred with fruitṣ Poets like Kālidāsa love to dwell upon the instantaneous arrival of the soul of the warrior whose head was cut off in battle and who was at once joined by an apsaras in heaven (vide Raghuvaṃśa VII. 51 ‘Vāmāṅgasamsaktasurāṅganāh svam nṛtyat-kabandham samare dadarśa’). The Purāṇas furnish graphic descriptions of the joys of heaveṇ Vide Brahmā-purāṇa 225. 6, Padma II. 95. 2–5, Mārkaṇḍeya 10. 93-95, which enumerate Nandana garden, aerial cars with bevies of Apsarases, golden beds and seats, absence of sorrows, all pleasure &c. Sābara on P. M. S. VI. 1. 1 refers to two popular views about svarga; one is, whatever gives pleasure to a person such as silken garments of fine texture, sandalwood, damsels sixteen years old is designated svarga. Another popular view is that svarga is a certain place where there is no heat nor cold, no hunger nor thirst, no dissatisfaction, no tirednesṣ Śābara and Kumārila say that popular¹⁸ ideas about svarga are invalid, that the Mahābhārata and Purāṇas, being composed by men, need not be considered and that the Vedic descriptions of svarga are mere arthavādas for praise.

P. M. S. IV. 3. 15. provides that svarga¹⁹ is the reward of all religious acts (such as Viśvajit) for which no express reward is provided by the textṣ Śābara states ‘happiness is svarga and all seek that'; an old verse says ‘that state of happiness in which there is no mixing of pain, which is not immediately overwhelmed by pain, that comes to one when one desires it, is called by the word svar (svarga)’.

Medhātithi remarks that smṛtis sometimes state²⁰ that the gift of a single cow yields all rewards and relieves from sins with the result that fruits of great religious acts and of slight ones would be deemed to be the same but it should be understood that the rewards differ in their duration; otherwise, no one would engage in great or difficult riteṣ

Some Vedic rites expressly declare fruits of sacrifices that are other than svarga. For example, the Tai. S. provides ‘one desirous of (plenty of) cattle should offer the citrā sacrifice’ (II. 4. 6. 1.) or ‘one desirous of (leadership or control over) a village should offer the Iṣṭi called Sāṅgrahaṇī’ (Tai. S. II. 3. 9. 2.).

Prakaraṇapañcikā deal with it. They both say that liberation consists in not having to assume a body agaiṇ²¹ The Śloka- vārtika states 'one desiring Mokṣa should not do any act that is forbidden or is Kāmya (prescribed for those who desire an object like riches, son &c); he should perform obligatory rites (such as agnihotra) and naimittika (like bath, japa and gifts on eclipse &c.) in order to avoid the sin that would accrue owing to non- performance of those two; if he does not desire the rewards of doing nitya and naimittika acts they will not come to him, as such a reward comes to him who seeks it. The results of acts in a former life would be eliminated by undergoing them in the life in which he seeks liberatioṇ This differs from Śankarācārya's position who holds on V. S. IV. 3. 14 that, as declared in the Śvet. Up. III. 8, there is no other way to Mokṣa except knowledge and realization of the Ātmaṇ In his bhāṣya on the same sūtra he seems to attack ²² Kumārila's positioṇ According to Kumārila Upaniṣad passages about the knowledge of the Ātman are only arthavādas as they convey to the performer the knowledge that he has a soul and that the soul has certain characteristics, while Śankara maintains (on V. S. I. 1. 1) that the phala, the subject of investigation and the Vedic exhortation (codanā) are different in Pūrvamīmāmsā and in Brahamamī- māmsā. There exist smṛtis that ridiculed the idea that the mere knowledge of the Self would lead to Mokṣa. For example, ²³ the Bṛ. Y. Y. affirms that both knowledge and actions lead to Liberation, that to say that knowledge alone leads to liberation is a sign of indolence, that out of the fear of bodily labour ignorant men do not want to engage in actionṣ

The doctrines of the early and principal writers on Pūrva- mīmāṁsā are rather quaint and startling. Their arguments about the eternality and self-existence of the Veda are fallacious and were not accepted even by other ancient Indian systemṣ Both Prabhākara and Kumārila have in their scheme no place for God as the dispenser of rewards or as the ruler of man's destiny, as being pleased with men's prayerṣ They do not expressly deny the existence of God, but they assign to God or the deities mentioned in the Vedic texts a secondary role or rather practi- cally no role at all. They raise yajña to the position of God and their dogmas about yajña seem to be based upon a sort of commercial or business-like system, ²⁴ viz. one should do so many acts, dispense gifts to priests, offer certain offerings, observe certain ethical rules and other rules of conduct (such as not eating flesh, subsisting on milk) ²⁵ and then the reward would follow without the intervention of Goḍ There is hardly any appeal to religious emotions, there is no omniscient Being, no Creator and no creation of the worlḍ The Pūrvamīmāṁsā no doubt lays emphasis on (the rights and) duties of man in life. The other darśanas are far more concerned with the ques- tion of escaping permanently from the world and with man's destiny after death. The P. M. S., Śabara and Kumārila, how- ever, make substantial contributions to the exegesis of Vedic textṣ There are about three thousand quotations in Śābara's bhāṣya, out of which several hundred have not been yet identifieḍ At least one thousand of these are taken from the Tai. S. and Br. About twelve adhikaraṇas are concerned with the Adhri-gupraiṣa (a long formula) which is quoted in H. of Dh. vol II. p. 1121 note 2504. Some adhikaraṇas are devoted to the explana-tion of certain words in that praiṣa e. g. PMS IX. 4. 22 explains urūka as 'vapā', IX. 4. 23-24 explain 'praśaśā', IX. 4. 25-27 explain five words (śyena, śalā, kaśyapa, kavaṣa, srekāparṇa). Similarly, X. 1. 32 explains the word bṛṣaya as meaning 'bṛhat.' Śābara's and Kumārila's stands on the individual soul and mokṣa confer on the P. M. system some status as a philosophical one. For a systematic and exhaustive study of Śābara's contribution to Vedic and post-vedic exegesis, vide Dr. S. V. Garge's citations in Śābara-bhāṣya' pp. 140–213 (Poona, 1952).

The doctrine that the Veda is eternal and of absolute and unquestioned authority has led to certain undesirable tendencieṣ Propounders of new doctrines make great efforts to show that there is Vedic authority for what they holḍ For example, the sūtras in V. S. I. 1. 5–18 are concerned to show that the Upaniṣads do not postulate Pradhāna as the cause of the world, as the Sāṅkhyas imagine. Śaṅkarācārya expressly states that the Sāṅkhyas explain Vedānta passages as favourably to their theories and therefore a refutation of their arguments was ²⁶ provided in V. S. I. 1. 5–18. It has been shown above how followers of Śākta worship try to interpret a verse like Ṛgveda V. 47. 4 (catvāra Im bibhrati &c) as referring to the Śākta doctrines and how treatises dignified with the title of Upaniṣads were produced by Śākta writers such as the Bhāvanopaniṣaḍ Śabara in his bhāṣya on PMS. I. 1. 5 states that the Vijñānavādi Bauddhas put forward Br. Up. IV. 5. 13 (Vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tānyevānuvināśyati na pretya saṁjñāsti) as supporting their positioṇ One of the most glaring examples of this tendency is the explanation of Ṛg. I. 141. 1–3 by Anandatīrtha, also called Madhvācārya, who in ‘Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya’ claims to be the third incarna-tion of Vāyu, the other two being Hanūmat and Bhīmasena, one of the Pāṇḍavas, and who endeavours to interpret Rg. I. 141: 1-3 as referring to these three avatāraṣ²⁷ The words ‘Madhuah’ and ‘Mātarisvâ’ (meaning ‘wind-god’) occur in Rg. I. 141. 3. This was deemed sufficient to claim that Madhva, the propounder of the Dvaita system, was mentioned in the Ṛgveda. I do not know how Madhvâcārya would have met the charge of Veda not being eternal if it referred to Bhimasena (who even according to the traditional account in the Mahābhārata lived at the end of Dvāpara age i. e. about 5000 years ago) and to Madhva himself who lived barely seven centuries ago. The Veda would be later than these dateṣ The argument that this refers to a previous Kalpa would not be available to rebut the charge, as the Kalpa, Manvantara and Mahāyuga when Bhima and Madhvâcārya flourished and in the present day are the same. There was no pralaya (dissolution of the world) at the end of Dvāpara and Kaliyuga immediately set iṇ The Bhārata war was fought between Dvāpara and Kali (Ādiparva 2. 13) and Kaliyuga was about to start at the time of that war (vide Vanaparva ‘etat kaliyugam nāmacirād-yad pravartate’ and Śalya 60. 25 (‘prāptam Kaliyugam viddhi’). It is on account of this pretention that he was very roughly handled by eminent writers like Appayya-dikṣita who charges Madhva with citing fabricated Vedic and other texts in support of his doctrineṣ Vide I. A. vol 62 at p. 189 where the writer, Shri Venkatasubbiah, sets out over thirty works mentioned by Madhva which he states occur nowhere else. M. M. Chinna-swami, who has edited (Benares, 1941) Appayya’s work in 60 verses with the commentary of Appayya called Madhvamata-vidhvamsana and notes of his own, sets out on p. 4 thirty-six unknown works and the sūtras where they are cited by Appayya.

their mere utterance (uccārana) but are really ‘abhidhāyaka’ (reminders of what is to be done or is being done). Śabara remarks that lakṣaṇa is the only way for the recognition of mantras and not an enumeration of some characteristics of mantras as done by the Vṛttikāra such as these viz. ²⁸ some end in ‘asi’ (thou art) or ‘tvā’ as in Tai. S. I. 1. 1 ‘iṣe tvā’, prayer or wish (as in ‘āyurdhā asi’ in Tai. S. I. 6. 6. 1), praise (‘agnir mūrdhā divaḥ’ in Tai. S. IV. 4. 4). Śabara points out that ‘asi’ and ‘tvā’ occur even in the middle of mantras, the other characteristics such as blessing and praise are found in Brāhma- ṇas also. The M. B. P. remarks that there are (p. 66) one hundred kinds of mantras and that if we take into account the fourteen Vedic metres and their sub-varieties there would be 273 different varieties of ṛk mantras alone (p. 67). There are cer- tain texts regarded as mantras (e. g. ‘Vasantāya kapiñjalān- ālabhate’ Vāj. S. 24. 20) which are not merely assertive but rather relate to the procedure of a yāga (in the case of Vāj. S. 24. 20, of Aśvamedha).

Mantras are classified under three heads viz. Ṛk, Sāman and Yajuṣ These are defined in P. M. S. II. 1, 35-37; the name ṛk is applied to those ²⁹ mantras that are divided into feet, metrical pādas (often) based on the meaning. Sāman is the name applied to Vedic mantras that are sung. It has been established in P. M. S. VII. 2. 1-21 and IX. 2. 1-2 that the mantra ³⁰ texts are not called Sāman but only the music, that giti is an action which manifests various tunes owing to the internal effort made by the singer and in order to bring about the musical effect the singer has to resort to modifications of the letters of the ṛk, to disjunction (of parts of it), to omission (of a letter), to repetitions, to pauses, to ³² stobha. In VII. 2. 1-21 the PMS establishes that the words 'Rathantara-sāman', 'Bṛhat-sāman' refer only to the music and not to the ṛk or basic text set to music. Yajus means those Vedic mantras that are neither ṛk nor sāmaṇ There is another word 'nigada' applied to certain mantras that are addressed to others as directions to do certain acts and are uttered loudly such as 'agnidagnin vihara', 'prokṣaṇīprasādaya', 'idhmābarhirupasādaya'. They are Yajus (i. e. in prose), the only difference being that they are loudly uttered (in order that the persons to whom they are addressed may hear them), while ordinary Yajus is uttered inaudibly. Vide P. M. S. II. 1. 38-45 for discussion on Nigadas and Mai. S. III. 6. 5 for 'uccair-ṛcā kriyata uccaiḥ sāmopāmśu yajuṣā'.

