Chapter II. Seven Angas of Rājya

Volume III pp. 17–55

Chapter II. Seven Angas of Rājya

According to almost all of our authorities a state (rājya) is constituted by seven elements¹ viz svāmin (ruler or sovereign), amātya (minister), janapada or rāṣṭra (the territory of the State and its people), durga (fortified city or capital), kośa (accumulated wealth in the ruler's treasury), daṇḍa (army), mitra (friends or allies). These seven are called aṅgas or prakṛtiṣ The word prakṛti in works on politics is also used for the constituents of a circle of states (of a maṇḍala) Vide Manu VII. 156 and Kauṭilya (VI.2). The word also means ministers as in Śukranītisāra II. 70-73 and 'subjects' in Khāravela's Inscription (E. I vol. 20 p.79 1. 4), Nārada (prakīrṇaka 5), Raghuvamśa VIII. 18. The order in which these are arranged and their names vary a good deal. The quotations given below will indicate how the order differṣ The sequence is important for the reason that some of our authorities expressly state that when calamities befall or deterioration sets in each of the seven elements, those that befall each preceding one are more serious for the State than those of each succeeding one (Kauṭilya VIII. 1, Manu IX. 295). For janapada sometimes the word jana or rāṣṭra is used, for 'daṇḍa' the word 'bala' and the word 'pura' for 'durga'. The Āśramavāsīparva (58) speaks of eight aṅgas of rājya. According to Sumantu quoted by the Sarasvatīvilāsa (p 46) daṇḍa means "punishment bodily or monetary" and 'army' is included under 'kośa'. Sumantu says that th esvāmin has to be preserved by himself, the ministers by showing them proper respect, the people by keeping them contented, the fortified capital by abundance of wealth and grain, the kośa by proper expenditure, daṇḍa by following one's dharma, friends by truthfulnesṣ The autho- rities are agreed that the ruler is the most important or the first of the seveṇ Kauṭilya puts the matter very forcibly and realis- tically when he states that the briefest exposition of the elements of rājya is to say that the king is the State². This is really not the same doctrine as that emphasized by Louis XIV of France when he said ‘ L’Etat c’est moi’. Kauṭilya makes his position clear (in VIII.1) by saying that it is the king who appoints ministers and servants and superintendents, who takes measures of relief against calamities befalling the other prakṛtis and measures of prosperity, that it is he who appoints other ministers when those already appointed are under calamities, that if the ruler is pros- perous he transmits prosperity to his prakṛtis, that the prakṛtis bear that character which the king has and that hence the ruler occupies the position of a permanent, never-exhausted centre of power. The Sukranītisāra II.4 remarks that if the king begins to act at his sweet will, it leads to calamities, to loss of ministers and of the kingdoṃ The Sukranītisāra (I. 61-62) compares the seven angas of rājya to the organs of the body viz., the king is the head, the ministers are the eyes, ally the ear, treasury the mouth, the army the mind, capital and rāṣṭra are hands and feet. It is emphasized by Kāṃ (IV.1-2) that each of the seven elements is complementary to the others, that if the state is defective even in one out of the seven elements it does not pull well. The Śāntiparva it is stated that it is not possible to say categorically that any one of the seven excels the others in merit, but that at different times a different element assumes importance over others, since that particular element is in the particular circumstances capable of accomplishing the purpose in hanḍ This shows that Manu and the Mahābhārata held that there was an organic unity in the several elements of rājya. All must work harmoniously towards one ideal or enḍ Manu (IX. 296-297) says this by means of a simile ‘Just as among the three staves tied together (by a rope of cow’s hair) used by a sannyāsin no particular staff is superior (to the others), so among the seven elements of the state no particular one can be said to excel the others, since each of them has a particular excellence of its own; a particular element is pre-eminent in some particular matter and therefore the superiority of one to the others when expressed (as e. g. in Manu IX. 295) is to be confined to that matter alone.' Manu here emphasizes the harmonious working or unity of the seven elements though they are diverse in their individual characterṣ The analysis of the elements and nature of the State led ancient Indian writers to hold that a mere conglomeration of people did not by itself constitute a State, but that for a State there must be people who live within certain definite geographical limits (rāṣṭra), they must be bound by the bond to render allegiance to a ruler (svāmī), have a certain system of government (amātya), must have a regulated economic system, a force for defence and international relationshipṣ That is, the most essential elements of a state are (1) a sovereign, (2) a system of govern- ment, (3) a definite territory and (4) a population of some size. These four were known even to the most ancient sūtraṣ Vide Gaut. XI. 1 (rājā), Āp. II. 6, 25. 10 (amātya), Āp. II. 10. 25. 11, II. 10. 26. 4 (viṣaya, nagara, grāma), Gaut XI. 5-8 (prajā).

These seven elements will now be dealt with one after another.

It should be noted that neither Kauṭilya nor Kāmandaka defines rājya. Etymologically it means the 'karma' or 'bhāva' (activity or state of a king)', being derived from 'rājan' with the affix 'ya' ('syañ or 'yak', acc. to Pāṇini V. 1. 124 and 128 ). This is the etymological meaning. But 'rājya' is employed in the sense of 'kingdom' in popular parlance and also in the smṛtis and works on polity as in Manu VII. 111, Kāṃ XIII. 81-82. But when it is said that 'rājya' has seven elements then 'rājya' has a very wide meaning and stands for the king, the ministers, the country and its people and the economic and military resources and in such a case it is proper to translate the word as 'the State' (as including both the Government and the governed). In some cases 'rājya' should be rendered as 'government' which includes only the king and his ministers and conveys also in modern times the agency or machinery through which the will of the State is formulated, realized or carried out; vide Mānasollāsa II. 8, verses 688, 689, 691 The Nītivākyāmṛta (p. 43) says "rājya means the activity of the ruler that would be appropriate to protecting the earth". Medhātithi on Manu VIII. 1 remarks that rājya means ‘a prosperous people’. In XIII. 4 Kauṭilya states ( na hyajano janapado rājyam janapadam vā bhavatiti Kauṭilyaḥ ) it as his opinion that a territory without any inhabitants cannot become a rājya (a kingdom) or a janapada (as one of the seven elements). Śabara on Jai. II. 3. 3 has a discourse on the deri-vation of rājya.

Prof. Bhandarkar in ‘Some Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity’ (pp. 66–89), Jayaswal in ‘Hindu Polity’ part II p 9, Prof. B K Sarkar in ‘Positive Background of Hindu Sociology’ Book II pp. 34–39 and others maintain that this ancient analysis of rājya into seven elements shows that the idea of the State as an organism, that is, the organic theory of the State was known to Hindu thinkers and that this doctrine of saptañga rājya³ satisfies the definition of the State given by Bluntschli and others On the other hand Mr Anjaria in chapter IV of his ‘Nature and grounds of political obligation in the Hindu state’, after pointing out how there are different versions of the organic theory of the state denies vehemently that the Hindu theory can be called a proper organic theory of the State, particularly because the Hindu thinkers did not regard the State as a moral organism, because they attached a permanent stigma of inferiority to large sections of the community on the bare ground of birth and that the Hindu conceptions did not harmonize the authority of the State and the liberty of the individual. It would be far beyond the scope of the present work to enter into any discussion of this problem All that may be said is that Mr Anjaria tilts the balance to the other side too much. The faults he points out in the Hindu theory and practice beset almost all theories of the State almost in all countrieṣ Even in the times of Plato and Aristotle huge populations of slaves had no voice in the affairs of the state Up to the 19th century true democracies never existed even in Europe

The Ruler—The necessity of a ruler is forcibly emphasized in several works The Ait. Br. I. 14 says that the gods thought they were worsted because they had no king, that therefore they elected one by consent This shows that military necessities

led to kingship. Manu VII 3 (=Śukranītisāra I. 71) says 'the Creator created the king for the protection of all this world when everything ran through fear hither and thither, as there was then no ruler in the world'. It goes on to say that the Creator proceeded to create Danda (the power of punishment) for the sake of the king and that if the king does not sedulously employ danda for punishing those that deserve it, the strong would torment the weak as fish are fried on a pike or as in water fish devour each other (Manu VII. 14 and 20, the last also showing a variant 'jale' for 'śūle'). This idea of mātsyanyāya (the maxim of the larger fish devouring the smaller ones or the strong despoiling the weak) is frequently dwelt upon by Kauṭilya, the Mahābhārata and other workṣ It can be traced back to the Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa XI. 1. 6. 24 'whenever there is drought, then the stronger seizes upon the weaker, for the waters are the law', which appears to mean that when there is no rain, the reign of law comes to an end and mātsyanyāya begins to operate. Kauṭilya says 'if danda be not employed, it gives rise to the condition of mātsyanyāya, since in the absence of a chastiser the strong devour the weak' and 'the people overwhelmed by the operation of mātsyanyāya made Manu Vaivasvata their king'.⁴ That in the absence of a king (arājaka) or when there is no fear of punishment, the condi- tion of mātsyanyāya follows is declared by several works such as the Rāmāyaṇa II. chap. 67, Śāntiparva 15. 30 and 67. 16, Kāmandaka II. 40, Matsyapurāṇa 225. 9, Mānasollāsa II. 20 verse 1295. Numerous works contain eulogies of danda. The king is called daṇḍadhara in many works e. g. in Śāntiparva 67.16 and Kāṃ I. 1. Gautama XI. 28 says that the word danda is derived by the wise from the root 'dam' (to control), that he (the king) should control by means of danda those who observe no restraint and (XI. 31) that the instructions of the teacher and the power of punishment (wielded by the king) guard those who violate the rules of varnas and āśramaṣ The Matsyapurāṇa⁵ 225, 17, Agnipurāṇa 226. 16 and Śāntiparva 15 8 state that daṇḍa is so called because it suppresses those that are not restrained (from the root 'dam') and punishes those that are imprudent or ungentlemanlike (from the root 'dand'). Daṇḍa is raised to the position of a divinity by Manu ⁶ VII. 25 (= Viṣṇudharma_ sūtra III 95 = Matsya 225 8), Yāj I. 354, Śānti 121. 15. Daṇḍa rules over all people, it protects all of them, daṇḍa is awake even when (the guardians of law) have gone to sleep, the wise regard daṇḍa as dharma (Manu VII. 18=Śānti 15. 2= Matsya 225 14-15). The whole world is under the heel of daṇḍa, for it is difficult to find a man who is pure by nature (Manu VII. 22 = Śānti 15. 34). The conception of daṇḍa is therefore this that the State's will and coercive power keep the indivi- dual and nation within the bounds of dharma, punish for breaches and effect the good of the whole The gods, dānavas, gandharvas, the rākṣasas and reptiles—these also tend to bring about enjoyment for men because they are pressed down by daṇḍa (Manu VII. 23) ⁷ The Bhagavadgītā (X. 38) identifies daṇḍa with the divine Kṛṣṇa 'I am daṇḍa in the hands of those who control others, I am nīti (i. e. rājanīti) for the conquerors'. For the detailed effects and long eulogies of daṇḍa, vide Manu VII. 14-31, Matsya 225. 4-17, Kāmandaka II. 38-44. These eulogies of daṇḍa presuppose the theory that people obey law and the dictates of the śāstra through the fear of force or punishment. Daṇḍa should be neither too severe nor too mild, but should be appropriate to the fault committed (Kaut I. 4, Kāmandaka II 37, Manu VII. 16, Śānti 15. 1ff, Śānti 56 21, 103 34) Śānti 57. 41 advises that one should first secure a king, then wife and then wealth, for in the absence of the ruler there would be no wife nor private property ⁸ This shows that the institutions of family and private property and the protection of the weak are bound up with the existence of a ruler. Kātyāyana (in Raja N. P. p. 30) says the king is the III ] protector of the helpless, the home of the homeless, the son of the sonless and the father of the fatherless