Mantra and Brāhmaṇa constitute the Veda. The P. M. S. ³³ states that all those parts of the Veda that are not or cannot be called Mantra constitute Brāhmaṇa. Śabara notes that the Vṛttikāra, in order to enable students to decide what texts are Brāhmaṇa texts, pointed out certain characteristics found in Brāhmaṇa texts such as abounding in the word ‘iti’ or ‘ityāhā’ (so it is said), anecdote, stating the reason for an injunction, etymology, condemnation, praise, doubt, injunction, instance where another did something of the same kind, what happened in past ages, changing the meaning after considering the context.³⁴ Śabara also quotes two verses summarising under ten heads the characteristics of Brāhmaṇa texts, points out that all this is only illustrative and that the characteristics mentioned by the Vṛttikāra sometimes occur in mantras also, such as ‘iti’ in Rg. X. 119. 1, ‘ityāha’ in Rg. VII. 41. 2, ‘ākhyāyikā’ as in Rg. I. 116. 3, reason (_hetu_) in Rg. I. 2. 4. The Ṛgveda alone contains over ten thousand mantraṣ Hardly one-third of them are employed in all the Vedic riteṣ The rest are employed in _japa_. Besides, the other Vedas also have thousands of mantraṣ Therefore, no formal definition of mantra is attempted and all that is stated is that mantras are those which have been recognised as such by the ³⁵ learneḍ

Brāhmaṇas are attached to each Veda, such as the Aitareya and Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇas to the Ṛgveda, the Taittirīya to the Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda, the Śatapatha to the Śukla Yajurveda, the Tāṇḍya to the Sāmaveda and Gopatha to the Yajurveda. The Brāhmaṇas contain the oldest known specimens of prose in Indo-European languages, though prose formulas (probably earlier in date than those in the Brāhmaṇas) are found in the Kṛṣṇa and Śukla Yajurveda Saṃhitāṣ They are the primary source of information about sacrifices, ritual and priestṣ They contain numerous myths and legends put forward for illustrating ritual and sacrificeṣ They often mention contests between gods and _asuras_ (titans) and abound in etymologieṣ Their contents can be divided into two broad classes, viz. injunctive (hortatory) passages (_vidhis_) and explanatory (or laudatory) passages (_arthavādas_). The scope and purpose of _arthavādas_ will be explained later oṇ But one important point to be noted is that the Mīmāṁsakas are strongly opposed to holding that any part of the Veda, even the smallest, is useless or meaninglesṣ

It is now time to see how the Mīmāṁsakas deal with the contents of the Veda. The extant Vedic literature is of enormous extent and of greatly varied content. Once it is admitted that the Veda is self-existent and not the work of any author, human or divine, every sentence in it apparently becomes of infallible authority. The Veda being the only means of knowing Dharma, the Mīmāṁsakas had to accept that whatever the Veda says was authoritative and binding on them, as Śabara³⁶ admitṣ But many Vedic texts are apparently in conflict with each other and often are in conflict with ordinary experience. A few striking instances may be given to show how difficulties arose. The Tai. S. V. 2. 7 and Mai. S. state ‘one should not pile the fire altar on (bare) earth, nor in the sky, nor in heaven’.³⁷ No one can build a fire altar in the sky, nor in heaveṇ The Veda apparently prohibits something which is quite impossible and therefore this prohibition seems at first sight senselesṣ The Tai. Br. (III. 8. 10. 5) states that by offering the Pūrṇāhuti the performer secures all desired objectṣ If Pūrṇāhuti yields all objects, then one need not perform any further rites of Agnihotra &c. Does the Veda mean this? The Veda contains stories and legends about individuals e. g. Tai. S. mentions Babara Prāvāhaṇi who desired to be an eloquent speaker and therefore performed a sacrifice called Pañcarātra and secured his object. The Veda would then be later in time than this Babara and this would forfeit the claim of being eternal &c. Therefore, Śabara states that a story that never happened is described for the sake of praise. This may be an escape from a tight corner but the explanation does not redound to the credit of the Veda which is here admitted to have manufactured a non-existent story for pushing up one of its injunctions; besides, if people come to know from what Śabara says that the story is false, people would not be induced to go in for performing that rite. A true story might encourage persons to follow the prescription of the Veda in this case. The Tantravārtika (p. 125) on this explanation of Śabara tries to meet the objection raised here. Sometimes Veda is divided into three portions viz. Vidhi, Arthavāda and Mantra, names of yāgas like udbhid and viśvajit being placed under vidhi. The Ślokavārtika refers to this threefold division in its last verse.³⁸ Though the whole Veda is the only means of right knowledge about what Dharma is i. e. what should be done and what should not be done, the different parts of the Veda are not all directly related to right knowledge about Dharma. Large portions of the Veda are related only mediately to the principal part.³⁹ In one place Śabara very succintly but clearly defines the three classes of Vedic texts and illustrates theṃ The Veda is also divided into five parts viz. vidhi, arthavāda, mantra, nāmādheya and pratiṣedha. These five have already been mentioned above. Here some details will have to be added on each of these. Vidhi is an injunction (or exhortation) that is meaningful on account of enjoining a matter that has a (useful) purpose and it prescribes something that does not follow (or is not established by) from any other authority. Śabara himself describes in many places what vidhi meanṣ For example, the injunction 'one desirous of (attaining) Heaven should offer Agnihotra' prescribes (the performance of) homa that does not follow from any other authority and that has a beneficial purpose, its meaning being 'by the Agnihotra offering one should effect (the attainment of) svarga'. Where, however, a rite is otherwise established, all that can be done is only to enjoin an accessory with regard to it. Thus in the sentence 'one should offer an oblation with curds' the homa being already established by the words 'one should offer Agnihotra (if one desires heaven)' all that is enjoined is the offering of curds with regard to it, the meaning being 'by curds one should effect the oblation'. Vide Tup-ṭīkā on P. M. S. VI, 3, 17 and M. N. P. p. 17 (B. O. R. I eḍ).⁴⁰

The collection of vidhis in the Vedic texts forms the core of the Veda and refers to many specific riteṣ The central element in a vidhi is the verb or verbal form, which will be analysed later oṇ The question is: how is one to recognize a vidhi. Śabara quotes a verse which those who know the propositions about the meanings of words and sentences declare traditionally, viz. in all the Vedas the fixed (or definite) sign of a vidhi is the words 'one shall do', 'it should be done', 'it ought to be done', 'it should be so', 'it ought to be so'.⁴¹ From this it follows that a vidhi is ordinarily couched in the optative form (called vidhiling in Sanskrit), and that a verb in the present tense cannot ordinarily be taken as laying down a vidhi.⁴² But sometimes a vidhi may be inferred even from a text in which the verb is in the present tense. For example, there is a vedic text occurring in the Mahāpitṛyajña which states 'he should follow holding the fuelstick below the handle of the ladle in the pitṛyajña, since the performer of rites for the gods holds the fuel-stick above the handle.⁴³ This has been construed as a vidhi (exhortation) and not as a mere arthavāda. Another example is that of Rātrisattras (Soma sacrifices occupying more than twelve days). A passage in the context of Rātrisattras states ‘those who perform rātrisattra attain stability (or fame), are endowed with brahma lustre and eat or possess food’. This looks like a mere praise (arthavāda) of the performance of rātrisattras, but really it is a vidhi about the reward of rātrisattra mentioned in the above passage and states an exception to the rule that svarga is the reward of a rite in which no reward is specified by the Vedic textṣ This is employed in the Mit. on Yāj. III. 226 which states that the sin committed through ignorance is removed by the performance of penanceṣ Ordinarily, a sinful act is deemed to be destroyed by undergoing the penalty that God may inflict, but Yāj. states a special rule. Medhātithi on Manu V. 40 (stating that animals, birds and herbs dying by being offered in yajñas reach higher levels) says that this is merely an arthavāda and no vidhi can be imagined from this by the maxim of Rātrisattra.⁴⁴ Vide Par. M. (I. 1. p. 149) which holds that an adhikāravidhi about one desirous of stability has been assumed from the passage about rātrisattra. Raghunandana in Ekāda-śītattva (p. 28) explains the sūtras (P. M. S. IV. 3. 17–19) and illustrates this nyāya.

Following the Vedas, the Smṛtis also lay down numerous vidhis by means of verbal optative forms or participles ending in ‘ya, tavya &c.’ For example, vide Manu IV. 25 ‘agnihotram ca juhuyāt’ and XI. 53 (‘caritavyam-ato &c.’) as instances of the two wayṣ From different points of view vidhi is classified in various wayṣ One classification is into four, Utpattividhi (originative injunction), Viniyogavidhi (applicatory), prayogavidhi (performance), adhikāra-vidhi (eligibility). Utpattividhi is one which shows in a general way the nature of the rite, as in ‘agnihotram juhoti’ (he offers the agnihotra oblation); an applicatory injunction is one which conveys the connexion of a subsidiary matter with the main rite as in ‘dadhņā juhoti’ (he offers oblation with curds) and this is dealt with in the 3rd chapter of the P. M. S.; a prayogavidhi is an injunction that governs the order of parts in a rite and suggests non-delay or promptness in the performance, though often times it is implied rather than expressly stateḍ This is considered in the chapters IV and V of the P. M. S. An Adhikāravidhi (injuction of qualification or eligibility) is one that points to the ownership of the fruit of an action as in ‘svargakāmo yajeta’ (he who desires to secure heaven should perform a yāga).⁴⁵ This is the subject of the 6th chapter of P. M. S. Another and an important classification is apūrva-vidhi (injunction of something quite new and not otherwise established as in ‘svargakāmo yajeta’), niyamavidhi (a restrictive injunction) as in ‘he pounds the rice’ and parisankhyāvidhi (an injunction in form where two alternatives being simultaneously possible one is precluded). The Tantravārtika defines these three in a well-known verse.⁴⁶ For a sacrifice a plot of land is required which may be quite flat or may have ups and downṣ Here there are two alternatives only and both cannot be availed of at the same time (i. e. a man cannot perform a sacrifice at the same time on even as well as on uneven ground). Therefore, ‘same deśe yajeta’ (one should offer a sacrifice on an even spot) is a `niyama` (it restricts the performance to flat land only) and excludes the use of uneven land for a sacrifice. ‘Five five-nailed animals are to be eaten’. This is a `parisaṅkhyā`. This sentence is not a `vidhi`, as eating flesh is already established by men’s appetiteṣ Nor is it a `niyama`, since one can eat the flesh of five-nailed animals as well as of other animals at the same time. It is a `parisaṅkhyā`. i. e. it prohibits the eating of the flesh of animals other than of five five-nailed animalṣ In form the sentence is a `vidhi` (as it employs the word ‘bhakṣyāḥ’ (which is optative or potential passive participle), but in substance it is a prohibition of eating the flesh of animals other than the five five-nailed oneṣ The sprinkling of water on rice in a rite is not established by any other means and is therefore a `vidhi`. Rice can be unhusked with the nails or by being pounded by the use of a mortar and pestle. Therefore ‘vrīhin avahanti’ is a `niyama`, since it does not allow the use of nails and puts the restriction of pounding. word parisankhya occurs in P. M. S X. 7. 4 and 7 and Śabara notes that it is liable to three faultṣ⁴⁷

Dharmaśāstra writers make frequent use of the doctrine of _niyama_ and _parisankhyā_. Medhātithi on Manu III. 45 (ṛtukā-lābhigāmi syāt) has a long note on niyama and parisankhyā, quotes the verse of Tantravārtika and explains the passage about five five-nailed animalṣ The Mit. also on Yāj. on I. 79 (tasmin yugmāsu sañviśet ‘the husband should approach the wife on every even night next to the 4th night up to the 16th after her monthly illness starts) and on I. 81 holds a lengthy discussion whether there is a vidhi or niyama or parisankhyā. The Mit. defines the three in prose, cites examples and tells us that some thought that there was only a parisankhyā, while Bhāruci, Viśvarūpa, and others (including the Mit.) hold that there is a niyamavidhi only in I. 79 and 81. Āp. Dh. S. II. 1. 17 deals with the same subject as Yāj. I. 79 and 81 and Haradatta says it is a niyama, while others thought it was a parisankhyā and that in any case it is not a pure vidhi. On Gautama V. 2 Haradatta comments that the ācārya (i. e. Gautama) holds that there is a parisankhyā only (the sūtra is ‘sarvatra vā pratīsidhavavarjam’). Compare Yāj. I. 81 (yathākāmi bhaved-vāpi &c.), on which the Mit. emphatically says that in both Gautama and Yāj. there is a restrictive rule (niyama). Gautama prescribes that a brāhmaṇa should eat at the houses of persons of the three higher classes that are commended for the performance of their duties and should receive gifts also from such personṣ Haradatta treats these two rules as⁴⁸ parisankhyāvidhiṣ Āp. Dh. S. II. provides the rules of conduct for husband and wife after their marriage, the first being ‘taking food two times (morning and evening)’. Haradatta takes it as a parisankhyā, meaning that eating a third time is prohibited (but they may or may not eat twice in the day), while others take it as a niyama meaning ‘they must eat twice in the day’. Niyamavidhis are of three classes, viz. those concerned with pratinidhis (substitutes), those about pratipatti (concluding act or final disposal of certain materials employed in a sacrifice), and those that are concerned with matters other than the preceding two. The Tāṇḍya-brāhmaṇa says⁴⁹ 'if one is not able to obtain the soma plant, one may extract juice from pūtikās. Jai. III, 6. 40 and VI, 3. 13–17 deal with this matter and Jai. and Śabara prescribe that if no soma plant is available in a soma sacrifice, would substitute pūtikās for Soma and no other substance, even if the latter be more similar to Soma, can be useḍ⁵⁰ The word pratipatti is used in several sūtras by Jai; vide IV. 2. 11, 15, 19, 22). The casting into water of all utensils and things smeared with soma (such as the dregs left after Soma is extracted, the stones, two wooden boards and the post of udumbara in the midst of the sadas) at the time of the final purificatory bath (avabhrtha) in Jyotiṣṭoma is said to be pratipattikarma (P. M S. IV. 2. 22). This terminology is employed in Dharmasśāstra workṣ Manu (III. 262–263) provides that out of the three piṇḍas (balls of boiled rice) that are offered to the three male ancestors of the performer of śrāddha the wife desirous of a son should eat the middle piṇḍa (meant for the paternal grandfather) and Devala provides that the piṇḍas may be given to a brāhmaṇa or may be eaten by a goat or a cow or cast into fire or water.⁵¹ (This is the pratipatti of the piṇḍas according to Aparārka (on Yaj. I. 256) and the Sṃ C. II p. 486. Vide H. of Dh. vol. IV pp. 480–481. The word pratipatti is opposed to arthakarma. For example, in Tai. S. we read 'after the soma plant is bought, he gives the staff to the Maitrāvaruṇa priest'. Here the staff had been first given to the performer (Yajamāna) at the time of Dīkṣā and then transferred to the Maitrāvaruṇa who has several uses for it, viz. he can walk with its help in darkness, may enter water, can prevent cows and snakes from coming near hiṃ support himself on it. So this is different from pratipatti, where the substance is finally disposed of and no further use is made of it. This is dealt with in P. M. S. IV. 2. 16–18. This (giving of the staff) is arthakarma as opposed to pratipatti-karma. This is mentioned in Tai. S. VI. I. 4. 2 (rite some maitrāvaruṇāya daṇḍam prayacchati &c.). Another example of pratipatti is the casting of the horn of the black antelope on the cātvala (Tai. S. VI. I. 3. 8 and PMS IV. 2. 19). PMS XI. 2. 66–68 deal with an example of arthakarma. Cremating a sacrificer when dead with his implements of sacrifice (mentioned in Tai. S. I. 6. 8. 2–3) is pratipattikarma of the implements (P. M. S. XI. 3. 34). Manu V. 167 provides that if the wife of an āhitāgni dies before him she is to be cremated with the sacred fires set up by him and with the sacrificial implementṣ An example of the third kind of niyama (which is not concerned with pratinidhi or pratipatti) is ‘one should take his meal, ⁵² facing the east’. A man can take food facing any direction but this restricts him to the east alone. Here no question of a pratinidhi or of pratipatti ariseṣ

Vidhis are also divided into Kratvartha (for the rite) and Puruṣārtha (for the man) They are concerned with ‘Prayukti’. (motivating force) which is the subject of chapter IV of the P.M. S. P. M. S. IV. 1. 2 defines ⁵³ puruṣārtha and Śabara advances three interpretations of that sūtra, one of which is ‘(Puruṣārtha) is that matter on doing which follows the happiness of man, as its understanding is due to man’s desire for obtaining it (happiness) and puruṣārtha (man’s purpose) is not different (from happiness)’. From this rather obscure and clumsy definition it appears to follow that puruṣārtha is what a man ordinarily undertakes for securing the reward of happiness, while kratvartha is that which helps in the accomplishment of puruṣārtha and does not itself directly yield any reward to the performer. All principal sacrifices like Darśa-pūrṇamāsa are included under puruṣārtha, while under kratvartha are put all those auxiliary acts that have the purpose of accomplishing the principal rite itself e. g. the five ⁵⁴ prayājas that are auxiliary to the Darśapūrṇamāsa are Kratvartha, while Darśapūrṇamāsa itself is puruṣārtha. The importance of this distinction lies in this that if what is kratvartha is not followed the rite itself becomes defective, while if what is puruṣārtha is not followed, the result is that the man himself becomes blamable or sinful but the undertaking or rite does not become defective. One set of the three interpretations of P. M. S. IV. 1. 2 given by Śabara is that it refers to the rules about the acquisition of wealth viz. that a brāhmaṇa should earn wealth by receiving gifts, a kṣatriya by conquest and a vaiśya by agriculture and the like (vide Gaut. X. 40-42, Manu X. 76-79). These are in the nature of niyamaṣ If the acquisition of wealth is kratvartha and, if one acquires wealth by means other than those prescribed by the Śāstra and performs a sacrifice with such wealth, the sacrifice itself would be defective and would not yield the desired rewarḍ But if the acquisition of wealth be puruṣārtha, then, by whatever means wealth with which a yāga is to be performed be obtained, the sacrifice would not be affecteḍ The Mit. on ⁵⁵ Yaj. II. 114 quotes a passage from Guru Prabhākara (vide note 1947) which is quoted by the Dāyabhāga also (II. 67) but without name, while the Sṃ C. II. pp. 257-58), Madanaratna (on Vyavahāra pp. 324-325) and Vyavahāraprakāśa (p. 420) quote a similar passage from the Nayaviveka. Viśvarūpa also on Yaj. II. 144 holds that rules about acquisition of wealth are 'puruṣārtha'. To acquire wealth is natural to man and acquisition of wealth does not depend upon Śāstra. Besides, every one can directly perceive that wealth when earned confers pleasure on the acquirer. Therefore, wealth is puruṣārtha and sacrifices which are performed with wealth are also puruṣārtha. The general rule is that all angas (auxiliary rites) are kratvartha and all principal rites (like Darśapūrṇamāsa, Somayāga) are puruṣārtha; all texts prescribing the rewards of rites are puruṣārtha. Some individual examples may be giveṇ

In the Śāṅkhāyana Br. (VI. 6) after saying that certain observances (vrata) must be followed by the sacrificer, it is provided that he should not see the sun rising or setting. These observances are called 'Prajāpativratāni' by Śabara. and are declared by him to be puruṣārtha, the meaning being that the sacrificer should make a resolve not to see the rising or setting suṇ

This distinction between Kratvartha and Puruṣārtha is often taken over into dharmaśāstra matterṣ For example, Yaj. I. 53 provides that one should marry a girl who is free from diseases, has a brother and who does not belong to the same gotra or pravara as that of the bridegrooṃ The Mit. ⁵⁶ explains that the status of being a wife does not at all arise if the girl is a sapinḍa or is of the same gotra or pravara as the bridegroom (i. e. marriage itself is null and void), but a girl who has some disease when married becomes a wife, the only result being that there is a visible defect (such as a diseased wife is a constant source of anxiety and unhappiness). Kullūka on Manu III. 7 (providing that one should not marry a girl from a family in which prevail diseases like phthisis, epilepsy, white and black leprosy, refers to this doctrine of Śabara elaborated above. The Mit. on Yaj. III. 280 quotes a verse 'a wise man should not marry a girl who has no brother, nor father, for fear that she may be a putrikā (daughter appointed as a son).' Here the prohibition is like the prohibition of marrying a deformed girl i. e. it is a perceptible purpose. Therefore, the marriage would be valid i. e. the prohibition is puruṣārtha. Manu says (IX. 168) 'that is known to be an adopted son whom the mother or father might give (to another) with water in a time of distress &c.'. The Mit. on Yaj. II. 130 quotes this verse and remarks that, as the word 'distress' is specifically mentioned, a son is not to be given in adoption to another when there is no distress and that this prohibition would affect only the giver (but not the act of adoption) i. e. this prohibition would be puruṣārtha and not kratvartha.⁵⁷ It may be noted that the Vyavahāramayūkha disagrees and holds that the prohibition is kratvartha. It may be said in a general way that those prescriptions that have an invisible, spiritual or other-worldly result or reward are kratvartha, while those that have a visible result are puruṣārtha.

Before proceeding further it is necessary to analyse the notions underlying the word ‘yajeta’ used in such Vedic sentences as ‘one desiring heaven should offer a sacrifice’ (svargakāmo yajeta). In the word ‘yajeta’⁵⁸ there are two parts viz. the root ‘yaj’ (to sacrifice) and the termination (of injunctive third person singular). In the termination also there are two parts (elements) viz. general verbal nature and injunctiveness (or injunctive force). General verbal nature is found in the ten lakāras (verbal forms in ten moods and tenses), but injunctiveness is found only in the injunctive forṃ Both general verbal nature and injunctiveness express only bhāvanā (force that brings into being something, efficient force). Bhāvanā (lit.) means a particular operation or activity of an agent which conduces to the coming into being of the result (lit. which is to come into being). And this bhāvanā is of two kinds, śābdi (word force) and ārthi (result-producing force).

It has been already stated that vidhis are the very core of the Veda. The doctrine of bhāvanā is the very heart of vidhis and is therefore one of the most important doctrines of the mīmāṁsā.

In ordinary life when a person says to another ‘this should be done by you’, the prompting to do something comes from a persoṇ But Veda has according to the Mīmāṁsā no author, human or divine. Therefore, in a Vedic vidhi the prompting arises from the injunctive or the optative form of the word; there is no person, human of divine, behind the injunction; hence the bhāvanā is said to be śābdi (i. e. based on the word itself and not on the will or direction of a person). There- fore, śābdi-bhāvanā is defined as a particular operation (or activity) of an agent (here the word of the Veda) that conduces to the activity of a man; and it is expressed by that part or element which is optative. It is called 'śābdi' because it is 'śabdaniṣṭha (centred in the word of the Veda) and not puruṣaniṣṭha (centred in a person). In a śābdibhāvanā there are three elements viz. (1) there is prompting of the agent to activity, (2) the injunction is the instrument and (3) the manner is furnished by the desirableness proclaimed by arthavāda passageṣ The śābdi-bhāvanā gives rise to ārthī-bhāvanā. In an ārthī-bhāvanā (that aims at or seeks the artha, the phala) also there are three elements viz. (1) svarga is the phala that is to be brought about, (2) the means or instrument is yāga, (3) there is also the procedure or method (itikartavyatā) of the yāga. All this is based on the P. M. S. sūtra II. 1. 1, on Śabara's bhāṣya and certain important verses of the Tantravārtika quoted below. This whole discussion leads on to the idea of apūrva. Yāga lasts for a short time, while svarga comes to a man after death, which may be years after the performance of the sacrifice. What is the connecting link between yāga and svarga (the cause and the result)? It is the force or potency generated by yāga that brings about svarga.

Briefly, the idea is; both the root and the affix together express the sense of the affix and as the bhāvanā is the principal element in this, it is held to be the sense of the affix. There are numerous ⁵⁹ 'bhāvaśabdas' such as yajati, juhoti, dadāti, dogdhi, pinasți. These are of two sorts, viz. pradhāna (principal) and guṇabhūta.⁶¹ Those by which a substance is not intended to be produced or embellished (or made fit) for a religious rite, are expressive of principal karma (such as prayājas), while those which are meant to produce a substance or to make a substance fit are guṇabhūta (such as pounding rice grains or chiselling a piece of wood for making a sacrificial post, wiping sruc ladle). Therefore the latter kind of actions are called guṇakarma. There are two kinds of verbal forms (1) those in which the form only conveys that the kartā (doer of the action) exists such as the forms ‘asti, bhavati, vidyate’; (2) there are others where not only there is the existence of the kartā but there is also the understanding of some activity that produces a result such as ‘yajati’ (meaning ‘yāgam karoti’), ‘dadāti’ (i. e. dānam karoti), ‘pacati’ (pākam karoti), ‘gacchati’ i. e. gamanam karoti). That is, in such cases the sense of karoti is also understooḍ Jaimini (in P. M. S. II. 1. 4) divides words into two classes viz. Nāmāni (nouns) and Karmaśabdāḥ (verbs). Under the first Śabara would include pronouns and adjectiveṣ The 2nd is called ‘ākhyāta’. Śabara (on II. 1. 3.) paraphrases (nāmāni as ‘dravya-guṇaśabdāḥ’ and remarks that in the sūtra (II. 1. 3) the word ‘nāmāni’ is employed in the sense of dravyaguṇaśabdāḥ’⁶¹. Śabara remarks that dhātvartha (the

(Continued from last page) ना), लृट् (future in स्व), लृङ् (conditional). The words भावार्थाः कर्मशब्दाः echo the निरुक्त I. 1 भावप्रधानमाख्यातम्. meaning of a verbal root) can have no ākāṅkṣā (expectancy) for Dharmas but it is the pratyayārtha that has ākāṅkṣā for the procedure (itikartavyatā).

We must now turn to the 2nd great division of Vedic texts, viz. Arthavādaṣ They are dealt with in P. M. S. first adhyāya, 2nd pāda. There are numerous Vedic passages such as 'he roared; because he roared he came to be called Rudra' (Tai. S. I. 5. 1. 1.), 'Prajāpati cut out his own fat' (Tai. S. II. 1. 1. 4.), 'the gods, having reached the sacrificial ground, did not know the directions' (Tai. S. VI. 1. 5. 1.); 'who knows whether one lives in the other world or not '(Tai. S. VI. I. 1. 1.); 'there should be no piling of fire altar on the earth nor in the sky nor in heaven' (Tai. S. V. 2.7.1.). The objector says 'you have yourself declared that enjoining religious rites is the purpose of the Veda' (P. M. S. I. 1. 2). The above and similar passages do not serve any purpose in the matter of religious acts, they are therefore useless and are non-eternal (or do not refer to any permanent matter). The reply is that these passages form one syntactical or connected whole with hortatory passages of the Veda and they serve the purpose of commending (or glorifying) the hortatory passageṣ Śabara cites on I. 2. 7 the passage 'one desiring prosperity should sacrifice a white animal in honour of Vāyu; Vāyu indeed is the swiftest deity; he runs near Vāyu with the share proper (to Vāyu); he (Vāyu) leads the sacrificer to prosperity'.⁶⁰ These words form one whole passage; the first part 'vāyavyaṃ..bhūtikāmaḥ' is clearly a vidhi, as the word 'ālabheta (in the optative form) showṣ The latter portion is an arthavāda for the purpose of commendatioṇ People are familiar with the fact that Vāyu is swift. Therefore, the latter portion (Vāyurvai &c.) merely repeats what is already well known (that is, it is an anuvāda). In sūtras 19-25 of I. 2 the P. M. S. considers certain passages that look like vidhis but are declared to be arthavādaṣ For example, (Tai. S. II. 1. 1. 6) 'the sacrificial post is to be of udumbara wood; the udumbara wood is indeed vigour (or food or sap); cattle are vigour; by this strong (or juicy) post, he (sacrificer) secures cattle, for 'the securing of strength'. The objector says that this is a phalavidhi (an injunctive text about a result) as the words 'ūrjośvaru-ddhyai' contain the purpose and there is no word of commendatioṇ The reply is that there is only commendatioṇ

There are some passages in the Veda in which occur words like 'hi' (because) such as in 'one should offer into fire the oblation with the winnowing basket, because food is prepared by means of it' (Tai. Br. I. 6. 5.) ²⁰¹⁵ The question that arises is whether this and other passages containing words denoting reason should be construed as arthavādas commending what is enjoined in the preceding sentence or whether as stating a reason for the injunctioṇ The established conclusion is that they are commendatory. If the other view were adopted (viz. that śruti gives a reason for the vidhi) then it may be argued that the ladle, pan and other utensils also may be used for making an offering (not merely the śūrpa), as they also are required in preparing fooḍ Raghunandana in Malamāsatattva p. 760 relies upon and explains this maxim with reference to Laghu-Hārīta's words 'cakravat parivarteta sūryaḥ kālavasaādyataḥ'. It should not be supposed that commendation (stuti) is the purpose of all arthavādaṣ In 'he lays down anointed pebbles, ghee is indeed brilliance' (Tai. Br. III. 2. 5. 12) a doubt arises about the material with which pebbles are to be anointeḍ That doubt is removed by the remainder of the passage that it is ghee with which they are to be anointed (P. M. S. I. 4. 24)

Arthavādas are of three kinds viz. guṇavāda, anuvāda and bhūtārthavāda; 'when an arthavāda text is in conflict with ordinary experience it is metaphorical; when something is definitely ascertained by other means of knowledge and becomes the subject of a text it is called anuvāda and when a text is not opposed to other pramāṇas or is not definitely ascertained otherwise, it is called 'bhūtārthavāda' (statement of an accomplished fact, or of a past event); in this way arthavāda is of three kinds'. ⁶⁵ An example of the first kind is 'during day-time only the smoke of fire is seen and not its flame' (this is Tai. Br. II. 1. 2. 10). One sees both smoke and fire during the day and night. What this text desires to emphasize is that by day the light of fire is not so well seen as at night (or not well seen from a distance by day as at night).