In order to magnify the importance of the kingly office, certain works state that the king has in him parts of the godṣ For example, Manu says “the Creator created the king with the essential parts taken from Indra, the Wind god, Yama, the Sun, Agni, Varuna, the Moon and Kubera the lord of wealth and therefore he surpasses all beings by his majesty (VII. 4–5 and compare Manu V. 96); one should not disrespect a boy-king with the thought ‘he is a human being (like others )’ for it is a great deity that stands (before people) in human form as a king” (Manu VII 8 = Śānti 68. 40). This conception goes back to Gautama XL 32 (‘Therefore a king and a spiritual teacher must not be reviled’) and Ap. Dh. S. I 11. 31. 5 (‘he shall not speak harsh or abusive words of the gods or of the king’). Manu VII. 3–4 are the same as Śukranītisāra I 71-72. The Matsyapurāṇa 226. 1 states that the king was created by Brahmā by taking portions of gods for wielding the power of punishment for the protection of all beingṣ Manu (IX. 303–311) puts forward a slightly diluted theory, viz. the king should possess the majesty of and imitate in his actions the first seven deities enumerated above with the Earth as the 8th and Manu sets out what the eight characteristic actions are. Matsya 226. 9–12 are the same as Manu IX. 303–306. The Agnipurāṇa (226. 17–20) states that as the king exercises the functions of nine deities viz. the Sun, the Moon, Vāyu, Yama, Varuna, Fire, Kubera, the Earth and Viṣṇu he has the form of these. Vide Śukranītisāra I 73–79 for similar ideaṣ These verses do not amount to the express theory of divine origin, but assimilate by analogy the king’s functions to those of certain deitieṣ The Nārada-smṛti (prakirnaka section, verses 20–31) contains ⁹ several interesting dicta. It says that in the form of the king it is really Indra himself who moves about on the earth (v. 20), that a king even when devoid of qualities deserves honour from the people, that kings exercise the functions of five deities viz. of Agni, Indra, Soma, Yama and Kubera (vv. 26-31). The Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa (27. 21-26) mentions the same five deitieṣ 'The Veda says that when a king is chosen it is Indra himself that is chosen; one desirous of prosperity should honour the king just as one worships Indra'—says Śānti 67 4 Śānti 69 states that all the gods are invisible, but the king is a deity that can be seeṇ The Vāyu-purāṇa (57. 72) remarks ¹⁰ that in all past and future manvantaras universal emperors (cakravartin) are born on the earth with parts of Viṣṇu. The Matsyapurāṇa (226. 1-12) mixes up the theory of the creation of the king from parts of the gods with the lesser idea of his functions being similar to those of certain deities The Bhāgavata-purāṇa (IV. 14. 26-27) states that Viṣṇu, Brahmā, Śiva, Indra, Vāyu, Varuṇa—these and other gods—exist in the body of the king and that the king is full of (the parts of) all godṣ It is to strengthen this conception that ancient kṣatriya dynasties and their panegyrists tried to trace for those dynasties descent from the Sun or the Moon and in later times from Fire The practice of addressing the king as ‘deva’ in Sanskrit dramas is due to the same tendency of the glorification of the royal office Aśoka was styled ‘devānām priya’ (beloved of the gods) and Kuṣhaṇa emperors like Kaniṣka and Huviṣka styled themselves Devaputra (E I. vol I. pp 371 at pp 381 and 386 ) This phenomenon is not confined to India Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar had their descent traced to gods and goddesses Alexander was deified during his life-time in 324 B C by the Greek world (vide Cambridge Ancient History, vol. VI p 433) and Cæsar's image was carried among those of the immortal gods Kauṭilya (I. 13) makes a spy say among pauras and jānapadas 'kings are (in) the place of (perform the functions of) Indra and Yama, since they visibly inflict punishment and bestow favours Even divine punishment affects those who despise them (kings). Therefore kings should not be despiseḍ' Hence it must be said that the conception of the divine nature of the kingly office'was well-known in Kauṭilya's days and he was not above recommending the employment of this conception for safe-guarding the king's position Vide Rāmāyaṇa, III 1. 18-19 and VII 76. 37-45 and Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa 24 23-28, Viṣṇudharmot-tara II. 2. 9 for similar ideas The phrase ‘nā viṣṇuḥ pṛthivīpatiḥ’ III] is well-known and may be interpreted in two ways viz. the ruler of the earth is Viṣṇu incarnated as man or no king is not Viṣṇu i. e, every king is Viṣṇu. The Pañcatantra¹¹ (I. 120 p. 19) states ' Manu has declared that the king is made up (of parts) of all gods'. The Rājanītiprakāśa is careful to point out that the idea of the king having in him parts of the deities applied only to the mahārāja ( the sovereign ruler ), while the idea of a ruler doing the functions of five deities applies to vassal kingṣ¹² For eulogy of the kingly office, vide Manu VII. 6-17, Śānti 63. 24-30, Śānti 68, Kāṃ I. 9-11, Rājanītiprakāśa pp. 17-31.

But it should not be supposed that this glorification of the king resulted in the full-fledged theory of the divine right of kings or that every king, however bad, was looked upon as a divinity or could do what he likeḍ In the first place, the Rājan nitiratnākara¹³ (p. 83) when speaking of the coronation of a prince by his abdicating royal father quotes a verse where the people ( prajā ) themselves are called Viṣṇu. In the second place the king's authority over brāhmaṇas was limited ( vide H. Dh. vol. II part 1 pp. 139-140 ). The Gautama-dharmasūtra ( XI. 1, 7 and 8 ) says ¹⁴ 'the king rules over all, except over brāhmaṇas; all, except brāhmaṇas should while sitting low on the ground wait upon ( worship ) him ( the king ) who occupies a high seat; they ( the brāhmaṇas ) too should honour him'. From the time the brāhmaṇas and the king's following the advice of brāhmaṇas had been insisted upoṇ Vide Ait. Br. 40. 1, Gaut. VIII. 1, XI. 27. Further the Sukranītisāra ( I. 70) states that a king who oppresses the subjects and causes loss of dharma is made up of the parts of rākṣasas.¹⁵ Manu ( VII. 111-112 ) states that the king who harasses his subjects loses his life, family and kingdom Moreover stories of kings killed for their tyranny are found in the ancient literature. For example, Veṇa, who was jealous of the gods, wanted sacrificial offerings to be made to himself (and not to the gods) and violated dharma, was killed by the brāhmaṇas (Śāntiparva 59 93-95, Bhāgavata-purāṇa IV. 14 ) The Anuśāsanaparva ¹⁶ (61 32-33) solemnly sanctions the killing of a king in certain circumstances "The people should gird themselves up and kill a cruel king who does not protect his subjects, who extracts taxes and simply robs them of their wealth, who gives no lead Such a king is Kali (evil and strife) incarnate That king who after declaring 'I shall protect you' does not protect his subjects should be killed (by the people) after forming a confederacy, like a dog that is afflicted with madness". Manu (VII. 27-28) states that the great principle of daṇḍa if properly wielded conduces to the advancement of the three puruṣārthas, but if a voluptuous, mean and unjust king wields it, it recoils on his head and destroys the king together with his relations Kām 2. 38 makes it clear that daṇḍa foolishly wielded might exasperate even hermits The Śāntiparva 92 19 recommends that a king who has false and very wicked ministers and who puts down dharma should be killed by the people Even as early as the Tai S II. 3 1 it appears that kings were driven away, while the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (XII. 9 3. 1 and 3) mentions a king Dustaritu Paumsāyana who had been expelled from the kingdom which had descended to him through ten ancestors The Sautrāmaņi iṣți is prescribed as a rite for a king to regain a kingdom from which he had been driven away (vide H Dh vol II p 1227) Śānti 92. 6 and 9, Manu VII. 27 and 34, Yāj I 356 appear to justify at least deposing a king, if not tyrannicide Similarly, the Śukranītisāra (II. 274-275) states ¹⁷ that a king, though of a noble pedigree, should be abandoned, if he violates dharma, if he hates good qualities (in others), lines of policy and the army and if his conduct would lead to the destruction of the kingdom and that the family priest with the consent of the principal III ] officers of state should place on the throne another scion of the royal family who is possessed of tho requisite virtueṣ Nārada props up the theory of divine right by stating that the king secures dominion over (lit. purchases) his subjects by his austerities (performed in former lives) and therefore the king is their lord (prakīrnaka 25). Śukranīti I. 20 also brings in the doctrine of Karma ‘the king holds the earth by the actions of his former lives and by his austerities’. Compare Manu VII. 111–112, Śānti 78. 36. The Sukranītisāra (IV. 7. 332–333) says that brāhmaṇas may even fight and destroy an oppressive kṣatriya king and would thereby incur no siṇ The Yaśastilaka (III p. 431) gives examples of kings killed by their subjects, one being a Kalinga king who made a barber his commander-in-chief. In fact in all works on polity we find comparatively little about the king’s rights and special privileges, but on the other hand the greatest emphasis is laid on the king’s duties and responsibilitieṣ Some works describe the king as a servant of the people whose wages or remuneration for the protection he affords is the taxes he raiseṣ Vide Bauḍ Dh. S. I. 10. 1, Śukranīti I. 188, Nārada (prakirṇaka 48) Śānti 71. 10.¹⁸ It may be said here that the apparently inconsistent dicta about the divinity of the king and about his being liable to be deposed or even killed for evil deeds are delivered from two different standpoints and are addressed to different personṣ The writers believed in maintaining the status quo about the duties of varṇas and āśramas, in the privileges of the respective castes and in the progressive deterioration of dharma in the ages to come and wanted a strong king to preserve the social order; therefore the king was raised to divinity and absolute obedience to his orders was demandeḍ This was addressed to the people in general. There was danger however of bad kings and ministers oppressing the people by misrule. Hence the king and his dicta were principally meant for the king and his adviserṣ