'Fire is the medicine (antidote) for cold' (Vāj. S. 23. 10 and Tai. S. VII. 4. 18. 2) is cited by some as an example of anuvāda. The M. B. P. finds fault with this on the ground that it is well-known as a mantra and does not form part of a vidhi by syntactical relation, and that it is cited by Nṛsiṁhāśrama as an example owing to neglect of the study of the Veda or absent-mindednesṣ A proper example would be 'Vāyu indeed is the swiftest deity' cited above. 'Prajāpati cut off his own fat' is cited by some as an example of bhūtārthavāda, but the M. B. P. does not approve of it and cites the verse 'yan-na duḥkhena sambhinnam' (cited above in note 1969) as an example.

The Mīmāṁsāparibhāṣā of Kṛṣṇayajvan classifies Arthavāda into four kinds, viz. nindā (censure), stuti (praise), parakṛti (performance by another great person) and purākalpa (what happened in bygone ages).⁶⁵ Devala states that sages have laid down expiation for the first wrong, for committing a second double of that, for committing a third time thrice as much but there is no expiation for committing it a fourth time. The Prāyaścitta-prakaraṇa of Bhavadeva says that this is not to be taken literally, but it is only nindārthavāda. The P. M. S. itself (VI. 7. 26 and 30) states that prakṛti and purākalpa are arthavādaṣ

The Vyavahāra-mayūkha quotes a verse of Devala²⁰¹⁷ 'on the father's death the sons should divide the paternal wealth, for they have no ownership as long as the father who suffers from no blemish (that deprive him of ownership) is alive'. Here the first half lays down a time for partition (it is a vidhi), the latter half is only an arthavāda praising the vidhi and means that, as long as the father is alive, the sons are not independent and not that they have no ownership in ancestral property.

Smṛtis also abound in arthavādaṣ For example, Medhātithi on Manu V. 56 (na māṁsabhakṣaṇe doṣaḥ) says that from V. 28 up to V. 56 all verses except two or three are arthavādaṣ Medhātithi points out in several other places in the Manusmṛti a few vidhis and numerous arthavādaṣ For example, Manu II. 117 contains a vidhi about abhivādana, while verses II. 118-121 are arthavādas in relation to it. In Manu II. 165 a vidhi is laid down for the study of the whole Veda by persons of the three upper classes; when Manu (X. I) again lays down that the three classes should study the Veda, this is merely an anuvāda. Medhātithi on Manu. IX. 135 remarks that many verses in Manu contain arthavādaṣ

The Vasiṣṭha-dharmasūtra and Viṣṇudharmottara⁶⁷ provide that cow’s urine, excreta, milk, curds, clarified butter, water in which kuśas have been dipped and a fast for a day and night will purify even a śvapāka. A Śvapāka was the lowest amongst untouchables and followed the same avocations as a cāṇḍāla and was governed by the same rules (vide Manu X. 51-56). This verse is not to be taken literally, as nothing could make a cāṇḍāla touchable. Therefore, this is a mere arthavāda meant to praise the purifying effects of pañcagavya and a fast.

It would have been noticed that every Vedic passage is not of the nature of a vidhi (of an injunctive or exhortatory character). There are numerous Vedic passages that are commendatory of a vidhi, condemn an act that is prohibited, give an illustration of some one having performed the vidhi in the past or put forward an easily understood reason for the specific act which is enjoineḍ These commendatory, condemnatory and illustrative passages are not to be treated as unnecessary or purposeless, but are to be taken along with the vidhi passages to complete their full import. This doctrine of arthavādas saves a huge portion of Vedic texts from being neglected or treated as unnecessary.

The Garuḍapurāṇa states ‘Gāndhārī, who observed a fast on Ekādaśī mixed with daśamī, lost her hundred sons; therefore Ekādaśī mixed with daśamī should be given up’. Here the first part is only a nindānuvāda (i. e. it indirectly supports the positive rule ‘tām parivarjayet’), as the maxim is that ‘nindā in a text is not meant for the mere sake of condemnation but for prescribing the opposite of what is condemneḍ’ Vide.Kṛtyarat-nākara p. 635 for this interpretatioṇ The M. B. P. (pp. 50-58) gives another classification of arthavādas into 38 varietieṣ They are passed over here from considerations of space.

The arthavādas constitute the largest part of the Veda, particularly in the Brāhmaṇa textṣ About arthavāda the Tantravārtika makes⁶⁸ a general statement that arthavāda passages coming after vidhi passages are weak, while those that come before vidhis are stronger.

The 3rd class of Vedic texts are mantraṣ They have already been treated above (vide p. 1220, notes 1979 ff.). Some mantras also lay down an injunction as in Ṛg. X. 117. 5 'prṇīyād-in-nādhamānāya-tavyān' (the strong must bestow wealth on one who begs), also the mantra 'vasantāya kapiñjalānalabhbate' (Vāj. S. 24. 20) cited above on p. 1221. But generally mantras are only expressive or assertive and call to mind things that are connected with the acts enjoined by vidhi-vākyas (injunctive passages). The Tantravārtika⁶⁹ notes that it is definitely understood that religious acts that are performed with mantras that recall to the mind the things enjoined lead to prosperity (or to svarga). The reader would notice how the Pūrvamīmāṁsā system came to relegate mantras to a secondary place and made them play a passive role in the sacrificial systeṃ The Ṛgveda contained sublime prayers, but in the mīmāṁsā system the most prominent place was given to Brāhmaṇa texts, that contained almost all the vidhiṣ It has been seen above pp. 950-952 how Ṛgveda mantras are full of faith (bhakti) in God and fervent appeals to God after confession of sin and repentance; vide Ṛg. VII. 86. 4-6 (kim-āga āsa varuṇa jyeṣṭham &c.); Ṛg. III. 39 is a hymn full of beatitude, verse 2 of which says ‘this prayer (dhīḥ) born of yore in heaven, sung in the holy assembly with earnestness, dressed in pure (lit-white) and auspicious garb is ours, ancient and inherited from our forefathers’

The 4th part of Vedic texts bearing on Dharma is ‘Nāma-dheya’ (proper names of sacrifices). There are such texts as ‘one should sacrifice with the udbhid’ (Tāṇḍya Br. 19. 7. 2-3), ‘one desirous of possessing cattle should sacrifice with citrā’⁷⁰ (Tai. S. II. 4. 6. 1). The question is whether in these passages what is laid down is some substance to be offered in some rite (as in 'dadhnā juhoti) or whether they are names of sacrificeṣ No substance is well-known as 'udbhid' (as dadhi is a well-known substance). Citrā means a female animal of variegated colour. If it is guṇavidhi (in the case of 'citrayā yajeta'), there would be the fault of Vākyābheda (one sentence broken up as laying down two vidhis) i. e. the injunction would be that a female paśu was to be sacrificed (not a male) and further injunction that its colour should be variegateḍ Therefore, Udbhid, Citrā, Balābhid, Abhijit, Viśvajit (Kausitaki Br. 25. 14) and Agnihot ra (P. M. S. 1. 4. 4), Vājapeya (P. M. S. I. 4. 6-8), Vaiśvadeva (P. M. S. I. 4. 13-16) are names of rites and are not substanceṣ Similarly, in 'Śyenābhicaran yajeta' (one practising black magic for bringing about the death of an enemy may perform a yāga called śyena). Here 'śyena' is the name of a yāga, because the yāga swoops down upon the enemy and seizes him just as a falcon swoops down upon its victim and catches it (Ṣaḍvimśa Br. III. 8. 1. 3). The point to be noted is that these names serve the purpose of ⁷² particularising the meaning of what is enjoineḍ The Vedic text 'svādhyāyo'dhyetavyaḥ' enjoins the study of the Veda consisting of all parts including nāmadheyas of sacrifices and we directly see that in such Vedic vidhis as 'Citrayā yajeta paśukāmaḥ' the name citrā is a part of the vidhi. Therefore, nāmadheya also is a puruṣārtha and is authoritative like other parts of the Veda (vide Śāstradipikā on Jai. I. 4. 1). In the sentences mentioned above yāga is enjoined with the fruit as the object, since it is not otherwise establisheḍ Since it is not intended to lay down a general injunction to sacrifice, a specific variety of sacrifice has to be enjoineḍ When one wants to know the specific variety enjoined, from the word 'udbhid' it is known that it is the sacrifice called udbhiḍ Dharmaśāstra writers apply this maxim called 'Udbhid-nyāya' to 'Upanayana' which literally means 'taking (a boy) near an ācārya' (teacher of the Veda)'. The Saṃskāraprakāśa says so. ⁷² The fifth (and last) part of Vedic texts consists of 'pratiṣedha' (niṣedha, prohibition). Prohibitions⁷³ serve the ends of man by causing men to desist from actions which would produce undesirable resultṣ To explain, just as vidhis, which express an urge or prompting (to do something), suggest, in order to effectuate their prompting quality, that the matter to be enjoined such as a sacrifice is the means to attain a desirable result and so urge a man to do it, so also prohibitions such as 'one should not eat Kalañja (red garlic)' or 'one should-not utter what is false' (Tai. S. II. 5. 5. 6) denote a turning away and in order to effectuate their own deterring quality, suggest that the thing to be prohibited viz. eating kalañja or speaking untruth will be the cause of bringing about an undesirable result and so make a man desist from it. The particle 'na' may come before a verbal form, a noun or an adjective and 'na' becomes in certain cases 'a' (as in 'abrāhmaṇa,' 'adharma') and 'an' in certain others when it is prefixed to a word beginning with a vowel (as in 'anāśva', 'anuspa'). Pāṇini devotes several sūtras to 'na' and expressly refers to 'pratiṣedha' as one of the meanings conveyed by 'na' (vide Pāṇ. II. 2. 6, VI. 2. 155 &c.)⁷⁴; 'na' is said to convey six senses as noted in the verse quoted below.⁷⁵

The first meaning of 'na' is 'abhāva' (non-existence). But that meaning would not suit all caseṣ When one says 'bring abrāhmaṇa' the meaning conveyed is not 'non-existence' since, if that were the meaning, one could not bring non-existing brāhmaṇa and so might not bring any one at all, or might bring a clod of earth which would not fulfil any purpose of the person addressing these words and therefore, on hearing this, a person not a brāhmaṇa but resembling a brāhmaṇa (such as a kṣatriya) is brought. So in this case ‘abrāhmaṇa’ means a person other than a brāhmaṇa; ‘na’ also conveys the opposite (virodha) of that to which it is prefixeḍ It has been seen above that the verb is the main part in a sentence and in the verbal form it is the termination that is the principal part. So, in ‘one must not eat kalañja’ the negative particle ‘na’ must be held to be connected with the optative termination in ‘bhaksayet’. In a vidhi⁷⁶ (or on hearing a vidhi) one perceives that the sentence urges the listener to be active. When ‘na’ is prefixed to an optative from it conveys the opposite of urging viz. ‘nivartana’ (desisting from something). The phala that one understands from a vidhi is as in ‘yajeta svargakāmaḥ’ svarga, while in a prohibition the phala is cessation of harm (anartha-nivṛtti). The adhikārī in a vidhi is one who desires svarga; in a niṣedha the adhikārī is one who is afraid of harm and desires to avoid what is undesirable. Therefore, these considerations establish that exhortation and prohibition are entirely different in their import.

But when there is an obstacle or difficulty in construing ‘na’ with the verbal termination, then it is construed with the meaning of the root. These obstacles are of two sorts; one is where the whole passage is introduced by the words ‘his vows are’ or where an option will emerge if the meaning of prohibition is stuck to. In the case of these two obstacles in sentences where ‘na’ occurs, we would have to resort to paryudāsa (exclusion or exception). In the case of the Prajāpativratas ⁷⁷ (which are puruṣārtha as decided in P. M. S. IV. 1. 3) the passage starts with the words ‘his vows are’ and then comes the sentence ‘he must not see the sun rising or setting’ (Kauṣītaki Br. VI. 6). Vrata means a mental act, a resolve not to do a certain thing, the meaning being ‘he should make a resolve to act in such a way as not to see the rising or setting sun and stick to it’. This really is niyama (restriction). This passage does not mean that he should never look at the sun (there is no prohibi-tion of seeing the sun) but it only excludes the sight of the rising or setting sun; therefore, this is only exclusion and he who observes this niyama (restriction) secures the reward while in the case of eating kalañja there is a total prohibitioṇ ‘Paryudāsa (exclusion) is to be understood where the negative particle is taken with another word (i. e. with the verbal root or a different word such as a noun); prohibition is to be understood where the negative particle is taken with the verbal form’.

In dharmaśāstra works, ‘na’ is frequently explained as laying down a paryudāsa (proviso or exception). In the section on the duties of a snātaka in Yāj. I. 129-166 ‘na’ occurs very ofteṇ The Mit. explains (on Yāj. I. 129) that in this section wherever ‘na’ occurs it is meant to denote a paryudāsa (sarva-trāpi asmin snātakaprakaraṇe nañ-śabdaḥ pratyekam paryudā-sārtha eva). To take only one example, Yāj. in I. 132 provides that one should not speak (to a man or woman) what would be painful without any necessity or cause. This does not altogether prohibit speaking what is painful; what it means is that a snātaka may say to another what is painful except when there is no proper reason nor proper occasion to do so. One may have to speak what is painful to an erring son or friend or near relative. Aparārka (pp. 206-207) quotes two well-known verses on the distinction between paryudāsa and pratiṣedha (the two halves of which are quoted and underlined in note ⁷⁶) on the interpretation of a verse requiring a man having a son not to observe a fast on certain days &c. The first halves of those verses are; ‘Pradhānatvam vidhauyatra pratiṣedhespradhānatā (paryudāsaḥ...nañ) ।। aprādhānyam vidhau yatra pratiṣedhe pradhānatā । prasajyaprati...nañ'.'।।

When the particle 'na' is employed in a sentence, it is either a prohibition or a paryudāsa or an arthavāda. These three have to be clearly distinguisheḍ) In Darśapūrṇamāsa passage states that the two ājyabhāgas are an anga (P. M. S. IV. 4. 30) and the two ājyabhāgas are the eyes of the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice. ⁷⁸ In connection with this the Veda says ‘these two are not performed in an animal sacrifice nor in a Soma sacrifice'. The question is; is this a prohibition or a paryudāsa or an arthavāda. A pratiṣedha occurs only when there is the possibility of what is prohibited following as a matter of course. As the ājyabhāgas are prescribed in Darśapūrṇamāsa there is no possibility of these two being required in a Somayāga and there is no real prohibitioṇ Nor is there paryudāsa, for if it be a paryudāsa there would be no proper connection, since in paryudāsa one would have to say 'there are ājyabhāgas in darśapūrṇamāsa except in somayāga', which would be absurḍ Therefore, these words 'na tau paśau karoti na some' contain an arthavāda. A true ⁷⁹ prohibition would occur only when something is first prescribed and then prohibiteḍ The stock example is of the Ṣodaśin cup; there are two Vedic sentences of equal authority ‘he takes the Ṣodaśin cup in Atirātra’ and ‘he does not take the Ṣodaśin cup in atirātra’; owing to this conflict an option is alloweḍ Similarly, there is a Vedic passage 'Vṛhibhir yajeta yavairvā' (one shall offer a sacrifice with grains of rice or with yavas). Therefore, in the above two cases where the two texts are irreconcilable, there is no way except that of allowing an option (vikalpa). But ‘vikalpa’ is liable to eight faultṣ⁸⁰ Therefore, an effort has to be made to avoid option and accept as far as possible a paryu- dāsa or arthavāda, since by accepting an option, the authorita- tive statement in one case or the other has to be regarded as unauthoritative and not binding. Śabara and Tantravārtika provide that vikalpa should be resorted to only in case there is no other way. The P. M. S. lays down that vikalpa may be accepted when several things having the same object (or sense) are stated by several authoritative textṣ

There is one more word that must be explained, viz. nityānuvāda.⁸¹ This word occurs in Āpastambadharmasūtra II. 6. 14. 13 (vide ṇ 1877 above). It occurs frequently in Jaiminī (vide II. 4. 26, IV. I. 5, VI. 7. 30, VII. 4. 5, VIII. 1. 6, IX. 4. 36, X. 2. 38) and Śabara uses it oftener still. He explains that where the Vedic text apparently prohibits something when there is no possibility of what is prohibited as happening, there is nityānu- vāda (as in ‘the fire altar should not be piled on bare earth nor in the sky nor in heaven’). The Tuptikā states the same thing in a different form when it says that where a prohibition amounts to an arthavāda, that is nityānuvāda.

Vikalpas (options) are grouped under three heads viz. those indicated by logic or reasoning, (2) those due to express words and (3) those dependent on the will of the performer. An example of the first kind is the option about rice grains and barley grains (yavair vrīhibhir-vā yajetā). The 2nd may be exemplified from Manu III. 267, which says that the Manes derive satisfaction for a month when offerings are made of sesame or of rice or of barley or of māṣa pulse or of water or of fruits and rootṣ An option depending on the will of a person occurs in the Jābālopaniṣad ⁸² (4) 'after finishing the period of studenthood one should become a householder, after becoming a householder, one should become a forest hermit and after becoming a forest hermit one may become a wandering ascetic (sannyāsin or parivrāj); or following another method one may become a wandering ascetic after finishing studenthood or after becoming an householder or after becoming a forest hermit.' The latter part of this passage gives an option as to āśramaṣ' This option is referred to by Gautama in the words 'some sages allow an option as to āśramas to him (to brahmacārin).' When Yāj. I. 14 provides that the Upanaayana of a brāhmaṇa boy may be performed in the eighth year from conception or from birth there is an option depending on the will of the father.

Manu IV. 7 provides that a dvija should amass as much corn as would fill a granary (i. e. as would last for a year) or a Kumbhi (for six months) or as much as would suffice for three days or may not care to amass even for to-morrow. These are four options and then Manu IV. 8 provides that a dvija who is an householder may choose one of these four, but each succeeding one is superior in point of merit and otherworldly rewardṣ

A vikalpa may also be vyavasthita (restricted or limited to a certain set of circumstances) or avyavasthita (not restricted). The Ap. Dh. S. provides ⁸³ that one should offer bali with his hand in the aupāsana fire or in the kitchen fire with the first six mantraṣ Haradatta remarks that 'This is a limited option' viz. in the aupāsana fire bali should be cast every day by those who have kept up that fire and in the ordinary kitchen fire by him whose wife is deaḍ Manu III. 82 prescribes that one should offer Śrāddha everyday with food, water, milk etc. Here there is vyavasthita-vikalpa i. e. first food, then in its absence milk, fruits and roots, and in the absence of these water. Manu IV. 95 prescribes “Having performed the Upākarma rite according to proper procedure on the Full Moon of Śrāvaṇa or of Bhādrapada a brāhmaṇa should diligently study the Vedas for four months and a half.” Medhātithi says that this is a ‘vyavasthita-vikalpa’ viz. the Sāmavedins should perform upākarma on Bhādrapada Full Moon, while Ṛgvedins and Yajurvedins on Śrāvaṇa Full Mooṇ Vide the Mit. on Yaj. I. 254 about the sapinḍana of a mother, where the Mit. introduces order among conflicting textṣ When Gaut. prescribes (III. 21) that a sannyāsin should completely shave the head or keep only a top-knot, there is an option depending on the will of the persoṇ Gaut. II. 51–53, Āp. Dh. S. I. 2. 11, Manu III. 1 prescribe brahmacarya for Veda study for 48, 36, 24, 12, 3 yearṣ Here there is an option depending on the capacity and wish of the student. It should be noted that the eight faults about accepting an option do not occur in a vyavasthita⁸⁴ vikalpa nor do they apply where the option is dependent on the volition of the performer nor where option is given by express textṣ Those eight faults apply only to an option indicated by reasoning.

The Mīmāṁsābalaprakāśa (pp. 153–165) provides a long list of the divisions and subdivisions of Vikalpa.

Śāstra is meant to give definite rules as stated by Patañjali⁸⁵ and therefore all Śāstrik works try to reduce options to the minimum and assign to apparently conflicting passages separate and definite provinces of application (Viṣayavyavasthā). Sometimes, the options are so many that commentators give up the task of assigning them different scopes e. g. the Mit. on Yaj. III. 22, after quoting the conflicting passages on impurity on birth and death, for kṣatriyas, vaiśyas and śūdras

of actionṣ The first comprehend substances, number &c., those that are of the nature of acts are two-fold viz. sannipatopakāraka and ārād-upakāraka. In the Paurṇamāsī rite there are such auxiliaries as Prayājas, the Āghāras, the Ājyabhāgaṣ These are ārādupakārakas. Sannipatyopakārakas are also called sāmavāyika, or āśrayikarmāṇi; they are such as the pounding of grains, prokṣaṇa etc. The Ārādūpakāraka are ⁸⁶ rites prescribed without being meant to do something about substances and are directly the aṅgas of the principal rite. These do not give rise to any saṁskāra (embellishment or making fit) in the substance meant to be offered in sacrifice, are helpful in producing the paramāpūrva that yields the fruit of the whole rite. They produce a subordinate apūrva of their owṇ They are directly aṅgas of the principal rite and are distinguished from sannipatyopakārakas, which are saṁskāraka (bring about some embellishment or fitness). The Sannipatyopakārakas are more powerful than Ārādūpakārakas and therefore the Tantravārtika states the proposition that where it is possible to hold an act ⁸⁷ in a rite to be sannipatyopakāraka or sāmavāyika, it is not proper to regard it as ārādupakāraka. It is somewhat remarkable that Prof. Keith in his 'Karmamīmāṁsā' (p. 88) inverts the meaning of these two wordṣ The explanation of sannipatyopakāraka in 'Prabhākara School' (by M. M. Jha) p. 181 also is rather obscure. The Ekādaśatattva (p. 97), while discussing the substitutes (pratinidhis) to be employed on Ekādaśī for ghee, for milk and honey (being milk-powder, curds and jaggery) quotes P. M. S. VI. 3. 18 'na devatāgniśabda-kriyam-anyārthasamyogāt', explains that in place of a prescribed kriyā like prayājas (that have an unseen or spiritual reward) there is to be no substitute, since what has an invisible result is ārādupakāraka, but in place of rice grains (that are the means of preparing puroḍāśa) a substitute may be employed; since the rice grains are sannipatyopakārakas and have a seen purpose viz. preparing puroḍāśa. Śaṅkarācārya in his bhāṣya on V. S. IV. 1. 16 states that the performance of obligatory vedic rites (like Agnihotra) by a man who has to acquire knowledge of brahma is helpful for attaining it as an āraḍupakāraka.²⁰⁰

Apart from the Veda and smṛtis the Pūrvamīmāṁsā relies upon or refers to loka or lokavat (usage of the ordinary people) for elucidatioṇ For example, I. 2. 20, I. 2. 29, II. 1. 12 (Lokavat), IV. 1.6 ‘tathā ca lokabhūteṣu’ meaning ‘lokepi’), VI. 2. 16 (loke karmaṇi vedavat-tato'dhipuruṣajñānam), VI. 5. 34 (na bhakti-tvaḍ-eṣā hi loke), VI. 8. 26 (yañca-krayaṇam-avidyamāne lokavat), VII. 4. 11 (Liṅgahetutvād-aliṅge laukikam syāt), VIII. 2. 22 (payo vā tat-pradhānatvāl-lokavad-dadhnas-tadarthatvāt) gives the illustration that in order to solidify milk a little of curds is enough; VIII. 4. 6, (na laukikānām) ‘laukikānām’ means ‘lokānām’); X. 3.44 (śabdārthaśeṣāpi lokavat), X. 3. 51, X. 6. 8, X. 7. 66 (Lokavat, Śabara saying ‘Yathā matsyān na payasā samāśnīyāt), XI. 1. 23, 26, 62. Śabara himself uses the word ‘Laukikanyāya’ in bhāṣya on PMS III. 4. 13 (evam varṇyamāne laukikayāyānugataḥ sūtrartho varṇi-to bhavisyati' p. 926).²⁰¹

Jaimini dealt with the eternal, self-existent and absolutely authoritative character of the Veda as regards Dharma in the first pāda of the first chapter and also dealt with the means of knowledge, the eternal character of the relation of words and senseṣ In the second pāda of the first adhyāya he pronounced that arthavādas which form a very large portion of the Veda were meant to laud the Vidhis with which they were connected and were not to be treated as uselesṣ He also provided that mantras (that formed part of the veda) had a purpose to serve viz. that of recalling to the mind the meaning of the rites performed, that some mantras like 'catvārī śṛṅgā'^201a (Rg. IV. 53. 3) are laudatory of yūga, by means of a metaphor, that the sense of some words in the mantras like ‘Jarbbari turpharitū (Rg. X. 106. 6) or ‘Indraḥ somasya kāpukaḥ’ (Rg. VIII. 77. 4) about which it is argued that no sense can be made out of them are really explicable with the help of Nirukta (etymology) and grammar, that some words like ‘Kikaṭā’, ‘Naicāśākha’, and ‘Pramaganda’, that are claimed to refer to a country, a city, a king and therefore are claimed to make the mantra (Rg. III. 53. 14) non-eternal, can be explained in a different way. In this way, no part of the Veda is anarthaka (without sense or useless) or non eternal. The Mīmāṁsakas are very keen on avoiding anarthakya of any Vedic words or sentenceṣ

In the third pāda of the first chapter Jaimini deals with the authoritativeness of smṛtis, the usages of respectable and learned people (sadācāra), the Vedāngas &c.

It appears that before Jaimini composed his sūtra, smṛtis had come into prominence and the usages of the śiṣṭas had been recognised as one of the sources of Dharma. The Dharma-sūtras of Gautama, Āpastamba, and ⁹² others had declared that the Vedas, the Smṛtis and the usages of those who know the Vedas are the sources of Dharma. Therefore, the Śāntiparva (137. 23, 135. 22 in Citrao eḍ) mentions dharmaśāstras and Anuśāsanaparva (45, 17) quotes gāthās from Yama's dharmaśāstra. Therefore, Jaimini had to consider whether smṛtis and usages were authoritative in the matter of Dharma and, if so, to what extent. Even if smṛtis were held to be unauthoritative, the authoritativeness of the Veda would not be affected; but the very first sūtra (of P. M. S.) postulated that the work would consider the question about the characteristics of Dharma and, therefore, smṛtis that were called dharmaśāstra (Manu II. 10) were connected with the discussion about Dharma. Besides, from VI. 7. 6 it follows that⁹³ Jaimini knew dharmaśāstras as he provides that in a Viśvajit the performer cannot make a śūdra a subject of gift simply because he serves a man of higher caste on account of the ordinances of dharmaśāstra. Even in the Upaniṣads (as in Tai. Up. I.11) the teacher after the pupil had completed Veda study impresses upon the latter that whenever he would have a doubt about the rites enjoined or about proper conduct he should follow the conduct of brāhmaṇas in his country that act after proper consideration, that are devoted to their duties and are not driven to do anything by another, are not harsh of character, that are intent on doing their dutieṣ This amounts to following 'sadācāra' as a source of dharma. Jaimini employs the word 'smṛti' in the sense of works in several sūtras as in VI. 8. 23 (which contains the very words that the Ap. Gr. sūtra employs), IX. 2. 1, XII. 4. 43. Śabara mentions 'smṛti' and the word 'smarati' and 'smaranti' more than a dozen timeṣ