In the Kauṭilīya V. 3 we meet with these words “ In Rājasūya and other solemn (or elaborate) sacrifices the ‘rājā’ gets three times the salary given to others who are as learned as he is ” (samanavidyebhyas-triguṇavetano rājā rājasūyādīsu kratusu ). Jayaswal ( in ‘Hindu Polity’ part II, p 136 ) seizes upon this passage to show that the king was a salaried person like the prime minister or the commander-in-chief. The words ‘ in Rājasūya and other kratus’ should have raised doubts in his mind about his interpretation, but he entirely missed the significance of the passage Kauṭilya in that passage is not referring to the king himself but to his representative or deputy when the king is engaged in numerous ceremonial duties during sacrifices of long duration like the Aśvamedha The Ap Śrautasūtra (XX. 3. 1–2), Baudhāyana Śrauta XV 4, Satyāsādha Śr. XIV. 1 24–25 state that the adhvatu priest was to deputize for the king when the latter was engaged in the Aśvamedha ¹⁹ (which was spread over a period of about two years ) The salary referred to by Kauṭilya is to be paid to the adhvaryu when representing the king Vide H Dh vol II p 1232 for thiṣ In X. 3 it is said by Kauṭilya that a virtuous king on the eve of a battle should urge on his soldiers the fact ‘I am a wage-earner like yourselves, this kingdom is to be enjoyed by me along with you You have to strike down the enemy pointed out by me “ ²⁰ Here the theory of the king being a wage-earner or a servant of the State is emphasized in a striking manner.

The word ‘rājan’ is derived in the Nirukta (II. 3) from the root ‘rāj’ to shine, but the Mahābhārata (Śānti 59. 125) likes to say that the king is styled ‘rājā’ since he keeps all people contented, that is, it derives the word ‘rājan’ from the root ‘ranj’. Great poets like Kālidāsa (Raghu IV. 12) follow the Mahābhārata in this, as also in deriving the word ‘kṣatriya’ from ‘kṣata’ and the root ‘trai’, meaning one who protects from wound and injury (Śānti 59 126 and Raghu-vaṁśa II. 53) Br. quoted in the Rāja Dh K. (I p 5) appears to derive the word both from ‘rāj’ and ‘ranj’ (balena caturangena yato rañjayati prajāḥ | dipyamānaḥ sa vapuṣā tena rājābhidhīyate).

There are in our authorities germs of several theories about the origin of kingship Rg X 173 (which corresponds to Atharvaveda VI. 87 and 88. 1–2) has been taken as an election hymn by some writers (e. g Jayaswal in ‘Hindu polity’ p. 7). But one is constrained to say that it is probably nothing of the kind The only words that may lend some colour to the theory of election are ‘let all the people desire thee (as king)’ in Rg. X. 173. 1, but those words may apply as a benediction even in the case of one who is already a king. In the Atharvaveda III. 4 2 there ¹¹ is a reference to the election of a king by the people ‘the people (viśaḥ) chose thee to govern the kingdom, these quarters, the five goddesses (chose thee)’. In Atharvaveda III. 5, 6 and 7 also there is a faint allusion to the election of a king by nobles, king-makers, sūtas and headmen of villages, by the clever makers of chariots and the skilled workers in metalṣ These ‘king-makers’ are called ‘ratnins’ in other Vedic texts and the Tai. Br. I. 7.3 states in connection with the twelve offerings in the Rājasūya called ‘ratninām haviṁsi’ that the ‘ratnins’ give the (rāṣṭra) kingdom (to the king). Vide H. Dh. vol. II. p. 1215 n 2648 and p. 1216 for the ‘ratnins’. So it appears that the conception was that the king got the kingdom from nobles, high functionaries and the common people. For the coronation bath (and its implications) mentioned in the Ait. Br. vide note 105 below. The Ayodhyākāṇda (chap. 1 and 2) describes how Daśaratha when he grew old desired to make his eldest son Rāma the Crown Prince (yuvarāja), how he called together an assembly of vassal kings, citizens and rural inhabi- tants and placed before the assembly his idea, how they acclaimed loudly the old emperor’s proposal and readily gave their consent. This shows that though kingship became hereditary in course of time some element of popular approval was sought for. But such passages referring to the approval of the people cannot be stretched to mean that the king was chosen by a parliament the members of which were elected by the people. All that happened appears to have been only this that citizens that approved assembled spontaneously and expressed their feelings in the assembly. In the Rāmāyaṇa II. 67. 2 it is said that when Daśa- ratha died sages like Mārkaṇḍeya and Vāmadeva declared along with the amātyas in the presence of the family priest (purohita) Vasiṣṭha that as Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa had gone into exile and Bharata and Śatrughna were in the Kekaya country, some scion of the Ikṣvāku race should be chosen as king These sages and ministers are spoken of as king-makers ('rāja-kartāraḥ') here and in chap. 79. 1. In the Ādiparva 44. 6 it is stated that all the citizens of the capital in one voice elected Janamejaya, though a boy, as a king on the death of Parikṣit and Janamejaya ruled with the help of his ministers and purohita There are histo- rical examples of the election of kings The kṣatrapa Rudrada- man was elected king by the people of Surāṣṭra (who at one time formed a republic, acc to Kauṭilya XL 1) and he took an oath as stated in his Junagadh inscription in the year 72 (150 A D)²² Vide E I Vol. VIII p 36 at p 40 Gopāla, the founder of the Pāla dynasty of Bengal (730-740 A D.), was elected a king (E I Vol IV. p. 243 at p 248 and Jayaswal's 'History of India,' 150-350 A D. pp 44-45) It appears that it was the business of the chief ministers and brāhmaṇas to propose some- body as king and such persons were called 'rājakartāraḥ'. In Ayodhyā 67. 8 they say 'our country is without a ruler and may therefore encounter disaster'. Arājaka does not necessarily mean in Ayodhyā 67 anarchy but a condition in which there is no king nor ruler. Though this is so, it is not possible to agree with Mr. K P. Jayaswal ('Hindu Polity', part I, pp 97-98, 134, 173) that 'arājaka' was 'an idealistic constitution, that it was an extreme democracy almost Tolstoian in ideal, that it was extreme individualism in which government itself was regarded as an evil' Ayodhyā 67 8-31, Ādi 41 27 ff, Śānti 67 3 ff, Matsyapurāṇa 225. 8-9 are the principal passages on arājaka. A perusal of these will convince any one not carried away by the over-patriotic desire to find the latest European thought in our ancient books that arājaka was viewed as a state of chaos and the negation of any constitution; that when a country was without a ruler, no private property in anything existed or was respected and people preyed upon each other like fishes (Ayo- dhyā 67 31) and that no Tolstoian ideals were present before the eyes of the writers that drew such a harrowing picture of a State without a ruler The famous Chinese traveller Hiouen Thsang notices (vide Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, 1884, vol I pp 210-216) that when Rājyavardhana was III ] treacherously murdered by king Śaśāṅka, the great minister Bhandin (who was also a cousin of Harsa) called an assembly of ministers and made to the young Harsavardhana a proposal to assume the royal authority, which proposal was backed up by all the ministers and magistrates, that thereupon Harsa agreed to become king after consulting the oracle of Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva. After the death of Parameśvaravarman II (of the Pallava dynasty), when the Pallava kingdom was subject to anarchy, the subjects chose a king. For the details of this elec tion, vide the important constitutional document of the Vai kuntha Perumal temple (Dr. C. Minakshi’s ‘Administration and Social life under the Pallavas’,1938, p. 38). The Rajataranginī narrates (V. 461-463) that Yaśaskara who was originally a poor man was chosen as king by the brāhmaṇaṣ

In some other places a theory somewhat like the theory of social contract expounded by Rousseau is adumbrateḍ The theory of social contract is presented in modern times under two formṣ In one there is supposed to be a tacit or explicit agreement between the Government and the people. In the 2nd form it is supposed that a political society was constituted by a compact among individuals (to which the ruler was not a party). This theory puts forward the notion that government depended on the consent of the people. Kauṭilya (I. 13) refers to the legend that Manu Vaivasvata was made a king by the people, who agreed to assign one-sixth of the grain raised by them as the king's share in return for the protection afforded by hiṃ But Kauṭilya is silent as to whether Manu made any promise to the people. Śāntiparva, chap. 59, states how Vainya, the first king, was called upon by the gods and sages to take an oath and how he promised them that he would protect the world, and would carry out his duties as laid down in the science of govern ment and not act at his sweet will.²³ When this theory of an agreement between the king who took an oath and the people spread among the people, the theory of the divine right of kings, if ever seriously held, would recede more and more into the back-grounḍ Vide Dr Beni Prasad’s ‘Theory of Government in Ancient India’ chap. VIII and ‘Pre-Buddhist India’ (1939) by Mr R N. Mehta, chap. II pp. 79 ff. and 101 for election of kings and for Buddhist theories of government. It is not possible to hold as Jayaswal, U. Ghosal and others do (e. g. ‘Manu and Yājñavalkya’ II, ‘Hindu Polity’ part II pp 54-57) that the theory of divine right of kings was later on propounded by the Manu-smṛti to support the brāhmaṇa empire of Puṣyamitra. Jaya-swal is wrong in saying (in ‘Hindu Polity’ part II p. 57) ‘the theory of the Māṇava was never approved or adopted by a single subsequent law-book’. It has been shown above that Nārada and others espoused the same theory. Manu himself eulogises the supreme power of daṇḍa over the king himself (Manu VII. 28). He makes use of both the theories as occasion demands