The following passages may be noteḍ On ⁹⁴ P. M. S. I. 3. 2. Śabara says "pramāṇam smṛtiḥ"; on P. M. S. I. 3. 3 he mentions three smṛti rules, two of which can be said to corres- pond with extant smṛtis; on PMS VI. I. 5, while dealing with the question whether lower animals (dogs &c.) have adhikāra for Vedic rites, Śabara denies their adhikāra, since they do not study the Veda nor the smṛtiśāstras (as men do); on PMS VI. 2. 21–22 (when the question is whether the smārta rules that a teacher should be followed or obeyed and obeisance be made to him and whether one should get up and honour an old man apply to even children whose upanayana is not performed) Śabara states that smṛti is equal to Veda (Vedatulya hi smṛtiḥ, vaidikā eva padārthā smaryanta ityuktam). On VI. 8. 23 he quotes one quarter of a śloka as smṛti (smaranti-teṣu kāleṣu daivānī-iti). On VI. 7. 31 he says that smṛti speaks of gandharvas living for a thousand yearṣ On VI. I. 20 Śabara says a woman owns no wealth, if one follows smṛti, but is owner of property if śruti be followeḍ On IX. 2. 2 Śabara says ‘naiṣā smṛtiḥ pramāṇam, dṛṣṭamūlā hyeṣā’; on X. 1.36 Śabara says that from the usage of respectable people smṛti is inferred and from smṛti Śruti text is inferred; on X. I. 42 Śabara says ‘Smṛti is stronger than usage’. On X. 3. 47 Śabara says ‘there is a smṛti that one should not sell a horse’. In one place Śabara employs the words ‘pramāṇāyām smṛtau’ instead of ‘pramāṇe smṛtau’ as one would expect and the Tantravārtika is at great pains to show that this lapse on the part of Śabara may be somehow justified (pp. 183–184) on I. 3. 3. The Baudhāyana Dh. S. (I. 1. 19–26) sets out five practices peculiar to the countries of the South (Southern India) and five others peculiar to the North and says that if one belonging to the South follows any of the usages peculiar to the North and vice versa he would be guilty of siṇ Vide H. of Dh. Vol. III. p. 858 and note 1663 for the passage from Bauḍ Dh. S. The objector says ⁹⁶ that smṛtis should be discarded, since smṛtis were composed by men ( i. e. they are pauruṣeya and not apauruṣeya, as the Veda is) and men are often deluded and forgetful. This is the main basis of the objector. To this the reply is that for prescriptions of the smṛtis, there are passages in the Veda that suggest some of the smṛti rules e. g. that the Aṣṭakā śrāddha was prevalent long before the smṛtis is indicated by the Vedic mantra ‘yam janaḥ pratinandanti’.⁹⁶ The usages about obeying the teacher, about providing cisterns for travellers have a seen purpose, viz. the benefit of otherṣ Even the Veda mentions ‘prapā ( Rg. IX. 4. 1 ‘dhanva-nniva prapā asi’ meaning ‘ O Agni! thou art like a prapā in a desert’. The Tantravārtika is most exhaustive on this and the following sūtras, differs from the Bhāṣyakāra in many places, finds fault with him and gives alternative matters as the subjects for discussioṇ He puts forward two theories about smṛti provisions for which it is impossible to suggest Vedic indicationṣ He says (firstly) that Smṛti⁹⁸ prescriptions may be based on lost Vedic śākhās, or (2) they may be based on texts contained in the very parts of the Veda that are available at present. If any one asks ‘how is it that they are not found’, Kumārila gives the reply: the several branches of the Veda are scattered about (in many distant territories), men are negligent, and the texts are contained in different sections of the Veda; on account of these one cannot point out the texts that are the basis of the smṛtis

That many Vedic texts were lost or are unavailable now was the view even before the days of the Āp. Dh. S. (I, 4, 12. 10), which states ‘rites were promulgated in the Brāhmaṇa texts, but the exact words ( of the Brāhmaṇa texts) are lost and have to be inferred from the performance of the rites (or from procedure prescribed in Smṛtis)’.⁹⁹ There was danger in relying on the theory that Smṛtis were based on Vedic texts that are lost (or disappeared), because that very argument might be urged by heterodox sects like the Bauddhaṣ¹⁰⁰ Therefore, Kumārila put forward the other theory viz. the basis of smṛtis are texts that are not found in the existing vedic texts because the Vedic śākhās are scattered about (as said in the verse quoted above).

This whole subject about Smṛtis according to the views of the Mīmāṃsakas has been dealt with at great length by the author in H. of Dh. vol. III. pp. 827-841. Therefore, only a few examples and conclusions may be mentioned here. Śabara himself proposes that PMS I. 3. 4¹⁰¹ should form a separate Adhikaraṇa by itself and puts forward an important maxim viz. where one can find out or ascribe a visible motive for an act one should not postulate an unseen Vedic text or a transcendental motive.¹⁰² The result of Śabara's dealing with PMS I. 3. 3-4 is neatly put by the Śāstradīpikā as follow: Smṛti rules that are opposed to Śruti rules and such smṛti provisions as can be shown to have a clear worldly motive are not authoritative or binding, while the rest of smṛti texts are authoritative. This doctrine is older than the Āp. Dh S. (I. 4. 10. 12) which provides 'where men act because they find pleasure in doing that act there Śāstra has no scope'. Kumārila does not agree with Śabara. He says that visible and invisible or spiritual motives are often inextricably mixed up. 'Unhusking rice grains' has a visible purpose in order that they may be well boiled and the boiled rice may be offered in a sacrifice. In this act then there is a visible purpose and yet this act is prescribed by the Veda. In a trenchant, finely worded and very accommodating passage redolent of a cosmopolitan outlook and the desire to give even the devil his due, Kumārila examines (in pp. 166-168) all the known classes of Sanskrit works with regard to their usefulness and relation to Veda and ordinary worldly experience. Only a few sentences will be set out here and in the noteṣ Therefore, he provides that all Smṛtis are authoritative according to the purpose they serve. Those parts of Smṛtis that are concerned with Dharma and Mokṣa have the Veda as their source, while whatever parts of Smṛtis are concerned with wealth (artha) and worldly pleasures (kāma) are based on worldly practiceṣ The same rule applies to the hortatory passages of Itihāsa (the Mahābhārata) and Purāṇas, both of which are often spoken of as Smṛti. The episodes and tales in these two should be taken as arthavādas. Then he refers to the descriptions of the divisions of the earth and the vaṁśas (dynastic lists) (both of which are among the subjects treated of in the Purāṇas) and sets out the purposes they might serve. The six Vedāṅgas (grammar, metrics, etymology, astronomy &c.) are useful as kratvartha and puruṣārtha, and Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya (logic) have been establi- shed (worked up) from worldly experience by means of pratyakṣa (direct perception) and inference based upon the technique evolved by a continuous and unbroken line of learned men; that no single person would have been able to put together for the first time such a large collection of arguments ¹⁰³ (as in the Mīmāṁsāśāstra). For the necessity of Nyāya (in the interpreta- tion of the Veda) he relies upon Manu XII. 105–106. Kumārila is prepared to concede that philosophical systems in which are postulated pradhāna and puruṣa (Sāṅkhya) or the supreme Lord or atoms (Vaiśeṣika) should be deemed to explain the creation and dissolution of the world, should be looked upon as exhibiting perceived, minute and gross substances divided into causes and effects due to the knowledge derived from mantras and arthavādas. The purpose of these is to make known the distinction of svarga and yāga as result and cause. The purpose of the description of creation and dissolution is to show the distinction between the power of luck and human effort. He goes even a step further and is prepared to admit that even heterodox hypotheses of Bauddhas such as the theory that only Vijñāna (cognition) exists, that everything is in an eternal flux and that there is no (permanent) soul, which (theories) sprang from the arthavāda passages in the Upaniṣads, serve the purpose of inducing people to give up extreme attachment to sensual pleasures and are useful and authoritative in their own wayṣ

He sums up the distinction by stating that as regards those smṛtis (or portions of them) in which the fruit or result promised cannot possibly be experienced in this life, but where the result is promised as fructifying in the remote future (i. e. after death), an inference as to their being based on Veda may be drawn, but, as in the case of scorpion lore ¹⁰⁴ (i. e. incantations for curing the sting of a scorpion), works dealing with matters that can be seen are authoritative only because the result can be perceived in other men similarly stung.

The medieval Dharmaśāstra works take up this discussion about the distinction between smṛtis based upon the Veda and those on perceptible motives or purposeṣ For example, the Kalpa- taru (Brahma-cārī-kāṇḍa p. 30) and Aparārka (pp. 626–627) quote verses from Bhaviṣyapurāṇa (Brāhmaparva chap. 181, 22–31) that divide the contents of smṛtis in five categories and exemplify that divisioṇ The Sṃ C. II. p. 24 quotes two of these and the Paribhāṣāprakāśa of Mitramiśra (p. 19) quotes all of theṃ Vide H. of Dh. Vol. III, p. 840 note 1634 for all the verseṣ

Kumārila (pp. 194–196 of Tantravārtika) holds that the passages quoted by Śabara on I. 3. 3 are not really opposed to Veda at all and that the proper subject for discussion under I. 3. 3–4 is the authoritativeness in matters of Dharma of the schools ¹⁰⁵ of Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Paśupata, Pāñcarātra and Śākyas and he holds that all these are outside the pale of the three Vedas and are to be discarded as unauthoritative, although they contain a few matters such as ahimsā, truthfulness, self-control, charity and compassion, that agree with Śruti and smṛti. It will have been seen from the above that Kumārila was aware of the emphasis placed by Buddhists on some moral values but he differed from them in many other matters, that he was ready to admit that Buddhist works had some value and he did not preach that they should be burnt or destroyeḍ Therefore, it appears that his attitude is far from being one of total hatred and persecution of the Buddhists, as alleged by Taranatha cited above on p. 1010 ṇ 1645.

Śabara explains that sūtras 5-7 of P. M. S. I. 3 are¹⁰⁶ concerned with certain religious acts such as ācamana (sipping water) when one sneezes in the midst of a rite, the wearing of Yajñopavīta (the sacred thread), the use of the right hand alone in all actṣ These interfere with the sequence and quick performance of the subordinate items in a religious rite, says the objector. Śabara establishes that there is no substance in the objectioṇ Kumārila feels that Śabara is not right as regards the three instances cited by hiṃ He splits the three sūtras into two adhikaraṇas (topics for consideration); sūtras 5 and 6 deal (acc. to Kumārila) with the contention that those precepts of Buddha and other founders of unorthodox sects, such as the construction of monasteries and parks, the insistence on desirelessness (vairāgya), the continuous practice of meditation, ahimsā, truthfulness, restraint of senses, charity and kindness are such as are laid down also by the Vedas, are not opposed to the ideas of śiṣṭas and cannot rouse the antipathy of those who know the Vedas and that therefore those parts of the unorthodox systems should be deemed to be authoritative. This contention is repelled by Kumārila with the remark that only 14 (four Vedas, 6 Vedāngas, Purāṇas, Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Dharmaśāstra) or 18 (adding four Upavedas) have been accepted by the Vedic śiṣṭas as authoritative in matters of Dharma and the works of Bauddhas and other sects are not included thereiṇ¹⁰⁷ Kumārila gives a telling example viz. milk, though by itself pure and useful, becomes useless and unacceptable, when poured into a bag of dog-skiṇ

Kumārila holds that sūtra 7 of PMS I. 3 is an adhikaraṇa by itself and is concerned with the authoritativeness of sadācāra (the customs and usages of śiṣṭas). His position as elaborated in the Tantravārtika is that those usages alone are authoritative that are not opposed to express Vedic texts, that are practised by śiṣṭas under the belief that they are right conduct (dharma) and for which no visible motive (such as pleasure or the satisfaction of desires or the acquisition of wealth) can be predicateḍ Śiṣṭas are only those that perform the religious rites and duties expressly enjoined by the Veda. The practices traditionally handed down from generation to generation that are observed by śiṣṭas (as defined above) with the conviction that they form part of Dharma must be regarded as Dharma and as leading to heaveṇ The Tantravārtika remarks that practices do not become authoritative merely by the fact that no visible motive or purpose can be postulated for them; but they become so only when they are observed by śiṣṭas as part of Dharma.¹⁰⁸ Many activities such as agriculture, service or trade, that are the means of securing wealth and pleasures and such actions as eating sumptuous food, drinking, sleeping on soft beds, possess- ing a charming house or garden, all of which are common to Āryas and Mlecchas are not deemed by any one to be part of Dharma and it does not follow that because a few actions of śiṣṭas are accepted as Dharma, all their actions are to be looked upon as Dharma. Kumārila quotes the advice that a man should follow the path by which his father, grand-father and other ancestors went, provided it is the path of the good, follow- ing which he will not come to harṃ¹⁰⁹