The germ of the theory of Divine Right of kings probably goes back even to the Ṛgveda. Ṛg IV. 42 is a hymn of king Trasadasyu, son of Purukutsa. Some of the ideas therein are startling enough. He says ‘the gods rely on the might of Varuna, while I am the lord of the people (verse 1, kratum sacante Varunasya devā rājāmi kṛṣṭeḥ &c); I am Indra and Varuna, I am the wide and the deep Heaven and Earth, I am the son of Aditi (verses 3 and 4)’. Here there is an explicit claim by a king to be identical with the mightiest and greatest gods of the Vedic pantheoṇ In the Atharvaveda VI. 87. 1–2 it is said about the king ‘May all the people long for you, may not the kingdom be lost from your hands, may you stand firm in the world like Indra and may you uphold the kingdom’. In the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa V. 1. 5. 14 (when describing the shooting of arrows in the Vājapeya) it is said ‘the rājanya is most manifestly of Prajāpati, while being one he rules over many’. Here the posi-tion of the rājanya appears to be regarded as due to his being the representative of Prajāpati. In the Śat. Br V. 4. 3 4 the sacrificer in the Rājasūya is identified with Indra and it is said that that position is due to two causes viz. (1) his being a member of the kṣatriya order and (2) his participating in a solemn sacrifice. But passages like the last and Śat. Br V. 1. 3 4, V. 1. 4. 2, V. 2. 2. 14 should not be relied upon in support of the theory of the divine right of kings (as done by U. Ghoshal in ‘Hindu Political Theories’, pp. 28-29), since every participator (whether a brāhmaṇa or a kṣatriya) in such solemn sacrifices as the Agniṣṭoma and Vājapeya was supposed to possess a celestial body after dīkṣā and Pravargya and was often spoken of as identified with Indra and other godṣ Viśvarūpa on Yaj. I 350 quotes a long vedic passage (āgama) in which it is stated “the gods said to Prajāpati ‘we shall arrange for a king in human III] form by taking from the moon, the sun, Indra, Viṣṇu, Vaisra- vana (Kubera) and Yama respectively majesty, brilliance, valour, victoriousness, liberality and control” and that the king thus formed asked the gods to give to him Dharma as his friend and that then he would protect the people and then the gods made Dharma (i. e. danda) his frienḍ

We may examine the theories of the origin of kingship in the Mahābhārata. The Śāntiparva deals with this subject in two places, in chap. 59 and 67. In chap. 59 Yudhisthira asks the great warrior and statesman Bhisma how the title ‘king’ arose and how one man, who has fundamentally the same physical and mental equipment as other men, rules over all meṇ These are not really two questions but only two aspects of the same questioṇ Then Bhisma starts by saying that there was originally a state of perfection (Kṛtayuga) in which there was no king, no kingdom, no punishment and no chastiser. Gradually moha (delusion or aberration of mind) spread among people and then greed, sexual desire and passions arose and the Vedas and dharma perisheḍ The gods did not receive offerings and went to Brahmā, who composed a vast treatise as stated above (p. 4) that dealt with the four goals of existence for the benefit of the world and that was the cream of learning. Then the gods went to Viṣṇu and requested him to appoint (as king) one who deserved to be the best among meṇ Viṣṇu created a son from his mind called Virajas who did not want to be a king. Fifth in descent from Virajas was Vena who destroyed dharma and so the brāhmaṇas killed him and from his right arm they churned Pṛthu, handsome, well-armed and proficient in the Vedas, Vedāṅgas and daṇḍanīti. Gods and sages asked him to follow settled dharma, to control his senses and to take an oath (set out above in note 41). He was crowned by the gods and sages for the protection of the people. Viṣṇu himself esta- blished him saying ‘Oh king, no man will go contrary to your order’ and then Viṣṇu entered the king Pṛthu (verse 128) and it is therefore that this world since then bows to kings as to godṣ In this account the oath administered to Pṛthu was so administered by the gods and sages and not by the people in the mass, nor does Pṛthu expressly promise anything to the people as such. Probably it was thought that the promise to the sages was impliedly a promise to the people in general. But the account, such as it is, rather appears to emphasize the divine origin of kingship. Chap 67 contains a much shorter version of the origin of kingship, probably because a few chapters before another version has already been given or because it embodies the views of some prior work or teacher. It begins by saying that the most desirable thing for a State is to crown a king, that in a kingless country there is no dharma, no security of life nor of property, that therefore the gods appointed kings for protecting people. Then it proceeds to say that the people assembled and made compacts (samayān) amongst themselves that whoever would commit libel or assault or adultery and break the compacts made by the people should be abandoneḍ All people went to Brahmā and requested him to appoint a ruler whom they would all honour and who would protect theṃ Brahmā appointed Manu for that purpose, but Manu did not at first like the idea, saying ‘Government is a very difficult business among men who are always deceitful and I am afraid of the sinful acts of men’. The people asked him not to be afraid as the sins committed by men will affect the perpetrators (and not Manu) and that the people would give him shares of produce (one-tenth of grain, one-fifth of cattle, one-fourth of their dharma &c.). Manu then agreed, went round the world, terrorizing evil-doers and making them conform to dharma. This story about Manu and the people is alluded to by Kauṭilya (vide p. 31 above). Even here Manu promises nothing expressly, while the people agree to pay taxes and answer for their own sinṣ There is no doubt that some of the details in the two chapters are different. In chap 67 there is no reference to an original state of perfection nor to a vast work nor to any oath; so also in one it is Vainya who becomes the first king and in the other it is Manu. But the conception in both is mythological and the fundamental fact in both is the same. God gives a king to the people in both, when they were without a king and degeneracy had set iṇ Though there is no offer to give a share in chap 59 yet it is to be inferred from the prajñā of Vainya that every subsequent king was deemed to do the same. It may be said that in chap 67 there is a blending of the theory of Divine Right and of an original compact between king and people. In both, however, the emphasis is on the theory of the divine origin of kingship. Śānti 67. 4 states 'one desirous of prosperity should honour the king as one honours Indra', while chap. 59. 139 asks ‘what is the cause but the divine character (the king possesses) on account of which people remain under his control’? It must be said that in both III] chapters of the Śāntiparva there is no proper theory of contract between king and people.

The Nāradasmṛti as indicated above (pp. 23, 27 and note 27) is a thorough-going advocate of the theory of divine right. It says (prakirņaka 20–22) ⁴⁰ It is Indra himself who moves about on the earth as king; people can nowhere live after transgressing his orderṣ Since the privilege of protection is his because of his supreme power (majesty) and on account of the fact that he is benign to all creatures, the settled rule is that whatever a king does is right. Just as the husband, though weak, must be honoured by the wife, so a ruler though devoid of qualities must be honoured by his subjects'. Verse 25 inculcates the duty of obedience to the king.

According to Mr. J. N. Figgis in his book 'The divine right of kings' (1934) pp. 5–6, the theory of the Divine Right of kings in its completest form involved the following propositions : (I) monarchy is a divinely ordained institution; (II) hereditary right is indefeasible i. e. the right acquired by birth and descend- ing by the law of primogeniture cannot be forfeited through any acts of usurpation, or by any incapacity of the heirs or by any act of deposition; (III) kings are accountable to God alone, i. e. a limited monarchy is a contradiction in terms; (IV) non- resistance and passive obedience are enjoined by God i e in any circumstances resistance to the king is a sin and leads to damnation and that when the king issues a command directly contrary to God's law, the latter is to be obeyed and also all penalties attached to the breach of the king's law are to be patiently borne. This theory was very much to the fore in the 16th and 17th centuries when in Europe theology and politics were in close unioṇ

It is to be seen how far the ancient Hindu theory agreed with this full-fledged theory of the divine right of kingṣ As regards proposition I it has been shown above that the Manusmṛti, the Mahābhārata and other works held that the king was either God himself, or God's vicar or vicegerent performing functions similar to those of several gods As regards proposi- tion II all Sanskrit works recognised hereditary right and primogeniture, but they allowed exceptions as will be shown later oṇ Our ancient books did not accept the third and the fourth propositions in toto. They say that the king cannot do as he likes, that he has to carry out the dictates of dharma, his power to make new rules is limited and if he does not act up to the rules of dharma he may be deposed, disobeyed or killeḍ Vide quotations from Śukranīti and Anuśāsanaparva cited above. When Manu (VII. 111-112) says that a king who harasses his kingdom loses his life, his family and his kingdom, it is implied that people are not bound to suffer silently all the wrongs heaped upon them by a bad king but that they may turn round and either depose him or kill hiṃ Fick (pp. 103-104) gives examples from the Buddhist Jātakas where bad kings were killed by the people and others were elected in their place. There is no doubt that obedience to the king is enjoined by Nārada and others, but it is due to the king only so long as he does not swerve from the path of right and virtue. Nārada²⁴ (prakirṇaka verses 12 and 32) says ‘on account of his majesty and sanctity a king and brāhmaṇa are not to be abused if they do not swerve from the right path; one should not treat with contempt or scold the king, one should abide by his order, since (the penalty of) death may follow from violating it (king's order)'. Here the duty of obedience is not based on the divine origin of kingship, but on the practical worldly ground that an offended king may punish with death. Nārada's doctrine does not lead to the requirement of absolute submission and non-resistance to a wicked king.

It is impossible to hold that the theory of divine right was put forward as a counterblast to the theory of social contract. The theory of divine right would arise very naturally even in the oldest days, while the theory of social contract is the product of a more advanced stage of political thought. The theory of divine right is not more absurd than the theory of social contract and was popularly held not only in India, but in many Christian countries, relying on passages in the Bible such as Daniel 4 and Romans 13. 1-7. The theory of divine right was circumscribed in India by another theory from very ancient timeṣ The cry of the American colonists against England in the 18th century was that taxation and representation went hand in hand; that of the ancient Hindu political and dharmaśāstra writers was that taxation and protection went hand in hand (see n 45). Bauḍ Dh. S. I. 10. 1. says ‘the king being hired for the sixth III ]

part (that he takes as tax) should protect the subjects'. Yaj. I. 337 states 'The king shares half of that evil which the subjects do when not protected by the king, since he takes taxes (from the people)' and Yaj. I 334 lays down that a king who protects according to śāstras receives the 6th part of the merit (punya) of the subjectṣ Śāntiparva (57. 44-45) states 'One should abandon six persons like a leaking boat in the ocean viz. a teacher who does not explain, a priest who does not study the Veda, a king who does not protect &c.' Śukranīti I. 121 affirms 'the gods destroy a king who does not protect, a brāhmaṇa who does not perform austerities, a wealthy man who makes no giftṣ' Vide Vasiṣṭha I. 44-46, Gaut. XI 11, Viṣṇu Dh S. III. 28, Udyoga-parva 132. 12, Śānti 67. 27 (4th part of punya), Śānti 24. 12 (4th part), Śānti 72. 20, Āśramavāsī 3.40, Anuśāsana 61.34 and 36, Kāṃ II. 10 for the idea that the king receives a part (generally 6th part) of the punya (and also sin) of the people. The king had to protect even forest hermits who paid no taxes, as he would share in their punya ²⁵. Vide Rāmāyaṇa III. 6. 14. Kālidāsa echoes this in the Śakuntala II. 13 Ādiparva 213. 9 looks upon the king who takes the sixth part as tax and affords no protection as the arch-sinner in the worlḍ Śānti 71. 29 says that the spiritual merit that a king gathers by protection according to the sacred code yields rewards for him in heaven for ten thousand yearṣ

From the preceding pages it is clear that the following are put forward as the grounds on which the obligation to render obedience to the ruler is based: (1) the king has divinity in him, (2) the great utility of the ruler affording protection as regards life, liberty and property, (3) the fear of punishment (Manu VII. 22), (4) a primeval contract between the ruler and the people, (5) the interdependence of the ruler and the people as parts of one organism (viz. the State). Vide Medhātithi on Manu IX. 294 for this last.

Who should be king? There were several views on this point. One meaning of the word ‘rājan’ is ‘kṣatriya’. Manu (VII. 1) states that he will declare rājadharmaś and in the very next verse he employs the word ‘kṣatriya’ and remarks that a kṣatriya who has undergone the upanayana saṁskāra (or abhiṣeka according to some commentators) should afford protection to all in his kingdoṃ Therefore a kṣatriya is the most proper person to be a king Some of the works such as the Rājadharma-kaus- tubha, Rājanitiprakāśa, the Nitimayūkha, and Par. M. vol I. pp. 449-451 refer to the discussion in the Pūrvamīmāmsā works on the topic of the Avasti sacrifice, but that only a Sabara and Kumārila hold an elaborate discussioṇ The Vedic texts say 'rājā rājasūyena yajeta' ('the Rājasūya should be performed by a rājan'). Among the numerous constituents of that sacrifice there is an iṣṭi called Avesti, with reference to which a vedic passage says 'if a brāhmaṇa performs avesti, he places the āhuti (offering) for Bṛhaspati in the middle, if a kṣatriya performs it the offering to Indra is placed in the middle of the offerings &c.'. The pūrvapakṣa (prima facie view) is that the word 'rājan' applies to any one (whether a brāhmaṇa, a kṣatriya or a vaiśya) who protects the people The siddhānta (the established conclusion) is that in this text the word rājan means a kṣatriya and that by the other passage about brāh- manas &c. what is meant is that brāhmaṇas and vaiśyas may independently perform the Avesti sacrifice, but that only a kṣatriya can perform the Avesti as part of the Rājasūya riteṣ Śabara makes the interesting remark that in the Andhra country the word 'rājan' is applied to a man of the kṣatriya caste even though he does not pursue the occupation of protecting a country or a city; while Kumārila observes that persons of all the four varnas are seen as rulers of kingdomṣ²⁶ In the literature on dharmaśāstra the word 'rājan' is understood in the sense of 'one who rules over or protects a country' (i e the pūrvapakṣa view in the Pūrvamīmāmsā) Vide Medhātithi on Manu VII. 1. Aparārka²⁷ (on Yāj I 366) remarks "when he who is not a kṣatriya performs the work of a kṣatriya (i e becomes a king) he should do all this (that a kṣatriya king has to do) since the maxim is 'that by assuming the position or the work of a particular person or thing one receives what is due to that other' and the duty of protecting the subjects arises from the fact of taking taxes from theṃ For everyone when giving wealth does so with reference to a purpose related to himself and there is no purpose except one’s protection that is intended in rendering taxeṣ Hence it is established that whoever receives taxes must secure protection of the subjects”. According to Kulluka the word ‘rājan’ means ‘any person who is crowned king and pro- tects the country and capital’ and is not used in the sense of ‘a person of the kṣatriya caste’. The Rājantīratnākara (p. 2) after citing Kullūka and Kāmadhenu states that many hold that ‘rājan’ means ‘any one who takes upon himself the task of protecting the subjects’. The Rājanītiprakāśa holds²⁸ a long discussion (pp. 10-15), states that the word ‘rājan’ may have three meanings viz. any one who protects people, a kṣatriya in general or a kṣatriya who is crowned and ultimately gives it as its opinion that the word ‘rājan’ is applied in popular usage to any one, whether crowned as king or not, who is the ruler of a country. The Vaijayantī on Viṣṇu Dh. S. III. 44 explains ‘rājuām’ as ‘of kṣatriyas’ by following the Avestī maxiṃ

Several brāhmaṇa families founded kingdoms and empireṣ Pusyamitra, founder of the Śuṅga empire, was a brāhmaṇa (Harivamśa III. 2. 35 ff, E. I. vol. 20 p. 54); the Kāṇvāyanas, who followed the Śuṅgas, were brāhmaṇas and so were the Vākāṭakas, the Kadambas (vide Talagunda pillar inscription of Kakusthavarman in E. I. vol. VIII. p. 24) and several otherṣ Vide H. Dh. vol. II. pp. 122-123 for texts on the question as to when a brāhmaṇa should follow the profession of armṣ Manu XII 100 states that a brāhmaṇa who knows the Veda deserves to be made a king, a commander-in-chief, the wielder of the power of punishment. Kumārila’s dictum that persons of all varṇas are seen to be rulers has been already quoteḍ Gopāla the founder of the Pāla dynasty of Bengal was a śūdra. Manu IV. 61 directs a brāhmaṇa not to stay in a country where the ruler was a śūdra. Medhātithi²⁹ explains this by saying that the prohibition applies only to a country where all the seven high functionaries such as, the chief minister, the commander-in-chief are of the śūdra caste; compare Ap. Dh. S I 11. 32. 18. Manu's dictum related to a time when there was hardly any śūdra king. But the logic of facts was too much for Medhātithi who had to twist the plain words of Manu Medhātithi on Manu VIII 1 remarks that ‘persons of other varṇas who subsist by the mode prescribed for kṣatriyas have power over the kingdom and have to protect the people’. Śāntiparva remarks, that whoever protects people from the hordes of dasyus and wields the power of punishment according to smṛti rules must be considered as king. The Harivamsa (III 3. 6 ‘akṣatriyāśca rājāno viprāh śūdropajīvinaḥ’) and some of the Purāṇas in depicting the awful degeneracy of the Kali age in a prophetic strain state that the kings in the Kali age will be mostly śūdras and that śūdra kings will celebrate Asvamedha sacrificeṣ Vide, for example, Matsya 144 40 and 43 and Lingapurāṇa 40. 7 and 42. Hiouen Thsang notices that in the first half of the 7th century A. D. Sind was under a śūdra king (Beal’s B R W. W. vol II p 272) It was almost a universal rule that a male alone was to be the ruler. There appear to have been stray exceptionṣ The Śāntiparva (33.43-46 ) enjoins³⁰ upon a conqueror the duty to place on the throne of a conquered country the brother, son or grandson of the vanquished king and if no prince be available, then to crown even the daughter of the late king The Rāja-taraṅgiṇī (V 249 and VI 332) describes at great length the regime of the notorious queens Sugandhā (904-906 A. D ) and Diddā (980-81 A D ) of Kashmir In India for many centuries there has been no Salic Law expressly declaring that daughters cannot inherit land, though on account of the general position of women, the requirements of disturbed times and military necessity women did not generally assume the role of sovereignṣ In a copper-plate grant from Ganjam (of about the 13th century) it is stated that when a certain king named Śubhākara died his queen ascended the throne and after her her daughter Dandi-paramādevi ruled the earth for a long time (E I vol VI p 133 at p. 138 ). Whether the grandiloquent titles were deserved by the queen or were only the exaggerated effusions of a courtier, It is clear that the widow and daughter of the last male ruler succeeded to the throne. The Raghuvamśa (XIX. 55, 57) states that the widowed queen of king Agnivarna sat on the throne and carried on the government with the help of hereditary ministerṣ