Very intricate questions arise with regard to the relative force of śruti (Veda), smṛti and sadācāra (usages observed by śiṣṭas as defined above and in Manu XII. 109). The Mī. on Yāj. I. 7 (laying down five sources of Dharma viz. śruti, smṛti, sadācāra, and two more) states the general rule that in case of conflict each preceding one is more powerful than each succeed- ing one. Manu (I. 12) states that, for those who desire to know Dharma, Śruti (Veda) is the highest authority. Therefore, in case of conflict between śruti and smṛti the former prevailṣ There are a few exceptions even to this clear rule which may be illustrated later oṇ But where two smṛtis are in conflict, the ordinary rule, following the Ṣoḍaśī-nyāya and the words of Gautama I, 5 ( Tulyabalavirodhe vikalpaḥ ), should be an optioṇ Many works on Dharmaśāstra must have been composed long before 500 B. C., since Gautama mentions Manu (in 21. 7) and ‘ācāryāḥ’ (in 3. 35, 4. 18) and Āp. Dh. S. (I. 6. 19. 2–12) mentions no less than nine individual authors’ opinions on the single question as to whose food may be eateṇ Manu (in III. 16 ) mentions three views held by four sages on the position of a brāhmaṇa who marries a śūdra wife or has a son or child from her. A striking example of a conflict between smṛtis is the rule of Manu (III. 13), Bauḍ Dh. S. I. 8. -2, Viṣṇu Dh. S. 24. 1-4, Vaṣ I. 25, Pār. Gr. I. 4 allowing anuloma marriages and permit- ting a brāhmaṇa to have a śūdra woman as a wife and the emphatic statement of Yaj. I. 56–57 that it does not agree with those that declare that persons of the three higher classes can take a śūdra woman as wife. Later writers of smṛtis and nibandhas should have said that on account of this conflict there is an optioṇ But they do not say so. They struck upon vari- ous devices to wriggle out of such apparent contradictionṣ The first device was declared by Bṛhaspati (about 500 A. D.) that the Manusmṛti occupies a pre-eminent position as it correct- ly represents the sense (the real view) of the Vedas and that a smṛti which is opposed to the teaching of Manu is not held in esteeṃ¹¹⁰ But this was not satisfactory and some other devices were resorted to. One was to insert passages in Manusmṛti itself and in other works opposing what had already been declared as the law. Two examples may be citeḍ As against Manu III, 13 (referred to immediately above) we find in the extant text (III. 14–19) verses strongly condemning persons of the three higher varṇas taking a śūdra woman as wife. Manu allowed the practice of niyoga (in IX. 59-62 ), but the extant Manusmṛti (IX. 64-68) condemns it in no measured termṣ These contradictory statements were known to Bṛhaspati who expressly says that Manu permits niyoga and himself forbids ¹¹¹ it and assigns a reason viz. that in former ages (Kṛta and Tretā) people practised tapas and were endowed with knowledge while in the Dvāpara and Kali ages men have lost the powers possessed by men of the past ages and therefore niyoga is forbiddeṇ yajña-valkya himself proposes (II. 21) that when two smṛtis are in conflict 'reasoning based on the practices of elders was of greater force'. Nārada has a similar rule. ¹¹² Another device was to declare that the nature of Dharma differed in each of the four yugas and that in the kṛta, tretā, dvāpara and kali ages the Dharmas respectively promulgated by Manu, Gautama, Śaṅkha-Likhita and Parāśara were to prevail. ¹¹³ This also could not solve all difficulties, since medieval commentators and digests found that even what was allowed by Parāśara (such as permitting a brāhmaṇa to eat food at the ¹¹⁴ house of such śūdras as his dāsa, cowherd, barber, family friend and a cultivator of his land for a half share of the crops, permission for a married woman to re-marry in certain circumstances), came to be disapproved of or condemned by people. | Another expedient in cases of conflict among smṛtis was provided by Gobhila viz. where there is a conflict of (smṛti) passages, the opinion of the majority should prevail. ¹¹⁵ As shown above smṛtis had been composed before 500 B. C. and they continued to be compiled till about 900 or 1000 A. D. i. e. for over 1500 yearṣ Yāj. (I. 4-5) mentions 19 smṛtis including his owṇ Vide H. of Dh. Vol. I. pp. 132-135 for the enumeration of different numbers of smṛtis in different workṣ At least a hundred smṛtis if not more can be nameḍ During the long period of over 1500 years vast changes in the religious and social ideas of the Indian people, in their customs and usages had occurreḍ Buddhism arose, flourished and disappea- red from India, the caste system became rigid in the matter of food, marriage and social behaviour; Vedic rites, divinities worshipped and language underwent great transformations, animal sacrifices, though occasionally performed, had ceased to be looked upon as meritoriouṣ The religious literature had therefore to be recast to suit new ideals, new worship and new patrons (viz. the common people who had ceased to follow ancient ritual and worship). Smṛtis reflected the changes in ideas, beliefs, worship and usages that occurred from time to time and naturally gave rise to great conflicts among them- selveṣ At last it appears that the learned men of the 10th and following centuries of the Christian era hit upon the plan of providing that certain customs and practices, though formerly allowed and practised, were harmful in the Kali age. A theory was put forward that great sages came together at the beginning of the Kali age and declared that certain rites, customs and usages, though allowed in past ages, should be prohibited in the Kali age. ¹¹⁶ The actions prohibited or to be avoided in the Kali age (about 55 in number and therefore called Kalivarjya) have been set out and discussed at length in H. of Dh. vol. III. pp. 926-967. It is clear from Medhātithi's bhāṣya on Manu (IX. 112) that long before his time (9th century A. D.) there were writers who had condemned govadha (in Madhuparka &c.), niyoga and the giving of a larger share to the eldest son and expressed the view that those practices were only allowed in bygone ageṣ

This subject of Kalivarjya requires some serious considera- tioṇ Three of the Kalivarjyas are the prohibition of niyoga, of the offering of the anubandhyā cow (after avabhṛtha) in Jyotiṣṭoma and of the allotment of the largest share (of ancestral wealth) to the eldest soṇ All these three were either enjoined or permitted by the Veda. From Rg. X. 40. 2 it follows that a sonless widow raised a son for the sake of the spiritual benefit of her husband's soul by sexual intercourse with the husband's brother.¹¹⁷ The Tai. S. (III. 1. 9. 4) has two contradictory passages viz. ‘Manu divided his wealth among his sons’ (without making any distinction among them) and ‘therefore they endow the eldest son with (the paternal) wealth’ (Tai. S. II. 5. 2. 7). In this last case it may be argued that as two Vedic passages are in conflict there is an optioṇ But from very early times there is a prohibition against allowing the whole ancestral wealth or a major portion of it to the eldest soṇ Āpastamba quotes both ¹¹⁸ Vedic passages, holds that equal division among sons is the proper rule and remarks that allowing the eldest son to take the whole or a major portion of ancestral estate is prohibited by the Śāstraṣ Among actions forbidden in the Kali age but practised in Vedic times some striking ones (apart from the three already cited above) may be mentioned here: (1) being initiated for Sattras (which were sacrifices extending from 12 days to 12 years or even more and which could be performed by brāhmaṇas alone); Jaimini ¹¹⁹ deals with them at some length in VI. 6. 16-32 and other placeṣ It is remarkable that neither Śabara nor Kumārila says anything against Sattradikṣā as prohibited in Kali. So it was not among generally recognized Kalivarjyas till at least the 8th century A. D. (2) killing of a cow or bull. There were several occasions on which this was done in the Vedic age. Vide H. of Dh. Vol. III. pp. 939–940. As flesh-eating came to be looked down upon, cow-sacrifices became most abhorrent and medieval Kalivarjya texts only register a prohibition which had been acted upon for centuries before theṃ (3) The employment of cups of wine in the Sautrāmaṇī sacrifice. ¹²⁰ Jaimini, Śabara and the Tūp-ṭīkā of Kumārila describe it and both Śabara and Kumārila refer to the offering of cups of wine in it. Therefore this rite must have become Kalivarjya after Kumārila's day. (4) Offering an animal with the recital of Vedic mantras to the bridegroom, to a guest and in honour of pitṛs. Vide H. of Dh. Vol. II, pp. 542–546 for Madhuparka in which a bull or a cow was offered according to the Ait. Br. and Vol. III. pp. 945–46 for this Kalivarjya. Manu (V. 41–44) allows the killing of animals in Madhuparka, in sacrifices and in rites for the pitṛs (Manes) and gods and emphasizes that sacrificing an animal as laid down by the Veda is no hiṁsā but is ahiṁsā. Yāj. (I. 258–260) prescribes the periods of time for which pitṛs are gratified by the offering of sacrificial food (such as rice or sesame), various kinds of fish and the flesh of several animalṣ The Mit. was ¹²¹ constrained to observe that, although Yāj. shows that sacrificial food (rice &c), flesh and honey are offerings in Śrāddha for all varṇas, yet (in its day) the rule established by Pulastya should be followed viz. food fit for muni (i. e. rice) should be offered by brāhmaṇas, flesh by kṣatriyas and vaiśyas and honey by śūdraṣ

According to the Pūrvamīmāṁsā Veda is eternal, self-existent and of absolute authority; one fails to understand how sages could have authority at the beginning of the Kali-yuga to prohibit what the Veda enjoined or permitteḍ This seems to be a fiction invented to accommodate as Dharma the changes in people's ideas and practices that had occurreḍ It would have been honest and straightforward if the writers on Dharmaśāstra had said that changed circumstances required that the words of the Veda or of the old smṛtis should not be followeḍ And there is nothing novel or revolutionary in saying thiṣ Both Manu ¹²² and Yājñavalkya prescribe that one should not observe but give up, what was (once) deemed to be dharma, if it had become hateful to the people and if it would end in unhappiness and not lead to the attainment of heaveṇ Even the Mitākṣarā follows this precept of the two smṛtis and expressly says that unequal distribution (at partition) of ancestral wealth, though found in the Śāstras, should not be followed because people had come to hate it. It may be noted that the word used by Yāj. and others is ‘lokavidviṣṭa’ or ‘lokavikruṣṭa’ (hated or reviled by the people) and not ‘śiṣṭa-vidviṣṭa’, the idea being that even if orthodox learned paṇḍits insist that people must follow what the Veda and smṛtis declare to be Dharma, common people may give up practices condemned by them or hateful to theṃ This attitude recognizes the historical facts that practices change in the course of centuries and common people are entitled to ignore the dicta even of the Veda (much more of the smṛtis). To the question why should one not be allowed to marry one’s mother’s sister or mother's sister's daughter if a maternal uncle's daughter can be married, the Smṛticandrikā replies 'we do not say that she could not be married according to Śāstra, but she should not be married as people abhor such a marriage' and it quotes Yaj. I. 156 (by oversight it ascribes the verse to Manu). In modern times when any change or reform in religious or social practices is suggested, Pandits calling themselves Sanātanīs put forward the pleas that the proposed change or reform is opposed to the śāstras, that the controversy should be carried on according to the Mīmāṁsā rules, that all Smṛti and other dicta should be so construed as to lead to samanvaya (consistent arrangement of apparently discordant texts), that the historical approach leads nowhere and should not be resorted to. All these objections are here briefly dealt with. It has been shown how from Vedic times to the present day great changes have taken place in religious ideas, worship and practices, how smṛtis from Gau- tama, Āpastamba, Manu downwards espouse conflicting views so much so that as early as the Mahābhārata Vyāsa ¹²³ had to protest that 'rationalisation is unstable, Vedas are in con- flict with each other, there is no single sage whose opinion is held to be authoritative (by all), the truth about Dharma is enveloped in a cave (i. e. it cannot be clearly discerned) and that therefore the path (to be followed) is the one followed by the great mass of people.' The Mīmāṁsā does not often lead to certain conclusions and it has already been seen how great Mīmāṁsā writers like Śabara, Kumārila, Prabhākara differ among themselves on numerous topics and it would be further illustrated later on how even great Mīmāṁsakas evolve highly conflicting conclusions in the interpretation of simple smṛti passageṣ Change is the one absolute in the long history of our religious and social ideas and what those who appeal to the historical approach mean is that the smṛtis were composed by human authors during a period of 1500 or 2000 years and were greatly influenced by the then prevailing religious and social atmosphere, that many of their dicta cannot be fully reconciled so as to form a consistent code of conduct, that they cannot be regarded as forever binding on all Hindus, that in the 20th century our people are free to introduce or recognize such changes as are required or have already taken place among the people in the changed circumstances and that this course is sanctioned even by Manu and Yājñavalkya and medieval eminent authors and works on the Dharmaśāstra such as the Mitākṣarā and the Kalpataru. It is of course clear that changes in practices and principles should not be made merely for the sake of change or for the whims of some leader, but the governing principle of conscious change should be the feelings and needs of common people, while retaining the foundations on which society has been based for thousands of yearṣ

It has further to be noted that the Mīmāṁsā rules were concerned only with the interpretation of the Vedic passages on sacrificial rites and matters relating thereto and had very little to do with the practices of people unconnected with sacrifices or religious riteṣ¹²⁴ The Mīmāṁsāsūtra nowhere says that the same rules should be applied to the interpretation of smṛtis On the contrary, the P. M. S. is very critical about smṛtis and usages (vide P. M. S. I. 3. 3-4 and 7). There are fundamental differences between the Veda and the smṛtis The Veda was deemed to be self-existent, eternal and of absolute authority, while smṛtis are pauruṣeya (works of human authors), have only a derived authority (as being presumed to be based on Vedic passages most of which are not now available), their number is very large, they often differ so much from each other that even eminent authors and works like the Mitākṣarā had sometimes to give up in despair the idea of bringing order out of the welter of smṛti passages and in their efforts at samanvaya had to say that certain smṛtis refer to a former Kalpa or Yuga (i. e. to a society of several thousands or millions of years ago). One of the well-known maxims of the P. M. S. is the one called 'Sarvaśākhāpratyayaṇyāya'¹²⁵ or ‘Śākhāntarādhikaraṇapanyāya’ (II. 4. 8-33). In the several recensions of the Veda and the Brāhmaṇas attached to the Vedic recensions the same rite is mentioned and is dilated upon with details some of which occur in one or more recensions but are absent from otherṣ Jaimini and Śabara establish that all the Śākhās of the Veda and the Brāhmaṇas form one corpus, that such rites as Agnihotra and Jyotiṣṭoma are one and the same in all recensions of the Veda, though the details may vary here and there, and this is the proper conclusion because the name (Jyotiṣṭoma and the like) is the same in all recensions, the promised reward of the rite is the same, the materials of the sacrifice and the devatā are the same and the codanās (the exhortatory sentences) are the same. This very maxim was extended to smṛtis from very early timeṣ Viśvarūpa, Medhātithi, the Mitākṣarā,¹²⁶ Aparārka and other commentators extend this to smṛtis and provide that where smṛtis are in conflict there is to be an option but that in other cases all the details are to be added up. But as an option was liable to eight faults the tendency developed that all smṛti passages on a topic were to be so interpreted as to give no rise to conflict or to allow no option by means of various devices Such as 'Visaya-vyavasthā', reference to another Kalpa or Yuga and so oṇ For example, even as regards the stock example of vikālpā (viz. taking or not taking the Śodaśin cup in Atirātra) the Mit. says that it is proper to assume that it should be taken if it is possible to do so, or it may be assumed that by taking the Śodaśin cup in Atirātra the attainment of svarga is hastened &c. ¹²⁷ The result of regarding all smṛtis as constituting one Śāstra was that many simple rites became in course of time overloaded with details, complicated and taxing to the performer. But sometimes it is necessary to apply this doctrine. For example, Yāj. I. 135 requires the snātaka not to look at the sun (nekṣetārkam); this would mean that to look at the sun is prohibited at all times, but the dictum of Yāj. should be read along with Manu IV. 37 which forbids a person to look at the rising or setting sun or at the sun when eclipsed or as reflected in water or when it is at the meridiaṇ So the rule will be as stated by Manu.