Apart from conquest and election in rare cases, monarchy was hereditary and generally descended by primogeniture. The passage from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (XII. 9.3, 1 and 3) mentioning the descent of kingship for ten generations in succession has already been referred to (p 26) Though succession was hereditary it was the general rule that the eldest son ascended the throne when the reigning monarch died or abdicateḍ The rights of the eldest son or daughter as against the younger son or daughter were very zealously guarded in the vedic age. It has already been shown how marrying before one's elder brother or sister was condemned in the vedic age and also in the times of the smṛtis (H. Dh. II. pp. 546-549). Even the Ṛgveda several times refers to jyaisthya (rights of seniority) of Indra (Rg.I 5.6, III 50 3). The Tai S. II. 2.11.5 states that the gods agreed to treat Indra as the 'jyestha' (the eldest) and Tai. S. II. ³¹ 5.2.7 refers to the ancient practice of giving all wealth (of the father) to the eldest soṇ The Ait. Br. 19.4 narrates the story that the gods did not accept Indra's position as the eldest and most exalted among them and that Indra then induced Bṛhaspati to perform the Dvādaśāha sacrifice for him, whereby he secured that positioṇ The Nirukta II. 10 sets out the interesting story that Devāpi and Śantanu were two brothers, scions of the Kuru family, of whom Devāpi was the eldest, but Śantanu the younger one got himself crowned king and so Devāpi practised austeritieṣ The result was that there was a drought in Śantanu's kingdom for 12 yearṣ The brāhmaṇas said to him 'You are guilty of having violated dharma in that passing over the eldest brother you got yourself crowned Therefore God does not send down rain'. Then Śantanu desired to give the kingdom to Devāpi, who however said that he would be his purohita and make him perform a sacrifice. The Ṛgveda hymn X 98 was then composed by Devāpi for bringing down raiṇ This story shows how long before Yāska the popular belief was that it was a great sin to pass over an elder brother in marriage and other matters and doing so brought down the serious displeasure of the godṣ Vide Bṛhad-devatā VII. 156-157 and VIII. 1–9 for the same story in a little greater detail, viz that Devāpi suffered from a skin disease, that when Devāpi said to the subjects that he did not deserve the kingdom and that Śantanu should be their king, the subjects crowned Śantanu as king When Yayāti desired to pass over his elder sons Yadu and others because they disobeyed him and wanted to make the younger Pūru his successor the brāhmaṇas and citizens protested 'How can the younger son secure the kingdom passing over the elder one³²? Arjuna upbraids Bhīmasena who got enraged against Yudhiṣṭhira 'who would act against one's eldest brother that follows the path of dharma?' (Sabhā 68 8). In the Rāmāyaṇa³³ Daśaratha addresses Rāma (II. 3 40) 'you are born of my eldest queen, who is of the same class as myself (i e of kṣatriya blood)' and Vasiṣṭha says to Rāma 'Among all Ikṣvākus the eldest son becomes the king; a younger brother is not crowned king when the elder exists' (II 110 36). The Ayodhyākāṇḍa in several places (8.23-24, 101,2) reiterates the idea that all the sons of a king do not succeed but only the eldest, although the other sons may be equally fit and endowed with qualitieṣ Kauṭilya (I 17)³⁴ states that people esteem rulership going to the eldest except in the case of some calamity. Manu IX. 106 says that by the very birth of the eldest son, a man becomes free from the debt he owes to his pitṛs and there- fore the eldest deserves to get everything from the father. The Rājadharma-k. (pp. 234-235) after quoting the Kālikāpurāṇa and the Rāmāyaṇa lays down the following propositions: (1) the aurasa son of a king alone succeeds in preference to the eleven kinds of secondary sons (whether he is junior or senior in age); (2) if the son of a junior queen (of the same caste) is senior by birth, he succeeds in preference to the son of the senior queen, who (son) is younger in age; (3) if two sons are born to two queens at the same moment, the son of the senior queen is preferred; (4) if twins are born to the senior queen, the son who is born first is to be preferreḍ

If the eldest son suffers from a physical or mental defect (such as blindness or lunacy) he is to be passed over and his younger brother becomes king (vide Manu IX. 201 for grounds of exclusion from inheritance). Ādiparva³⁵ 109. 25 states that Dhṛtarāṣṭra because he was blind did not succeed to the kingdoṃ Vide also Udyoga 147. 39. The Śukranītisāra (I. 343-344) states that if the eldest prince suffers from deafness, dumbness, blindness, leprosy or impotence he is unfit to rule and that in such a case his younger brother or son should succeeḍ³⁶ The Śukranītisāra further points out that by dividing a kingdom among the several princes no benefit results, but on the contrary the small parts would fall an easy prey to enemies; therefore when the eldest alone succeeds he should make his younger brothers provincial governors or superintendents over the treasury, horses &c. (I. 346-348). The Rājadharmakaustubha lays down a few additional propositions: (1) even if the eldest does not succeed owing to some mental or physical defect, his son’s right will remain intact and R. D K. quotes the words of the fisherman chief to Bhīṣma in Ādi 100. 92.³⁷ The Bālambhaṭṭī and Rājantīprakāśa p 40 say the same. Another example is that of Anśumān who became king when his father Asamañja was exiled from the state by Sagara for his misdeedṣ (2) When a younger son is crowned king because the eldest is disqualified, then after the former’s death his son succeeds and not the son of the disqualified eldest son who is born after the coronation of the younger (e g. Yudhiṣṭhira deserved the kingdom on Pāṇḍu’s death and not Duryodhana). The Nītivākyāmṛta (sec. 24 p. 249) lays down the order of succession in the case of kings as follows: the son, full brother, half-brother, uncle, a male of the same family, daughter’s son, a stranger (who is either elected or who takes up the kingdom³⁸ ). Sometimes a king selected a younger son to succeed hiṃ There are famous historical exampleṣ The great Gupta Emperor Samudragupta though a younger son was nominated by his father Chandragupta I to succeed and by his brilliant and most successful career Samudragupta more than justified the choice. Vide the Allahabad Pillar Inscription verse 4 (Gupta Inscriptions p 6). Similarly Chandragupta II, though younger, was nominated by his father Samudragupta to succeed himself. Yayāti selected his youngest son Pūru because he was devoted and obedient and the eldest and other sons disobeyed hiṃ Vide Ādiparva chap 75 ff and above p 42. The principle of hereditary succession was so strong that even a boy king was placed on the throne. Vide Raghu XVIII 39.

In almost all works on rājaśāstra there is a disquisition on the qualities that a good king should possesṣ Vide Kaut VI 1, Manu VII 32-44, Yāj I. 309-311 and 334, Śaṅkha-Likhita quoted in R. D. K III p 14 and Rājaniti-prakāśa p 116, Śānti 57 12 ff. and 70, Kām I. 21-22, IV 6-24, XV 31, Mānasollāsa II. 1 1-9 (p. 29), Śukra I 73-86, Viṣṇudharmottara II. 3. Only one or two passages can be set out here. Yāj (I 309-311 and 334) states 'a king should have great energy, should be generous, mindful of past (good or bad) turns done by others, dependent on those who are advanced (in austerities, knowledge and experience), possessed of a disciplined mind, endowed with an even temper (in good or bad luck), born of a noble family (on both sides), truthful, pure (in body and mind), prompt in action, of strong memory, not mean-minded, not harsh (in words or acts), observant of the rules of dharma (as to varṇas and āśramas), free from vices, talented, brave, clever in concealing secrets (or acc. to Bhāruci and Aparārka 'clever in scenting the secrets of his enemies'), guarding the weak points of his state, well-taught as regards logic, the science of government, the science of wealth and the three vedaṣ He should be forbearing towards brāhmaṇas, straightforward towards his friends, wrathful towards his enemies, and should be (kind) like a father towards his servants and subjects'. Manu VII 32 is very similar to Yāj I 334. The Mit says that the qualities specified in Yāj I 309-311 are antāraṅga (inward or more essential). The 2nd quality 'sthūla-lakṣa' occurs also in the inscrip-tion of Rudradāman (E. I vol. VIII. at p 44). From I 312 Yāj. states the bahuraṅga qualities viz selection of ministers, purohita and sacrificial priests, gifts to worthy brāhmaṇas, protection &c. Kauṭilya VI. 1 contains several lists of the king's qualities from several points of view. First, there is a list of qualities that make the king win the heart of the people (or make him approachable) viz. being of a noble family, godly, spirited, consulting the aged, virtuous, truthful, not failing in his promises, grateful, taking broad views (not pusillanimous), highly enthusiastic, not given to procrastination, powerful enough to control his feudatories, firm in mind, having a council of ministers of no mean calibre, desirous of self-discipline. These are called 'ābhi-gāmika-guṇas' which word occurs in the Palitana plates of Dharasena II (of Valabhi) in EI vol. XI p 83 and in the Māliya plate of the same king (Gupta Inṣ pp. 164, 169). The Daśakumāra-carita VIII appears to make a pointed reference to this list when it makes a character say that the king (there referred to) has in him all the qualities beginning from good family (sarvai-vātma-sampad-abhijñānāt-prabhṛti &c.) Then the intellectual qualities he should possess are: desire to learn, study, under-standing of what is studied and retaining it, reflection, discus-sion and devotion to the principles accepted after discussioṇ Almost the same qualities of the intellect (dhi) are mentioned by Kāṃ IV. 22. The word 'śakyasāmanta' (in Kaut. VI. 1) occurs also in Agnipurāṇa 239. 4. The qualities that are the different aspects of his enthusiasm (or energy) are: valour, non-endurance (of the might of others), quickness (of action) and assiduity. The same occur in Kāṃ IV. 23. Then follows a long list of quali-ties that go to make up the personal endowment of the king (ātma-sampat). Gaut. (XI. 2, 4-6) requires that the king should do what is right (acc. to śāstras) and speak (or decide) rightly, should be pure (at heart and externally), should control his senses, be possessed of qualified servants and endowed with knowledge of the means of policy, should be even-handed towards all his subjects and look after their welfare. The long list of Śankha-likhita agrees more or less with those of Kauṭilya and Yaj. Śāntiparva 70 states that the king should possess 36 quali-ties, viz. he should not speak bitterly, he should be godly, not wicked, not haughty, of agreeable address &c. Kāṃ I. 21-22 mentions 19 qualities that lead to the well-equipped personality of the king (ātma-sampat), viz. study of śāstra (daṇḍanīti), intellect, serenity, cleverness, boldness, power of comprehension, energy, eloquence, firmness, capacity to endure the worries of adversities, majesty, purity, kindness, liberality, truthfulness, gratefulness, noble family, character, self-restraint. Then Kāṃ in IV. 15-19 sets out the qualities called ātma-sampat, which generally agree with Kauṭilya's enumeration (in VI 1). According to Kāṃ IV 24 liberality, truthfulness and valour are the three greatest qualities in a king, who, when endowed with these, acquires all other qualitieṣ The Mānasollāsa (II 1 2–7) first enumerates 44 qualities such as truthfulness, spiritedness (which agree more or less with Kauṭilya's enumeration) and then states that the five most essential qualities in a king are truthfulness, valour, forbearance, liberality and capacity to appreciate the worth of otherṣ The Agnipurāṇa (239. 2–5) enumerates 21 qualities such as noble family, character &c In the Paraśurāma- pratāpa 96 qualities are enumerated in the Rājāvallahhakānda (Ms 239 of Viśramabāg collection II, folio 21b). The Sabhāparva 5 107–109 and Rāmāyaṇa II. 100 65–67 require the king to avoid 14 faults viz. atheism, falsehood, hot temper, carelessness, pro- crastination, not seeing the wise, laziness, addiction to five pleasures of sense, considering state matters alone (without mantras), taking counsel with those who do not know politics, not starting to do what is decided upon, not guarding secret royal policy, not practising auspicious acts, taking up under- takings on all sides at one and the same time. Vanaparva 251. 5 says that subjects do not like a king who is very timid, very weak, procrastinating, careless and immersed in pleasures on account of viceṣ Sabhā 5 125 states that sleep (by day), lazi- ness, timidity, hot temper, softness and dilatoriness are six calamities in a king

The works on dharmaśāstra and arthaśāstra devote a good deal of space to the education of the king and to his moral dis- cipline. Gaut XI 3 requires that the king should have received instruction in Trayī (the three Vedas) and Ānvikṣiki. This last has been differently interpreted by different writerṣ Kaut I 2 says that Ānvikṣiki comprehends Sānkhya, ³⁹ Yoga and Lokā- yata and that it examines the relative strength of the three other vidyās with reasons, and thereby benefits the world, steadies the mind in calamities and prosperity and imparts excellence in intellect, speech and actionṣ It is always the torch of ( sheds light on ) all vidyās, it is the means of (inducing to go in for) all undertakings, it is the source of all dharmas. Kauṭilya derives the name from the root 'iks' with 'anu' and he takes it to mean the science of ratiocinatioṇ It is somewhat strange that Lokāyata is included in Ānvīksikī, one of the subjects of study for the prince. But it appears from the remarks he makes that Kaut. uses it only in the sense of logic based on premises derived from ordinary experience (loka) though in later literature Lokāyata came to mean 'nāstika' (atheist, materialist ).Acc.⁵⁸

III. 3 53 and 54 states that the Laūkāyatikas held the view that conscious- ness is a quality of the body (and there is no soul over and above the body ). The Tantravārtika runs them down as fools and apes (on Jaiminī 1. 3. 3 ). In the Rāmāyaṇa Rāma asks Bharata not to resort to Loķāyatika brāhmaṇas, who, though ehuldish, look upon themselves as learned and who relying on the knowledge acquired by Ānvīksikī speak nonsense in spite of the fact that there are principal Dharmaśāstras (that point out the sensible path). काञ्जिल लोकयतिकान् ब्राह्मणास्तात सेवसे । अनयेकुशला होते घालाः पण्डितमानिनः ॥ धर्मशास्त्रेषु गुरुयेषु विद्यमानेषु दुर्बुधाः । बुद्धिमान्वोक्षिकीं प्राप्य निरर्थं प्रबदन्ति ते ॥ अपोष्यकाण 100 38-39. The Kāmasūtra (I 2 30) says that the Laūkāyatikas hold that a kārṣāpaṇa (copper coin) which one is certain of is better than a nişka (a gold coio) which is doubtful. बरं सांशयिकान्निस्सांशयिकः कार्षापण इति लौकायतिक । कामसूत्र I 2. 30 Rājaśekhara in his Kāvyamīmāmsā p 37 (Gaekwad's O. series, ed of 1934) refers to the opinion of the Lauķāyatika logiciaos that the consciousness in human beings arises from the bhūtas (elements) just as the power of intoxication (in wine) is due to the mixture of several iogredients (none of which may by itself be intoxicating). The Nītivākyāmộta p. 76 remarks "the Lokāyatika view leads to the effectuation of worldly affairs, for the king is able to uproot the thorns of the country by the help of Lokāyata". ऐहिक्यमवहारसमाधनपरं लोकायतिकम् । लोकायतो हि राजा राष्ट्रकण्टकानुद्धरति । नीतिवा p. 76. Vide J. R. A. S. for 1917 p. 175 ṇ 2, article ०० लोकायत in J A O. S. 1930 p. 132 ff., H. Dh. vol II p 359 ṇ; 'Historical Notices of the Loķāyatas' in the Silver Jubiles vol. of the B. O. R. Institute, Poona pp 386-397. to the Amarakośa, Viśvarūpa on Yāj. I. 306, Haradatta on Gaut. (XI. 3), Aparārka and several others Ānvīkṣikī means 'Logic'. Acc. to Kāṃ II. 7 and 11, the Mit. on Yāj I 311, Śukranīti I 158 it means ‘Ātmavidyā’ (Metaphysics), while Śukranīti I. 153 and Rājanīti-prakāśa p 118 combine the two by saying that it is logic that leads on to or is useful for acquiring knowledge of the Self. The Nītimayūkha (p. 34) includes logic and Vedānta in Ānvīkṣikī and Mīmāṁsā and smṛtis under Trayī The Bārhaspatyasūtra (II. 5–6) advises the king to follow the Laukayatika doctrines at the time of securing artha (wealth) and the Kāpālika-śāstra in achieving his sexual and similar desires⁴²

Great divergence of views prevailed as to the vidyās that were essential for the education of the king. According to the Manusmṛti VII 43, Śānti 59 33, Kaut I 2, Yāj I 311, Kām II 2, Śukranīti I. 152, Agni. 238 8, the subjects for the king's education are four viz., Ānvīkṣikī, Trayī, Vārtā and Daṇḍanīti. Kaut notes that the school of the Mānavas held the view that the vidyās were three and regarded Ānvīkṣikī as a special branch of Trayī; that the Bārhaspatya school was of opinion that they were only two, Vārtā and Daṇḍanīti, since Trayī only acted as a screen (to obscure the intellect) of one (the king) who wants to know the ways of the world; and the Auśanasas regarded Daṇḍanīti as the only vidyā for a king, since according to them, the efforts to learn all vidyās are tied down to it (i e are ultimately intended to lead on to the mastery of Daṇḍanīti) It will be seen how the Auśanasas and Bārhaspatyas had an entirely secular view in the science of government and divorced it from the study of sacred books and metaphysics in the case of the king. The Dasakumāracarita VIII (that displays a deep study of Kauṭilya) says that the vidyās for the king are four (catasro rājavidyās-trayīvārtānvīkṣikīdaṇḍanītiḥ ) The Bārhaspatyasūtra I 3 (Daṇḍanītireva vidyā) holds that Daṇḍanīti is the only (essential) vidyā for the king. Kauṭilya further explains that dharma and its opposite are learnt from the three Vedas, viz Sāmaveda, Ṛgveda and Yajurveda, that the Atharvaveda and Itihāsaveda (i e Itihāsa and Purāṇa) are the other Vedas and that the six Aṅgas also (viz. phonetics, ritual, grammar, etymology, metrics and astronomy) are comprehend- ed in the word ‘Trayī²²’. Sukranīti I. 155 says that the 14 vidyās (enumerated in Yāj. I. 3) are comprehended in Trayī. Gaut. XI. 19 expressly says that in doing his duty of making the people observe the rules of the sacred codes the king would have to rely on the Veda, dharmaśāstras, the Angas, Upavedas and Purāṇa. In the Rāmāyaṇa, Rāma and his brothers are often spoken of as proficient in the Vedas, Vedāṅgas, in Dhanurveda, Gāndharvaveda, Rājavidyā &c. (I. 18. 24 and 26, II. 1.20, II. 2. 34-35, V. 35. 13-14). In the Vanaparva 277. 4 it is said that the princes were proficient in the Vedas with their secret doctrine and in Dhanurveda. In the Ādiparva 221. 72-74 Abhimanyu is said to have learned from Arjuna before he became 16 the Dhanurveda in four sections, the knowledge of astras, and the theory and practice of these. Vide also Anuśāsana 104. 146-147. Khāravela in his Hathigumphā Inscription (E. I. vol. XX. p. 79 II. 2 and 5) states that he learnt Lekha (official correspondence), Rūpa (currency), Gaṇanā (Accountancy) and the administration of justice, when he was the crown prince and also Gāndharvaveda (music). In the Junagadh Inscription of Rudradāman (E. I. vol. VIII at page 44) the Mahākṣatrapa is said to have attained great fame by his deep study, retention and actual practice of grammar, artha (either lexicography or politics), music, logic and other vidyās and to have been a fine rider of horses, elephants, chariots and a great adept in wielding the sword and shield and in wrestling⁴⁴. The personal attainments of Samudragupta (in Gupta Inscriptions No. 1 pp. 12, 15-16) show how thorough the education of at least some princes was or at least what the ideal about their education waṣ Vide H. Dh. vol. II. p. 364 for the education of princes and Dr. Beni Prasad's 'Theory of Government in Ancient India' p. 218 for an ideal course of education for a prince quoted from the Buddhist work, Sūtralaṁkāra of Aśvaghoṣa. The Nītivākyāmṛta⁸² adds a long list of the accomplishments which a prince should possess viz. all scripts, valuing of jewels, knowledge of arms &c. On reading the ideal courses prescribed for the education of the prince by ancient Indian writers one cannot help feeling that they were probably actuated by the same sentiments that are attributed to Socrates by Plato in his 'Republic' (tr. by Jowett, eḍ of 1875, vol. III. p. 357) viz. 'Until philosophers are kings or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy and political greatness and wisdom meet in one and these commoner natures who follow either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never cease from ill-no, nor the human race as I believe-and then only will our State have a possibility of light and behold the light of day &c' The Agnipurāṇa (225. 1-4) prescribes that the prince should be taught dharmaśāstra, kāmaśāstra, arthaśāstra, science of archery (dhanurveda), the various arts and crafts by trusted teachers, that he should not be allowed to be associated with those who are angry with the king or disrespected by him or who are greedy and that if it is impossible to impart good qualities to him he should be confined, surrounded by pleasureṣ The princes were sometimes educated in their own capital or in a nearby college. Vide H. Dh. vol. II p 364. Sometimes, it appears, princes went to such famous seats of learning as Takṣaśīlā (vide Jātakas eḍ by Fausböll II. 87, 278, 319, 323, 400, III. 158, 168, 415, 463). The subjects of study there were the three vedas and 18 śilpāni or vidyās (Jātakas, vol. II. 87, III 115). Kauṭilya (I. 4) explains that Vārtā is constituted by agriculture, the rearing of cattle and trade; it benefits (the State) by bringing in grain, cattle, gold, baser metals, and free labour; by means of vārtā the king secures treasury and army whereby he brings under control his own side and the enemy. In the Sabhāparva⁸³ 5.79 and Ayodhyakāṇḍa 100 47 it is declared that when the world relies on vārttā it easily prosperṣ The Sānti-parva (263. 3) gives the warning that this world would cease to exist if vārttā was given up, that this world is rooted in vārttā and is sustained by the three vedas (68. 35). The Vanaparva (150. 30) states that the whole world is sustained by vārttā i. e. by merchandise, mines, trade, agriculture and tending cows, she-goats and eweṣ The Nītivākyāmṛta (p. 93) after defining vārttā as above emphasizes that the king secures the abundance of everything when vārttā is prosperous and that the man who has his own agriculture, milch-cattle, plot for growing vegetables and a well in his own house has indeed all the pleasures of this worlḍ These quotations indicate what importance was attached to agriculture and the economic structure of society. The result is that in the Arthaśāstra economic matters occupy a very large space.