While on this subject of the authoritativeness of Smṛtis it would be useful to glance at what Jaimini and particularly Kumārila say about the Vedāṅgaṣ As regards Śikṣā (Phonetics) Kumārila says that the account given in that work about the organs employed in pronunciation and the rules about Vedic accents have their use in the correct recitation of mantraṣ On the Kalpa-sūtras Jaimini¹²⁸ has a separate adhikaraṇa (I. 3. 11-14). Śabara mentions by name the Māsaka, Hāstika and Kauṇḍinyaka Kalpasūtras and the Tantravārtika draws a distinction between kalpa (ritual of Śrauta sacrifices) and Kalpa-sūtras, and refers by name to eight.

These sūtras (PMS I. 3. 11-14) have been interpreted by Kumārila in several different ways, firstly as referring to the authoritativeness of Kalpasūtras (as done by Śabara), secondly as referring to all the six Vedāṅgas and thirdly as referring to the so-called smṛtis of Buddha and otherṣ That the Buddhist works claimed to be smṛtis is clear from the Manusmṛti ¹²⁹ 'the smṛtis that are beyond the pale of the Veda and whatever other false systems may exist, they are all fruitless as to the (soul's) Hereafter (destiny after bodily death), since they are all based on tamas (ignorance).' Here some words will be said about the Vedāṅgas according to Kumārila. According to both Śabara and Kumārila, vyākaraṇa is dealt with in Jaimini I, 3. 24–29. In the Tantravārtika Kumārila launches an elaborate and telling (pūrvapakṣa) onslaught against Pāṇini himself, aganist Kātyāyana (the author of the Vārtikas) and Patañjali (author of the Mahābhāṣya) in which some very interesting points are made but they have to be passed over for reasons of space. Kumārila says that the proper subject of grammar is to deter- mine what words are correct or incorrect. It is interesting to note that in the prima facie attack against grammar two Pūrvamīmāṁsā sūtras are said to offend against grammar, ¹³⁰

The Nirukta of Yāska, which is one of the six aṅgas of the Veda, is an extensive work and deals with the derivation of words, semantics, explanations of several hundred Vedic verses in whole or in part. Jaimini agrees with several conclusions of the Nirukta, which claims that without its help one cannot under- stand the meaning of the Veda, that it has a purpose of its own and is a complement of grammar, and it controverts at great length the view of Kautsa¹³¹ that Vedic mantras have no meaning (or purpose) and emphatically asserts that Vedic mantras have a meaning (and a purpose) because the words they contain are the same as those employed in popular speech and that a Brāhmaṇa passage states that sacrifice has a perfect form when a ṛk verse or yajus formula refers to the rite that is being perform-eḍ Jaimini (in I. 2. 4. ff and I. 3. 30) holds that Mantras are meaningful and that Vedic words and words in popular Sanskrit are the same and the things denoted by them both are the same (except that some difference may be caused by accentuation in the Veda).¹³² The very first sentence of Śabara’s bhāṣya says the same thing. Jaimini further¹³³ agrees with the Nirukta about the denotation of verbs and nounṣ Śabara frequently quotes either the very words of the Nirukta or pointedly refers to theṃ¹³⁴ Jaimini agrees with the Nirukta in the matter of the nature and functions of the Devatās in sacrificeṣ¹³⁵ Kumārila makes a general remark that all the six aṅgas and the dharmaśāstras are comprehended under Smṛti. ¹³⁶ It appears that Jaimini did not attach much importance to Smṛtis, since out of 915 (or 1000) Adhikaraṇas barely about a dozen are concerned in any way with smṛtis alone, viz. I. 3. 1–2, I. 3. 3–4, I. 3. 11–14, I. 3. 24–29, VI. 2. 21–22, VI. 2. 30, VI. 8. 23–24, VII. 1. 10, IX. 2. 1–2, XII. 4. 43. Śabara, however, refers to smṛtis in many more places such as on VI. 1. 5 and 13, IX. 1. 6–9. We are here concerned with the attitude of Jaimini and his early commentators like Śabara and Kumārila towards Smṛtiṣ The established conclusion arrived at by Jaimini (in I. 3. 2) is that in case of conflict with the Veda Smṛti is to be discarded, but if there be no conflict (of Smṛti with Veda), it may be inferred (that Smṛti is based on some Vedic text). This amounts to saying that there is always a presumption that smṛtis are based on Veda, if their prescriptions are not directly in conflict with the Veda. Smṛtis prescribe the obser-vance of Aṣṭakā śrāddhas, the digging of tanks, following and obeying a teacher. These are authoritative because they do not conflict with any Vedic text of opposite import. The Smṛtis do claim that they are based on the Veda. Gautama says so (in XI. 19 in note 2042) and Manu states (II. 7) 'whatever Dharma is proclaimed by Manu for anybody has all been (already) declared in the Veda, since Veda possesses all knowledge'. In connection with smṛtis and usages an important question arises viz. if there is conflict between smṛtis and usages of śiṣṭas, which is to be regarded as more authoritative. Kumārila holds that if the practice of good men is not opposed to what is taught in the Veda and Smṛti, such practices can be understood to be authoritative but if there is contradiction between what is taught by Veda and by Smṛti and by usages, then their authoritativeness would be opposed (i. e. would be lost) and further that ¹³⁷ smṛti is more authoritative because it is based directly on the Veda, while in the case of usages, one has to infer that śiṣṭas must have based their conduct on some Vedic text i. e. usage is removed from the Veda by one step further than Smṛtis and besides it is well-known that smṛtis are compositions by persons who were deeply versed in the Veda, while the origins of usages are vague and unascertainable.

Though this is the theoretical rule, supported by Dharma-śāstra works such as Vaṣ I, 5, Mit. on Yaj. I. 7 and II. 117, Kullūka on Manu II. 10, one finds that usages opposed to smṛtis have been in vogue from ancient times (such as the usage of marrying one's maternal uncle's daughter that is condemned by Manu and authoritative smṛtis). The Vyavahāramayūkha (p. 98 of the text in B. G. S.) was constrained to observe that in the Purāṇas one often finds usages opposed to smṛtis The courts have held that ‘immemorial usage is transcendental law’ and that this is the translation by Sir William Jones of ‘ācāraḥ paramo dharmaḥ’ in Manu I. 108. Vide H. of Dh. Vol. III. pp 874-876 for two interpretations of this verse of Manu I. 108 in modern timeṣ Manu in (II. 10) asserts that Veda and smṛti are in all matters not to be subjected to (hostile) reasoning, since Dharma shone forth from these two. Manu further provided that as regards matters not specifically provided for, whatever brāhmaṇas that have studied the Veda together with the supporting lores (viz. the six āṅgas, mīmāṁsā, Purāṇas &c.) and that make others realize what Śruti says are śiṣṭas and whatever they declare to be the Dharma in such unprovided cases is undoubtedly the Dharma.

It was declared by the Privy Council that ‘under the Hindu system of law clear proof of usage will outweigh the written text of the law.’ ¹³⁸ From very ancient times customs and usages have been held to be authoritative. For example, Gautama XI. 20 says ‘the usages of countries, castes and families are authoritative, provided they are not (directly) opposed to Vedic textṣ’ Manu I. 118 states that he has embodied in his Śāstra the long-standing customs and usages of coun-tries, castes, families, heretical sects and guildṣ In some matters modern legislation in India allows to customs and usages over-riding ²⁰⁸⁸ authority.

In the examination of certain Kalīvarjyas mentioned above, (p. 1268–1270) it has been shown how several actions prohibited in the Kalīvarjya texts were practised in Vedic times or were enjoined by Vedic textṣ

Kumārila points out that even brāhmaṇa women of Ahi- cchātrā and Mathurā drank ²⁰⁸⁹ liquor in his day, that northern brāhmaṇas engage in such transactions as the gift and sale of horses that have a mane, of mules, camels and animals that have two rows of teeth and eat from the same plate with their wives, children and friends, that brāhmaṇas of the South enter into matrimony with the maternal uncle's daughter and take their meals while seated on a couch of wickerwork, that both (brāhmaṇas of the North and South) take cooked food (kept in pots) that remains after their friends or relatives have partaken of it or that has been touched by them (at the time of eating), that they chew tāmbūla of betel leaves, betelnut, catechu and lime made into a roll that has been touched (in a betel-seller's shop) and do not sip water at the end of the chewing, wear clothes cleaned by washermen and brought on the back of asses, that they do not avoid the contact of persons guilty of grave sins except the murder of a brāhmaṇa; there are also an infinite number of obvious violations of the subtle dictates of Dharma laid down for each man, caste or family, that these (transgressions) are contrary to Śruti and Smṛti and have a visible purpose and that it is not possible to regard such adulterated practices as Dharma inculcated by sadācāra. The requisites of valid usages according to the Pūrvamīmāmsā school are that they must be ancient, not opposed to the express texts of the Veda or of Smṛti, must be such as are deemed by śiṣṭas to be obligatory and must be observed by them with the consciousness that they are so. they must not have a visible purpose and must not be immoral. Vide H. of Dh. Vol. III. p. 853-855 for discussion on valid cus- toms and usageṣ

The general rules laid down by Dharmaśāstra works about the binding character of customs and usages are in line with the rules of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā. Vide H. of Dh. Vol. III, pp. 871– 884. But deviation from Vedic texts and smṛtis gradually arose as noted above.

Even all actions done by great men cannot be called sadācāru, according to Kumārila, if they can be attributed to greed or some such base motive and should not be looked upon as Dharma. Gautama, ²⁰⁹⁰ Āp. Dh. S. and the Bhāgavata-purā- ṇa remark that even great men were guilty of violations of Dharma and defiant excesses, that those great men incurred no sin (got over the effects of such violations) on account of their being endowed with eminent tapas (spiritual merit due to auster- ities) but that others of later ages following their examples and treading the same path would sink (into hell). Kumārila cites twelve such instances of lapses, explains them away or says they were due to wrath or other passions and were not intended by the authors (of those acts) as dharma and were not looked upon as śiṣṭācāra by modern meṇ The twelve instances are: Prajā- pati who became enamoured of his own daughter (Usas, explains Kumārila), Indra is described as the jāra (paramour) of Ahalyā (night, according to Kumārila’s explanation); Vasiṣṭha through grief for the slaughter of his hundred sons by a demon contemp- lated suicide; Viśvāmitra who became officiating priest to Triśaṅku that had become a cāṇḍāla through a curse; Nahuṣa who, when he occupied the position of Indra, made approaches to Śacī, wife of Indra and was transformed into an ajagara (huge reptile); Purūravas, when separated from Urvaśī, thought of dying (by hanging &c.); Kṛṣṇa-dvaipāyana who was naiṣṭhika (perpe- tual) brahmacārin raised sons on the widows of his uterine brother, Vicitravīrya; Bhīṣma, though unmarried, performed Aśvamedha sacrifices; Dhṛtarāṣṭra, though congenitally blind, performed sacrifices which blind men are not authorised to do (compare Jai. VI, I. 42); five Pāṇḍavas marrying one Draupadī; Yudhiṣṭhira who prevaricated and thereby caused the death of Droṇa, his brāhmaṇa guru; Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna are described in the Mahābhārata as drunk with wine ('ubhau madhvāsavakṣībau dṛṣṭau me Keśavārjunau' in Udyogaparva 59. 5 ) and married their maternal uncle's daughters; Rāma performed Aśvamedha by associating a golden image of Sītā with hiṃ

Kumārila displays great ingenuity in explaining away most of these transgressions by plausible and specious arguments, by relying on the great tapas in some cases (such as about Viśvāmitra ) and in some cases by downright denial ( as in the case of Subhadrā being the sister of Kṛṣṇa).¹⁴² Those interested may refer for all these instances and their explanations by Kumārila to H. of Dh. Vol. III. pp. 845-848.

One interesting adhikaraṇa is the Holākādhikaraṇa (Jai. I. 3. 15-23 ). It is said that Holākā should be observed by the easterners, Āhninaibuka by Southerners, Ūdvyṣabāyājña by northernerṣ The established conclusion is that such observances are meant for all (and not merely for persons of the East or South &c.), if they are fit to be done by¹⁴³ easterners or southerners (there is no reason why these should not be observances fit applicable to all Āryas; no cogent reason exists why a restricted Vedic text should be inferred in the case of the above observanceṣ Vide H. of Dh. Vol. III. pp. 851-853 for detailed explanation of this maxim and above pp. 237 ff. The Dāyabhāga (II. 40 and VI. 22-23) refers to this maxim in connection with a double share to be allotted to the acquirer and with reference to a person acquiring property without detriment to the ancestral estate and explains the purpose of the Holākādhikaraṇa.

The Holākādhikaraṇanyāya is frequently mentioned by writers on Dharmaśāstra. Viśvarūpa on Yaj. I. 53 quotes the siddhāntasūtra ‘api va sarvadharmaḥ syāt tannyāyatvād vidhānasya’ (Jai. I. 3. 16) and adds that it must be regarded as ‘Sarvadharma’ (as applicable to all) if it is recommended as something to be observed by some people. There is a difference of opinion between medieval writers on dharmaśāstra as to the exact import of this adhikarana. The Dāyabhāga says ¹⁴⁴ that the Śruti to be inferred from the practice of Holākā by easterners is simply the general one (sāmānya-śruti) that Holākā rites should be observeḍ On the other hand Govindānanda in his Coṃ on the Prāyaścitta-viveka of Śūlapāṇi says that the Holakādhikaraṇa leads to this only that the Śruti to be inferred from this practice is not in the form ‘the easterners should perform Holakā’ but it is in a general form viz. ‘the usage of a country should be observed by those in the country’.