Kauṭilya (I. 5) starts by saying that the three vidyās (except daṇḍanīti) in the case of the prince depend upon danda, that danda in its turn is based upon discipline, which is of two kinds, natural and induced (or acquired). Vidyās produce discipline (of the 2nd kind) in him who possesses the qualities of intellect specified above. Then he goes on to say that the prince should learn the alphabet and arithmetic after his caula is performed (in the 3rd year or later) and after upanayana he should learn the three vedas and ānvīkṣikī from the śiṣṭas (those learned in the veda), vārttā from the heads or superintendents (of the various departments thereof) and daṇḍanīti from expounders (of the vidyā) and from practical politicianṣ Vide Manu VII. 43 ( =Matsya 215. 54 and Agni 225. 21-22) for directions as to from whom the prince was to learn the four vidyās Kauṭilya prescribes that the prince should study these up to the 16th year, should then marry and that in order to foster the growth of the discipline of the intellect he should always associate with those who are advanced in the vidyās enumerated above (after his 16th year) and that the king should spend the first part of the day in practising the riding of elephants, horses, chariots and in the science of arms and the latter part of the day in listening to Itihāsa which comprises Purāṇa, history, stories, panegyrics, dharmaśāstra and artha- śāstra. A king whose intellect is thus disciplined and who is devoted to disciplining his subjects also and to doing good to all will be the sole ruler of the earth. The Nītivākyāmṛta (p. 162) defines vinaya as 'acting with humility towards those who excel in vratas, vidyās and are aged' Manu VII. 38-39. Kāṃ I 19-20 and 59-63, Śukra I. 92-93 ( taken from Kāṃ I. 19-20) extol the value and importance of vinaya, and waiting upon the aged and the learned Manu (VII. 40-42) states that many kings perished with their vast paraphernalia through want of discipline while others, though residing in a forest (i. e without an army &c ), gained kingdoms through vinaya, and names Vena, Nahuṣa, Sudās son of Pijavana and Sumukha Nimi as those who perished through lack of vinaya and gives Pṛthu and Manu as examples of those who secured kingdoms through vinaya. Matsya 215.53 is the same as Manu VII. 40. Ancient Indian writers harp on the education of the prince so much because their ideal of kingship was that the king should be a rājarṣi ( a royal sage ) Kālidāsa frequently speaks of this e g in Śākuntala II. 14 and Raghuvamśa (I. 58) They were aware, like Socrates, that until either philosophers became⁴⁷ kings or kings philosophers States will never succeed in remedying their short-comings ( vide p. 50 above ). Not only was an extensive course of intellectual training prescribed for the king, but both dharmaśāstra and Arthaśāstra works strongly and frequently insist upon the necessity of moral discipline and the right direct- ion of the emotions and will in the case of the king.

Kauṭilya (I. 6) emphasizes that control of the organs of sense is the cause of (proficiency in) vidyās and discipline should be attempted by giving up the six enemical tendencies viz. lust, hot temper, greed, vanity ( māna ), haughtiness or insolence ( made ), overjoy. He says that (the whole purpose or insistence of ) all śāstras is the restraint of the senses, that even a supreme ruler of the whole earth up to its four borders whose senses are not under control will at once perish and cites two examples on each of these six tendencies, viz Dāṇḍakya Bhoja who attempted to rape a brāhmaṇa girl through lust and perished with his kingdom and kinsmen and Karāla king of Videha; Janamejaya (perished) who attacked brāhmaṇas through hot temper and Tālajaṅgha who did so against the Bhṛgus, Aila who exacted through greed excessive taxes from persons of the four varṇas and Ajabindu, the king of Sauvirā; Rāvaṇa who did not restore another's wife through his conceit and Duryodhana who did not give even a part from his kingdom; Dambhodbhava who despised all beings through his insolence and Arjuna of the Haihaya dynasty; Vātāpi through overjoy when he attacked Agastya and also the oligarchy of the Vṛṣṇis when they attacked Dvaipāyana²⁷. These six evil tendencies are called śatru-ṣaḍ-varga or ari-ṣaḍvarga. Kauṭilya adds that by the conquest of these six evil tendencies Jāmadagnya (Paraśurāma) and Ambarīṣa enjoyed the earth for a long time. Kāṃ (I. 55-58) and Śukra. I. 144-146 give six of the twelve examples of Kaut and Kāṃ I 58 is the same as the last verse of Kauṭilya I. 6. Vide Mārkaṇḍeya 27. 12-13. In the Vāsavadattā of Subandhu (Hall's ed pp. 273-276) there is a long list of the kings of antiquity (Purūravas, Nahuṣa, Yayāti, Sudyumņa, Nala and nine others) who suffered owing to some failing or other in themselves The Udyogaparva (74. 13-18) mentions by name 18 kings who by their evil career destroyed themselves, their friends and relatives (such as Mudāvarta of the Haihayas, Janamejaya of the Nipas, Bahula of Tālajanghas, Dhautamūlaka of the Cīnas). This shows that Cīna does not probably stand for modern China in the epic. Manu VII. 44 (=Matsya 215. 55) also emphasizes the necessity for the king incessantly to curb the senses and not to fall a prey to vices arising from kāma and krodha. Manu (VII. 45-48) enumerates ten vicious tendencies due to kāma (desire for pleasures) viz. hunting, gambling, sleep by day, finding fault (with others), women, drunkenness, (excessive indulgence in) dancing, singing and instrumental music, and aimless wandering; and eight vicious tendencies due to krodha (hot temper) viz. tale-bearing, violence, treachery, envy, slander, (improper) seizure of property, reviling and assault. Manu further declares (VII. 50) that among the vices due to kāma, drinking wine, gambling, women and hunting are the most harmful, each preceding one being worse than each succeeding one and (VII. 52) that among the vices due to hot temper, caus- ing physical injury, reviling and deprivation of wealth are the worst. Manu (VII. 52) has a sly hit that these seven vices are more or less prevalent among kings ( sarvatrānusanginah ) and therefore the only choice is that of the lesser or least of evils Kauṭilya (VIII. 3) has a lengthy disquisition on the views of his predecessors about the relative harmfulness of the three vices due to hot temper and of the four due to kāma and states his own opinion that arthadūṣaṇa meaning loss of the means of livelihood by gifts, exactions (by the king), loss or abandonment of pro- perty is more harmful than reviling and daṇḍapāruṣya is more harmful than arthadūṣaṇa. He points out the benefits derived from hunting viz exercise, the disappearance of phlegm, bile, fat and sweat, the acquisition of skill in aiming at stationary and moving bodies, the ascertainment of the minds of beasts when they are provoked and occasional travel ⁴⁹ These are echoed, almost in the same words by Kām XIV 25 and in the Śākuntala (II. 25) by Kālidāsa. Vide Sabhā 68 20, Udyoga 33 92 for the seven principal viceṣ Kām (XIV. 6 and 7) enumerates the three vices of hot temper and the four of kāma and holds an elaborate discussion on their respective demeritṣ He defines arthadūṣaṇa (XIV. 17) somewhat differently ( viz as the aban- doning of an important object or of great wealth in order to show that what really merits blame is not so). Vide the Viṣṇudharmot- tara II.65 12-15 for the two meanings of arthadūṣaṇa ⁵⁰ Kām does not agree that hunting has many good points in its favour and advises the king to prepare a separate well-guarded hunting ground of one-half yojana in length and breadth if he really desires to hunt (XIV. 28-42). The Mānasollāsa (vol II) in the 15th chapter of the 4th vimśati deals with hunting as sport for kings and points out how a forest is to be preserved for royal hunting and how it is to be guarded and enumerates 31 methods of hunting. Kām warns the king who wants to retain III] his kingdom against fondness for women (XIV. 57-58). He further says that a king may even indulge in fondness for women and may even drink moderately, but he must totally avoid gambling and hunting (XIV. 65). Kauṭilya regards gambling as the worst of the vices for a king (VIII. 3 last sentence in prose). In the Daśakumāracarita (VIII) there is an elaborate (but ironical) description of the mental and other benefits derived from the four principal vices due to kāma. Kāṃ I. 54 states that hunting, gambling and wine in the case of kings must be condemned, since calamities befell Pāṇḍu, Nala and the Vṛṣṇis (respectively) by being addicted to these. Even an ideal king like Rāma was fond of hunting. Śukra (I. 332-333) points out that hunting has much in its favour, but there is one great defect in it viz. slaughter of animalṣ Śukra (I. 109-119) denounces gambling, drinking and fondness for women as the worst of vices and points out that Indra, Daṇḍakya, Nahuṣa and Rāvaṇa came to grief through their passion for women (I. 114) and that a king who is excessively fond of dancers, singers, courtesans, wrestlers, eunuchs and men of low birth falls an easy prey to his enemies (I. 128). Kāṃ (I. 40-46, which are almost the same as Śukra I. 102-107) gives a poetic description of how animals like the deer, the elephant, the moth, the fish and the bee meet death or become confined by extreme attach- ment to one only out of the five objects of sense and emphasizes that man who can and does enjoy all the pleasures of the five senses must practise great restraint.